Universa Philosophia

Cardinal Toletus, lib. 1. cap. 13, says that a concrete term is that which receives its denomination from another, but an abstract one that which gives it, as homo is named from humanity. Hence humanitas is abstract, but homo concrete. P. Fonseca agrees with this definition, lib. 1. cap. 13. That the concrete is: that which has a composite mode of signifying; but the abstract that which has not a composite but a simple significate. And indeed rightly. For concernere is to perceive another thing together for entering into composition, as album denotes a subject embracing whiteness in itself, homo humanity in the suppositum. But the abstract signifies that one is separated from another; thus albedo signifies quality, but does not signify it in a subject, which is in the mode of signifying to be abstracted from the subject. Hence the Summulists commonly say that by an abstract name a thing is signified as if standing per se, but by a concrete name as existing in another, that is, in a composite.

Concrete and abstract terms can first be considered with only a diversity of abstract and concrete words, without any real or conceptual diversity in the things themselves signified; which words and terms can be called abstract and concrete only grammatically: because they have abstract and concrete words in the grammatical manner, as ens, et entitas, which in no way differ. For being is entity, and entity is being most formally without any distinction between the two.

In the second way they can be considered with real identity between abstract and concrete, and with a distinction of reason: for example Deus and Deitas are in reality the same, yet they differ in our mode of conceiving, because Deus states the suppositum, which is distinguished by reason from the Deity; but these are logical concretes: because their composition is not in reality, but in our intellect.

In the third way they can be considered with a real distinction between abstract and concrete, as album, albedo. For the former is really distinguished from the latter by reason of its subject; these can be called physical concretes, because their composition really exists in them. Of these concretes some are substantive, as homo, which are not connotative; others adjective, which are connotative, as albus; of adjectives some are purely denominative, as humanus, about which I shall treat in d. 9 of logic, sect. 2; others essential, as are proper differences, as rationale. Others accidental logically and predicably, as risibile; others accidental physically, as albus, etc.

Soto, 1 p. of the introduction, c. 12, lect. 1, says that a complex term is: that which has two parts signifying according to the signification of the whole; this definition indeed fits a complex term, but it is obscure: for what is it to signify according to the signification of the whole, except to say that each part of the complex term is per se significative, and retains its whole signification, as if it were not in the composite?

Villalpandus, lib. 1, 2 part, cap. 4, says that a complex term is several words standing together congruously: it does not displease, except that he says it also belongs to a speech, a defect from which Soto's definition is not free. It is true that a speech and one entire proposition can be a term of another, and then it will be a complex term; but a speech differs from a complex term in that the latter abstracts from a verb, whereas the former does not, as I shall say disput. 3 sect. 3.

Toletus, lib. 1. cap. 12, says very well that a complex term is whose parts are per se significative; which definition posits that a complex term is composite, since it has parts: the particle per se denotes that those parts by themselves alone, without one depending on the other, have an entire signification distinct from the other: as homo iustus, each part in the composite retains the signification it had before; for it is complex because it embraces two terms with their significations. Likewise note that one term must consist of two, for which they must be united in some way, otherwise it will not be one complex, but two disparate incomplexes. Likewise they must signify different things, either in reality or in the mode of conceiving: in reality as homo iustus, by our reason as Deus sapiens; but if the terms signify the same thing conceived in the same way, there is no complexio but synonymy, as Marcus Tullius, unless perhaps in these names there is a different signification: as Claudius Caligula, because Claudius was so called on account of the memory of his ancestors, but Caligula because he used boots.

And so although they signify the same man, yet not conceived in the same way, which suffices for the complexion of a term. Likewise a name can be composed of two entire words, and yet it will not be complex unless each word retains its signification, as Pedemontanus is an incomplex term, and includes Pede and Montanus, by which there pes and Montanus homo are not signified, but one dwelling at the roots of the Alps mountains.

An incomplex term is: One term lacking the composition of two parts per se significative. Hence Proconsul is an incomplex term: because although Pro and Consul retain there their entire significations, yet Pro is not a term, but a preposition, which like a conjunction, interjection and other syncategoremata, in a proposition are neither made subjects nor predicated, except when something is signified about them reflexively: as pro est praepositio, which supposition is material; but in Proconsule it has no supposition except formally. But Respublica is a complex term: because both Res and publica are terms, and each retains its entire signification. Add to the definition that a complex term is: One term formed from two retaining their entire significations without a verb; for if they consist with a verb, they will be a speech, as is clear disput. 3 sect. 3.

A copulative term is: A simple term signifying one thing composed of several things accidentally copulated among themselves without true union, as multitudo, acervus, Respublica, civitas, exercitus, etc. I said to be a simple term to exclude complex terms, which can be called copulated terms and composed of two, as homo, et equus currunt: where the subject signifies several things, and Respublica is a copulative term and complex, therefore I do not exclude all complex terms. Likewise I said one thing composed of several copulated things, to exclude common terms signifying several individuals, as they are one in a common respect: for in reality neither are all men, on their own part, one man, nor is homo ut sic one account simply, because all its unity is not in the object but in the intellect; but a copulative term signifies unity on the part of the thing holding itself together, and several things which are understood to compose one thing of themselves, as Respublica is composed of different states of persons; but homo in common does not have on its own part composition from Peter and Paul.

I said accidentally copulated, to exclude concrete and abstract terms signifying things composed per se, and which are truly one thing, as humanitas signifies matter and form united per se, and not accidentally. And homo signifies humanity and suppositum united per se. Finally I added without true union, to exclude connotative terms signifying a subject united to an accident.

You will say that vestitus et armatus are not copulative terms, and they signify several things without union, therefore. I deny the minor: because they do not signify several things in the direct sense, but in the direct sense they signify a man, and in the oblique sense clothing, and not after the manner of one thing resulting from clothing and man. You will say let vestitum be taken substantively, as it signifies a composite of man and clothing. I answer that then it will be a copulative term: because in the direct sense it signifies several aggregated things without union, as Acervus. A non-copulative term is that which does not signify several aggregated things, as homo, Deus, sapiens.