De fide catholica

Alan of Lille

De fide catholica

Alan of Lille (1120–1202)

Alan of Lille's De fide catholica contra haereticos sui temporis is a four-book late-twelfth-century exercise in Christian polemic. Written in the scholastic world of Paris and southern France, it organizes arguments against the religious positions Alan associated with Cathars, Waldensians, Jews, and Muslims, using Scripture, patristic authorities, and dialectical reasoning to articulate Catholic doctrine. The work is valuable both as a theological synthesis and as evidence for how learned Latin writers classified and contested religious difference; modern historians caution that its descriptions are polemical constructions, not transparent reports of communities. Schola presents the Latin text and an English translation.

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Prologus I: Ad principem Montispessulani

Liber I: Liber primus.

Against the Albigensians.

Caput I: De collatione gentilium et Christianorum, in materiali et spirituali strenuitate.

Just as it is read in the treatises of the ancients, that the leaders and chiefs of the gentiles, hunting after human glory, nobly destroyed diverse kinds of monsters — as Hercules destroyed Antaeus, Theseus the Minotaur, Jason the fire-breathing Bull, Meleager the immense Boar, Corebus the Stygian monster, Perseus the sea monster — so the noble leaders of the holy Church have overthrown the monsters of the various heretics and heresies with spiritual weapons. And just as Antaeus, having drawn strength again from the earth, was made stronger, and the hydra was made richer by the loss of its heads, so too when ancient and outmoded heresies are stamped out, slaughter sprouts up again in new form. But in this there is a great difference: Antaeus's strength was destroyed, the hydra was uprooted to its foundation; but among the moderns there are none who withstand the sprouting-up heresies and root them out. Yet I, the least among the sons of Jesse, taken up from among those who tend the flocks, will attempt to slay Goliath with his own sword, and to kill the Egyptian who insults the Hebrews.

Caput II: Quibus auctoritatibus muniti hæretici, dicunt esse duo rerum principia.

The heretics of our time claim that there are two principles of things: the principle of light, and the principle of darkness.

They say the principle of light is God, from whom come spiritual things, namely souls and angels; the principle of darkness is Lucifer, from whom come temporal things. This they strive to prove by authorities and by reasonings. By authorities, thus: A good tree cannot bear evil fruit, nor an evil tree good fruit (Matth. 7). Therefore since God is supremely good, evil things do not come from him; but since evil things exist, and do not come from God, therefore they come from someone other than God. Therefore, since God is the principle of good things, the principle of evil things is something else. Likewise, in the beginning of Genesis it is read that darkness was upon the face of the deep (Gen. 1), and thus the world had its beginning from darkness. And so the creator of the world was the principle of darkness, and thus the author of the world was evil, since the beginning of his creation began from darkness. Likewise Christ says in the Gospel: The prince of this world comes, and he has nothing in me (John 14). There he calls Lucifer the prince of the world rather than himself, and so Lucifer was rather the author of the world than Christ. And elsewhere it is said: No one can serve two masters (Matth. 6), namely God and mammon. There Christ calls himself and mammon, that is the devil, "masters"; but Christ is not called Lord except by reason of creation; therefore the devil too, is called lord by a similar reason of creation. Likewise: You are of your father the devil (John 8). Likewise the Apostle: It is not I who do it, but sin which dwells in me, that is, in my flesh (Rom. 7). If sin dwells in the flesh, and comes from the flesh, and flesh cannot be without sin, then the flesh is evil, and thus does not come from God. Likewise: I perceive another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and taking me captive in the law of sin, which is in my members (ibid.).

If the law of the flesh is the law of sin and death, then flesh seems to be evil, and therefore does not come from God. Likewise the same author says: The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh (Gal. 5). If flesh always contradicts reason, flesh is evil, and thus comes from evil.

Caput III: Quibus rationibus muniti hæretici dicunt esse duo rerum principia.

By these reasonings too the heretics prove their opinion: If God made these visible things, either he was able to make them incorruptible, or not; if he was able and did not, he was powerless; if he was able and unwilling, he was envious. Likewise: if the cause is immutable, the effect is immutable; but it is agreed that corporeal things are mutable, therefore their cause is mutable. Likewise: since many things in the world happen by chance, they do not seem to happen by divine ordinance. Likewise: since human flesh is generated in sin and through sin, it does not seem to come from a good principle. Likewise: there are certain creatures which serve no useful purpose, such as serpents, flies, spiders, but rather serve manifold harm; therefore, since they are suited for evil and not for good, they come from evil, not from good.

Caput IV: Solutio catholicorum ad prædictas auctoritates hæreticorum de duobus principiis.

Responding to these authorities, we say that the authority A good tree, etc. (Matth. 7) is to be understood of a good or evil intention: for from a good intention proceeds only a good work, and from an evil intention only an evil one. We also say that this word "evil" sometimes signifies an evil action, sometimes the deformity of that action; as when it is said: There is no evil in the city which God has not done — that is, there is no evil action which he does not allow to happen; but the malice itself, that is, the deformity of the action, according to which it is called evil, is nothing, nor does he himself cause it. For the deformity of the action, by which the action is called evil, is nothing. Insofar, then, as this word signifies an evil action, evil is said to be something, and to be from God — not in that it is evil, but in that it is. But insofar as it signifies malice, it is said to be neither something, nor from God; for it denotes rather a privation of being than a positing of a thing. We also say that this word "darkness" denotes rather the absence of light than the existence of a thing, and therefore the world did not have its beginning from darkness. But the sense is: Darkness was upon the face of the deep (Gen. 1), that is, there was no light. Nor is the devil called the prince of the world because he created the world, but prince of the world, that is, of worldly men, because he rules in their hearts, and reigns through earthly desire. By the same reasoning he is called lord of the world. That "the world" means "lovers of the world" is read in John, where it is said: And the world knew him not (John 1), that is, the lovers of the world. And elsewhere in the Gospel: My kingdom is not of this world (John 18); that is, the lovers of this world are not my kingdom; that is, I do not reign in them. The devil, moreover, is called father of men not by reason of creation, but by reason of imitation, because through wicked deeds men imitate him. Sin, moreover, is said to dwell in the flesh of man — that is, the kindling of sin, or concupiscence — which dwells in the flesh not by reason of substance, but by reason of circumstance. For from the time Adam sinned, the flesh was made prone to desire, that is, man became weak in the flesh. Although, then, concupiscence remains in the flesh occasionally, the flesh is not therefore evil — that is, vicious — but vitiated, or weakened; nor is it therefore any less from God. Just as man, although he is weak, nevertheless has his existence from God.

In similar fashion the following authority is explained; for although the law of sin and death, that is concupiscence, arises in and from the members occasionally — that is, from the weakness of the members — nevertheless those members, although vitiated, are, insofar as they exist, from God; but as vitiated, that is, weakened, they are not from God.

That the flesh is said to fight against the spirit is not to be understood of the flesh itself, but of the carnality of the flesh: for the flesh, that is, carnality, always contradicts the spirit, that is, reason.

Caput V: Refelluntur rationes hæreticorum, de duobus principiis.

To these reasonings the answer is thus given: although God could have made the world unchangeable in act, and did not, he was not envious; for it belonged to his supreme goodness that he made the world, but to his wisdom that he allowed it to be changeable, so that through the changeable we might be changed into the unchangeable. For everything changeable implies that something is unchangeable; everything moving implies that something is at rest. Therefore I say "unchangeable in act," because he could not make anything unchangeable by nature; for every created thing, from the fact that it is created, has a beginning of its existence: by the same reasoning it has an end, in act or by nature, for every thing is bounded by two limits. Furthermore, it does not follow that if the cause is unchangeable, the effect is unchangeable. One kind of cause is efficient, another formal. The efficient cause is that which moves and works so that a thing may exist; as the craftsman is the efficient cause of his work, and moves it, and works so that it may exist; yet it does not follow that whatever is predicated of the craftsman is also true, or the contrary, of his work. For it happens that a work is long-lasting while its maker is not. Similarly, since God is the supreme craftsman of all things, and the efficient cause, he himself is unchangeable, yet the things created by him are not therefore unchangeable; indeed, it is impossible that things created by him should not be changeable, since whatever has a beginning naturally has an end.

Everything that is begotten tends toward destruction.

Concerning the formal cause, however, it is true that if it itself is unchangeable, the effect too is unchangeable, and conversely, as if whiteness is changeable, the white thing is also changeable. Thus, since humanity, which is the substantial nature of man and the formal cause, is changeable, its effect too is changeable, that is, the making of a man. Since, then, God is not a formal cause but an efficient one, although he himself is unchangeable, things are not therefore unchangeable.

And although many things in this world seem to happen by chance, nevertheless they do not happen apart from God's ordinance, who knows how and in what way each thing comes to be. For "there is no thing," as the philosopher says, "whose origin is not preceded by a legitimate cause and reason." Whence Christ says in the Gospel that not even one sparrow falls to the ground without God (Matth. 10).

To the next argument this answer is given: many things happen in sin, and by means of sin, and yet are not themselves sins, and are from God; as the knowledge which one acquires with an evil intention — namely with a view to human favor, or earthly gain — is possessed by means of sin, and yet is from God. Similarly, power which one acquires by simony is acquired in sin and through sin, and yet is from God. Similarly money which is acquired through usury is possessed in sin and through sin.

Likewise, although human flesh occasionally has its origin from sin, that which it is, is from God.

Caput VI: Quibus auctoritatibus probatur, quod Deus bonus creavit mundum.

After the determination of the authorities and the refutation of the reasonings by which the heretics seem to confirm their error, let us turn our pen to the authorities and reasonings which are brought against them. For John says of Christ: All things were made through him (John 1). This totality either includes visible and invisible things together, or not; if not all, then either visible things only, or invisible things only, or some visible and some invisible — which they themselves do not grant. If invisible things only, why invisible rather than visible, since the multitude of visible things is greater than that of invisible ones, which rather pertain to the totality? Whence it follows: And without him nothing was made (ibid.) — that is, no thing was made without him.

Perhaps the heretics will say that by this word "nothing" is meant a corporeal thing which decays and tends toward nothingness; but many corporeal things neither decay nor tend toward nothingness, such as the sun and the other stars; and of the earth it is said that it stands forever. If they say that the stars vary in their rising and setting, in the waxing and waning of their light — by the same reasoning souls vary, and tend toward nothingness; for they change according to sorrow and joy, according to ignorance and knowledge, according to sin and righteousness.

By whatever reasoning, then, this word "nothing" designates everything corporeal because it is variable, by the same reasoning every spirit will be so designated, because it too is variable. Likewise in the same Gospel: He came unto his own, and his own received him not (ibid.). What is meant by "his own," except these visible and worldly things, into which Christ came through his assumed humanity? — things which are called Christ's own not so much by reason of possession as by reason of creation and authority. If they say they are Christ's own by reason of possession, then the devil's possession is also God's; for if they were created by the devil, they would rather be possessed by him than by God, and yet there is no partnership between Christ and Belial (II Cor. 6). Likewise in the same Gospel: He was in the world, and the world was made through him (John 1). Likewise in the apostolic Creed it is read: Creator of heaven and earth. Likewise Christ in the Gospel: Are not two sparrows sold for a penny, and not one of them falls to the ground without your Father? (Matth. 10.) What does it mean that a sparrow does not fall to the ground without your Father, except that the sparrow is under the power of God? Likewise in the Gospel it says that God clothes the lilies of the field (Matth. 6); what does it mean that God clothes the lilies of the field, except that he gives them their elegant nature, and thus that the nature of the lily is from God? Likewise the Apostle in the Epistle to the Colossians (ch. 1), speaking of Christ, says: In whom all things were created, visible and invisible. Likewise in the Epistle to the Hebrews (ch. 1): God, who at various times and in various ways spoke of old to the fathers by the prophets, has in these last days spoken to us by his Son, whom he appointed heir of all things, through whom also he made the ages. Likewise in the same Epistle, on the authority of David, it proves that God created heaven and earth, in this way: In the beginning, Lord, you founded the earth, and the heavens are the work of your hands (Ps. 101). Likewise in the Acts of the Apostles (ch. 17), Paul says to the Athenians: This unknown God to whom you have built this altar, I proclaim to you: this is the God who made this world, and all things that are in it, in whom we live, and move, and have our being. In Luke (ch. 3) also, where the genealogy of Christ is traced, it is read: Who was the son of Seth, who was the son of Adam, who was the son of God. Adam is said to have been the son of God by reason of creation, and thus he was from God, and not from the devil. Likewise Christ in the Gospel says to the Jews: You have dishonored me, but my Father, of whom you say that he is your God, glorifies me (John 8). If, then, the Jews said that God the Father was their God, they did not believe the devil to be their God. Of these heretics, against whom we speak, the Apostle says to Timothy: The Spirit says that in the last times some will depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits and doctrines of demons, speaking lies in hypocrisy, forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from foods which God created (I Tim. 4). Do not the aforesaid heretics depart from the faith in these last times — the faith, I say, which the universal Church holds? For they do not depart from the faith of the Jews — that faith, I say, they never had — nor from the faith of the Saracens, since they lack faith; therefore they depart from the faith of the Christians. These are they who give heed to the doctrines of demons, and, feigning themselves to be righteous, speak lies in hypocrisy. They themselves forbid marriage, since they condemn weddings; they themselves command abstinence from foods which God created. Likewise in Matthew the Lord is introduced speaking thus: He who made man from the beginning made them male and female (Matth. 19); and elsewhere: So God loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son (John 3). Paul also, in the Epistle to the Corinthians, says: God placed the members, each one of them, in the body as he willed (I Cor. 12). Likewise Peter: The God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob, has raised up his Son Jesus (Acts, ch. 3).

Caput VII: Quibus auctoritatibus probatur quod Deus omnipotens mundum creavit.

By the authorities of the gentile philosophers too the aforesaid errors are refuted; for the Apostle said that by the things that are made, the invisible things of God are seen (Rom. 1) — by the philosophers; because through the greatness of things the philosophers understood the power of God, through the beauty of things his wisdom, through their order, his divine goodness. Whence Plato, speaking of God, says: To find the begetter of the universe is as difficult as it is to speak worthily of him once found. Boethius too, in the book of the Consolation, says:

O you who govern the world by everlasting reason, sower of the earth and the heavens.

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