Universa Philosophia
Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641)
First published 1624
Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa Philosophia (Lyon 1624): the Summulae and the Logica through Disputatio VII, with an original English translation. The rest of the work follows in later append batches.
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Summulae
Instruction for the Beginner on the Method of Argument
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Disputatio I. On the Terms of Propositions, and Their Union.
Aristoteles primo Physicorum
Sectio I. What Are Subject, Predicate, and Union?
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Sectio II. The Definition of Terms.
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Sectio III. On Vocal, Written, and Mental Terms.
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Sectio IV. On Significant and Non-Significant Terms.
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Signum significativum ad placitum
Sectio V. Divisions of the Mental Term.
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Sectio VI. On Universal, Particular, Confused, and Determinate, Superior, and Inferior Terms.
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Sectio VII. On Transcendent and Non-Transcendent Terms.
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Sectio VIII. On Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogous Terms.
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Sectio IX. On Absolute and Connotative Terms.
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Sectio X. On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.
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Dices categorematicos significare
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Sectio XI. Concrete, Abstract, Complex, and Incomplex; Copulative and Non-Copulative Terms.
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Sectio XII. On Negative and Non-Negative Terms: Contrary and Contradictory.
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Sectio XIII. On Terms of First and Second Intention: Pertinent and Impertinent.
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Disputatio II. On the Properties of Terms.
Sectio I. On Supposition.
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Sectio II. Formal and Material Supposition.
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Sectio III. Simple and Personal Supposition.
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Sectio IV. Common and Singular Supposition.
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Sectio V. Distributive, Copulate, Determinate, Natural, and Accidental Supposition.
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Sectio VI. On Ascent and Descent.
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Sectio VII. On Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Diminution.
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Sectio VIII. On Appellation.
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Disputatio III. On Speech, Its Parts, and Division.
Sectio I. On the Noun.
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Sectio II. On the Verb.
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Sectio III. On Speech.
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Disputatio IV. On the Proposition.
Sectio I. I Define the Proposition.
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Sectio II. On the Matter, Quality, and Quantity of the Proposition.
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Sectio III. Categorical, Hypothetical, Complex, and Incomplex Propositions.
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Sectio IV. On the Equipollence of Simple Propositions.
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Sectio V. On the Conversion of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VI. On the Opposition of the Simple Proposition.
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Sectio VII. The Preceding Doctrine and the Rules of Opposites Explained.
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Sectio VIII. On the Modal Proposition.
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Sectio IX. Modal Propositions Explained and Described.
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Sectio X. Why Are All Propositions of Each Figure Mutually Equipollent?
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Sectio XI. On the Quantity and Quality of Each Figure.
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Sectio XII. On the Opposition of Each Figure to the Others.
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Sectio XIII. On Exponible and Exclusive Propositions.
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Sectio XIV. Difficulties Concerning This Doctrine.
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Sectio XV. On Exceptive and Reduplicative Propositions.
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Disputatio V. On the Method of Knowing.
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Sectio I. On Definition.
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Sectio II. On Division.
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Sectio III. On Argumentation.
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Sectio IV. On the Mode and Figure of the Syllogism.
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Sectio V. Ostensive Deduction of Syllogisms.
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Sectio VI. Deduction of Syllogisms to the Impossible.
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Sectio VII. On Consequence.
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Some Terms Explained.
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Logic
Disputatio I: Disputatio I. On the Object of Logic.
Sectio I. On Object and Subject in General.
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Sectio II. The Adequate Matter of Logic.
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Sectio III. Whether Words Are the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Words are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio II. That voices do not inadequately pertain to the logician either.
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Sectio IV. Whether a Being of Reason Is the Object of Logic?
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Subsectio I. Which beings of reason constitute the object of logic.
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Subsectio II. Refutation of the first argument drawn from authority.
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Subsectio III. Arguments for the opinion of Soto and the other Thomists.
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Subsectio IV. The object of logic is real being.
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Sectio V. Whether the Formal or Rather the Objective Method of Knowing Is the Object of Logic.
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Subsectio I. These modes of knowing are explained.
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Subsectio II. The question is resolved.
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Sectio VI. What the Logician Immediately Considers in the Formal Method of Knowing.
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Sectio VII. Whether the Formal Method of Knowing Is Treated by Attribution to the Objective.
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Sectio VIII. On the Adequate Object of Dialectical Attribution.
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Subsectio I. The first opinion.
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Subsectio II.
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Subsectio III. Definition, division, and argumentation are not the adequate object of logic.
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Subsectio IV. Demonstration alone is the adequate object of attribution.
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Sectio IX. Other Matters Concerning the Object of Logic.
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Disputatio II: Disputatio II. How Logic Attains Its Object.
I shall touch very briefly on the matter of this disputation, relegating the multitude of arguments and the variety of opinions to the books On the Soul and the Metaphysics: for the things which dialecticians snatch from them vex and deter the more recent authors and beginners, nor are they treated according to their dignity. But so that the hearers may not depart entirely unfed on these matters, the heads of the difficulties will be run through in summary.
Sectio I. On Logic as Used and as Taught: Whether Each Is a Science?
§ 1
The first opinion concerning logic as teaching and as using. It is rejected.— Concerning using logic there is great contention of words among the Doctors, without great utility. First, some hold that teaching logic is the habit of logic which teaches the nature of the mode of knowing, but that using logic is a habit which teaches such a mode and produces it. But undeservedly, because only one habit of logic is given which teaches how to make a mode of knowing; but this habit does not produce it in another matter, but only in its own. Nor can practical logic be called using, because science is always teaching.
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The second opinion. It is attacked first.— Second, others hold that using logic is a certain peculiar habit which argues probably in any faculty or matter whatever. But it is altogether false that a peculiar habit is given which argues probably in any matter. First, because no peculiar habit is given which argues demonstratively in any matter, therefore neither is one given which argues probably. The antecedent is certain; the consequence is clear from the parity of reason. Second, because just as in any faculty there are some certain and evident habits, so there are also probable ones, which in different matter have different formal accounts, from which they take a different species. Therefore one probable habit common to all the sciences is not to be granted.1
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The third opinion.— Third, many hold that using logic is that part of logic which we call the science of topics, which does not argue in any particular matter whatever, but hands down the precepts and common rules of arguing probably; these rules are called commonplaces, which the Rhetoricians commonly use. Then, through the probable habits of the other sciences, one argues probably in any matter whatever by using the commonplaces in that matter.
This opinion seems to be that of Aristotle and of Blessed Thomas. That such a habit is given is not doubtful, just as demonstrative logic is given, which teaches arguing evidently. But that this habit is called using logic is a question of name, since the matter is agreed. Nor do I see why the topics rather than the demonstrative part should be called using.12
§ 4
The fourth opinion concerning using logic.— Others hold that using logic is the acts or habits of the other sciences insofar as they are directed by logical precepts. So P. Vazquez, tit. 1, p. 1, disp. 8, num. 19. Nor does this way displease me, because it is the most proper of all, but logic ought to be in the ablative case, not the nominative. Nor is using logic one thing, but there are several using logics, because all the sciences use logic. Nor is this way unusual, for Augustine calls Paul and the rest of the Theologians Dialecticians, because they use Dialectic. And the Dialecticians divided logic into logic abstracted from things, which is teaching, because it is concerned not with the things of the other sciences but with the direction of the acts themselves; and into logic concrete with things, which are all the real sciences, because each is concerned with its own real object, which are called using logic.12
Use whichever of these last two opinions you please, noting this, that according to this fourth opinion teaching logic is using logic regarding its own proper object, because regarding that object it uses its own precepts, and that it teaches argumentation in general: argumentation itself according to its common account is the object of itself. Likewise, upon any logical act one can reflect by another act, but the direct act will properly be using logic. But according to the third opinion, topical logic is using, because it teaches the rules of arguing in its own proper matter.34
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Teaching logic is truly and properly a science.— Concerning teaching logic there can be no doubt that it is truly and properly a science, because it has principles and evident conclusions. But if any of the Fathers at some time said that logic is not a science but a destruction, understand this not of logic which teaches the mode of knowing, but of the Sophistic which the pagan Philosophers abused against Catholics. You will say: Logic is called a mode of knowing. Therefore it is not a science. I deny the consequence, because the formal mode of knowing is truly and properly a science, because we are formally denominated knowers by it. You will say: It is commonly said to be absurd to seek at the same time science and the mode of knowing, but that mode of knowing is logic, therefore logic is not a science. It is answered that by the name “mode of knowing” logical science is understood, and by the name “science” the real sciences are understood, which it is absurd to seek unless logic has been premised.123
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According to the third opinion, using logic is properly a science.— Concerning using logic according to the fourth and third opinions one must philosophize. According to the third, there is no doubt that it is truly and properly a science, because the topics demonstratively teaches by what account you form a probable argument: for although the topical syllogism, about which it is concerned, is not science but opinion itself, nevertheless it teaches scientifically that it is opinative. Likewise it teaches from which commonplace a probable argument is to be drawn: just as the logician evidently shows the nature of a fallacious syllogism, because a science can proceed evidently regarding one error; just as regarding demonstration itself some discourse probably, others evidently, and others indeed reason falsely and badly. The a priori reason is that logic is a reflexive science which has for its object every demonstration and argumentation. But this, since it has its own nature and properties, can be known either clearly, or probably, or falsely, just like any other object.
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According to the fourth opinion, if a particular science is properly a science, using logic also is; but if it is not, neither is using logic.— According to the fourth opinion one must distinguish: for either the particular real science (which according to this opinion is called using logic) is properly a science, or it is not; if it is a science, using logic will be a science; but if it is not a science, neither will using logic be one. The reason is that many acts of the other sciences are probable, many evident, many false, although they are rightly ordered by logic.
§ 8
One thing is called into doubt. Whether using logic, as using, is a science, even in scientific acts? It is answered briefly: the acts of the other sciences are considered in two ways. First, as they themselves represent their objects; and thus they are either demonstrations or species of syllogism. Second, not as they represent objects, but as they are known by other acts; and thus they are neither science nor opinion, but are the objects of a reflexive act. I say therefore that using logic, as using, is neither science nor opinion. It is proved, because using logic, as using, has the character of an object of teaching logic; but an object, as object, is not a science; therefore using logic, as using, is not a science. The minor is proved, because using logic is an act of a real science directed by logic; but it is the same to be an object of teaching logic and to be an act directed by teaching logic, because teaching logic does not direct an act except by knowing it; just as the architect's hand uses architecture while the house is known by that same architecture; therefore using logic, as using, is the object of teaching logic.123
§ 9
Nor for this reason do I say that using logic is only an extrinsic denomination from teaching logic, but that using is formally constituted in the character of using by teaching logic, while the objective mode of knowing is constituted in objective being by the formal mode. The reason is that using logic is an object which is known through teaching logic. This I think is taught by most of the more recent authors, who say that using logic and teaching logic are the same, that is, as regards the form from which using is denominated, just as they say that the formal and objective mode of knowing are the same form from which the objective mode is denominated. But why logic rather than the other faculties is so called. I answer: because the poets willed it so.