De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio

It is now the place to consider a question which we have so far deferred, namely, whether the first man possessed in Paradise those three kinds of freedom of which we have spoken, that is to say, freedom of choice, of counsel and of pleasure, or, in other words, freedom from necessity, from sin, and from misery, in all their fullness; or but two of them, or only one. And indeed, concerning the first of these, there is now no question, if we remember how plainly higher reason hath taught us that it is equally the possession of the righteous and of sinners. Concerning the remaining two it may not improperly be asked whether Adam ever possessed either both, or so much as one of them? For, if he possessed neither of them at all, what is it that he lost? Freedom of choice, at any rate, he always preserved intact both before and after his sin. If he lost nothing, in what did he suffer by being cast out of Paradise? But if he lost either one of them, how did he lose it? What is certain is that, from the time that he sinned, thenceforward, so long as he remained in the flesh, he was free neither from sin nor from misery. But again, he could in no measure have lost either of these freedoms, when he had once received it;¹ otherwise he cannot be proved to have possessed in their perfection either wisdom or power, as we have above defined them, for he would have been able both to will what he ought not to have willed and to receive what he was not willing to receive.² Or should it rather be said that, in a certain measure, he possessed wisdom and power, but that, because he did not possess them in their fullness, he was able to lose them?³ For, indeed, each of these hath two degrees, a higher and a lower. The higher degree of freedom of counsel is not to be able to sin; the lower degree is to be able not to sin.⁴ So also the higher degree of freedom of pleasure is not to be able to be disturbed; the lower degree is to be able not to be disturbed.⁵ Accordingly [the first] man received at his creation the lower degrees of both kinds of freedom together with full freedom of choice, and, when he fell into sin, lost the two former. But he fell from the state of being able not to sin into that of not being able not to sin, having wholly lost freedom of counsel.⁶ So too did man fall from the state of being able not to be disturbed into that of not being able not to be disturbed, having wholly lost freedom of pleasure. There remained to him only freedom of choice, and that subject to punishment, in that by its means he lost the other kinds of freedom; but it he could not lose. Having, indeed, by his own will become the servant of sin, deservedly he lost freedom of counsel. Further, having by reason of sin become liable to pay the penalty of death, how was he any longer able to keep possession of freedom of pleasure?⁷

Of the three kinds of freedom, therefore, which he had received, Adam, by the abuse of that which is called freedom of choice, deprived himself of the rest. But he abused it by the fact that, when he had received it for his glory, he made of it his disgrace, according to the testimony of the Scripture which saith: "Man when he was in honour, had no understanding; he was compared unto the foolish beasts, and become like unto them."⁸ To man alone, amongst living creatures, was it given, on account of his prerogative of free choice, to be able to sin. But it was given to him not in order that he should accordingly⁹ sin, but in order that, if he did not sin when he was able to have sinned, he might appear more glorious. For what could have redounded more to his glory, than if it could have been said of him, as the Scripture runneth: “ Who is he, and we will praise him? ” Why is he thus praiseworthy? “ For wondrous things he did while he lived.” What things? “ Who was able to transgress,” it saith, “ yet did he not transgress; to do evil yet did he not do evil.”¹⁰ This honour, then, he preserved so long as he did not sin; when he sinned he lost it. But he sinned, because he was free to sin; nor was he free otherwise than by virtue of freedom of choice, whence it was indeed that he had in him the possibility of sinning. Yet was it not the fault of Him who gave him free choice, but of himself who abused it, in that plainly he converted to the use of sinning the faculty which he had received for the glory of not sinning.¹¹ For although he sinned by means of the power which he received, he did not sin because he possessed the power to do so, but because he willed to do so. For, when the devil and his angels sinned, the rest also of the angels did not sin; not because they were not able to sin, but because they did not will to sin.¹²

Man’s fall, when he sinned, is to be ascribed, therefore, not to the gift of the power to sin, but to the fault of the will. Nevertheless, though he fell by an act of will, he hath it not equally in his power by an act of will to rise again free from sin; because although there was given to the will the power so to stand that it should not fall,¹³ there was not given it the power to rise again, if it fell. For not so easy is it to get out of a pit as it is to fall into it. By an act of will alone man fell into the pit of sin; but no act of will is sufficient to enable him to rise again, seeing that now, even if he so will, he is not able not to sin.¹⁴