Universa Philosophia

ARISTOTLE, in book 1 of the Physics, ch. 1, says that the discussion of composite things must begin from their parts and elements. But since every argumentation (which is the matter of the Summulae) consists of parts, these are the first things that come up for discussion. Argumentation, however, consists of propositions, a proposition of subject, predicate, and the union of both; but subject and predicate have customarily been called terms.

In every proposition, whether spoken or written, three words or expressions are found, to which three acts in the intellect correspond. In this proposition, Peter is white, the first word is called the subject, the third the predicate, and the second the union or copula. The whole essence of a proposition consists in these, just as the essence of a human being consists in body, soul, and their union. The same number of words occurs in every proposition made with other verbs, as in Peter runs: for this has the sense, Peter is running.

The subject is that of which we say or predicate something, as in the proposition Peter is white: Peter is the subject, because of him it is said and predicated that he is white. The predicate, in turn, is the thing that is said or predicated of another; thus white is predicated and said of Peter in that proposition. Subject is so called from subiicio, that is, “it is thrown beneath another.” For just as, among physical things, Peter is a subject because he lies beneath accidents, while the accidents are in Peter, so logically the subject is what underlies predication, which places the predicate in it. The predicate, however, is so called because it is the thing predicated. The union is so called because it unites or joins the subject to the predicate. For it signifies that the subject and predicate are the same, which is to unite them. In a negative proposition, however, it does not unite but separates the predicate from the subject and denies that they are the same, as in Peter is not a stone.

Predicate and subject are one thing as that which, and another as that by which. That which is the thing itself, or the object that is subjected or predicated. That by which is the word, writing, or concept by which we say one thing of another. For example, in Peter is a human being, what I say and affirm of Peter is the human being himself, who really exists in Peter; he is the predicate that which, or the matter that is predicated. But the word human being is the instrument by which I say Peter is a human being; it is the predicate that by which, that is, the formal character by which I predicate “human being.” In this sense the Nominalists say that one word is predicated of another, not as that which—for that would be false, since Peter is a human being would be false if it meant that the word Peter is the word human being—but as that by which. That is, it is predicated in the character of a sign taken for the thing signified. For it amounts to saying that the word human being is predicated that by which of the word Peter to say that the word human being is a sign of the same thing of which the word Peter is a sign. The reason is that a sign is taken for the thing signified, and thus stands in place not of itself but of the thing it signifies. For example, someone sees two images of Pompey and says, This is Pompey; the same Pompey, or the same man, is here and there—not because those images are the same or are Pompey, but because they are taken for their prototype, whose images they are. But if he sees a statue of Caesar and compares it with a statue of Pompey, he says, This is not Pompey, that is, it does not represent Pompey. I shall show elsewhere from Ockham that this is the Nominalists’ meaning. All dialecticians speak in this way when they teach rules about propositions, yet they wrongly accuse the Nominalists of it.

From § 1, conclude that it matters little whether the subject or the union is the first or second word of a proposition. For it is not the subject because it is first, nor the union because it is in the middle; rather, it is the subject because something is said of it, and the union because it joins and states that the predicate is the same as the subject. For in the proposition Peter is white, the subject, predicate, and union are the same as in Is Peter white or White Peter is.

The word term has a signification without limit, for it signifies a boundary, the last point, and the extremity of each thing, outside which there is nothing of that same thing and within which the whole thing is enclosed. Thus Cádiz and Irún are called the boundaries of Spain, because all Spain lies between them. Logicians use term for any expression, spoken or written, that we use in propositions. Thus some propositions are said to be self-evident, to which we necessarily assent from the explanation of the terms alone, that is, from knowledge of the words. Likewise, people who are mistaken and whom we deceive by an argument are said not to know their terms. Indeed, our Spaniards call courtiers and city-dwellers who say something elegantly people who use a good term: Dizelo con buenos terminos—“Put it in good terms.”

Soto, in part 1 of the Summulae, chapter 5, sole lecture, note 1, teaches from Boethius that any part of a categorical proposition is a term; Villalpando, book 1 of the Summulae, chapter 1, agrees with him. Others take term to mean only the predicate and subject, prompted by Aristotle, who supports this view. The question, however, concerns not so much the thing as the word. For it is clear that the union, as well as the predicate and subject, are parts of an enunciation. Which of them should be called a term, and which should not, matters little. Soto follows the grammatical meaning; the others follow the Aristotelian and philosophical one. For a union is generally called a joining of extremes, and the extremes are the terms of the thing whose extremes they are. Indeed, precisely because it is a union, it is the middle by which the extremes are linked; for a middle implies a relation to extremes. I use term in this sense, with the Fathers of Coimbra, book 1 of the Prior Analytics, chapter 1, question 7, article 3, because term comes from terminating, as indivisibles are said to terminate the quantity whose extremes they are. This is confirmed by the fact that the whole proposition is not a term among Dialecticians, yet in Soto’s sense it would be a term, because as a whole it is a meaningful expression and is called an expression by Grammarians. Therefore, among Dialecticians term does not mean “expression.”

Some define a term as a spoken expression signifying by convention, from which a simple proposition is formed. But this is not a good definition. First, it does not apply to everything defined: there are simple mental and written propositions that have terms which are not spoken expressions, so the definition does not apply to everything defined. You may say that it applies to them by analogy. But a whole species does not have complete likeness to another, since each has opposed differences; and it is wrong to define things taken universally by a single species. For if you were to say, An animal is a living, sentient, rational being, you would speak ineptly, because you would define a genus by a species contained under it, which is a defect: a definition must apply to all the subordinate things contained under what is defined, as the definition of animal must apply to human beings and lions. But this definition of term is general and does not apply to every term contained under the common notion of term; therefore it is bad. It is also refuted because many propositions contain a term that does not signify by convention, and so the definition is bad. I prove the premise: this is a proposition, “blytiri” is not a spoken expression signifying by convention, and yet ly blytiri is a term and does not signify by convention. Therefore.

You may say that blytiri is used there materially. But propositions are formed from terms that materially stand for themselves, as in “Nomen” is a word of the neuter gender: nomen stands for itself, so blytiri too, by standing for itself, forms a proposition. I shall soon refute the remaining defects in this definition, when I refute Soto’s. Second, you may say that the word blytiri stands for the mental term corresponding to it. Good; then it forms a spoken proposition because it is substituted for the mental term, as will become clear in disputation 2, section 1. Therefore, for a sign to be a term in a proposition, it need not signify by convention; it is enough that it can stand for a mental term. This is common to a spoken expression that signifies by convention and one that does not.