Universa Philosophia

The word term has a signification without limit, for it signifies a boundary, the last point, and the extremity of each thing, outside which there is nothing of that same thing and within which the whole thing is enclosed. Thus Cádiz and Irún are called the boundaries of Spain, because all Spain lies between them. Logicians use term for any expression, spoken or written, that we use in propositions. Thus some propositions are said to be self-evident, to which we necessarily assent from the explanation of the terms alone, that is, from knowledge of the words. Likewise, people who are mistaken and whom we deceive by an argument are said not to know their terms. Indeed, our Spaniards call courtiers and city-dwellers who say something elegantly people who use a good term: Dizelo con buenos terminos—“Put it in good terms.”

Soto, in part 1 of the Summulae, chapter 5, sole lecture, note 1, teaches from Boethius that any part of a categorical proposition is a term; Villalpando, book 1 of the Summulae, chapter 1, agrees with him. Others take term to mean only the predicate and subject, prompted by Aristotle, who supports this view. The question, however, concerns not so much the thing as the word. For it is clear that the union, as well as the predicate and subject, are parts of an enunciation. Which of them should be called a term, and which should not, matters little. Soto follows the grammatical meaning; the others follow the Aristotelian and philosophical one. For a union is generally called a joining of extremes, and the extremes are the terms of the thing whose extremes they are. Indeed, precisely because it is a union, it is the middle by which the extremes are linked; for a middle implies a relation to extremes. I use term in this sense, with the Fathers of Coimbra, book 1 of the Prior Analytics, chapter 1, question 7, article 3, because term comes from terminating, as indivisibles are said to terminate the quantity whose extremes they are. This is confirmed by the fact that the whole proposition is not a term among Dialecticians, yet in Soto’s sense it would be a term, because as a whole it is a meaningful expression and is called an expression by Grammarians. Therefore, among Dialecticians term does not mean “expression.”

Some define a term as a spoken expression signifying by convention, from which a simple proposition is formed. But this is not a good definition. First, it does not apply to everything defined: there are simple mental and written propositions that have terms which are not spoken expressions, so the definition does not apply to everything defined. You may say that it applies to them by analogy. But a whole species does not have complete likeness to another, since each has opposed differences; and it is wrong to define things taken universally by a single species. For if you were to say, An animal is a living, sentient, rational being, you would speak ineptly, because you would define a genus by a species contained under it, which is a defect: a definition must apply to all the subordinate things contained under what is defined, as the definition of animal must apply to human beings and lions. But this definition of term is general and does not apply to every term contained under the common notion of term; therefore it is bad. It is also refuted because many propositions contain a term that does not signify by convention, and so the definition is bad. I prove the premise: this is a proposition, “blytiri” is not a spoken expression signifying by convention, and yet ly blytiri is a term and does not signify by convention. Therefore.

You may say that blytiri is used there materially. But propositions are formed from terms that materially stand for themselves, as in “Nomen” is a word of the neuter gender: nomen stands for itself, so blytiri too, by standing for itself, forms a proposition. I shall soon refute the remaining defects in this definition, when I refute Soto’s. Second, you may say that the word blytiri stands for the mental term corresponding to it. Good; then it forms a spoken proposition because it is substituted for the mental term, as will become clear in disputation 2, section 1. Therefore, for a sign to be a term in a proposition, it need not signify by convention; it is enough that it can stand for a mental term. This is common to a spoken expression that signifies by convention and one that does not.

Soto, part 1, chapter 5, sole lecture, note 2, thus defines a term: a sign constituting a categorical proposition. Observe that a categorical proposition is simple, as in Peter is white. Other propositions, however, are composed of one complete proposition, other terms, and a union; people commonly call them hypothetical propositions. For example, in Peter is white is a proposition, Peter is white is the subject, proposition is the predicate, and the second is is the union. With this established, I first object to Soto because his definition is incomplete: it does not apply to the parts of a hypothetical proposition, which truly are terms. I prove that it does not apply: Soto says that a term is constitutive of a categorical proposition, but this is not constitutive of a hypothetical proposition, since distinct propositions have distinct constituents. Therefore it does not apply to a constituent of a hypothetical proposition.

I prove that this is a defect because the parts of a hypothetical proposition agree univocally with the parts of a categorical proposition in their character of constituting a proposition; therefore, they ought to be included under the same common definition. I prove the antecedent: a hypothetical proposition and a categorical proposition agree univocally in the character of a proposition; therefore, their parts too agree univocally in the character of a part of a proposition as such. The consequence is clear, because composites cannot agree unless their parts agree. I prove the antecedent: both are affirmative or negative, and each signifies something true or false. Moreover, one mental proposition that is hypothetical and another that is categorical agree univocally in the character of judgment; spoken propositions agree with one another in the same way, and so do written propositions.

Second, I argue that a hypothetical proposition contains a subject, predicate, and union; therefore these ought to have been included under a common definition of subject, predicate, and union. I prove the consequence: all things that agree in one common character share its definition, as human beings and lions share the definition of animal because they agree in the common character of animal. Then one must explain the proper differences of each species.

You may object first, from Soto above, that the ancients never call a proposition a term. Second, you may say that the subject of a hypothetical proposition is one whole proposition, and therefore is not a term. I prove the consequence: a term is a part of a proposition, whereas a proposition is a whole; and a whole is distinct from a part, so a term too is distinct from a proposition. Otherwise we would confuse terms. These objections are not compelling. To the first I answer that Aristotle, in book 1 of the Prior Analytics, defines a term as subject and predicate. Hence when a whole proposition becomes the subject in another proposition, it will be that proposition’s term according to Aristotle. Thus Toledo, book 1, chapter 10, and Villalpando, book 1, chapter 1, define term in general, abstracting from hypothetical and categorical propositions.

To the second objection, I deny the consequence. In proof, I distinguish the major premise: a term is a part of the proposition of which it is a term, and is distinct from that proposition—I grant the major; a term is a part of a proposition of which it is not a term, and is distinct from that proposition—I deny the major. I likewise distinguish the minor premise: a part is distinct from the whole of which it is a part—I grant the minor; a part is distinct from a whole of which it is not a part, but is itself a whole and is ordered as a part to another whole—I deny the minor.

I explain: the proposition Peter is white is a certain whole and is distinct from each of its parts; with respect to itself, it is not a part of itself, nor is it a term or subject. Yet that entire proposition is a part and subject of this hypothetical proposition: Peter is white is a proposition. Here, then, an entire proposition is part of another and its subject. Hence it is clear that a term is always distinct from the whole proposition of which it is a term, and that the proposition is not a term of itself. This does not confuse the matter; it clarifies the nature of a term. The reason is that the intellect is reflexive: it can affirm something of an entire proposition and make it the subject of another. Therefore I clearly turn the argument back against Soto. A categorical proposition is a part and constitutive subject of a hypothetical proposition, just as human being is a subject and constitutive part of a categorical proposition; and something is said of the entire categorical proposition in the hypothetical, just as something is said of a human being in the categorical. Therefore they agree in the character of a term. Moreover, Soto’s definition applies to the union, which I said in § 6 is not a logical term.

Villalpando, in book 1, chapter 1, says that a term is a sign that can be placed in a proposition. This definition fits a term in a hypothetical proposition too, but is infected with two defects. First, it applies to the union, which I showed in § 6 is not a term. Next, it applies to many things that are neither terms nor parts of a proposition. For example, in I and Peter love God, God is placed in the proposition as a sign, yet it is not a term, because it is neither the subject—nothing is predicated of it—nor the predicate, since the predicate must be the same as the subject, nor the union, as is clear. Therefore it is not a part of the proposition. But it is agreed that a term must be a part of a proposition. Therefore. I prove the minor premise: every term is an extreme of something, or at least is contained within it.