De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio

It happened once that, when I was publicly commending the grace of God towards me in that in any good work I both recognized that I had been prevented¹ and felt that I was being furthered and hoped for full attainment, by its means, one of the bystanders demanded: What then is thine own work in the matter, or what recompense or reward dost thou hope for, if so be that God doeth it all? What then, I reply, dost thou advise? Give, saith he, the glóry to God Who freely prevented thee, moved thee, originated thy good work, and live worthily for the time to come; so mayest thou prove thyself not ungrateful for benefits already received and not unworthy of receiving benefits in the future. Thou counsellest well, say I, provided only that thy counsel can be followed. But indeed easier is it to know what ought to be done than it is to do it; for one thing is it to lead the blind and another thing to carry the weary. Not every man that sheweth him the way giveth the wayfarer food for his journey. He that instructeth him so that his feet wander not doeth one thing; he that feedeth him so that he faint not by the way doeth another. Thus neither is every teacher also the giver of the good that he teacheth. Accordingly my need is twofold, namely, to be taught and to be helped to do what I am taught. Thou, as a mere man, truly givest excellent counsel to my ignorance, but, if the Apostle is to be believed, “The Spirit helpeth our infirmity,”² yea, verily, it needeth that He Who by thy mouth giveth me such counsel, Himself give me by His Spirit help whereby I may obey it. For, see, already His gift to will is present with me, but “how to perform I find not,”³ nor have I any confidence that I shall ever find the way unless it be that He Who gave me the will give me also the power to perform the same. Where, then, sayest thou, are our merits? Or where is our hope?⁴

Listen, I pray: “Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us.”⁵ What? Didst thou think, perchance, that thou hadst created thine own merits,⁶ that thou canst be saved by thine own righteousness, who canst not even say that Jesus is the Lord, save in the Holy Spirit?⁷ Hast thou then forgotten Who it is that said: “Without Me ye can do nothing,”⁸ and “It is not of him that runneth, nor of him that willeth, but of God that sheweth mercy”?⁹

What, therefore, thou askest, doth free will do? I answer in a word: It is saved. Take away free will and there remaineth nothing to be saved; take away grace and there is no means whereby it can be saved. This work of salvation cannot be wrought without two factors: the one, that by which it is wrought, and the other, that for which or in which it is wrought. God is the author of salvation; free will is merely receptive thereof; none can grant it save God alone, nothing can receive it save the free will. Thus then salvation is given by God alone, and it is given only to the free will; even as it cannot be wrought¹⁰ without the consent of the receiver, so cannot it be wrought without the grace of the giver. Accordingly free will is said to co-operate with the grace which worketh salvation, when the free will consenteth, that is to say, is saved; for to consent is to be saved.¹¹ It followeth that the spirit of a brute can in no wise receive such salvation, for it lacketh the faculty of free consent whereby it may submissively obey the God that saveth it, whether by acquiescing in His commands, or by believing His promises, or by rendering thanks for His benefits. But consent of the will is one thing; natural appetite is another.¹² The latter, indeed, is common to us with the irrational animals; nor hath it the power of giving consent to the spirit,¹³ being ensnared by the attractions of the flesh. And perhaps it is this of which the Apostle speaketh under another name as “The wisdom of the flesh,” where he saith: “The wisdom of the flesh is at enmity with God; for it is not subject to the law of God, as indeed it cannot be.”¹⁴ Having then (as I have said) this appetite in common with the brutes, it is voluntary consent which distinguisheth us from the same. It is a habit of the mind, self-determining. Voluntary consent is not under compulsion, nor can it be extorted. It is an act of the will; it is not subject to necessity; it neither denieth itself nor yieldeth itself to any, save only willingly.¹⁵ Otherwise, if it can be compelled to act when it would not, it is subject to force and not voluntary. But where there is not an act of will, there is not consent, for consent cannot be other than an act of will. Where, therefore, there is consent, there is an act of will. Moreover, where there is an act of will, there is freedom. In this sense it is that I understand the term free will.

In order that what is said may be made plain, and that we may the more completely attain unto the end we seek, it needeth, I think, that we go somewhat further back in our enquiry. In the material world life is not the same thing as sense-perception; nor sense-perception as appetite; nor appetite as consent. This will be the more plain if we define each of these. There is in every corporeal being¹ a life, which is an internal and natural movement, energizing only within the confines of such a being.² Whereas sense-perception, which is a movement in the body and proper to its life, energizes outside its confines.³ The natural appetite, however, is an active force in the living being, whose function it is to move the senses to self-gratification.⁴ But consent is spontaneous assent of the will; or, indeed (as I remember that I have already said), it is a habit of the mind, self-determining.⁵ Further, will is a movement of reason, and rules over both sense-perception and appetite.⁶ In fact will, in whatever direction it determine itself, always hath reason as its companion, we may say, as its follower: not that it is always moved by reason, but that it never moveth without reason, in such a way that it doth many things by means of reason against reason, that is to say, as it were by the aid of its ministry but against its advice or judgement.⁷ Whence we read: “ The children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light,"⁸ and again: "They are wise to do evil."⁹ For no creature can be intelligent, even in wrong doing, save only by the aid of reason.

But reason hath been given to the will in order to instruct it, not to destroy it. It would, however, destroy it, were it to impose upon it such necessity that it could not freely of its own choice determine itself, whether by wrongly consenting either to the appetite or to some evil spirit¹⁰ (in which case it would be merely animal, incapable of perceiving, in any case, of following after, the things which belong to the Spirit of God), or by accepting the leading of grace unto well-doing, and thus becoming that spiritual will which judgeth all things, but is itself judged of none.¹¹ If, I say, the will were unable, owing to the prohibition of reason to take either of these courses, then it would cease to be the will. For where necessity is there is not free will.¹² But if right or wrong could be done under compulsion, and without the consent of free will, in such case a reasonable creature ought indeed, on no valid ground, to suffer the doom of misery, nor could it fully enjoy blessedness, seeing that that faculty in it, which alone is capable either of misery or of blessedness, namely, the will, would be lacking. The aforesaid life, sense-perception, appetite, plainly do not of themselves produce either misery or blessedness; otherwise would the plants which possess life, and the beasts which possess the remaining two attributes also, be either liable to misery or fit for blessedness, which is altogether impossible. We possess, therefore, on the one hand, life in common with the plants, and on the other hand, as well as life, sense-perception and appetite in common with the beasts, while that which distinguisheth us from both is what is called will. And it is consent of the will, free, not necessitated, which, seeing that in it consisteth our righteousness or unrighteousness, maketh us deservedly blessed or the reverse. Such consent, then, on account both of the inalienable freedom of the will, and of the inevitable judgement which reason everywhere and at all times exerciseth when we act,¹³ is not (as I think), unfittingly called free choice,¹⁴ being self-determining on account of the will, and self-judging on account of the reason. And rightly doth judgement accompany freedom, seeing that he that is free to determine himself, when he sinneth, judgeth himself. There is a judicial sentence passed, because, if he sinneth, he, who need not sin unless he would, justly suffereth what he would not.¹⁵

Moreover, were the will not acknowledged to be free, how could either good or evil justly be imputed to it? Necessity, indeed, removeth responsibility for both of these.

Further, where necessity is, there is not freedom; where freedom is not, there is neither merit,¹⁶ nor its correlative, judgement, excluding altogether original sin, which it is agreed is of a different order from personal sin. Thus it remaineth that whatsoever hath not this liberty of free consent, undoubtedly can neither merit nor be subject to judgement.¹⁷ Therefore, save only the will, all that belongeth to man, seeing that it is incapable of self-determination, is a matter neither for the award of merit nor for judgement. Life, sense-perception, appetite, memory, thought,¹⁸ and anything else of such kind that there may be, are subject to necessity, except in so far as they are subject to the will.¹⁹ But it is impossible for the will, which cannot of its very nature do otherwise than obey itself (for there is none who doth not will what he willeth, or who willeth what he doth not will), to be deprived of its freedom. The will can, indeed, be changed, but only to another will,²⁰ in such a way that it never loseth its freedom. Therefore it can no more be deprived of its freedom than it can be deprived of itself. Were a man ever able either to will nothing at all,²¹ or to will anything unwillingly, then and then only would the will be able to be deprived of its freedom. Hence it is that to the insane, to infants, and also to persons asleep, nothing which they may do, whether it be good or bad, is imputed; because, plainly, just as they are not in possession of reason, so do they not possess the use of their own wills, and therefore their freedom is not subject to judgement. Seeing, then, that the will hath nothing free save itself, it is only rightly judged as it is in itself. Indeed, neither slowness of intellect, nor lapse of memory, nor restlessness of appetite, nor obtuseness of sense-perception, nor feebleness of vitality, of themselves bring a man into condemnation, even as their contraries do not make him innocent; and this for no other reason than that these conditions are proved to be caused necessarily, and independently of the will.²²

It is the will alone therefore which, seeing that by reason of its innate freedom it is compelled by no necessity either to disagree with itself or to consent in any matter in spite of itself, rightly maketh a man, as being under no compulsion to be either righteous or unrighteous, fittingly capable of blessedness or of misery; provided, that is to say, that it hath given its consent whether to righteousness or to unrighteousness. Accordingly I think that this free consent of the will, upon which (as aforesaid) every act of judgement is founded, is not unsuitably wont to be called, as we have already defined it, free choice, the word "free" having reference to the will, and the word "choice" to the reason. Yet is it not necessarily free with that liberty of which the Apostle speaketh: "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."¹ This is that freedom from sin of which he saith elsewhere: "When ye were the servants of sin ye were free from righteousness. . . . But now being made free from sin, and become servants to God, ye have your fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life."² But who is there in the sinful flesh that can claim for himself freedom from sin? Of this liberty free choice can, I think, by no means rightly be said to be possessed.³ There is also a freedom from misery of which the Apostle speaketh likewise: "The creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God."⁴ But doth any man claim to possess such freedom in this our mortal state? Therefore we rightly refuse to call the will free in respect of this freedom. But there is a freedom which, I think, is more proper to the will, and of which we can speak as freedom from necessity, on the ground that what is necessary seemeth to be the contrary of what is free, in the sense that what is done of necessity is not freely done; and the converse.

Seeing therefore that, as may have occurred to us, there is set before us a threefold freedom, that from sin, that from misery, and that from necessity; the last of these is bestowed upon us in the state of nature, the first is restored to us by grace, and the second is reserved for us in the fatherland.⁵ Let us then call that which is first in order of development the freedom of nature, that which is second, the freedom of grace, and that which is third, the freedom of life or of glory. By the first were we created with freedom of will to choose as we will, creatures ennobled for the service of God; by the second are we restored to innocence, newly created in Christ; by the third are we raised to the state of glory, creatures perfected in the Spirit. Thus the first freedom hath great honour, the second hath more abundant virtue, the last hath super-abundant delight.

It is indeed in virtue of the first that we rule the brutes; in virtue of the second that we subdue the flesh; in virtue of the third that we overcome death; or, let us say, just as in the gift of the first freedom God put under our feet sheep and oxen and the beasts of the field, so also by means of the second freedom He in like manner casteth down and crusheth beneath our feet those spiritual beasts of this world,⁶ of which it is said: “ Deliver not to the beasts the souls that confess to Thee.”⁷ Finally, in the third state of freedom, when He shall have fully subdued us to ourselves by means of victory over corruption and over death, when, that is to say, the last enemy, death, shall have been destroyed, then shall we pass unto the glorious freedom of the sons of God, the freedom wherewith Christ shall make us free when He shall deliver us over as His kingdom to God, even the Father.⁸ It was of this freedom, as also of that which we have called freedom from sin, that, as I think, He spake, when He said unto the Jews: “ If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.”⁹ He would signify that free choice needeth a liberator; but plainly not a liberator from necessity of which, by the very fact that it is the function of the will,¹⁰ it could know nothing; but a liberator from sin, into which it freely and of itself had fallen, and at the same time from the penalty of sin, which it had heedlessly incurred and was unwillingly bearing, from neither of which could it at all be set free, save only by means of Him Who alone of men was made free among the dead;¹¹ free, that is to say, from sin, yet living in the midst of sinners.

For He alone among the sons of Adam claimeth for Himself freedom from sin, “Who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth.”¹² Moreover from misery also, which is the penalty of sin, was He, potentially though not actually, none the less free. No man indeed took away His life; He laid it down of Himself.¹³ Finally, as the prophet beareth witness: “He was offered because He willed so to be”;¹⁴ even as also, when He willed, He was “born of a woman, made under the law, that He might redeem them that were under the law.”¹⁵ Thus was He Himself also subject to the law of misery; but this was because He so willed, in order that, free among the miserable and sinners, He might break the yoke of misery and sin from off the necks of His brethren.¹⁶ Accordingly He possessed in full these three kinds of freedom, the first (that from necessity) in virtue both of His divine and of His human natures,¹⁷ and the rest in virtue of His divine power. Whether, or in what manner, and to what extent, the first man possessed in Paradise these two last-mentioned kinds of freedom we shall see later.

¹We must, however, understand that both these kinds of freedom are possessed in fulness and perfection by the disembodied souls which have been made perfect, even as they are possessed by God and by His Christ and by the angels in heaven. To the holy souls indeed, who have not yet received their bodies, there lacketh something of glory; nevertheless they have no misery. ² Freedom from necessity, however, belongeth to all reasonable creatures, whether evil or good, equally and indifferently with God. Nor is this freedom lost, or diminished, either by sin or by misery; nor is it greater in the righteous than in the unrighteous, or more complete in the angels than in men. For even as by means of grace the consent of the human will is given to well-doing, so that, by the fact that it is willingly given and not unwillingly compelled, it maketh a man freely good and free in well-doing; thus also the consent of the will, when of its own accord turned aside to evil, maketh a man none the less both free and self-determining in evil-doing, being indeed led by his own will and not compelled by any outside force to become evil. And as the angels in heaven, or even God Himself, remain good freely, that is to say, of their own will, and not of any extrinsic necessity; so the devil both fell into evil-doing and persisteth therein equally freely, that is to say, of his own free motion, and not by the compulsion of another. Therefore freedom of will remaineth, even where there is captivity of mind, certainly as fully in the evil as in the good, though in a more ordered state in the good; it remaineth also as completely, after its proper fashion,³ in human creatures as it doth in the Creator, though in Him it is more powerful.

But as to the fact that men are wont to complain, and say: I will to possess a good will and I am unable so to do; this by no means implieth a restriction of its freedom, so that in such a case the will as it were suffereth violence or is subject to necessity; but plainly witnesseth that the will lacketh that freedom which is called freedom from sin. For he that willeth to possess a good will proveth that he possesseth a will, for it is only by means of the will that he willeth to possess a good will; but if he possesseth a will, then hath he freedom, not from sin but from necessity. Truly he perceiveth of himself that he hath not freedom, so as to be able, when he willeth, to possess a good will; freedom, plainly, from sin by which it grieveth him that his will is oppressed, though not suppressed.⁴ Yet without doubt he already hath in some way a good will, when he willeth to possess such a will.⁵ What he willeth is, in fact, good; nor could he will what is good unless by a good will; even as he could not will what is evil unless by an evil will. When we will what is good, that is a good will; when we will what is evil, that is an evil will. In both cases there is will, and everywhere there is freedom: necessity yieldeth to will. But when we cannot do what we will,⁶ we perceive indeed that our freedom is by reason of sin in a certain way miserable,⁷ though not lost.⁸

It is, therefore, simply from this freedom, by which the will is free to judge itself, whether as good, if it have consented to well-doing, or as evil, if to evil-doing (forsooth it perceiveth plainly that it is only by an act of will that it hath consented to either of the two), that we believe free determination to be so called.⁹ For freedom from sin might, perhaps, more fittingly be called free counsel,¹⁰ and freedom from misery free pleasure,¹¹ rather than free determination.¹² As a fact determination is judgement. But just as it belongeth to judgement to distinguish between what may and what may not be allowable, so it belongeth to counsel to show what may and what may not be expedient, and to pleasure to discover what may and what may not be agreeable. Would that we as freely took counsel for our profit as we judge concerning the allowableness of our deeds,¹³ so that, even as by judgement we freely decide as to the allowable and the non-allowable, so by counsel we were free to choose for ourselves the allowable as expedient, and to reject the non-allowable as inexpedient! For in such a case we should be not only free in judgement, but without doubt also free in counsel, and therefore free from sin. But what if either the freedom to approve what is expedient, or the freedom to judge what is allowable, give us also the other kinds of freedom? Should we not then rightly be said to possess free pleasure also, seeing that we should perceive ourselves to be free in the same manner from everything that could displease, that is from all misery? But, as it is; seeing that there are many things which by the judgement we decide ought to be either done or not done, which yet by the counsel we neither approve nor reject in accordance with right judgement; and, again, seeing that not all things which we approve as right and expedient do we also freely welcome as well-pleasing to us, but that rather we impatiently endure them as hard and painful; such being the case, is it sufficiently plain that we possess neither free counsel nor free pleasure.

It is another question whether, even before sin entered in, the first man had free pleasure; this shall be discussed in its proper place. But quite certainly we shall possess it, when by the mercy of God we shall obtain what we pray for when we say: "Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven." For this shall be fulfilled when that which (as hath been said) seemeth to be common everywhere to all reasonable creatures, namely, a will free from necessity, shall be (as it is in the holy angels) both secure from sin and safe from misery in the elect of mankind also, who shall at length prove by the happy experience of a threefold freedom "what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God."¹⁴ Meanwhile, because this hath not yet come to pass, it is freedom of choice¹⁵ alone which in its fulness and integrity man now possesseth. For freedom of counsel existeth but in a measure only, and that in a few spiritual persons, who "have crucified their flesh with its vices and desires,"¹⁶ so that sin may not reign in their mortal body.¹⁷ Thus then that sin doth not reign cometh of freedom of counsel; that sin, however, is not wholly lacking cometh of the captivity of the will.¹⁸ "But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away";¹⁹ that is to say, when the judgement shall be wholly free, there shall no longer be any captivity of the will. And this it is for which every day we pray, when we say unto God: "Thy kingdom come." Not yet is this kingdom fully established amongst us. Nevertheless every day little by little it draweth near, and with sensible increase are its borders daily extended, at least in those whose inward man is by the help of God “renewed from day to day.”²⁰ Therefore in the measure in which the kingdom of grace is extended, in that measure is the power of sin diminished. But in the measure in which, on account of the body of death²¹ which “presseth down the soul,” and on account of the straitened state of our earthly habitation, which indeed “weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things,”²² the kingdom of grace is still restricted, in that measure in this our mortal life even they who seem to be somewhat nigh unto perfection are under necessity of confessing: “In many things we offend all,”²³ and “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.”²⁴ Wherefore it is that they pray without ceasing, saying: “Thy kingdom come.” But this will not be consummated even in them, until not only doth not sin reign in their mortal body,²⁵ but there neither is nor can be any sin at all in the body then immortal.

What now are we to say as regardeth the existence of freedom of pleasure in this wicked world, in which scarcely “sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof”;¹ in which “the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now,”² being indeed “made subject to vanity, not willingly”;³ where the life of man upon the earth consisteth in temptation;⁴ where even spiritual men, who “already have received the firstfruits of the Spirit, even they groan within themselves waiting for the redemption of their bodies”?⁵ Can it at all be that, under such conditions, there is any place for freedom of the kind of which we speak? For neither will innocence, nor righteousness, be found to be safe either from sin or yet from misery in a world in which the righteous man crieth out: “O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?”⁶ and again: “My tears have been my meat day and night.”⁷ Where nights and days are passed in mourning, there surely is no time to spare for taking pleasure. Finally, they that would live godly in Christ themselves suffer persecution the more;⁸ for judgement beginneth at the house of God.⁹ Which also He commandeth, saying: “ Begin at them of my household.”¹⁰

But although virtue be in no place of safety in this world, perchance vice is, and in some measure enjoyeth pleasure and escapeth misery. Far from it. For they that rejoice where they have done evil, and exult in deeds of infamy, do but laugh with the wild laughter of the mad.¹¹ But no misery is more genuine than is false joy. In short, what in this world seemeth to be happiness is so far misery, that the wise man saith: “ It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to go to the house of feasting.”¹² There is certainly some pleasure in the good things of the body, namely, in eating, drinking, warming oneself, and other the like comforts or coverings of the flesh. But can it be said that even in these matters we are wholly free from misery? Bread is good, but to the hungry; drink delighteth, but the thirsty; in fact, to him that is satisfied food and drink are by no means pleasant, but distasteful. Take away hunger, and thou wilt not relish bread; take away thirst, and thou wilt decline the most limpid fountain as though it were a stagnant marsh. In like manner is it only he that is faint with heat that seeketh shade; and only he that is chilled or in the gloom troubleth himself about the sun.¹³ None of these things will be pleasing to a man unless urgent need have gone before. If the need be taken away, then the very pleasantness which seemeth to be in them is turned into loathing and disgust.¹⁴ It must be confessed, therefore, that, in this respect, everything which belongeth unto our present life, partaketh of misery; unless it be that, in the continual trials of our heavier labours, our lighter labours are, as it were, a kind of consolation, and, while perchance, as time passeth and conditions change, tedium and relief follow one upon another, the experience of the lesser labours seemeth unto us to be some reprieve from misery, so that sometimes the passage from the more painful to the less irksome toil is counted for felicity.

And yet it must be confessed that they who, at times rapt in spirit through excess of contemplation, are in some small measure able to taste the sweetness of heavenly felicity, are indeed, as often as they experience such a state, free from misery. Plainly these, as cannot be denied, even in the flesh, although but seldom and only in their raptures, enjoy freedom of pleasure, in that with Mary they “have chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from them.”¹⁵ For they that now possess what cannot be taken away from them in truth have experience of that which is to come. But that which is to come is felicity. Moreover felicity and misery cannot exist together at the same moment. As often therefore as they partake of the former, so often do they not feel the latter. Accordingly it is only contemplatives who in this life are in any degree able to enjoy freedom of pleasure, and that but in part, in very small part, and upon the rarest occasion.¹⁶ Beyond this there are even some righteous persons who enjoy freedom of counsel, in part certainly, but in considerable part.¹⁷ For the rest, freedom of will (as hath been plainly shown above) belongeth equally to all who have the use of reason; as such, it is none the less in the evil than in the good, it is as entire in the present world as in the world to come.¹⁸

It hath, I think, been sufficiently shown that this freedom of will is yet in certain fashion held captive, so long as the other two kinds of freedom scarcely at all, or only in a small measure, accompany it; and that from no other cause than the lack of these two kinds of freedom ariseth that defect of ours of which the Apostle speaketh, saying: “ So that ye cannot do the things that ye would.”¹ To will indeed belongeth to us in virtue of free choice, but not also the power to do what we will. I do not speak of willing what is good, nor of willing what is evil, but merely of willing. For to will what is good is a moral success, to will what is evil is a moral failure. But the simple act of willing, that it is which either succeedeth or faileth. Further, it is creative grace which gave existence to the will; it is saving grace which giveth it moral success; it is the will itself which bringeth about its own moral failure. Accordingly, free choice maketh us possessed of will; grace maketh us possessed of good will. It is in virtue of free choice that we will, it is in virtue of grace that we will what is good. For even as it is one thing simply to fear, and another thing to fear God; one thing simply² to love and another thing to love God (indeed, the terms fear and love, considered merely in the abstract, signify affections, but with the addition of the object³ they signify virtues); so also is it one thing to will and another thing to will what is good.⁴

The affections, truly, considered simply in themselves, belong to us by nature; in a certain sense they originate from ourselves; that they are directed towards their proper objects is due to grace. Nor, indeed, is the case otherwise than that grace ordereth aright what creation hath bestowed, so that the virtues are none else than the affections rightly ordered. It is written concerning certain men that "there they were in great fear, where no fear was."⁵ There was fear, but it was unregulated fear. The Lord wished to regulate it aright in His disciples, when He said: "I will show you whom ye ought to fear";⁶ so also David saith: "Come, ye children, hearken unto me: I will teach you the fear of the Lord."⁷ Thus, too, did the Lord rebuke men for unregulated love, saying: "I came as the light into this world, and men loved darkness rather than light."⁸ Therefore⁹ is it that the bride prayeth in the Song of Songs: "Order love in me aright."¹⁰ In like manner also were they rebuked for an unregulated will, to whom it was said: "Ye know not what ye ask."¹¹ But they were taught to lead back the perverted will into the way of righteousness, when they heard: "Are ye able to drink of the cup that I am about to drink of?"¹² Then indeed by word, but afterward by example also, He taught them to order the will aright, when, praying, in the hour of His passion, that the cup might pass from Him, He added immediately: "Nevertheless not what I will, but what Thou wilt."¹³ Therefore we have received from God in the state of nature the power to will, in the same way as we have received the power to fear and the power to love, so that thus we might be simply created beings;¹⁴ but to will what is good, even as to fear and to love God, we receive by the visitation of grace, so that thus we may become (not simply creatures but) God's creatures.

In a certain manner then, created as our own possession for freedom of will, by means of goodness of will we are made God's possession.¹⁵ Moreover it is He that made the will free, Who also maketh it good; and to this end doth He make it good "that we may be a kind of firstfruits of His creatures":¹⁶ since, better were it for us not to have existed at all than for us to remain always our own possession. For they, who willed to be their own possession, became indeed "as gods, knowing good and evil";¹⁷ but they did not then belong only to themselves, they belonged to the devil also. Accordingly free will maketh us our own; evil will maketh us the devil's; good will maketh us God's. This is the meaning of the words: "The Lord knoweth them that are His."¹⁸ For to them that are not His He saith: "Verily I say unto you, I know you not."¹⁹ When, therefore, by reason of evil will we belong to the devil, in a certain sense we do not meanwhile belong to God:²⁰ even as when by reason of good will we become God's possession, we then cease to be the devil's; seeing that "No man can serve two masters."²¹ For the rest, whether we belong to God or to the devil, we do not cease to belong to ourselves also. Indeed free will remaineth to us in either case, whereby there remaineth also the ground of merit; so that deservedly we are either punished as evil persons, who have of their own will freely become such, or glorified as good, which equally we cannot be save only as free agents. In truth it is our own will, and not the power of God, which delivereth us over to the devil: it is God's grace, and not our own will, which maketh us subject to God.²² Our will, of course, was (as must be confessed) created good by the good God; it will not, however, be perfect until it hath been perfectly subjected to its Creator.²³ But far be it from us to ascribe to the will itself its own perfection, while we ascribe to God its creation only; seeing that, without doubt it is better for it to be perfect than for it to have been simply made; and that, indeed, it seemeth to be blasphemy to ascribe to God the lesser, and to ourselves the more excellent work.²⁴ Finally the Apostle, perceiving what was of nature, and what was to be expected of grace, said: “ To will is present with me, but how to will perfectly I find not.”²⁵ He knew for a fact that he was able to will, as possessing free choice; but that, in order that he might will perfectly, he was in need of grace. For if to will what is evil is, as it were, a failure of the will, then to will what is good must be a success of the will; for the will, however, to be able to will everything that is good is its perfection.²⁶

In order, therefore, to the perfection of that will of ours, which we possess in virtue of free choice, we stand in need of a twofold gift of grace, namely, both wisdom, which is the conversion of the will to what is good, and also full power, which is its establishing in the good.²⁷ Now perfect conversion is conversion to what is good, to the end that nothing may be pleasing save only what is fitting, or what is lawful; perfect establishing in the good is to the end that nothing which is thus pleasing may any longer be lacking. Then at length shall the will be perfect, when it shall have become both completely good and well satisfied.²⁸ The will possesseth, certainly, a twofold goodness from the beginning of its existence; the one, a general goodness derived from the mere fact of its creation, in that it could not have been created other than good by the good God, for “ God saw all that He had made, and it was very good ”;²⁹ the other, a special goodness derived from the freedom of choice, in virtue of which it was made even after the image of Him Who created it. Suppose now that to these two goods be added a third, its conversion to its Creator; then not unfittingly will the will be counted perfectly good; good, without doubt, as a mere created thing, better by reason of its special gift of freedom, best by reason of its being regulated aright.³⁰ But the regulation of the will consisteth in its conversion in every single respect to God, in its entire and free devotion and submission to Him. To such perfect righteousness, however, is rightly due, nay, indeed, is actually joined the fulness of glory; for these two things are so united the one to the other that the perfection of righteousness cannot be possessed, save only in the fulness of glory; nor can there be fulness of glory apart from perfect righteousness. Finally, as a matter of due merit, there can be no such righteousness apart from glory, seeing that there can be no true glory which is not derived from such righteousness; wherefore it is rightly said: "Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled."³¹

But these are those two gifts of which we have above spoken, namely, true wisdom and full power; thus wisdom concerneth righteousness, and power concerneth glory. The terms "true" and "full" are added, the one in order to distinguish from the wisdom of the flesh, which is death,³² as well as from the wisdom of the world, which is foolishness with God, and by which men are wise in their own sight,³³ "wise," I mean, "to do evil";³⁴ the other, in order to distinguish from them of whom it is said: "Mighty men shall be mightily tormented.”³⁵ For neither true wisdom nor full power are to be found at all, except there are joined to the free will those two possessions, to which we have earlier referred, namely, freedom of counsel and freedom of pleasure. I should say that, certainly, he alone possesseth true wisdom and full power, who is at last able not only to will in virtue of free choice, but also to will perfectly in virtue of the remaining two kinds of freedom,³⁶ seeing that he can no longer will what is evil, nor fail in the attainment of what he wills; of which results the one, namely, true wisdom, cometh of freedom of counsel, and the other, namely, full power, cometh of freedom of pleasure.³⁷ But who would dare to boast, because man hath it within his reach to become such and so great as this? Where, or when, is such an end attained? Surely, not in this world, is it? Were any disposed so to boast, he would be greater than Paul, who confesseth, saying: “How to will perfectly I find not.”³⁸ Was Adam in Paradise such and so great as this? Surely, had it been so, never would he have been an exile³⁹ therefrom.

It is now the place to consider a question which we have so far deferred, namely, whether the first man possessed in Paradise those three kinds of freedom of which we have spoken, that is to say, freedom of choice, of counsel and of pleasure, or, in other words, freedom from necessity, from sin, and from misery, in all their fullness; or but two of them, or only one. And indeed, concerning the first of these, there is now no question, if we remember how plainly higher reason hath taught us that it is equally the possession of the righteous and of sinners. Concerning the remaining two it may not improperly be asked whether Adam ever possessed either both, or so much as one of them? For, if he possessed neither of them at all, what is it that he lost? Freedom of choice, at any rate, he always preserved intact both before and after his sin. If he lost nothing, in what did he suffer by being cast out of Paradise? But if he lost either one of them, how did he lose it? What is certain is that, from the time that he sinned, thenceforward, so long as he remained in the flesh, he was free neither from sin nor from misery. But again, he could in no measure have lost either of these freedoms, when he had once received it;¹ otherwise he cannot be proved to have possessed in their perfection either wisdom or power, as we have above defined them, for he would have been able both to will what he ought not to have willed and to receive what he was not willing to receive.² Or should it rather be said that, in a certain measure, he possessed wisdom and power, but that, because he did not possess them in their fullness, he was able to lose them?³ For, indeed, each of these hath two degrees, a higher and a lower. The higher degree of freedom of counsel is not to be able to sin; the lower degree is to be able not to sin.⁴ So also the higher degree of freedom of pleasure is not to be able to be disturbed; the lower degree is to be able not to be disturbed.⁵ Accordingly [the first] man received at his creation the lower degrees of both kinds of freedom together with full freedom of choice, and, when he fell into sin, lost the two former. But he fell from the state of being able not to sin into that of not being able not to sin, having wholly lost freedom of counsel.⁶ So too did man fall from the state of being able not to be disturbed into that of not being able not to be disturbed, having wholly lost freedom of pleasure. There remained to him only freedom of choice, and that subject to punishment, in that by its means he lost the other kinds of freedom; but it he could not lose. Having, indeed, by his own will become the servant of sin, deservedly he lost freedom of counsel. Further, having by reason of sin become liable to pay the penalty of death, how was he any longer able to keep possession of freedom of pleasure?⁷

Of the three kinds of freedom, therefore, which he had received, Adam, by the abuse of that which is called freedom of choice, deprived himself of the rest. But he abused it by the fact that, when he had received it for his glory, he made of it his disgrace, according to the testimony of the Scripture which saith: "Man when he was in honour, had no understanding; he was compared unto the foolish beasts, and become like unto them."⁸ To man alone, amongst living creatures, was it given, on account of his prerogative of free choice, to be able to sin. But it was given to him not in order that he should accordingly⁹ sin, but in order that, if he did not sin when he was able to have sinned, he might appear more glorious. For what could have redounded more to his glory, than if it could have been said of him, as the Scripture runneth: “ Who is he, and we will praise him? ” Why is he thus praiseworthy? “ For wondrous things he did while he lived.” What things? “ Who was able to transgress,” it saith, “ yet did he not transgress; to do evil yet did he not do evil.”¹⁰ This honour, then, he preserved so long as he did not sin; when he sinned he lost it. But he sinned, because he was free to sin; nor was he free otherwise than by virtue of freedom of choice, whence it was indeed that he had in him the possibility of sinning. Yet was it not the fault of Him who gave him free choice, but of himself who abused it, in that plainly he converted to the use of sinning the faculty which he had received for the glory of not sinning.¹¹ For although he sinned by means of the power which he received, he did not sin because he possessed the power to do so, but because he willed to do so. For, when the devil and his angels sinned, the rest also of the angels did not sin; not because they were not able to sin, but because they did not will to sin.¹²

Man’s fall, when he sinned, is to be ascribed, therefore, not to the gift of the power to sin, but to the fault of the will. Nevertheless, though he fell by an act of will, he hath it not equally in his power by an act of will to rise again free from sin; because although there was given to the will the power so to stand that it should not fall,¹³ there was not given it the power to rise again, if it fell. For not so easy is it to get out of a pit as it is to fall into it. By an act of will alone man fell into the pit of sin; but no act of will is sufficient to enable him to rise again, seeing that now, even if he so will, he is not able not to sin.¹⁴

What then? Hath free choice perished, because man is not able not to sin? By no means: but man hath lost free counsel, by means of which he before possessed the power not to sin; he lost it, moreover, in such a manner that, because he is not able indeed any longer not to be disturbed, it befalleth him in his wretched state to have lost also freedom of pleasure, by means of which he before possessed also the power of being able not to be disturbed.¹ There remaineth, therefore, even after sin, freedom of choice, which, although in a state of misery,² is yet intact. And the fact that man is not able of himself to shake himself free of the bondage of sin, or of misery, doth not signify the destruction of freedom of choice, but privation of the two remaining kinds of freedom. For there neither belongeth, nor ever hath belonged, to freedom of choice, as such, to possess either power or wisdom, but merely will: it maketh us neither able, nor wise, but simply willing.³ Therefore we are not to be thought to have lost freedom of choice, if we cease to be either powerful or wise,⁴ but only if we cease to be willing. For where there is not will, there is not freedom. I do not say, if we ceased to will what is good, but if we ceased to will at all: it must be allowed without contradiction that, when the will—not goodness of will—no longer existeth, then also freedom of choice is lost. But if the case be that the will is merely unable to will what is good, it meaneth that it lacketh, not freedom of choice, but freedom of counsel. Again, if the will be unable, not indeed to will what is good, but to perform the good which it willeth,⁵ then let it be assured that it lacketh freedom of pleasure, not that it hath lost freedom of choice. If, then, freedom of choice everywhere accompanieth the will, in such a way that, unless the will wholly cease to be itself, it lacketh it not, but alike in evil and in good remaineth the will; thus none the less doth free choice also abide in its fulness whether in evil or in good. And as the will, even when in the state of misery,⁶ doth not cease to be the will, but is called, and is, the miserable will, as it is also called, and is, the blessed will;⁷ so also can neither any adversity, nor necessity, either destroy or (so far as in it lieth)⁸ in any degree lessen freedom of choice.⁹

But, although free choice remaineth everywhere equally without any diminution, nevertheless it will not find itself able of itself to revive from an evil to a good state, after the same fashion in which of itself it was able to fall from a good into an evil state.¹⁰ And what wonder is it if one that lieth prone be not able of himself to rise again, seeing that when standing upright he was unable by any effort of his own to advance to a better position? In fine, while freedom of choice still in some measure had with it the other two kinds of freedom, it was unable from the lower vantage ground of them to rise to higher levels, that is to say, to rise from the states of being able not to sin and being able not to be disturbed to those of not being able to sin and not being able to be disturbed: but if, even however aided by those other two kinds of freedom, it yet was not strong enough to advance from the good to the better, how much less, now that it is deprived of them, will it be able of itself to escape from evil to the good in which it stood of old?¹¹

Man, therefore, hath need of “the power of God, and the wisdom of God,”¹² even Christ, in order that, by reason of the fact that He is wisdom, He may reinfuse into him true wisdom,¹³ and thus restore to him the state of freedom of counsel, and in order that, by reason of the fact that He is power, He may re-establish in him full power, and thus restore to him the state of freedom of pleasure; in such a measure that, being in virtue of the one perfectly good, he may no longer know sin, and, being in virtue of the other completely blessed, he may suffer no adversity. But in truth it is in the future life that such perfection as this is to be expected, when both kinds of freedom now lost will be restored¹⁴ to free choice; not merely in the measure in which in this world they are restored to any righteous person, however perfect he may be; nor merely in the measure in which it was granted even to our first parents to possess them in Paradise; but as already now the angels possess them in heaven.¹⁵ Meanwhile, however, let it suffice in this body of death, and in this evil world,¹⁶ that by freedom of counsel we obey not sin in lust,¹⁷ while by freedom of pleasure we fear not to suffer adversity for righteousness' sake.¹⁸ But, in this sinful flesh and in this evil day, if not wholly to lack, certainly not to consent to sin, this is in no small measure to be wise; and, if not yet wholly to enjoy felicity, at least for truth's sake manfully to endure contempt, this is in no small measure to be powerful.¹⁹

Truly it behoveth us here, meanwhile, by freedom of counsel to learn no longer to abuse freedom of choice, in order that in the future we may be able fully to enjoy freedom of pleasure. Thus, indeed, we are restoring in ourselves the image of God; thus by means of grace we are being prepared to win that ancient honour which we lost through sin. And blessed is he who shall deserve to hear it said concerning himself: “ Who is he, and we will praise him? For he did wondrous things while he lived; he was able to transgress, yet did he not transgress; to do evil, yet did he not do evil.”²⁰

Now I think that in these three kinds of freedom consist the very image and the likeness of the Creator, in which we were created; that the image indeed consisteth in freedom of choice, while in the remaining two kinds of freedom is revealed a certain two-sided likeness.¹ Hence it is, perhaps, that freedom of choice alone suffereth not at all any defect or diminution of itself, because it is in it above all else that, as it were, may be seen impressed the substantial image of the eternal and unchangeable Godhead.² For although it had a beginning, yet it knoweth not destruction; neither hath it any increase from righteousness or from glory, nor doth it suffer any diminution from sin or from misery.³ What is there that, while it is not eternal, is more like unto eternity than is this? Further in the other two kinds of freedom, seeing that they can be not only partly diminished, but also wholly lost, we recognize as it were a likeness of divine wisdom, and a likeness of divine power, added to the divine image.⁴ Finally we have lost them both by sin, and we have recovered them both by grace; and every day, indeed, we either advance in them, or we fall back from them, some of us more, others of us less. They can also be so lost that they cannot any longer be recovered; and they can be so possessed that they can never at any time be either lost or diminished.

In this two-sided divine likeness of wisdom and of power, not indeed in its highest degree, but in that which is next to the highest, was man created in Paradise. For what is nearer to the state of not being able to sin, or to be disturbed (in which without doubt the holy angels are now confirmed, and in which God always exists), than that of being able not to sin and not to be disturbed, in which, we know, man was created? And he—nay, rather, we in him and with him,⁵ having by means of sin fallen from this state, have by means of grace received again, not indeed the very same degree thereof, but in place of it a certain lower degree. For we are not able to exist here in this world entirely without sin, or without misery; although we are able, by the aid of grace, to avoid being overcome by sin, or by misery. Nevertheless Scripture saith: "Whatsoever is born of God, sinneth not."⁶ But this is said of them that are predestined unto life, not meaning that they do not sin at all, but that sin is not imputed unto them, being either punished by befitting penance, or in love put utterly away.⁷ "Love," indeed, "covereth a multitude of sins,"⁸ and "Blessed are they whose unrighteousnesses are forgiven, and whose sins are covered."⁹ The angels therefore are in the highest, not the lowest grade, of the divine likeness, we are in the lowest; Adam was in the intermediate grade; the evil spirits, again, are in no such grade at all.¹⁰ To the angels in heaven then it was granted to endure to the end without sin and without misery; but to Adam it was granted to exist without these, though not also to continue to exist without them;¹¹ to us,¹² however, it was not granted even to exist without them, but only not to be overcome by them. For the rest, the devil and his angels, even as they never have the will to resist sin, so are they never able to escape the penalty of sin.

Seeing, therefore, that these two kinds of freedom, freedom of counsel and freedom of pleasure, by means of which wisdom and power are supplied to reasonable creatures, do, by the dispensation of God, vary according as He willeth, in respect of certain causes, places and times—so that on earth they are possessed but in very small measure; in heaven fully; in the intermediate state moderately; in hell not at all—whereas freedom of choice, wherewith reasonable beings were created, is in no degree whatsoever changed by their condition, but (so far as it is free choice) is always equally possessed in heaven, on earth, and in hell; (seeing that this is so) it is only fitting that the two former should be held to be the divine likeness, and the latter the divine image. And indeed that in hell both kinds of freedom, which belong to the divine likeness, have perished, the authority of Scripture testifieth. For that there true wisdom which cometh, we know, of freedom of counsel, doth not exist at all that passage showeth, where we read: “Whatsoever thy hand can do, do it with all thy might: for there is neither work, nor judgement, nor wisdom in the lower world, whither thou hastenest.”¹³ Moreover, concerning power, which is granted by means of freedom of pleasure, the Gospel saith as followeth: "Bind him hand and foot, cast him into outer darkness."¹⁴ For what is binding of the hands and feet, if not complete deprivation of power?

But some one saith: How cometh it that there is not any wisdom there, where the ills that are suffered compel repentance for the ills that have been wrought? Surely it cannot be either that in torment a man cannot repent, or that to repent of evil is not true wisdom? Now this objection would rightly be raised, were it the case that what is punished is merely the deed of sin, and not also the evil will.¹⁵ Certainly there is no doubt but that no one in torment delighteth¹⁶ to repeat an act of sin. But if, even in torment, the will remaineth evil, what value hath the abnegation of an evil act, that any man should therefore be accounted wise simply because now in the midst of the flames he taketh no delight in riotous living? In a word: "Into a soul that willeth evil wisdom shall not enter."¹⁷ Whence, however, shall we prove that even in that state, in which the lost are punished, the will remaineth evil? To omit all else, certainly they are unwilling to be punished. But it is right that they should be punished, who have done things deserving of punishment. Therefore they do not will what is right. He, however, who doth not will what is right, hath not a righteous will. By the fact then that his will doth not consent to what is righteous it is unrighteous, and thus also evil. Two things there are, either of which proveth a will to be wicked; namely, that it pleaseth it to sin, and that it pleaseth it to have sinned with impunity (in the past). Thus to take pleasure in sin so long as it is possible to sin; and, when it is no longer possible, to will that sin remain unpunished; what of true wisdom is there in this? What good will does this show? But granted that it repenteth the lost to have sinned, can we say that the will is yet good if, were the choice given to it, it preferreth to continue in sin rather than to endure the punishment of sin?¹⁸ The former is a wrong choice, the latter is a righteous. But when would a good will choose rather what is wrong than what is right? Besides, they do not truly repent, who do not so much grieve that they have lived unto themselves as that now no longer are they able to live unto themselves. Finally, a man's outward state revealeth his inward state. For so long as the body is in flames of torment, so long is it plain that the will persisteth in wickedness.¹⁹ Accordingly, among the lost there is nothing whatever of that likeness of God, which consisteth in freedom of counsel and freedom of pleasure; nor can there be; yet, by reason of freedom of choice the image of God abideth there immovably.

¹But in this world the likeness could nowhere reasonably be found, nay, rather the divine image would here still lie filthy and defaced, were it not that the woman of whom the Gospel tells should light her candle; that is to say, unless He who is Wisdom were to appear in the flesh, and turn inside out the house of sins and seek again the piece which He had lost,² namely, His own image, which, despoiled of its native beauty, encrusted with the filth of sin lay hidden as it were in the very dust; and when found, should cleanse it to its first fair state again, making it like unto the saints in glory; nay, rather, should make it in all respects like unto Himself, when the word of Scripture should be fulfilled, which saith: "We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is."³ And, in truth, whom did such a work befit better than the Son of God? Who seeing that He is the effulgence of the Father's glory, and the essential form of His very being, upholding the universe by His word,⁴ manifested Himself, endowed with full power for the twofold work of restoring what was deformed and strengthening what was weak; putting to flight the darkness of sin by the effulgence of His Godhead,⁵ and restoring wisdom; and by the virtue of His word giving power against the tyranny of evil spirits.⁶

He came, therefore, the very essential form⁷ (of God), to Whom the free choice (of man) had to be conformed:⁸ for, in order that it might receive again its original form, it needed to be reformed from the same source from which it had been formed.⁹ But the form is Wisdom; the conformation consisteth in the image doing that work in the human body which the form doth in the whole world.¹⁰ Now that Wisdom “reacheth from one end to another mightily, and sweetly doth it order all things.”¹¹ It “reacheth from one end to another,” that is to say, from the highest heaven to the depths of earth; from the greatest angel to the very least of worms. But it “reacheth mightily,” not indeed by digressive motion or by local diffusion, nor merely by official administration of created life, its subject; rather by a certain essential¹² and omnipresent strength, whereby indeed He¹³ moveth, ordereth, and governeth the whole universe most potently.¹⁴ And all this He doeth by no necessity that compelleth Him.¹⁵ Nor in these matters doth He work with any difficulty; but, with a tranquil will, He “ordereth all things sweetly.”¹⁶ In very truth He “reacheth from one end to another,” that is, from the origin of created life even unto the end appointed for it by the Creator; whether it be the end to which fallen nature impels it, or that which judgement hastens, or that which grace concedes.¹⁷ He “reacheth from one end to another mightily,” seeing that none of these ends is reached, that He doth not foreordain it, as He willeth, by the power of His providence.¹⁸

Therefore let free choice seek to rule its own body, even as Wisdom ruleth the world; itself also reaching “from one end to another mightily,” to wit, giving its commands to each sense and to each member with such authority that it allow not sin to reign in its mortal body, nor yield its members as weapons to iniquity, but rather present them for the service of righteousness.¹⁹ Thus no longer will the man be the servant of sin, when he doeth not sin;²⁰ from which indeed set free,²¹ he will now begin to recover freedom of counsel and to vindicate his dignity, while he clotheth himself with a likeness befitting the divine image in himself, yea, restoreth his ancient comely state. But let him take heed that he do this not less “sweetly” than “mightily”; that is to say, “not of sorrow or of necessity,”²² which is but the beginning, and not the fulness of wisdom;²³ nay, rather, with a ready and a cheerful will, which maketh a sacrifice accepted, seeing that “ God loveth a cheerful giver.”²⁴ And thus in all things he will follow the example of Wisdom, both withstanding vice “ mightily,” and being “ sweetly ” at rest in conscience.

But in truth we need also the help of Him by whose example we are incited to such conduct as this; in order, plainly, that by means of Him we may be conformed unto Him, and be “ transformed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord.”²⁵ Therefore if it be by the Spirit of the Lord that this is brought about, it is no longer by free choice.²⁶ Let no one then think that free choice is so called because with equal power or facility it concerneth itself with good and evil;²⁷ seeing that it was indeed able to fall by means of itself, but not to rise again, save by means of the Spirit of the Lord.²⁸ Otherwise neither God, nor the holy angels—for they are in such sense good, as not to be able to be evil; nor, again, the fallen angels—for they are in such sense evil, as not to be able to be good—could be said to possess freedom of choice. Nor, moreover, shall we lose free freedom of choice after the general resurrection, when, undoubtedly, we shall have been inseparably associated, some of us with the good, other of us with the evil, angels. For the rest, neither God nor the devil lacketh freedom of choice; for it is no weak necessity, but a will strong in the good, and a free strength of purpose, which maketh it impossible for the former to be evil;²⁹ and that the latter is unable to long after the good³⁰ no violent force of another effecteth but his own will, stubborn in evil, and his own free obstinacy. Therefore, then, freedom of choice is so called rather because, whether in doing good or in doing evil, it maketh the will equally free; for neither ought, nor can, any man be said to be either good or bad, except in so far as he is willingly such. On this reasoning he will fittingly be said to be equally situated towards good and towards evil, because plainly he has—not, indeed, equal facility in preferring³¹ but—equal freedom in willing the one or the other.³²

Truly, as hath been said, by this prerogative of divine¹ dignity the Creator hath singularly honoured the reasonable creature; in such fashion that as He Himself was independent, and was good of His own will, and by no necessity imposed by another;² thus it also should in a manner be so far independent, as neither to become evil and justly to be condemned, nor to remain good and deservedly to be rewarded, save only of its own will. Not, however, that its own will could suffice unto it for salvation; but that without its own will it could take no step in the direction of salvation.³ No one, forsooth, is saved against his will. Nor, indeed, is what is said in the Gospel: “No one cometh unto Me, unless My Father draw him”;⁴ and again, in another place: “Compel them to come in,”⁵ at all contrary to this; for, while certainly the loving Father, “Who willeth all to be saved,”⁶ seemeth to draw, or compel, as many as may be; nevertheless, He judgeth no one worthy of salvation, unless He have already found Him willing to be saved. And when He frighteneth men, or smiteth them, His purpose is to make them willing to be saved, not to save them against their will; in so far that, while He changeth the will from evil to good, He doth not take away its freedom, but transfereth its allegiance.⁷ As for being drawn, however, it is not always against their will that men are drawn; for neither the blind, nor the weary, are saddened for being led or borne. Moreover Paul was led by the hand to Damascus,⁸ certainly not against His will. Finally she was indeed most willing, who, in the Song of Songs, made earnest request saying: “ Draw me; because of the savour of thine ointments we will run after thee.”⁹

Then, on the other hand,¹⁰ there is the fact that it is written: “ Each man is tempted by his own lust, having been drawn away and enticed by it ”;¹¹ and also that “ the body which is corrupted presseth down the soul, and the earthy tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things";¹² and that the Apostle saith: "I find another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my members";¹³ all these statements may be thought to imply that the will is under compulsion and deprived of its freedom. But the truth is that however a man may be pressed by temptation, whether from within or from without,¹⁴ his will, so far as concerneth choice, will be always free; in as much as, in spite of everything, it will be free to decide in the matter of its own consent.¹⁵ But so far as concerneth (freedom of) counsel or (freedom of) pleasure, as long as endureth the struggle with concupiscence and with misery,¹⁶ so long indeed doth the will perceive itself to be restricted in its freedom; though not on that account to be evil, save only if it consent to evil. Finally Paul, who complaineth that he is being drawn a captive to the law of sin¹⁷—without doubt by reason that he hath not full freedom of counsel—nevertheless boasteth that the consent of his will is unimpaired, and now in large measure also free in well-doing, saying: “ It is no longer I that do it.”¹⁸ Whence, Paul, this confidence? Because, saith he, “ I consent to the law of God, that it is good ”;¹⁹ and again: “ For I delight in the law of God according to the inner man.”²⁰ The eye being single he presumeth the whole body to be full of light.²¹ The consent of his will being unimpaired, he doth not hesitate to profess that, although drawn by sin and taken captive by misery, he is yet free in well-doing. And in this confidence it is that he concludeth generally: “ There is therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.”²²