Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
§ 1
§ 2
§ 3
§ 4
Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
§ 5
§ 6
§ 7
§ 8
§ 9
§ 10
§ 11
§ 12
§ 13
§ 14
§ 15
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§ 17
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§ 20
Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
§ 21
§ 22
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§ 24
§ 25
§ 26
Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
§ 27
§ 28
§ 29
§ 30
§ 31
§ 32
§ 33
§ 34
§ 35
Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
§ 37
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§ 39
§ 40
§ 41
§ 42
§ 43
Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
§ 44
§ 45
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
§ 67
§ 68
Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
§ 69
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§ 73
Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
§ 74
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§ 78
§ 79
§ 80
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§ 82
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
§ 88
Dices categorematicos significare
§ 90
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§ 92
Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
§ 93
§ 94
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§ 98
§ 99
§ 100
§ 101
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
§ 104
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§ 106
§ 107
§ 108
Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
§ 109
Intention can be taken for the end, or goal proposed to itself by something. The first intention will be the end that nature proposes to itself. The second intention will be what it intends secondarily. Or the first intention, because it is the root and origin of the second. Dialecticians commonly use these words. Therefore names of first intention are those that signify things as they are independently of the operation of the intellect, as man, stone, they signify essences actually befitting man and stone, which essences are the first intentions of man: because nature is first engaged with them. A term of second intention is one that signifies things as they are affected by some extrinsic denomination from the operation of the intellect. E.g. species, genus, difference, subject, predicate, etc. For when it is said that man is a species, and animal a genus, and rational a difference, and Peter a subject, and man a predicate, the object man, or animal, is signified as it is known confusedly, and constitutes a species, or Peter as he constitutes a proposition, which he does not have on the part of the thing but from the act of the intellect.
§ 110
You ask whether these names intellection, discourse, etc. are of first or of second intention? I answer that those names are of first intention, because they signify the essences of acts of the intellect, according as they are on the part of the thing independent of denomination by another reflected act of the intellect, dealing with the acts signified by those names. If however the acts are referred to their objects, as those denominate them known, in comparison with those they are of second intention.
§ 111
Finally, terms are either pertinent or impertinent. Pertinent [terms] are called pertinent by consequence, or by repugnance. Because one is pertinent to denying the other; which is to pertain by repugnance, because one is repugnant to the other, as is man, therefore is not irrational, because irrational is repugnant to man. Pertinent by consequence are called when from one there follows a consequence to the other, as is man: therefore is animal, this pertinence can be mutual: as is risible: therefore is man. Is man, therefore is risible. Or it can be non-mutual as from animal does not follow man. Impertinent are called disparate, because neither consequence follows nor is one repugnant: as from man neither can motion be inferred nor denied.