De visione Dei

The things said of God do not really differ. Consequently attend that all things said of God cannot really differ on account of the highest simplicity of God, although we attribute to God other and other names according to other and other reasons. But God, since he is the absolute reason, enfolds in himself all reasons of all formal reasons. Whence, although we attribute to God gaze, hearing, taste, smell, touch, sense, reason, and intellect, and such things, according to other and other reasons of the significations of each name, yet in him to see is not other than to hear, and to taste, and to smell, and to touch, and to sense, and to understand. And thus the whole of theology, placed in a circle, says that it affirms one of the attributes of another. And to have of God is his being, and to move is to stand, and to run is to rest, and so of the other attributes. Thus, although we attribute to him to move by one reason and to stand by another, yet because he himself is the absolute reason in which all otherness is unity and all diversity identity, then the diversity of reasons which is not the very identity, according as we conceive diversity, cannot be in God.