De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio

Now I think that in these three kinds of freedom consist the very image and the likeness of the Creator, in which we were created; that the image indeed consisteth in freedom of choice, while in the remaining two kinds of freedom is revealed a certain two-sided likeness.¹ Hence it is, perhaps, that freedom of choice alone suffereth not at all any defect or diminution of itself, because it is in it above all else that, as it were, may be seen impressed the substantial image of the eternal and unchangeable Godhead.² For although it had a beginning, yet it knoweth not destruction; neither hath it any increase from righteousness or from glory, nor doth it suffer any diminution from sin or from misery.³ What is there that, while it is not eternal, is more like unto eternity than is this? Further in the other two kinds of freedom, seeing that they can be not only partly diminished, but also wholly lost, we recognize as it were a likeness of divine wisdom, and a likeness of divine power, added to the divine image.⁴ Finally we have lost them both by sin, and we have recovered them both by grace; and every day, indeed, we either advance in them, or we fall back from them, some of us more, others of us less. They can also be so lost that they cannot any longer be recovered; and they can be so possessed that they can never at any time be either lost or diminished.

In this two-sided divine likeness of wisdom and of power, not indeed in its highest degree, but in that which is next to the highest, was man created in Paradise. For what is nearer to the state of not being able to sin, or to be disturbed (in which without doubt the holy angels are now confirmed, and in which God always exists), than that of being able not to sin and not to be disturbed, in which, we know, man was created? And he—nay, rather, we in him and with him,⁵ having by means of sin fallen from this state, have by means of grace received again, not indeed the very same degree thereof, but in place of it a certain lower degree. For we are not able to exist here in this world entirely without sin, or without misery; although we are able, by the aid of grace, to avoid being overcome by sin, or by misery. Nevertheless Scripture saith: "Whatsoever is born of God, sinneth not."⁶ But this is said of them that are predestined unto life, not meaning that they do not sin at all, but that sin is not imputed unto them, being either punished by befitting penance, or in love put utterly away.⁷ "Love," indeed, "covereth a multitude of sins,"⁸ and "Blessed are they whose unrighteousnesses are forgiven, and whose sins are covered."⁹ The angels therefore are in the highest, not the lowest grade, of the divine likeness, we are in the lowest; Adam was in the intermediate grade; the evil spirits, again, are in no such grade at all.¹⁰ To the angels in heaven then it was granted to endure to the end without sin and without misery; but to Adam it was granted to exist without these, though not also to continue to exist without them;¹¹ to us,¹² however, it was not granted even to exist without them, but only not to be overcome by them. For the rest, the devil and his angels, even as they never have the will to resist sin, so are they never able to escape the penalty of sin.

Seeing, therefore, that these two kinds of freedom, freedom of counsel and freedom of pleasure, by means of which wisdom and power are supplied to reasonable creatures, do, by the dispensation of God, vary according as He willeth, in respect of certain causes, places and times—so that on earth they are possessed but in very small measure; in heaven fully; in the intermediate state moderately; in hell not at all—whereas freedom of choice, wherewith reasonable beings were created, is in no degree whatsoever changed by their condition, but (so far as it is free choice) is always equally possessed in heaven, on earth, and in hell; (seeing that this is so) it is only fitting that the two former should be held to be the divine likeness, and the latter the divine image. And indeed that in hell both kinds of freedom, which belong to the divine likeness, have perished, the authority of Scripture testifieth. For that there true wisdom which cometh, we know, of freedom of counsel, doth not exist at all that passage showeth, where we read: “Whatsoever thy hand can do, do it with all thy might: for there is neither work, nor judgement, nor wisdom in the lower world, whither thou hastenest.”¹³ Moreover, concerning power, which is granted by means of freedom of pleasure, the Gospel saith as followeth: "Bind him hand and foot, cast him into outer darkness."¹⁴ For what is binding of the hands and feet, if not complete deprivation of power?

But some one saith: How cometh it that there is not any wisdom there, where the ills that are suffered compel repentance for the ills that have been wrought? Surely it cannot be either that in torment a man cannot repent, or that to repent of evil is not true wisdom? Now this objection would rightly be raised, were it the case that what is punished is merely the deed of sin, and not also the evil will.¹⁵ Certainly there is no doubt but that no one in torment delighteth¹⁶ to repeat an act of sin. But if, even in torment, the will remaineth evil, what value hath the abnegation of an evil act, that any man should therefore be accounted wise simply because now in the midst of the flames he taketh no delight in riotous living? In a word: "Into a soul that willeth evil wisdom shall not enter."¹⁷ Whence, however, shall we prove that even in that state, in which the lost are punished, the will remaineth evil? To omit all else, certainly they are unwilling to be punished. But it is right that they should be punished, who have done things deserving of punishment. Therefore they do not will what is right. He, however, who doth not will what is right, hath not a righteous will. By the fact then that his will doth not consent to what is righteous it is unrighteous, and thus also evil. Two things there are, either of which proveth a will to be wicked; namely, that it pleaseth it to sin, and that it pleaseth it to have sinned with impunity (in the past). Thus to take pleasure in sin so long as it is possible to sin; and, when it is no longer possible, to will that sin remain unpunished; what of true wisdom is there in this? What good will does this show? But granted that it repenteth the lost to have sinned, can we say that the will is yet good if, were the choice given to it, it preferreth to continue in sin rather than to endure the punishment of sin?¹⁸ The former is a wrong choice, the latter is a righteous. But when would a good will choose rather what is wrong than what is right? Besides, they do not truly repent, who do not so much grieve that they have lived unto themselves as that now no longer are they able to live unto themselves. Finally, a man's outward state revealeth his inward state. For so long as the body is in flames of torment, so long is it plain that the will persisteth in wickedness.¹⁹ Accordingly, among the lost there is nothing whatever of that likeness of God, which consisteth in freedom of counsel and freedom of pleasure; nor can there be; yet, by reason of freedom of choice the image of God abideth there immovably.