Universa Philosophia

You will find many things similar to one another in some respect; others altogether dissimilar; others neither altogether similar nor altogether dissimilar, but in part similar and in part dissimilar. Those which are altogether similar are wont to be called one, because we do not divide one from another by the intellect, but rather make all one. Whence flowed the adage among similars as similars there is no distinguishing, because the intellect does not sufficiently distinguish among their differences; so we say that men having similar annual incomes have the same incomes: the Spanish una mesma renta. But those which are altogether dissimilar ground no unity in that respect, but diversity. Indeed they do not have one character but several, and thus do not ground unity. But those which have a mixed similarity and dissimilarity have neither complete diversity nor unity or similarity.

Therefore a univocal term is one which signifies several things which are the same in the character signified by it. This definition is gathered from Aristotle's definition of univocals, whose name is common, and according to the name the account of substance is the same. Therefore that name which thus signifies them is univocal. It is confirmed: similar things, as altogether similar, can be signified by one name, therefore that is univocal, because it tends toward all by one character: such terms are Homo, leo, and all words pertaining to the five predicables.

An equivocal term is one which signifies several things altogether diverse in the character signified by the name: because equivocals are whose name is common, and according to the name the account of substance is diverse. For example. Canis does not signify one concept in which animal, fish, and star agree. These terms are equivocal either by chance, because perhaps by fortune the same word was imposed on different things, as Rolanus on a soldier and on a dog; or by counsel, as when someone imposes on another thing the same word that was imposed on one thing: and that in two ways, first to signify in the second thing some property in which it agrees with the first, as if someone should call a valiant soldier Cid on account of the similarity he has with Roderick Cid in the conduct of wars: but names of this kind are not equivocal but analogical by proportion, as when Christ is called leo or vitis: for they do not signify altogether diverse things, but things similar in some way. Secondly when a word is not imposed on one thing on account of the similarity of another, but for the sake of memory or love or honor, as when a prince's servant calls himself Guzman or Mendoza, on account of the lord whom he serves, which words are equivocal, because the significates do not agree in the signification of those names: for the servant, who does not derive his origin from the head of the Guzmans or Mendozas, does not agree with the Guzmans in nobility, as is signified by that name.

An analogical term is one which signifies several things neither altogether the same nor altogether diverse in the character signified by it. For thus analogical things are defined. For example, ens is analogical to substance and accident, because in them it is partly the same and partly diverse, which is most difficult to explain, as is plain in disputation 9 of the Logic, section 4. Analogical terms are in one way proper, that is, when the analogical character is found properly in each analogate, as ens is found properly in substance and accident, in God and creature: in another way improper, when the analogical character is found properly in one analogate, but improperly in the others, and by comparison to the proper one: for example, risus is analogical to the laughter of a man and of a meadow, but laughter is found properly in man alone, in a meadow however by trope in relation to man. In these analogical terms the common adage is true. An analogical term taken per se stands for the more famous significate, that is, for the proper significate. For if someone says, risus dolore miscebitur: he does not speak of the greenness and limpness of leaves, but of human laughter and pain: but in proper analogical terms that adage is not true, for ens taken per se does not stand for God alone. On the matter of this section, see disputation 9 of the Logic and 2 of the Metaphysics: but whether equivocation is in the mind, see disputation 5 on the soul, section 6.

Note that things which are equivocal under one name can be univocal under another. For example. The terrestrial and marine canis are equivocal under the concept and word Canis: but univocal under the concept of animal, because Canis signifies no character common to both, which nevertheless animal signifies. Likewise a word which is equivocal in comparison with several things can be univocal in respect of others, as Canis is an equivocal word compared with a fish and a terrestrial animal, but is univocal in comparison with terrestrial dogs, because it signifies the character of the terrestrial dog, and so also compared with marine dogs. The same happens with analogical terms.