De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio

¹We must, however, understand that both these kinds of freedom are possessed in fulness and perfection by the disembodied souls which have been made perfect, even as they are possessed by God and by His Christ and by the angels in heaven. To the holy souls indeed, who have not yet received their bodies, there lacketh something of glory; nevertheless they have no misery. ² Freedom from necessity, however, belongeth to all reasonable creatures, whether evil or good, equally and indifferently with God. Nor is this freedom lost, or diminished, either by sin or by misery; nor is it greater in the righteous than in the unrighteous, or more complete in the angels than in men. For even as by means of grace the consent of the human will is given to well-doing, so that, by the fact that it is willingly given and not unwillingly compelled, it maketh a man freely good and free in well-doing; thus also the consent of the will, when of its own accord turned aside to evil, maketh a man none the less both free and self-determining in evil-doing, being indeed led by his own will and not compelled by any outside force to become evil. And as the angels in heaven, or even God Himself, remain good freely, that is to say, of their own will, and not of any extrinsic necessity; so the devil both fell into evil-doing and persisteth therein equally freely, that is to say, of his own free motion, and not by the compulsion of another. Therefore freedom of will remaineth, even where there is captivity of mind, certainly as fully in the evil as in the good, though in a more ordered state in the good; it remaineth also as completely, after its proper fashion,³ in human creatures as it doth in the Creator, though in Him it is more powerful.

But as to the fact that men are wont to complain, and say: I will to possess a good will and I am unable so to do; this by no means implieth a restriction of its freedom, so that in such a case the will as it were suffereth violence or is subject to necessity; but plainly witnesseth that the will lacketh that freedom which is called freedom from sin. For he that willeth to possess a good will proveth that he possesseth a will, for it is only by means of the will that he willeth to possess a good will; but if he possesseth a will, then hath he freedom, not from sin but from necessity. Truly he perceiveth of himself that he hath not freedom, so as to be able, when he willeth, to possess a good will; freedom, plainly, from sin by which it grieveth him that his will is oppressed, though not suppressed.⁴ Yet without doubt he already hath in some way a good will, when he willeth to possess such a will.⁵ What he willeth is, in fact, good; nor could he will what is good unless by a good will; even as he could not will what is evil unless by an evil will. When we will what is good, that is a good will; when we will what is evil, that is an evil will. In both cases there is will, and everywhere there is freedom: necessity yieldeth to will. But when we cannot do what we will,⁶ we perceive indeed that our freedom is by reason of sin in a certain way miserable,⁷ though not lost.⁸

It is, therefore, simply from this freedom, by which the will is free to judge itself, whether as good, if it have consented to well-doing, or as evil, if to evil-doing (forsooth it perceiveth plainly that it is only by an act of will that it hath consented to either of the two), that we believe free determination to be so called.⁹ For freedom from sin might, perhaps, more fittingly be called free counsel,¹⁰ and freedom from misery free pleasure,¹¹ rather than free determination.¹² As a fact determination is judgement. But just as it belongeth to judgement to distinguish between what may and what may not be allowable, so it belongeth to counsel to show what may and what may not be expedient, and to pleasure to discover what may and what may not be agreeable. Would that we as freely took counsel for our profit as we judge concerning the allowableness of our deeds,¹³ so that, even as by judgement we freely decide as to the allowable and the non-allowable, so by counsel we were free to choose for ourselves the allowable as expedient, and to reject the non-allowable as inexpedient! For in such a case we should be not only free in judgement, but without doubt also free in counsel, and therefore free from sin. But what if either the freedom to approve what is expedient, or the freedom to judge what is allowable, give us also the other kinds of freedom? Should we not then rightly be said to possess free pleasure also, seeing that we should perceive ourselves to be free in the same manner from everything that could displease, that is from all misery? But, as it is; seeing that there are many things which by the judgement we decide ought to be either done or not done, which yet by the counsel we neither approve nor reject in accordance with right judgement; and, again, seeing that not all things which we approve as right and expedient do we also freely welcome as well-pleasing to us, but that rather we impatiently endure them as hard and painful; such being the case, is it sufficiently plain that we possess neither free counsel nor free pleasure.

It is another question whether, even before sin entered in, the first man had free pleasure; this shall be discussed in its proper place. But quite certainly we shall possess it, when by the mercy of God we shall obtain what we pray for when we say: "Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven." For this shall be fulfilled when that which (as hath been said) seemeth to be common everywhere to all reasonable creatures, namely, a will free from necessity, shall be (as it is in the holy angels) both secure from sin and safe from misery in the elect of mankind also, who shall at length prove by the happy experience of a threefold freedom "what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God."¹⁴ Meanwhile, because this hath not yet come to pass, it is freedom of choice¹⁵ alone which in its fulness and integrity man now possesseth. For freedom of counsel existeth but in a measure only, and that in a few spiritual persons, who "have crucified their flesh with its vices and desires,"¹⁶ so that sin may not reign in their mortal body.¹⁷ Thus then that sin doth not reign cometh of freedom of counsel; that sin, however, is not wholly lacking cometh of the captivity of the will.¹⁸ "But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away";¹⁹ that is to say, when the judgement shall be wholly free, there shall no longer be any captivity of the will. And this it is for which every day we pray, when we say unto God: "Thy kingdom come." Not yet is this kingdom fully established amongst us. Nevertheless every day little by little it draweth near, and with sensible increase are its borders daily extended, at least in those whose inward man is by the help of God “renewed from day to day.”²⁰ Therefore in the measure in which the kingdom of grace is extended, in that measure is the power of sin diminished. But in the measure in which, on account of the body of death²¹ which “presseth down the soul,” and on account of the straitened state of our earthly habitation, which indeed “weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things,”²² the kingdom of grace is still restricted, in that measure in this our mortal life even they who seem to be somewhat nigh unto perfection are under necessity of confessing: “In many things we offend all,”²³ and “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.”²⁴ Wherefore it is that they pray without ceasing, saying: “Thy kingdom come.” But this will not be consummated even in them, until not only doth not sin reign in their mortal body,²⁵ but there neither is nor can be any sin at all in the body then immortal.