De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio

Bernard of Clairvaux

De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio

Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153)

First published 1128

A theological treatise on the relationship between divine grace and free will in the work of salvation. Bernard examines how grace precedes, assists, heals, and perfects the human will, while free will freely consents and cooperates with divine action. He explains the nature of human merit, arguing that all good originates in God's grace, yet becomes attributable to man through voluntary cooperation. The work distinguishes the divine operations of creation, reformation, and consummation, and explores the respective roles of grace and free will in each.


Preface

Caput I: That to the merit of a good work is needed, together with the grace of God, the consent of the free will

Caput II: In what freedom of will consisteth

Caput III: That there is a threefold freedom: that of nature, that of grace, and that of glory

Caput IV: What kind of freedom belongeth to the holy souls in their disembodied state: what kind belongeth to God, and what kind is common to all reasonable creatures

Caput V: Whether freedom from misery, or freedom of counsel, is granted in this world

Caput VI: That grace is altogether necessary in order that we may will what is good

Caput VII: Whether the first man in Paradise was endowed with this threefold freedom, and how far his endowment was lost by sin

Caput VIII: That free choice remaineth after sin hath entered in

Caput IX: That the image and the likeness of God, in which we were created, consist in a threefold freedom

Caput X: That through Christ the likeness which properly belongeth to the divine image is restored in us

But in this world the likeness could nowhere reasonably be found, nay, rather the divine image would here still lie filthy and defaced, were it not that the woman of whom the Gospel tells should light her candle; that is to say, unless He who is Wisdom were to appear in the flesh, and turn inside out the house of sins and seek again the piece which He had lost, namely, His own image, which, despoiled of its native beauty, encrusted with the filth of sin lay hidden as it were in the very dust; and when found, should cleanse it to its first fair state again, making it like unto the saints in glory; nay, rather, should make it in all respects like unto Himself, when the word of Scripture should be fulfilled, which saith: "We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is." And, in truth, whom did such a work befit better than the Son of God? Who seeing that He is the effulgence of the Father's glory, and the essential form of His very being, upholding the universe by His word, manifested Himself, endowed with full power for the twofold work of restoring what was deformed and strengthening what was weak; putting to flight the darkness of sin by the effulgence of His Godhead, and restoring wisdom; and by the virtue of His word giving power against the tyranny of evil spirits.

He came, therefore, the very essential form (of God), to Whom the free choice (of man) had to be conformed: for, in order that it might receive again its original form, it needed to be reformed from the same source from which it had been formed. But the form is Wisdom; the conformation consisteth in the image doing that work in the human body which the form doth in the whole world. Now that Wisdom “reacheth from one end to another mightily, and sweetly doth it order all things.” It “reacheth from one end to another,” that is to say, from the highest heaven to the depths of earth; from the greatest angel to the very least of worms. But it “reacheth mightily,” not indeed by digressive motion or by local diffusion, nor merely by official administration of created life, its subject; rather by a certain essential and omnipresent strength, whereby indeed He moveth, ordereth, and governeth the whole universe most potently. And all this He doeth by no necessity that compelleth Him. Nor in these matters doth He work with any difficulty; but, with a tranquil will, He “ordereth all things sweetly.” In very truth He “reacheth from one end to another,” that is, from the origin of created life even unto the end appointed for it by the Creator; whether it be the end to which fallen nature impels it, or that which judgement hastens, or that which grace concedes. He “reacheth from one end to another mightily,” seeing that none of these ends is reached, that He doth not foreordain it, as He willeth, by the power of His providence.

Therefore let free choice seek to rule its own body, even as Wisdom ruleth the world; itself also reaching “from one end to another mightily,” to wit, giving its commands to each sense and to each member with such authority that it allow not sin to reign in its mortal body, nor yield its members as weapons to iniquity, but rather present them for the service of righteousness. Thus no longer will the man be the servant of sin, when he doeth not sin; from which indeed set free, he will now begin to recover freedom of counsel and to vindicate his dignity, while he clotheth himself with a likeness befitting the divine image in himself, yea, restoreth his ancient comely state. But let him take heed that he do this not less “sweetly” than “mightily”; that is to say, “not of sorrow or of necessity,” which is but the beginning, and not the fulness of wisdom; nay, rather, with a ready and a cheerful will, which maketh a sacrifice accepted, seeing that “ God loveth a cheerful giver.” And thus in all things he will follow the example of Wisdom, both withstanding vice “ mightily,” and being “ sweetly ” at rest in conscience.

But in truth we need also the help of Him by whose example we are incited to such conduct as this; in order, plainly, that by means of Him we may be conformed unto Him, and be “ transformed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord.” Therefore if it be by the Spirit of the Lord that this is brought about, it is no longer by free choice. Let no one then think that free choice is so called because with equal power or facility it concerneth itself with good and evil; seeing that it was indeed able to fall by means of itself, but not to rise again, save by means of the Spirit of the Lord. Otherwise neither God, nor the holy angels—for they are in such sense good, as not to be able to be evil; nor, again, the fallen angels—for they are in such sense evil, as not to be able to be good—could be said to possess freedom of choice. Nor, moreover, shall we lose free freedom of choice after the general resurrection, when, undoubtedly, we shall have been inseparably associated, some of us with the good, other of us with the evil, angels. For the rest, neither God nor the devil lacketh freedom of choice; for it is no weak necessity, but a will strong in the good, and a free strength of purpose, which maketh it impossible for the former to be evil; and that the latter is unable to long after the good no violent force of another effecteth but his own will, stubborn in evil, and his own free obstinacy. Therefore, then, freedom of choice is so called rather because, whether in doing good or in doing evil, it maketh the will equally free; for neither ought, nor can, any man be said to be either good or bad, except in so far as he is willingly such. On this reasoning he will fittingly be said to be equally situated towards good and towards evil, because plainly he has—not, indeed, equal facility in preferring but—equal freedom in willing the one or the other.

Caput XI: That neither grace, nor temptation, taketh away from freedom of choice

Caput XII: Whether one that, for fear of death or of other penalty, denieth the faith is to be excused from blame, or to be held destitute of free choice

Caput XIII: That human merits are no other than divine gifts

Caput XIV: What part is to be assigned to grace, and what to free choice, in the work of salvation

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