Universa Philosophia

With terms explained, their properties must be run through.

Supposition is the placing of one thing in place of another. For it is a subrogation, substitution or suffection, by which a thing is subrogated, substituted, or suffected for another; in this sense it is taken in the present [discussion]: because it is a certain affection of the term. And first, at the threshold, observe that signification differs from supposition: for every effect signifies its cause, and is not supposited for it. For when you see smoke, and from it conceive fire, the smoke was a sign of fire to you: but for what is smoke supposited? Likewise cognition is the natural representation of an object; although it is supposited for nothing. For it is of itself representative of the object, and in regard to that object is subrogated for no other thing. The reason a priori, because the character of a sign is only to lead the power into knowledge of the thing signified, but to be supposited is to be constituted to act for another, which was to be done by it.

Note from P. Fonseca, book 8, ch. 2, that it is wrongly said that a term supposits for another, but that it should be said is supposited, because the term is placed for another thing, while man supposits it: Sotus however, a better Summulist than the Latin [writer] of the 2nd part of the introduction, ch. 1, lecture 1, note 1, says the old custom must be retained. But if it is bad, why retain it because it is old? That it is bad is clear from good Grammar, because suppono is an active verb, and not neuter.

Villalpandus, book 1, 3rd part, ch. 1, says that a term to supposit is for the term to exist in the proposition, and to be the thing which it signifies at the time signified by the copula. For example. In this proposition Adam was, Adam supposits, because he exists at the time enunciated by the proposition: likewise in this Adam is, Adam does not supposit: because Adam does not exist at the time signified. Villalpandus has not yet wholly cast off the trifles of the sophists, who poured out many things about supposition; thinking that supposition is a term verifiable in a proposition. Hence took its origin among them the common adage in false propositions, they are about a non-suppositing subject, that is, about a term not verifiable, and about a non-existent object, as it is enunciated in the proposition. But this definition is rightly rejected, and hissed off by Sotus, Toletus, and Fonseca. For to supposit is to be placed for another, therefore every term in any proposition whatsoever is supposited, or supposits. I prove the consequence, because a term in any proposition whatsoever is placed in place of the thing signified, or in place of mental concepts. For in this proposition, Peter is a stone, this word Peter is not placed in place of itself, but in place of Peter himself as existing in the mental proposition, as in this Peter is a man, it is not placed for itself, but for Peter, who is a man, therefore in both propositions it is placed in place of another, and is supposited. But whether the object exists or does not exist is irrelevant. The adage took its origin from trifling sophists, because there is no subject of a proposition that is not supposited, or suppositing: but the object signified by the terms is not supposited nor supposits, but rather the term is supposited in its place. But a proposition will be able to be called about a non-suppositing subject, when someone argues from some proposition as if conceded, when it is not: as if someone says, let us suppose Peter to be honest, then thus, but every honest man is worthy of praise, therefore Peter is worthy of praise. If this man proceeds in the argument without the suppositum being admitted by the respondent, he can be said to speak about a non-suppositing subject.

Sotus, 2nd part of the introduction, ch. [lect.] and note 1, says: supposition is the acceptance of a term for something answering to it according to the same acceptance. A better definition than Villalpandus's, but not without fault. For acceptance is the same as signification at pleasure; but I showed that supposition is not signification, §1. therefore. The major is clear, because we accept and impose words for signifying, and hence acceptance of a word is also imposition. Then he says it is an acceptance, if the word acceptance signifies signification, it has this sense: supposition signifies the same thing that is signified by it, because to be an acceptance is to signify, and to answer to the signification is to be signified, and thus the definition will be trifling: if however the word acceptance signifies not signification, but the substitution of a term for its object, it has this sense, supposition is substitution for the thing for which it is substituted, because supposition is substitution for a thing, and the thing to answer to it according to the same supposition is the thing to be that for which it is substituted; but thus Sotus will fall into the same straits. In another sense I think Sotus means, that the word acceptance is the same as substitution, and to answer according to the same acceptance is the same as to answer to the same term as signifying the thing, that is, supposition is the substitution of a term for the thing signified by it: thus the definition is clear, but the Sotic one is less clear, and thus it also suffers its difficulty. For in the same place Sotus admits, and truly, that non-significative terms at pleasure have supposition: likewise that there is material supposition; but then nothing answers to a non-significative term according to its acceptance; because it signifies nothing, nor does anything answer to a term materially supposited according to its signification, because the answer demands an extreme, which answers to the supposited term, therefore. That nothing answers is clear in this proposition, Peter is a significative word at pleasure, in which Peter is supposited for itself, and its significate does not answer to it. By this last argument the definition of Fonseca is attacked, book 8, ch. 20, asserting, supposition is the acceptance of a name for the thing which it signifies. For non-significative words are not accepted for the thing which they signify, because they signify nothing, nor in material supposition is a name accepted for the thing which it signifies. Note that the word acceptance is taken by Fonseca for substitution, as is clear from the same.

Toletus book 2 ch. 1: supposition is (he says) the use of a term for itself, or for its significate. This definition is more common, and closer to the truth: for it embraces both material and formal supposition: which can scarcely be held together by one definition in any other way. Likewise it is from the mind of Aristotle, 1 elenchorum, asserting that we use terms for things because we cannot bring things along with us. But these things seem to have been admitted by Aristotle with a dull Minerva. For it was not difficult for Aristotle to bring along with him the horse on which he rode, and the garment with which he was covered, and infinite other things, and yet he could not dispute about them thus present without vocal or written terms: therefore the necessity of using words does not arise from the inability to drag things along with us, but from elsewhere, therefore words are not supposited for the things which they signify: but for other things, without which we cannot discourse, and yet we cannot produce them into disputation. I prove the consequence, because the supposition of words is necessary for disputing: not because the things which they signify are absent, because through them we dispute neither about present nor absent things: but about them, because I dispute about my garment, which I have in the disputation, and yet I dispute not about it, but with words: therefore from elsewhere arises the necessity of summoning words into the disputation; namely, that with the words themselves we dispute about things physically present or absent. For what then do we necessarily use words; except for the thing necessary for disputing, which we do not produce into the middle?

That this may be clear, note that our whole disputation is formally in the intellect: because to dispute, affirm, deny, define, divide, and reason are acts of the intellective power. Angels, because they can manifest their thoughts without external signs, do not need voice, writing, or other motion: because Michael by his sole will can show to Gabriel what he has in his mind. Indeed one angel clearly sees the intellection of another: but we, while the mind is imprisoned in the body, cannot open what we think about things, except through external signs, through which we speak. That is, we unfold our minds. These signs are multiple: for with fires lit a soldier speaks that the enemy is approaching, but commonly we use writing and words, with men born: since therefore we cannot dispute and converse with one another immediately through acts of the intellect, we use external signs, with which we discourse and speak. These signs have two functions, both to signify a thing, as this word man signifies man, and to be set in propositions, and through them something is affirmed or denied, in which they are substituted for concepts. And so vocal disputation is a substitute for mental disputation: because the latter is shown through the former, and the vocal is substituted for the mental, which would not be necessary, if we saw acts of the intellect after the manner of intelligences. Whence Aristotle would have said better, that we use words because we cannot bring mental terms into the middle of the disputation, and that hence arises the necessity of words, not indeed because we cannot drag things along with us.

Hence I conclude that supposition is the substitution of a sensible sign in place of a mental concept for constituting a proposition about the significate of the mental term. That it is for constituting a proposition is clear from the Summulists asserting that a term signifies outside a proposition, but is supposited or supposits within a proposition: that it is a substitution is clear both from etymology and from Aristotle asserting that we use words for things. Thirdly: because through words and writings we discourse by substituting them either for things or for concepts of the mind. That it is in place of a mental concept is clear from §6. For we use words in a proposition, in order that through them we may affirm or deny to those with whom we speak, but to affirm or deny is not formally in words, therefore to substitute (so to speak) is in place of affirmation and of a mental act, not indeed in place of things. The minor was proved in disput. 1 §14. because to affirm is an act of judgment formally existing in the intellect, then thus, therefore words in affirmation are substituted in place of the mental affirmation: because words are instrumental affirmations by denomination from the formal intellectual affirmation, therefore we place words in place of the mental affirmation, and so words signify the things themselves, and are supposited for the concepts of the intellect.

It is confirmed, if I could deal with you immediately through acts of the intellect, so that you would see my mental propositions, and I yours, certainly you would see the precepts with which I would imbue you, and there would be no need for me to manifest them to you through words: because without words they would be manifest: but in truth, because you do not see those precepts in my intellect, for that reason there is need for me to manifest them to you through words. Which words signify to you man: e.g. to be animal: because my mental precept signifies the same. And those words bring it about with you that you perceive man to be animal, which the mental precept would do, if it lay open to you. And so the mental and vocal precept have the same object, namely man to be animal: and the vocal makes you more certain of it in place of the mental, and because through the mental alone I cannot speak with you, I substitute the vocal in its place. And so the whole reason and necessity of using words signifying at pleasure arises from the inability to see our cognitions about things. Which if we could produce into disputation, there would be no need to bring in the things themselves signified, nor the words signifying them. Because through cognitions alone it would be disputed, nor for receiving precepts would words be needed, just as is provided by angels speaking mutually through concepts without external signs: therefore the whole vocal disputation is placed in place of mental [disputations], to do what these would have done, if they could be brought into the middle.

You say that mental acts are also supposited for things, therefore also vocal ones. I deny the antecedent, because things would do nothing in the intellect, and so the mental term does not do what the thing would do, nor is it placed in its place. For mental terms are the very cognitions which cognize things and objects: but objects ought not to cognize, but to be cognized, and so acts perform their office, and cognize and predicate: but objects perform theirs, they are cognized and terminate, and vocal terms are supposited to predicate in place of mental terms, whose objects they signify, or are. Likewise words are subrogated to make up a proposition and argumentation, but objects do not compose an argumentation, but we argue about them, whence objective argumentation is called [so], that is, the object of argumentation, which objects would do nothing in the mind, but acts are [there], because they do, that is, express and manifest the object, which we manifest to others through words, which for that reason do what the acts were going to do, and are subrogated in their place.

I said in the definition of a sensible sign: because not only words and writings, but any other signs whatsoever can be substituted for a mental concept: but words and characters are more frequent. I added for a proposition, because also the union of subject and predicate is supposited for the concept answering to it. Wherefore some old Summulists wrongly say that adjective terms are not supposited, when they are truly subrogated in place of the mental [terms] answering to them. For in this proposition, Peter is white, the predicate is no less placed in place of a mental concept to signify the object, than the subject is placed. Note that in any speech whatsoever words are supposited for a concept, as in this Peter run, which is placed in place of the interior command, but I speak of supposition with respect to a proposition, which pertains to the logician.