Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.
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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.
Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?
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Sectio II. Whether Logic Is a Practical Science or a Speculative One?
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Sectio III. Whether Logic Concurs Efficiently in the Acts of Other Sciences?
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Sectio IV. The Utility, Unity, and End of Dialectic.
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Disputatio III: Disputatio III. On the Predicables in General.
§ 1
THE DIRECTION of the acts of the intellect depends for a great part on the knowledge of the predicable, because from these almost all propositions and demonstrations are constituted; in the investigation of which, following the account of Porphyry and the dialectical method, we shall dispute those things that are the office of the logician, nor shall we undertake a metaphysical business, lest, going out from the logical prison, we touch another's goal, and the cobbler be beyond his shoes. I shall perhaps seem new — I am, I confess — to some semi-theological and metaphysical dialecticians, but not to those pure ancients; yet I prefer the utility of my hearers to the sayings of others. And since they openly confess with our Suarez, 1. metaphy. disp. 6. sect. 8. nu. 4. that the long disputation of the dialecticians about universals was an abuse brought into logic, it is no wonder if we attempt to correct that abuse. And as it is in the old proverb of our people. Almal uso quebrar le la pierna. But if I have no one among the more recent whom I may imitate in this part, I shall certainly bring it about that posterity may have someone whom they may imitate, as some have done not without praise. In sect. 1 I shall briefly premise concerning universals, which are necessary to the logician for forming those predications. Then, according to our plan, we shall begin the disputation concerning the predicables themselves.
Sectio I. I Premise Certain Points Concerning Universals.
§ 2
THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSAL MUST BE FOREFOREKNOWN, so that from it we may know its predicable character (which belongs to logic). In this part the universal is one in many, and of many. For thus the universal in causing is one cause of several effects, as the sun, and the universal in representing is one sign of several signified things, as this word homo; so the universal in being and in predicating is one existing in many things, and predicable of them, e.g. animal is in man, and in the lion, and is predicated of all of them.
§ 3
Scotus (as is commonly attributed to him) affirms 1 that the higher degrees (which we call universals) are distinguished in the nature of the thing from the lower, just as a union is distinguished from the things united, and an action from its produced term. Thus animal is distinguished in reality from rational, and man from Peter. 2 Scotus founds it first, because animal and rational have distinct definitions, therefore they are distinguished in the nature of the thing. 3 But this consequence is null, because to have distinct definitions is nothing other than to be known by distinct acts of the intellect, which can belong to the same thing, as when I see a color in a faint light, I cannot discern whether it is blackness or whiteness. But when a greater light is added I know that this color is whiteness. Behold, I know the same color first by a universal and confused cognition, then by a particular and distinct one. Thus it happens in definitions, that one who knows man and cannot discern whether he is a man or not, but only discerns that he is an animal, knows explicitly and clearly the character of animal and defines it. Then, knowing it more clearly, he clearly knows that it is man, and knows rationality, and defines it. Behold in what way different definitions belong to the same thing; the remaining foundations of Scotus, and a long refutation of the same Scotus, you have in disput. 5 of the metaphysics sect. 4 and 6.
§ 4
It is established therefore that in reality no universal in being is given, 1 but for this some work of our reason is required. Yet there is in reality a universal fundamentally, that is, a foundation for making a universal. 2 That foundation then is the very likeness of things. It comes about thus. Someone sees that Peter agrees with Paul in that each is a man, each two-footed, and discursive. Likewise he sees that Peter differs from Paul, perhaps in color, voice, shape, etc. Thus immediately the intellect conceives one character of man, in which Peter and Paul agree, and another character of such a man, in which they differ. Behold the character of man is called a common and universal concept, and the character of such a man is called a particular concept, in which each differs from another. Likewise I see that man agrees with a horse in other things, because each is an animal, each walks, etc. Likewise I see that between the two there is a wide disagreement. For a horse has no rational power. Behold I conceive the character of animal as common to Peter and the horse, in which they agree, and I conceive the irrationality of the horse, in which they differ. The foundation of these concepts is the similar and dissimilar operations that are found in them; yet in the thing itself man is a different animal from the horse. That character of animal is one in many, one (I say) by likeness, as we call those in Spain who have similar annual incomes. Tienen una misma renta. Which therefore St. Augustine splendidly explained 3. lib. 13. de Trinit. cap. 2. For even two most similar men (he says), when we see them, we say they have one face and marvel at both. Which testimony I produce at length disput. 5. de fide §. 5. Or it is one through the intellect apprehending those things as if it were one, and that is predicable of many, because animal is predicated of the horse and Peter. That common concept, when it is conceived in things dissimilar in essence, as in a horse and a man, is called abstraction of the genus from the species, and when it is conceived in two individuals of the same species, as man in Peter and Paul, it is called abstraction of the species from individuals, because thus the generic character is known in such a way that the species is not clearly and distinctly attained, and thus the species is conceived in such a way that individuals are not conceived clearly, and this is to abstract one from another, to conceive one without the other. 3
§ 5
1 And indeed abstraction is twofold: one precisive, which they call precision of reason; the other negative, by which we deny one of another. In this second there can be falsehood, in the first not, because when I conceive Peter to be a man, I lie in nothing, although I do not say that he is Peter. Therefore it is said there is no falsehood in those who abstract. But when the genus is conceived together with one difference, as animal with rational, then the genus is said to be contracted to the species, and when the species is conceived together with Petreity, e.g., then the species is said to be contracted to individuals, because that common concept which extended widely is limited, contracted, and narrowed to this species, or to this individual.
§ 6
1 There is found therefore in any universal both a confused cognition and a confusedly known object. For the universal is a certain composite of matter and form. But what is its form? The Thomists commonly hold that it is an entity of reason, which results from that abstraction. Leaning on this opinion: because universals are entities of reason, but they are not entities of reason as to the material [element], because animal and man are real entities. Therefore they are entities of reason as to the formal [element]. Therefore their form is an entity of reason. But I have shown disput. 19. metaphys. that an entity of reason is not made except through an act of falsehood. But in that abstraction no falsehood is found, therefore through that abstraction no entity of reason is made. Therefore the form of a universal thing, as universal, is the act of the intellect abstracting the common character from the lower things. 2 But what and of what sort that form is you have in disput. 5. metaphys. sect. 7. et 8.
§ 7
Concerning the material [element] of the universal, however, there is a great controversy between Thomists and Nominalists. 1 The Thomists say that by universal acts the common nature is so abstracted from its lower things that these lower things are not formally known, and they distinguish on the part of the object itself several formalities, as when animal is known, they say the formality rationale is not known, and when man is known, Petreity is not known, and the intellect has this power of dividing objects really indivisible. Thus not only the universal act but also the objects themselves are distinguished by universal acts. But the lower characters are known materially, insofar as they are the same as the universals in reality. They say also that when man is predicated of Peter, the same man is indeed predicated of Paul, the same (I say) not really, nor as to the thing predicated, but the same in reason, and as to the mode of predicating.
§ 8
1 But the Nominalists attack this opinion; for they hold that on the part of the object several distinct formalities cannot correspond. But the same in number formality, which is named diversely, not because of the diversity of objects, but because of the various concepts through which it is denominated. For they say that when man is known, some character of man is indeed known explicitly, but Petreity is known formally, and all other individuals, but not clearly and distinctly, but confusedly. And to this note that in this opinion it is one thing to know a singular thing, another to know it in the singular, that is, to conceive common characters which they hold to be singular on the part of the object essentially. And that cognition is such that by its force one cannot be discerned from another; therefore it is called a common character, because that concept, although it represents a singular thing, is nevertheless confused, common and indifferent, representing no more this singular than that, but all confusedly; because, since all singulars are represented in that character as similar, one cannot be discerned from another, because among similars as similars there is no distinguishing; but to know a singular thing in the singular is to represent a singular thing, and to know it as such, and to discern it from others, as when someone knows that a man is Peter. You have a long examination of each opinion in the Metaphysics disput. 5. sect. 10; in what way the distinction of reason comes about you have ibidem disput. 6. sect. 4.
Sectio II. Whether Predicability Belongs to the Essence of the Universal?
§ 9
1 A property cannot be of the essence of a thing. Because essence is the first concept that is known in an object, as in man body and soul; but property is the second concept, which flows from the first. 2 Property can be taken in two ways: first, as it is a thing truly and really distinct from the essence, as heat is a property of fire. In the second way, as it is not really distinct, but is understood to be distinguished only by our reason, and to flow from the essence, as the divine attributes are not really distinguished from the nature of God, but only by our reason.