De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio
Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153)
First published 1128
A theological treatise on the relationship between divine grace and free will in the work of salvation. Bernard examines how grace precedes, assists, heals, and perfects the human will, while free will freely consents and cooperates with divine action. He explains the nature of human merit, arguing that all good originates in God's grace, yet becomes attributable to man through voluntary cooperation. The work distinguishes the divine operations of creation, reformation, and consummation, and explores the respective roles of grace and free will in each.
Preface
Caput I: That to the merit of a good work is needed, together with the grace of God, the consent of the free will
Caput II: In what freedom of will consisteth
Caput III: That there is a threefold freedom: that of nature, that of grace, and that of glory
Caput IV: What kind of freedom belongeth to the holy souls in their disembodied state: what kind belongeth to God, and what kind is common to all reasonable creatures
Caput V: Whether freedom from misery, or freedom of counsel, is granted in this world
Caput VI: That grace is altogether necessary in order that we may will what is good
It hath, I think, been sufficiently shown that this freedom of will is yet in certain fashion held captive, so long as the other two kinds of freedom scarcely at all, or only in a small measure, accompany it; and that from no other cause than the lack of these two kinds of freedom ariseth that defect of ours of which the Apostle speaketh, saying: “ So that ye cannot do the things that ye would.”1 To will indeed belongeth to us in virtue of free choice, but not also the power to do what we will. I do not speak of willing what is good, nor of willing what is evil, but merely of willing. For to will what is good is a moral success, to will what is evil is a moral failure. But the simple act of willing, that it is which either succeedeth or faileth. Further, it is creative grace which gave existence to the will; it is saving grace which giveth it moral success; it is the will itself which bringeth about its own moral failure. Accordingly, free choice maketh us possessed of will; grace maketh us possessed of good will. It is in virtue of free choice that we will, it is in virtue of grace that we will what is good. For even as it is one thing simply to fear, and another thing to fear God; one thing simply2 to love and another thing to love God (indeed, the terms fear and love, considered merely in the abstract, signify affections, but with the addition of the object3 they signify virtues); so also is it one thing to will and another thing to will what is good.4
The affections, truly, considered simply in themselves, belong to us by nature; in a certain sense they originate from ourselves; that they are directed towards their proper objects is due to grace. Nor, indeed, is the case otherwise than that grace ordereth aright what creation hath bestowed, so that the virtues are none else than the affections rightly ordered. It is written concerning certain men that "there they were in great fear, where no fear was."5 There was fear, but it was unregulated fear. The Lord wished to regulate it aright in His disciples, when He said: "I will show you whom ye ought to fear";6 so also David saith: "Come, ye children, hearken unto me: I will teach you the fear of the Lord."7 Thus, too, did the Lord rebuke men for unregulated love, saying: "I came as the light into this world, and men loved darkness rather than light."8 Therefore9 is it that the bride prayeth in the Song of Songs: "Order love in me aright."10 In like manner also were they rebuked for an unregulated will, to whom it was said: "Ye know not what ye ask."11 But they were taught to lead back the perverted will into the way of righteousness, when they heard: "Are ye able to drink of the cup that I am about to drink of?"12 Then indeed by word, but afterward by example also, He taught them to order the will aright, when, praying, in the hour of His passion, that the cup might pass from Him, He added immediately: "Nevertheless not what I will, but what Thou wilt."13 Therefore we have received from God in the state of nature the power to will, in the same way as we have received the power to fear and the power to love, so that thus we might be simply created beings;14 but to will what is good, even as to fear and to love God, we receive by the visitation of grace, so that thus we may become (not simply creatures but) God's creatures.
In a certain manner then, created as our own possession for freedom of will, by means of goodness of will we are made God's possession.15 Moreover it is He that made the will free, Who also maketh it good; and to this end doth He make it good "that we may be a kind of firstfruits of His creatures":16 since, better were it for us not to have existed at all than for us to remain always our own possession. For they, who willed to be their own possession, became indeed "as gods, knowing good and evil";17 but they did not then belong only to themselves, they belonged to the devil also. Accordingly free will maketh us our own; evil will maketh us the devil's; good will maketh us God's. This is the meaning of the words: "The Lord knoweth them that are His."18 For to them that are not His He saith: "Verily I say unto you, I know you not."19 When, therefore, by reason of evil will we belong to the devil, in a certain sense we do not meanwhile belong to God:20 even as when by reason of good will we become God's possession, we then cease to be the devil's; seeing that "No man can serve two masters."21 For the rest, whether we belong to God or to the devil, we do not cease to belong to ourselves also. Indeed free will remaineth to us in either case, whereby there remaineth also the ground of merit; so that deservedly we are either punished as evil persons, who have of their own will freely become such, or glorified as good, which equally we cannot be save only as free agents. In truth it is our own will, and not the power of God, which delivereth us over to the devil: it is God's grace, and not our own will, which maketh us subject to God.22 Our will, of course, was (as must be confessed) created good by the good God; it will not, however, be perfect until it hath been perfectly subjected to its Creator.23 But far be it from us to ascribe to the will itself its own perfection, while we ascribe to God its creation only; seeing that, without doubt it is better for it to be perfect than for it to have been simply made; and that, indeed, it seemeth to be blasphemy to ascribe to God the lesser, and to ourselves the more excellent work.24 Finally the Apostle, perceiving what was of nature, and what was to be expected of grace, said: “ To will is present with me, but how to will perfectly I find not.”25 He knew for a fact that he was able to will, as possessing free choice; but that, in order that he might will perfectly, he was in need of grace. For if to will what is evil is, as it were, a failure of the will, then to will what is good must be a success of the will; for the will, however, to be able to will everything that is good is its perfection.26
In order, therefore, to the perfection of that will of ours, which we possess in virtue of free choice, we stand in need of a twofold gift of grace, namely, both wisdom, which is the conversion of the will to what is good, and also full power, which is its establishing in the good.27 Now perfect conversion is conversion to what is good, to the end that nothing may be pleasing save only what is fitting, or what is lawful; perfect establishing in the good is to the end that nothing which is thus pleasing may any longer be lacking. Then at length shall the will be perfect, when it shall have become both completely good and well satisfied.28 The will possesseth, certainly, a twofold goodness from the beginning of its existence; the one, a general goodness derived from the mere fact of its creation, in that it could not have been created other than good by the good God, for “ God saw all that He had made, and it was very good ”;29 the other, a special goodness derived from the freedom of choice, in virtue of which it was made even after the image of Him Who created it. Suppose now that to these two goods be added a third, its conversion to its Creator; then not unfittingly will the will be counted perfectly good; good, without doubt, as a mere created thing, better by reason of its special gift of freedom, best by reason of its being regulated aright.30 But the regulation of the will consisteth in its conversion in every single respect to God, in its entire and free devotion and submission to Him. To such perfect righteousness, however, is rightly due, nay, indeed, is actually joined the fulness of glory; for these two things are so united the one to the other that the perfection of righteousness cannot be possessed, save only in the fulness of glory; nor can there be fulness of glory apart from perfect righteousness. Finally, as a matter of due merit, there can be no such righteousness apart from glory, seeing that there can be no true glory which is not derived from such righteousness; wherefore it is rightly said: "Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled."31
But these are those two gifts of which we have above spoken, namely, true wisdom and full power; thus wisdom concerneth righteousness, and power concerneth glory. The terms "true" and "full" are added, the one in order to distinguish from the wisdom of the flesh, which is death,32 as well as from the wisdom of the world, which is foolishness with God, and by which men are wise in their own sight,33 "wise," I mean, "to do evil";34 the other, in order to distinguish from them of whom it is said: "Mighty men shall be mightily tormented.”35 For neither true wisdom nor full power are to be found at all, except there are joined to the free will those two possessions, to which we have earlier referred, namely, freedom of counsel and freedom of pleasure. I should say that, certainly, he alone possesseth true wisdom and full power, who is at last able not only to will in virtue of free choice, but also to will perfectly in virtue of the remaining two kinds of freedom,36 seeing that he can no longer will what is evil, nor fail in the attainment of what he wills; of which results the one, namely, true wisdom, cometh of freedom of counsel, and the other, namely, full power, cometh of freedom of pleasure.37 But who would dare to boast, because man hath it within his reach to become such and so great as this? Where, or when, is such an end attained? Surely, not in this world, is it? Were any disposed so to boast, he would be greater than Paul, who confesseth, saying: “How to will perfectly I find not.”38 Was Adam in Paradise such and so great as this? Surely, had it been so, never would he have been an exile39 therefrom.