Universa Philosophia

Every term has it to signify, but to some it also belongs not to signify, in what way this happens I explain.

A sign is what represents something to a cognitive power, that is, what makes something be known, for to represent to a power, to make present, and to make the power know, are synonymous.

One sign is formal, another instrumental: a formal sign is that by which alone, and without another, the power is made knowing: Or, it is the formal account of knowing, as whiteness is the account of the white. This sign is cognition, which is the formal representation of the object, the expressed sign, or expressed species of it, whence through it the object is represented to us, without its being necessary that there be another sign, which is to be a formal sign: that is, by its sole entity it makes the power knowing: whence it is clear that all mental terms are significative, because all are the expressed species, and image of their object, through which it is present to the cognitive power.

An instrumental sign is an instrument moving the cognitive power to cognition of the object, for an instrument is an active principle by which something is effected: but all instrumental signs effect cognition of the things which they signify: therefore they are an instrument moving the cognitive power. Which differs from the formal, because the latter by itself alone, by making nothing distinct from itself, represents its object: but the former does not represent by itself alone, but by making something distinct from itself, namely cognition, which is a formal sign.

An instrumental sign is twofold. One kind, without being cognized itself, brings us to cognition of another thing. For example, the impressed species, which a color projects into the eyes and through them into the intellect, is an instrument that brings the eyes and the intellect to cognition of whiteness. Yet it is not necessary for the impressed species to be cognized. It is called the virtual representation of the object, not because it represents that object in itself—for this belongs to cognition alone—but because it is a power in its operation, an active power containing formal representation. This sign belongs to the science of the soul, not to logic.

The other instrumental sign is what through cognition of itself moves the intellect to cognition of the thing signified through it. In all things it agrees with the other instrumental, except that this one needs prior cognition of itself to excite cognition of the object, unlike the other. Let smoke representing fire be an example of this, yet first known.

You object, that this definition applies to things other than the defined: for a cause, once known, leads into cognition of its effect, and yet a cause is not a sign of its effect¹, therefore. I deny that this defect is committed in the definition. For it is said leads into cognition of the thing signified through it, but a cause, although once known it leads into cognition of its effect, nevertheless the effect is not signified through the cause. For to be a sign, or image of a thing, says that such a thing is by its nature, or by the will of men, imposed for representing another: but a cause is not by its nature for representing an effect. For Caesar does not represent his image, although from cognition of Caesar we come into cognition of his image: but the image of Caesar represents Caesar, because it was made to represent him. Thus I am the image of my parent, and he is not the image of me, because I was made to the likeness of him. so creatures are called images of God: but God is by no means an image of creatures. Nay, the Son of God is called the image of the Father, because he was produced to express the Father, but the eternal Father is not called the image of the Son, thus demonstrations through effects are called demonstrations from a sign.

A sign, which through cognition of itself makes us come into cognition of the thing signified through it; one is purely intellectual, because it is perceived by the intellect alone: another is sensible, because it is perceived by an external sense. Which is excellently defined by Blessed Augustine: A sign is what, besides the species which it brings into the senses, makes us come into cognition of another thing. There the word species can be taken either for the impressed species, which the sensible object throws into the senses: or better for the sensation itself, which Augustine rightly calls species, because since it is cognition produced in the sense, it is the expressed species, and the formal image of the object. Besides this cognition, the sign causes another, namely cognition of the thing signified, smoke for example, or the footprint of an animal, moves the sense to cognition of itself. From which sensation the intellect is aroused, and knows the smoke and the footprint: which once known is moved through cognition of the smoke to cognition of fire, and through cognition of the footprint to cognition of the animal: and so two cognitions arise from this sign, one about the sign itself, the other about the signified thing.

This sign is divided into the significative at will and the purely naturally significative, and not at will. The purely naturally significative sign does not lead into cognition of another thing, except of its own causes, and that from its nature everywhere in the world and among peoples. Thus every spoken word and writing is a natural sign of the writer and of the speaker. The logician cares little about these signs, because propositions are rarely made from them, demonstrations most rarely; indeed there is no need for him to deal with them, but with those which take the place of mental propositions, and from these non-significative [signs] they naturally signify mental propositions concerned with those things whose powers they themselves bear: as in this blytiri non significat ad placitum; the [word] blytiri is supposed for a concept of the mind terminated at the very word blytiri.

A significative sign at will is: That which beyond the cognition of itself makes us come into cognition of another thing by human institution. For example, this word equus causes three cognitions: two from its own nature in any intellect whatsoever, whether in Greece or in Latium, but the third only from the will and institution of the Latins in an intellect knowing Latin. Natural are the cognition of the word itself and the cognition of the man uttering it. But the third is the cognition of the horse signified by it among the Latins: the Summulist disputes about these signs, both written and spoken: not because it pertains to him how the voice is formed by instruments, as Peter of Spain does, but as it is now accepted in place of an internal proposition; otherwise the Summulist would also be a schoolmaster, and would teach with what pen one ought to write: therefore write or speak in whatever manner you please.

The Summulist only wants to employ external signs in place of the acts of the intellect by which things of this kind are perceived.