De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio

Bernard of Clairvaux

De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio

Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153)

First published 1128

A theological treatise on the relationship between divine grace and free will in the work of salvation. Bernard examines how grace precedes, assists, heals, and perfects the human will, while free will freely consents and cooperates with divine action. He explains the nature of human merit, arguing that all good originates in God's grace, yet becomes attributable to man through voluntary cooperation. The work distinguishes the divine operations of creation, reformation, and consummation, and explores the respective roles of grace and free will in each.


Preface

Caput I: That to the merit of a good work is needed, together with the grace of God, the consent of the free will

Caput II: In what freedom of will consisteth

Caput III: That there is a threefold freedom: that of nature, that of grace, and that of glory

Caput IV: What kind of freedom belongeth to the holy souls in their disembodied state: what kind belongeth to God, and what kind is common to all reasonable creatures

Caput V: Whether freedom from misery, or freedom of counsel, is granted in this world

Caput VI: That grace is altogether necessary in order that we may will what is good

Caput VII: Whether the first man in Paradise was endowed with this threefold freedom, and how far his endowment was lost by sin

Caput VIII: That free choice remaineth after sin hath entered in

Caput IX: That the image and the likeness of God, in which we were created, consist in a threefold freedom

Caput X: That through Christ the likeness which properly belongeth to the divine image is restored in us

Caput XI: That neither grace, nor temptation, taketh away from freedom of choice

Truly, as hath been said, by this prerogative of divine dignity the Creator hath singularly honoured the reasonable creature; in such fashion that as He Himself was independent, and was good of His own will, and by no necessity imposed by another; thus it also should in a manner be so far independent, as neither to become evil and justly to be condemned, nor to remain good and deservedly to be rewarded, save only of its own will. Not, however, that its own will could suffice unto it for salvation; but that without its own will it could take no step in the direction of salvation. No one, forsooth, is saved against his will. Nor, indeed, is what is said in the Gospel: “No one cometh unto Me, unless My Father draw him”; and again, in another place: “Compel them to come in,” at all contrary to this; for, while certainly the loving Father, “Who willeth all to be saved,” seemeth to draw, or compel, as many as may be; nevertheless, He judgeth no one worthy of salvation, unless He have already found Him willing to be saved. And when He frighteneth men, or smiteth them, His purpose is to make them willing to be saved, not to save them against their will; in so far that, while He changeth the will from evil to good, He doth not take away its freedom, but transfereth its allegiance. As for being drawn, however, it is not always against their will that men are drawn; for neither the blind, nor the weary, are saddened for being led or borne. Moreover Paul was led by the hand to Damascus, certainly not against His will. Finally she was indeed most willing, who, in the Song of Songs, made earnest request saying: “ Draw me; because of the savour of thine ointments we will run after thee.”

Then, on the other hand, there is the fact that it is written: “ Each man is tempted by his own lust, having been drawn away and enticed by it ”; and also that “ the body which is corrupted presseth down the soul, and the earthy tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things"; and that the Apostle saith: "I find another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my members"; all these statements may be thought to imply that the will is under compulsion and deprived of its freedom. But the truth is that however a man may be pressed by temptation, whether from within or from without, his will, so far as concerneth choice, will be always free; in as much as, in spite of everything, it will be free to decide in the matter of its own consent. But so far as concerneth (freedom of) counsel or (freedom of) pleasure, as long as endureth the struggle with concupiscence and with misery, so long indeed doth the will perceive itself to be restricted in its freedom; though not on that account to be evil, save only if it consent to evil. Finally Paul, who complaineth that he is being drawn a captive to the law of sin—without doubt by reason that he hath not full freedom of counsel—nevertheless boasteth that the consent of his will is unimpaired, and now in large measure also free in well-doing, saying: “ It is no longer I that do it.” Whence, Paul, this confidence? Because, saith he, “ I consent to the law of God, that it is good ”; and again: “ For I delight in the law of God according to the inner man.” The eye being single he presumeth the whole body to be full of light. The consent of his will being unimpaired, he doth not hesitate to profess that, although drawn by sin and taken captive by misery, he is yet free in well-doing. And in this confidence it is that he concludeth generally: “ There is therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.”

Caput XII: Whether one that, for fear of death or of other penalty, denieth the faith is to be excused from blame, or to be held destitute of free choice

Caput XIII: That human merits are no other than divine gifts

Caput XIV: What part is to be assigned to grace, and what to free choice, in the work of salvation

↑ Top of work