Universa Philosophia

The mental term is first divided into ultimate and non-ultimate. An ultimate term is one which reaches the ultimate character of the object. The object can be attained ultimately in two ways. First, by clear and quidditative cognition, by penetrating the proper and singular difference of the object, as when someone conceives Peter insofar as Peter is Peter. For common characters are not ultimate, but because they are common they are posterior to our consideration, they are called ultimate. In which sense cognition of man in common is non-ultimate, because it does not attain the ultimate differences of man, which are Peter and Paul. This sense is very metaphysical, alien to the Summulist. Secondly, an ultimate term is [one] compared with the sign by which the intellect is moved; for when someone hears the sound of a trumpet and knows it, and at the same time penetrates that it is then being sounded for retreat or for battle, he forms the ultimate concept of the sign, because through it he conceives the thing signified by it.

The non-ultimate is opposed to the ultimate: first, when the ultimate difference of the thing is not attained; secondly, and more properly to our task, when the sign being conceived it is not known what it signifies, for example the inexperienced recruit, ignorant of military signals, hears the drum; nor does he know for whom it is being sounded, he does not form the ultimate concept of the sign, because he does not reach the last end of the sign, which is the thing signified. A sign of this is that men of this kind are restless and ask questions until they are taught the thing signified by the sign.

Note that someone can form an ultimate concept of the sign according to itself, and not an ultimate one of the thing signified, as when a Greek hears a Latin, he knows that it is a sound significative at will, and penetrates the quiddity, roughness, or smoothness of the voice; but he does not know what it signifies. Likewise he can know the thing signified ultimately, as if a Latin [word] signifies the city in which the Greek was born; this man indeed knows the thing and the sign, but that is to know those things materially, that is, he knows those matters well, not however formally in the character of sign and signified. Hence someone can rightly be ignorant of the physical nature of the sign and of the thing signified, and form an ultimate concept of them in the character of sign and signified, as the word equus is not known by a muleteer — whether it is a quality? or an action? nor whether a horse is a species of beast of burden — and yet he knows that a horse is signified by that word. That is to know the sign ultimately in the character of sign, because it is known that that thing, whatever it may be, is signified by that word, whether it be action or quality; and he who does not know this does not form the ultimate concept of the thing, however perfectly he may know both the sign and the thing.

Secondly, divide the mental term into reflexive and direct. A direct term is that which is terminated at a thing distinct from the act of the same power, as the act lapis, leo, that is, which represents stone and lion; it is so called because the power as it were by a straight way tends through it into the object. A reflexive [term] is cognition of some cognition of the same power: for example, I know a stone, this first cognition is direct. Then by another cognition I know that I have known a stone, and I inquire whether I was deceived in the cognition of the stone or not? this second cognition is called reflexive: because through it the power bends itself back, reflects, and returns upon itself.

You ask whether the cognition by which the intellect knows itself is reflexive. I answer that it is not: because this word is imposed only to signify cognition of another cognition of the same power, not however for cognition of the cognitive power itself. But we use words like coins at the discretion of the commonwealth. Secondly, because no one says that sight is reflexive of itself, although it sees itself in a mirror: therefore to know a power is not reflection. Hence all cognitions of other things distinct from the cognition of the same power are direct. The intellect and will alone are reflexive, in which reflections they can go on without end.

You will say first that writings and spoken words are also reflexive. I answer that that reflection does not belong to them properly, but by denomination from the reflection of the intellect and will, which use signs as they please, and, one word having been uttered, they can utter a second to signify the first. Just as the intellect and will through second acts can love the first, and just as cognition representing cognition in common represents itself confusedly, so this word vox humana signifies itself confusedly, as also other words: because the intellect uses it to signify all.

You object secondly that the imagination is reflexive, for we often remember that we had dreams. I answer that we can by the imagination remember things which fell into the imagination during sleep, because memory belongs to a material power; but reflexive memory upon the acts of dreaming belongs only to the intellect, in which a species is left not only of the object but of the act of dreaming itself. Note that words are not reflexive precisely because they signify acts of the intellect, as cognitio, species, genus, discursus, etc., but it is necessary that they signify acts of the intellect terminated at other [acts] of the same intellect.