Universa Philosophia

Having explained the account of term in common, it is necessary to divide it, so that we may know terms in their species, and first the term as such is divided into mental, vocal, and written. A mental term is the extreme of a mental proposition: that is, one which is formed in the mind and intellect. Soto, 1st part of the Introduction, ch. 6, lecture 1, notable 2, says that a mental term extends also to the sensitive cognitions of brute animals: but not well; both because mind is far absent from brutes; and because besides the intellect no cognitive power forms propositions; therefore neither does it have terms, from which a proposition is composed. For although brute cognition is a formal sign of an object, it is nevertheless unfit for propositions, like a stone. A written term is the extreme of a written proposition: but a vocal term is the extreme of a vocal proposition: for thus terms can be divided according to the variety of propositions which they constitute, whence I reject Toletus's definition of a significative vocal term, book 1, ch. 11. A significative vocal term, he says, is a significative utterance at pleasure, from which a simple proposition is made. For a union is a significative utterance at pleasure, from which a simple proposition is effected, which in §6 and 19 I showed not to be a term. Likewise it does not apply to the terms of a hypothetical vocal proposition, of which I treated in §9, 10, and 11.

Observe first, that terms and propositions are formally and properly in the intellect alone, but are not found properly in voice and writing, but improperly, analogically, and by extrinsic denomination, for a proposition is a judgment affirming or denying something, or is a judgment signifying truly or falsely: but to affirm or to deny, to speak truly or falsely, if taken properly, are found in the mind alone, a sign of which is that these utterances, which now affirm, could by the mere will of men have been negative: for this sentence, Peter is a man, could have signified that Peter is not a man; if however two men agree in taking utterances in the contrary signification from that in which we commonly use them, the very same utterances signify affirmatively for them, but negatively for others; therefore utterances do not in themselves have to affirm rather than to deny, because affirmation could be taken from them as well as negation. therefore they are propositions by extrinsic denomination alone.

The a priori reason, because voices and writing are signs of things as they are apprehended by the mind, by which we signify both the things which we conceive and the acts by which we conceive them: and precisely they are propositions insofar as they are signs, and instrumental speech of our concepts, and through the former we speak precisely because through the latter as through instruments we cause others to come into cognition of things: but all these things are according to our will: therefore they are propositions from our will alone. Nay, they are not more propositions than a painted man is a man, who is a man by extrinsic denomination of the true man whom he represents: thus utterances are significative propositions only because they are signs of mental propositions; nay, a painted man is more a man than a vocal proposition is a proposition: because this represents propositions by the mere will of men, but a painted man represents a man, who cannot signify a horse, nor does he depend in representing on the will of men.

Hence observe secondly, that this division of term thus taken is improper. For the divided account ought to be common at least by intrinsic analogy; as being is common to substance and accident: but term as such is not common, not even by intrinsic analogy, to mental and vocal; therefore it cannot be divided into them. The major is most certain, because the dividing parts are contained under the divided, and participate it intrinsically, otherwise they do not agree in it. The minor is proved, because a proposition as such is not found properly in a vocal or written proposition, as I proved in §22. Therefore neither is a term. The consequence is clear: because a proper term of a proposition is not found except in a proper proposition.

It is confirmed: man is not well divided into painted and true: because they do not agree in the account of man: therefore neither is term into vocal, written, and mental: but term ought to be divided through the various mental terms: but with crude Minerva, the term is thus divided for the sake of clarity, therefore, for beginners: then so that precepts may be handed down through vocal and written terms, because what is said about them fits mental terms by attribution, in whose place they are substituted, as a sign is accustomed to be put for the thing signified, and because voices and writings are signs of mental terms, for that reason the term is divided through them.

Observe thirdly, that term could also have been divided through the various kinds of signs by which we speak, for as we speak by writing and voice, so also by a nod, gesture, and other movements; which are propositions as much as written and vocal ones: but because these are the more perfect signs, more customary, and more consonant with teaching, it is necessary to dispute about them, and not about the others, and the precepts concerning one apply to the rest.