De docta ignorantia

The teaching of ignorance thus dispatched concerning the nature of the absolute maximum through certain symbolical characters, let us further inquire through it, shining a little upon us in shadow by the same way, the things which, whatever they are, are from the absolute maximum itself. But since the caused is wholly from the cause, and nothing from itself, and accompanies, as nearly and as likenly as it can, the origin and reason by which it is what it is, it is evident the nature of contraction is difficult to attain, the absolute exemplar being unknown. Above our apprehension, therefore, it befits us to be learned in a certain ignorance, so that, not grasping the precision of truth as it is, we may at least be led to see that it is, which now we cannot comprehend. This is the end of my labor in this part, which may your clemency judge and accept.

It will profit the doctrine of learned ignorance greatly to premise preliminary corollaries from our principle. For they will afford a certain facility for eliciting infinite similar points by the same art, and will make what is to be said clearer. We held at the root of what was said that in exceeds and exceedings there is no arriving at the maximum in being and in power. Hence in the earlier chapters we showed that precise equality befits God alone; from which it follows that all givables besides him differ. One motion, therefore, cannot be equal to another, nor can one be the measure of another, since a measure necessarily differs from the measured.

These points, though they serve you unto infinity, yet if you transfer them to astronomy, you grasp that the calculator's art lacks precision, since it presupposes that the motion of all the other planets can be measured by the motion of the sun. The disposition of the heaven too, as regards any place whatever, whether the risings and settings of the signs or the elevation of the pole, and what concerns this, is not precisely knowable. And since no two places agree precisely in time and situation, it is manifest that the indications of the stars are far from precision in their particularity.

If consequently you adapt this rule to mathematics in geometrical figures, you see equality in act to be impossible, and that no thing can agree precisely with another in figure or in magnitude. And although the rules given in their formal character for describing an equal to a given figure are true, yet in act equality among diverse things is impossible. From this you ascend to how truth abstracted from material things sees equality in its concept, which it is altogether impossible to experience in things, since there it exists only with defect.

Come now: in music there is no precision from rule. No thing therefore agrees with another in weight, nor in length, nor in thickness; nor is it possible for harmonic proportions among the various voices of pipes, bells, men and other instruments to be found precisely, but a more precise one can always be given, nor is the same degree of truth of proportion in diverse instruments, as neither in diverse men; but in all there is necessary diversity according to place, time, temperament and other things. Precise proportion therefore is seen only in its concept; and we cannot find the sweetest harmony in sensible things without defect, for it is not there. Ascend here to how the most precise maximal harmony is proportion in equality, which no living man can hear in the flesh, since it would draw to itself the reason of our soul, since it is all reason, as infinite light draws all light; so that the soul, freed from sensibles, would not hear that supremely concordant harmony with the ear of the intellect without rapture. Some great sweetness of contemplation could be drawn here, both concerning the immortality of our intellectual and rational spirit, which bears incorruptible reason in its nature, through which it attains from itself concordant and discordant likeness in musical things, and concerning the eternal joy into which the blessed, freed from worldly things, are transferred. But of this elsewhere.

Further, if we apply our rule to arithmetic, we see that no two things in number can agree; since for the truth of number, composition, temperament, proportion, harmony, motion and all things are varied by extending to infinity. From this we understand that we are ignorant, since no one is like another in anything whatever, neither in sense, nor imagination, nor intellect, nor in operation or writing or painting or art, even if for a thousand years one strove to imitate another, and yet in anything whatever would never attain precision, although the sensible difference is sometimes not perceived. — Art too imitates nature as much as it can, but can never arrive at its precision. Medicine, alchemy, magic and the other arts of transmutation therefore lack the precision of truth, although one be truer in comparison with another, as medicine is truer than the arts of transmutation, as is evident of itself.

Still eliciting from the same foundation, let us say: since in opposites we find exceeding and exceeded, as in simple and composite, abstract and concrete, formal and material, corruptible and incorruptible and the rest, hence there is no arriving at either pure opposite, or at that in which they concur precisely equally. All things therefore are from opposites in diversity of degree, having more of one, less of the other, taking on the nature of one of the opposites through the victory of one over the other. From this the knowledge of things is rationally investigated, that we may know how composition in one thing exists in a certain simplicity, and in another enfolded in composition — as corruptibility in incorruptibility in one, the contrary in another — as of the rest, as we shall show in the book of Conjectures, where this will be treated more widely. Let these few points suffice for showing the marvelous power of learned ignorance.

Further, descending more to the point, I say that ascent to the maximum and descent to the minimum simply is not possible, lest there be transit to infinity, as is established in number and in the division of the continuum. Then it is clear that, given any finite thing whatever, a greater and a lesser is necessarily givable, whether in quantity or power or perfection, and in other respects, since a maximum or minimum simply is not givable in things, nor is there process to infinity, as was just shown. For since every part of the infinite is infinite, it implies contradiction that more and less be found where infinity would be reached, since more and less can no more befit the infinite than they have any proportion whatever to the infinite, since it is itself necessarily infinite too. For two would not be less than a hundred in infinite number, if by ascent to it one could arrive in act, just as an infinite line of infinite two-foot lines would not be less than an infinite line of infinite four-foot lines. There is therefore nothing givable that would terminate the divine power; hence for everything given a greater and a lesser is givable through it, unless the given were the absolute maximum, as will be deduced in the third little book. Only the absolute maximum therefore is negatively infinite; hence only it is that which can be by all power. The universe, however, since it embraces all things that are not God, cannot be negatively infinite, although it be without limit and thus privatively infinite; and in this consideration it is neither finite nor infinite. For it cannot be greater than it is: this indeed happens from defect; for possibility, or matter, does not extend beyond itself. For to say the universe can always be actually greater is nothing other than to say possibility can pass into actually infinite being, which is impossible, since the actuality of the infinite, which is absolute eternity, cannot arise from possibility, which is all possibility of being. Hence although in respect of the infinite power of God, which is interminable, the universe could be greater, yet, with the possibility of being, or matter, resisting, which is not actually extensible to infinity, the universe cannot be greater, and is thus unterminated, since nothing actually greater than it is givable at which it would be terminated, and it is privatively infinite. It, however, exists in act only contractedly, in the better way indeed which the condition of its nature allows. For it is a creature, which of necessity is, from the simply absolute divine being, as we shall show consequently in learned ignorance as clearly and simply as can be, as briefly as possible.

Our sacred ignorance teaches us in the earlier chapters that nothing is from itself except the maximum simply, where from itself, in itself, through itself are all the same, namely absolute being itself; and that everything which is, that which it is, insofar as it is, is necessarily from it. For how could that which is not from itself be otherwise than from eternal being? Since, however, the maximum itself is far from all envy, it cannot communicate itself as diminished. The creature, therefore, which is from being, does not have all that it is — corruptibility, divisibility, imperfection, diversity, plurality and other such things — from the maximum, eternal, indivisible, most perfect, indistinct, one, nor from any positive cause. For as the infinite line is infinite straightness, which is the cause of all linear being, while the curved line, in that it is a line, is from the infinite, in that it is curved, is not from the infinite, but curvature follows upon finitude, since it is curved for this reason, that it is not maximal (for if it were maximal, it would not be curved, as was shown above). So indeed it befalls things that, since they cannot be the maximum, they are diminished, other, distinct and suchlike, which indeed have no cause. The creature therefore has from God that it be one, discrete and connected to the universe, and the more one, the liker God.

But that its unity is in plurality, discretion in confusion, and connection in discordance, it does not have from God, nor from any positive cause, but contingently. Who therefore, joining together at once in the creature absolute necessity, from which it is, and contingency, without which it is not, can understand its being? For it seems that the creature itself, which is neither God nor nothing, is as it were after God and before nothing, between God and nothing, as one of the wise says: 'God is the opposition of nothing through the mediation of being'. Nor yet can it be composed of being and non-being. It seems therefore neither to be, through this that it descends from being, nor not to be, since it is before nothing, nor composed of them. Our intellect, however, which cannot pass beyond contradictories, does not attain the being of the creature divisively or compositively, although it knows its being to be only from the being of the maximum. The being of the creature is therefore not intelligible, since the being from which it is is not intelligible, just as neither is the being of an accident intelligible, if the substance in which it inheres is not understood. The creature, therefore, as creature, cannot be called one, since it descends from unity, nor many, since its being is from one, nor both copulatively, but its unity is contingently in a certain plurality; and so concerning simplicity and composition and the remaining opposites it seems must be said alike.

Since, however, the creature is created through the being of the maximum, and in the maximum being, making and creating are the same, then to create seems nothing other than for God to be all things. If therefore God is all things, and this is to create, how can this be understood, that the creature is not eternal, since the being of God is eternal, indeed eternity itself? For insofar as the creature itself is the being of God, no one doubts it is eternity; insofar therefore as it falls under time, it is not from God, who is eternal. Who therefore understands the creature to be from eternity and with this to be temporally? For the creature could not in being itself not be in eternity, nor could it be before time, since before time there was no before; and thus it always was, when it could be. Who finally can understand God to be the form of being, and yet not to be mingled with the creature? For from an infinite line and a finite curve no one composite can arise, which cannot be without proportion. That proportion between infinite and finite cannot fall, no one doubts. How therefore can the intellect grasp the being of the curved line to be from the infinite straight, which yet does not inform it as form, but as cause and reason, which reason it cannot participate by taking a part, since it is infinite and indivisible: neither as matter participates form, as Socrates and Plato humanity, nor as a whole is participated by parts, as the universe by its parts, nor as many mirrors the same face diversely, since the being of the creature is not before from being, since it is itself as it were a mirror, before both mirror and that it receive the image of the face. Who is there therefore who can understand how diversely the one infinite form is participated in diverse creatures, since the being of the creature can be nothing other than the very refulgence itself, not received by anything else positively, but contingently diverse? As perhaps if a fashioned thing wholly depending on the artificer's idea had no other being than that of dependence, from which it would have being and under whose influence it would be conserved, as the image of a species in a mirror, supposing that the same mirror before or after is in and of itself nothing.

Nor can it be understood how God can be made manifest to us through visible creatures; for not as our intellect, known only to God and to us, which, when it has come into thought, receives from certain phantasms a certain form in memory of color or sound or another, which before was unformed, and after this, assuming another form of signs, voices or letters, insinuates itself to others. For although God, for the sake of his goodness to be known, as they wish, or from this that maximal absolute necessity created the world to obey him, that there be those who know him and fear him and whom he judges, or otherwise, yet it is manifest that he neither puts on another form, since he is the form of all forms, nor appears in positive signs, since the signs themselves alike in that which they are would require others in which they would be, and so to infinity. Who could understand these things, how all things are the image of that one unique infinite form, having diversity from contingency, as if the creature were God occasioned, as accident is substance occasioned, and woman man occasioned? Since the infinite form itself is not, except finitely received, so that every creature is as it were finite infinity, or a created God, that it be in that mode in which it could not be better; as if the creator had said: 'Let it be, and since God could not be made, who is eternity itself, this is made which could be made likest God.' From which it is subinferred that every creature as such is perfect, even if in respect of another it seems less perfect. For the most loving God communicates being to all in that mode in which it can be received. Since therefore God communicates without diversity and envy and is received so that the contingency of another does not suffer to be received otherwise and differently, every created being rests in its perfection, which it has liberally from the divine being, desiring no other created being, as more perfect, but preferring that which it has from the maximum, desiring as it were a certain divine gift for this to be perfected incorruptibly and conserved.

Nothing can be said or thought concerning the truth to be investigated, of which we treated in the first part, that is not enfolded in the first truth. For all things that agree with what was said here concerning the first truth must be true; the rest, which disagree, are false. But it has been shown there that there can be only one maximum of all maxima. The maximum, however, is that to which nothing can be opposed, where the minimum too is the maximum. Infinite unity, therefore, is the enfolding of all things;

This is indeed called unity, which unites all things; and it is maximal not only as the enfolding of numerical unity, but as the enfolding of all things. And just as in number, which unfolds unity, nothing is found but unity, so in all things that are, nothing is found but the maximum. This unity is indeed called point in relation to quantity, which unfolds that unity, since nothing is found in quantity but point. Just as the point is everywhere in the line, everywhere in a different way, so too in surface and in body. Nor is there more than one point, which is nothing other than infinite unity itself, since that unity itself — the point which is the limit, perfection, and totality of line and quantity, enfolding it — has the line as its first unfolding, in which nothing is found but point. So too rest is unity, enfolding motion, which is rest ordered in series, if you consider it subtly. Motion, therefore, is the unfolding of rest. So the now, or presence, enfolds time. The past was present, the future will be present; nothing, therefore, is found in time but presence ordered. The past and the future, therefore, are the unfolding of the present; the present is the enfolding of all present times, and present times are serially its unfolding, and nothing is found in them but the present. Presence, then, is the one enfolding of all times; and that presence is unity itself. So identity is the enfolding of diversity, equality of inequality, and simplicity of divisions or distinctions. There is, then, one enfolding, and the enfolding is not one thing of substance, another of quality, or of quantity, and so of the rest, since there is but one maximum, with which the minimum will coincide, where enfolded diversity is not opposed to enfolding identity. For just as unity precedes otherness, so too point — which belongs to the perfect — precedes magnitude, for every perfect thing precedes the imperfect; so rest precedes motion, identity diversity, equality inequality, and so of the rest, which are convertible with unity, which is eternity itself; for there cannot be several eternal things. God, therefore, is the enfolding of all things in this: that all things are in him; he is the unfolding of all things in this: that he himself is in all things. And to declare our meaning in numbers: number is the unfolding of unity; number, however, bespeaks reason, and reason is from mind; therefore brute animals, which have no mind, cannot count. Just as, then, from our mind, through our understanding many singulars in relation to one common thing, number arises; so the plurality of things comes from the divine mind, in which there are many without plurality, because in enfolding unity. For through this: that things cannot equally participate in equality of being itself, God in eternity understood one thing in one way, another in another, from which plurality — which in him is unity — has arisen. Plurality or number, moreover, has no other being than as it is from unity itself. Unity, therefore, without which there would be no number, is number in plurality; and this is indeed to unfold unity: namely, that all things be in plurality. But the mode of enfolding and unfolding exceeds our mind; who, I ask, would understand how there is a plurality of things from the divine mind, given that God's understanding is his being, who is infinite unity? If you proceed to number, considering the likeness — how number is the multiplication of one common thing through mind — it seems as though God, who is unity, were multiplied in things, given that his understanding is being; and yet you understand that it is not possible for that unity, which is infinite and maximal, to be multiplied. How, then, do you understand a plurality whose being is from the one, without multiplication? Or how do you understand the multiplication of unity without multiplication? Not indeed as of one species or one genus in many species or individuals, apart from which the genus or species exists only through the abstracting intellect.

How God, then — whose unitary being is neither through an intellect abstracting from things, nor united to or immersed in things — is unfolded through the number of things, no one understands. If you consider things without him, they are nothing, just as number without unity. If you consider him without things, he is, and things are nothing. If you consider him as he is in things, you consider that the thing is something in which he is; and in this you err, as was clear in the preceding chapter, since the being of the thing, as a diverse thing, is not something else, but its being is from the being of the maximum. If you consider the thing as it is in God, then it is God and unity. Nothing remains but to say that the plurality of things arises through this: that God is in nothing. For take God away from the creature, and nothing remains; take substance away from the composite, and nothing remains but accident — and thus nothing remains. How this can be grasped by our intellect — for although accident perishes when substance is removed, accident is not on that account nothing; it perishes because the being of an accident is to inhere. And therefore, just as quantity exists only through the being of substance, yet because it inheres, substance is then quantified through quantity. It is not so here, for the creature does not inhere in God in this way; for it confers nothing upon God, as accident does upon substance; indeed accident so confers upon substance that, although it has its being from it, nevertheless as a consequence substance cannot be without any accident; this indeed cannot similarly hold in the case of God.

How, then, shall we be able to understand the creature, as creature, which is from God, and yet can attribute nothing even consequently to him who is the maximum? And if, as creature, it does not have even as much entity as an accident, but is utterly nothing, how is it understood that the plurality of things is unfolded through this: that God is in nothing, since nothing is not of any entity? If you say: his omnipotent will is the cause, and will and omnipotence are his being — for all theology is in a circle — then you must confess that you utterly do not know enfolding and unfolding, how it comes about; and that you know only this: that you do not know the mode, although you also know that God is the enfolding and unfolding of all things, and that, as he is enfolding, all things in him are he himself, and, as he is unfolding, he in all things is that which they are, as truth in an image; as if a face were in its own image, which is multiplied at a distance and nearby from it, as regards the multiplication of the image — I speak not of local distance but of gradual distance from the truth of the face, since it cannot be multiplied otherwise; in those multiplied diverse images from the one face, the one face would appear in diverse ways and manifoldly, beyond all sense and mind, in an unintelligible manner.

If we extend with subtle consideration what has been manifested to us through learned ignorance in the premises, from this however that we know all things to be the absolute maximum, or to be from it, many things about the world or universe, which I wish to be only the contracted maximum, will be able to lie open to us. For the contracted or concrete itself, since from the absolute it has all that it is, then imitates as much as it can that which is the maximum, the maximally absolute. Therefore what in the first book became known to us concerning the absolute maximum, as then they befit it absolutely as absolute in the maximal way, those we affirm to befit the contracted contractedly; but let us unfold some, that we may prepare an entrance for the inquirer.

God is absolute maximality and absolute unity, preventing and uniting difference and distance, as are contradictories, of which there is no mean: which absolutely is that which all things are, in all things the absolute principle and end of things and entity. In whom all things are without plurality, the absolute maximum itself most simply, indistinctly, as all figures are in the infinite line. So likewise the world or universe is the contracted maximum and one, preventing opposites contractedly, as are contraries: existing contractedly that which all things are; in all things the contracted principle and contracted end of things, contracted being, contracted infinity, that it be contractedly infinite; in which all things without plurality are the contracted maximum itself with contracted simplicity and indistinction, as the maximal contracted line is contractedly all figures. Whence, when contraction is rightly considered, all things are clear. For contracted infinity or simplicity, or indistinction, descends through the infinite into contraction from that which is absolute, so that the infinite and eternal world falls without proportion from absolute infinity and eternity, and one from unity. Whence absolute unity is absolute from all plurality; but contracted unity, which is the one universe, although it be one maximum since it is contracted, is not absolute from plurality, although it be only one contracted maximum. Hence, although it be maximally one, yet its unity is contracted through plurality, as infinity through finitude, simplicity through composition, eternity through succession, necessity through possibility, and so of the rest, as if absolute necessity communicated itself without admixture and were contractedly terminated in its opposite, as if whiteness had absolute being in itself without abstraction of our intellect, from which white were contractedly white: then whiteness would be terminated through non-whiteness in the white in act, so that this were white through whiteness, which without it would not be white. From these the investigator will be able to elicit many things. For as God, since he is immense, is neither in the sun nor in the moon, although in them is that which they are, absolutely, so the universe is neither in the sun nor in the moon, although in them is that which they are, contractedly. And since the quiddity of the sun is not other than the absolute quiddity of the moon, since it is God himself, who is the absolute entity and quiddity of all things, and the contracted quiddity of the sun is other than the contracted quiddity of the moon, since as the absolute quiddity of a thing is not the thing itself, so the contracted is nothing other than it itself. Hence it is clear that, since the universe is contracted quiddity, which is contracted otherwise in the sun and otherwise in the moon, hence the identity of the universe is in diversity, as unity in plurality.

Whence the universe, although it is neither sun nor moon, is yet in the sun sun and in the moon moon, but that which is sun and moon, without plurality and diversity. Universe says universality, that is, unity of many. On this account, as humanity is neither Socrates nor Plato, but in Socrates is Socrates, in Plato Plato, so the universe to all things. Since, however, it has been said that the universe is only the contracted principle, and in this the maximum, it is clear how through simple emanation of the contracted maximum from the absolute maximum the whole universe proceeds into being. All beings, however, which are parts of the universe, without which the universe, since it is contracted, could not be one, whole and perfect, proceeded into being together with the universe, and not first intelligential things, then the noble soul, then nature, as Avicenna and other philosophers wished; as in the artificer's intention the whole, say a house, is prior to the part, say a wall, so we say, since from God's intention all things proceeded into being, that then the universe proceeded first, and in consequence of it all things, without which neither the universe nor the perfect can be. Whence, as the abstract is in the concrete, so we consider the absolute maximum priorly in the contracted maximum, that it be consequently in all particulars, since it is absolutely in that which is all things contractedly. For God is the absolute quiddity of the world or universe. The universe, however, is contracted quiddity itself. Contraction is said to something, as to being this or that. God therefore, who is one, is in the one universe; the universe, however, is contractedly in universals. And thus it will be able to be understood how God, who is the most simple unity, existing in the one universe, is as it were from consequence through the medium of the universe in all things, and the plurality of things through the medium of the one universe in God.

If you attend to what was said before, it will not be difficult for you to see a foundation of that Anaxagorean truth that each thing is in each thing, perhaps higher than Anaxagoras. For, since it is manifest from the first book that God is so in all things that all things are in him, and it is now established that God is in all things as it were through the medium of the universe, hence it is established that all things are in all things and each thing in each thing: for the universe as it were in the order of nature, as most perfect, preceded all things, that each thing could be in each thing. For in any creature whatever the universe is the creature itself, and so each thing receives all things, that in it they be itself contractedly; since each thing cannot actually be all things, since it is contracted, it contracts all things, that they be itself. If therefore all things are in all things, all things seem to precede each thing. All things, therefore, are not many, since plurality does not precede each thing. Whence all things without plurality preceded each thing in the order of nature; in each thing, therefore, there are not many in act, but all things without plurality are itself.

The universe, however, is only contractedly in things, and every actually existing thing contracts universals, that it be actually that which it is. Every actually existing thing, however, is in God, since he is the act of all things. Act, however, is the perfection and end of potency. Whence, since the universe in any actually existing thing is contracted, it is clear that God, who is in the universe, is in each thing, and each actually existing thing immediately in God, as the universe. To say each thing is in each thing, therefore, is nothing other than that God through all things is in all things and all things through all things are in God.

These things are most clearly comprehended by a subtle intellect in the highest way: how God is without diversity in all things, since each thing is in each thing, and all things in God, since all things are in all things. But, since the universe is so in each thing that each thing is in it, and the universe is in each thing contractedly that which it is contractedly itself, and each thing in the universe is the universe itself, although the universe is in each thing diversely and each thing in the universe diversely. See an example: it is manifest that the infinite line is line, triangle, circle and sphere. Every finite line, however, has its being from the infinite, which is all that it is. Hence in the finite line all that which is is the infinite line; but as it is line, triangular, circular, spherical, it is the finite line. Every figure, therefore, in the finite line is the line itself; and there is not in it either triangular or circular or sphere in act, since from many in act one in act is not made, since each thing in act is not in each thing, but the triangle in the line is line, and the circle in the line is line, and so of the rest. And, that you may see more clearly, a line cannot be in act except in a body, as will be shown elsewhere. In a body, however, long, wide and deep, no one doubts that all figures are unfolded. In the line in act, therefore, are all figures in act the line itself, and in the triangle triangle, and so of the rest. For all things in stone are stone, and in the vegetative soul the soul itself, and in life life, and in sense sense, in sight sight, in hearing hearing, in image imagination, in reason reason, in intellect intellect, in God God.

— And now see how the unity of things or the universe is in plurality and conversely plurality in unity. Consider more attentively, and you will see how any actually existing thing rests from this, since all things in it are itself and itself in God is God. A marvelous unity of things, an admirable equality, and a most marvelous connection you see, that all things be in all things. The diversity of things too and their connection you understand to arise in this. For, since any thing in act could not be all things, since it would have been God, and therefore all things were in each thing in that mode in which they could be according to that which each thing is, nor could each thing be wholly like another through all things, as was clear above, it made all things to be in diverse degrees; as also that being which could not at once be incorruptibly, it made to be incorruptibly in temporal succession; that thus all things be that which they are, since otherwise and better they could not be.

All things therefore rest in each thing, since one degree could not be without another, as in the members of the body each confers to each, and all things are contained in all things. For after the eye cannot be hand and feet and all other things in act, it is content to be eye, and the foot foot, and all members confer mutually to one another, that each be in the better mode in which it can that which it is, and the hand is not hand nor the foot foot in the eye, but in the eye they are eye, inasmuch as the eye itself is immediately in man; and so all members in the foot, inasmuch as the foot is immediately in man, so that each member through each be immediately in man, and man, or the whole, through each member be in each, as the whole is in the parts through each in each. If therefore you consider humanity as it were something absolute, unmixable and incontractible, and consider man, in whom absolute humanity itself is absolutely, and from whom is contracted humanity itself, which is man, absolute humanity itself is as it were God, and contracted as it were the universe. And as absolute humanity itself is in man principally or priorly and consequently in any member or any part whatever, and contracted humanity itself is in the eye eye, in the heart heart, and so of the rest, and so contractedly in each thing each thing, then according to this position indeed is found the likeness of God and the world, and the guidance of them all, which in these two chapters have been touched, with many others which follow from this.

Beyond all intellect we have found in the earlier chapters the universe or world to be one, whose unity is contracted through plurality, that it be unity in plurality. And since absolute unity is first, and the unity of the universe is from it, the unity of the universe will be the second unity, which consists in a certain plurality. And since, as will be shown in On Conjectures, the second unity is denary, uniting the ten predicaments, the universe will be one unfolding the first absolute simple unity by denary contraction. All things, however, are enfolded in the decad, since there is no number above it. Hence the unity of the universe enfolds the contracted plurality of all things denarily. And since that unity of the universe as the contracted principle of all things is in all things, then, as ten is the square root of a hundred and the cubic root of a thousand, so the unity of the universe is the root of universals. From which root first arises as it were the number of squares, as the third unity, and the cubic number arises, as the last or fourth unity. And the first unfolding of the unity of the universe is the third unity, centenary; and the last unfolding the fourth unity, millenary.

And so we find three universal unities descending by degrees to the particular, in which they are contracted, that they be actually itself. The first absolute unity enfolds all things absolutely, the first contracted all things contractedly; but the order has it that the absolute unity be seen as it were to enfold the first contracted, that through its medium all others; and the first contracted to enfold the second contracted, and through its medium the third contracted; and the second contracted the third contracted, which is the last universal unity, and the fourth from the first, that through its medium it come into the particular. And so we see how the universe is contracted through three degrees in any particular whatever.

The universe, therefore, is as it were the universality of the ten most general, and then genera, then species, and so universal things are those according to their degrees, which in a certain order of nature exist by degrees before the thing which contracts them in act. And since the universe is contracted, then it is found only unfolded in genera, and genera are found only in species; individuals are in act, in which universals are contracted, and in this consideration it is seen how universals are only contractedly in act.

And in this way indeed the Peripatetics speak truly that universals are not in act outside things. For only the singular is in act, in which universals are contractedly itself. Universals, however, have in the order of nature a certain universal contractible being through the singular, not that they be in act before contraction otherwise than in natural order, as the contractible into the non-subsistent, but into that which is in act; as point, line, surface, in progressive order, precede body, in which alone they are in act. For the universe, since it is in act only contractedly, is therefore only a being of reason; so universals are not only beings of reason, although they are not found outside singulars in act; as line and surface, although they are not found outside body, are therefore not beings of reason only, since they are in body, as universals in singulars. The intellect, however, makes them to be outside things through abstraction. Which abstraction indeed is a being of reason, since absolute being cannot befit them. For the wholly absolute universal is God. How, however, the universal is in the intellect, we shall see in the book of Conjectures; — although from the above this can be clear enough, since they are there only intellect, and so contractedly intellectually; whose understanding, since it is not clearer and higher being, apprehends the contraction of universals in itself and in others. For dog and other animals of the same species are united on account of the common specific nature which is in them, which would be contracted in them too, if Plato's intellect did not fabricate for itself species from comparison of likenesses.

It follows therefore that to understand is being and living as regards its operation, since through its operation neither can the intellect itself give being nor living nor understanding, that it follows being and living and understanding of nature in likeness to the things understood. Hence the universals which it makes from comparison are the likeness of the universals contracted in things; which universals in the intellect itself are already contractedly, before it unfolds them outwardly by those notes through understanding, which is its operating. For it can understand nothing which is not already in it contractedly itself. By understanding, therefore, a certain similitudinary world, which is in it contractedly, is unfolded by similitudinary notes and signs.

Concerning the unity, therefore, and contraction of the universe in things enough has been said in this place; further let us subjoin concerning its trinity.

After absolute unity is necessarily trine, not indeed contractedly, but absolutely, for absolute unity is nothing other than trinity, which indeed is familiarly apprehended in a certain correlation, as has been sufficiently said in the first book, so indeed the maximal contracted unity, even as it is unity, is trine, not indeed absolutely, that trinity be unity, but contractedly, so that unity be only in trinity, as a whole contractedly in parts. In divinity unity is not contractedly in trinity, as a whole in parts, or a universal in particulars, but unity itself is trinity. Therefore any of the persons is unity itself; and since unity is trinity, one person is not another. In the universe, however, it cannot be so. On this account those three correlations, which in divinity are called persons, have no being in act except simultaneously in unity.

These things must be acutely noted. For in divinity so great is the perfection of unity, which is trinity, that the Father is actually God, the Son actually God, the Holy Spirit actually God; Son and Holy Spirit actually in the Father, Son and Father in the Holy Spirit, Father and Holy Spirit in the Son; so indeed it cannot be in the contracted. For correlations are not subsistent of themselves except conjointly. Nor therefore can any one of them be the universe, but all simultaneously. Nor is one in the others in act, but they are in that mode which the condition of contraction most perfectly contracted to one another suffers, that from them be one universe, which without that trinity could not be one. For the contracted cannot be without contractible, contracting and nexus, which is perfected through the common act of both. Contractibility, however, says a certain possibility, and descends from that begetting unity in divinity, as otherness from unity. For it says mutability and otherness in consideration of the principle. For nothing seems able to precede. For how would a thing be, if it could not be? Possibility therefore descends from eternal unity. The contracting itself, since it terminates the possibility of the contractible, descends from the equality of unity. For the equality of unity is equality of being. For being and one are convertible. Whence, since the contracting is adequating possibility to being contractedly this or that, it is rightly said to descend from equality of being, which is the Word in divinity. And since the Word itself, which is reason and idea and absolute necessity of things, necessitates and constrains through itself such a contracting possibility. Hence some called the contracting itself a certain form or soul of the world, and possibility matter. Others fate in substance, others, as the Platonists, necessity of complexion, since it descends from absolute necessity, that it be as it were a certain contracted necessity and contracted form, in which all forms are in truth. Concerning which will be said below. There is then the nexus of the contracting and the contractible, or of matter and form, or of possibility and necessity of complexion, which is perfected in act as it were by a certain spirit of love with a certain motion uniting them. And this nexus was customarily named by some determined possibility, since posse-be to be this or that in act is determined from the union of the determining form itself and the determinable matter. Hence that the nexus descends from the Holy Spirit, who is the infinite nexus, is manifest. The unity of the universe, therefore, is trine, since from possibility, necessity of complexion and nexus, which can be called potency, act and nexus. And from this collect the four universal modes of being. For there is a mode of being which is called absolute necessity, namely as God is form of forms, being of beings, reason or quiddity of things; and in this mode of being all things in God are absolute necessity itself. Another mode is as things are in necessity of complexion, in which are the forms of things true in themselves with distinction and order of nature, as in mind; whether this be so, we shall see below.

Another mode of being is as things are in determined possibility in act, this or that. And the lowest mode of being is as things can be, and is pure possibility. The last three modes of being are in one universality, which is the contracted maximum; from which there is one universal mode of being, since nothing can be without them. I say modes of being, since there is not a universal mode of being as composed of those three as of parts in such a way, as a house of roof, foundation and wall; but from modes of being, since the rose which is in the rosebush in potency in winter and in act in summer passed from one mode of being of possibility to the determinate in act. From which we see the mode of being of possibility to be one, of necessity another, and of actual determination another; from which there is one universal mode of being, since without them nothing is, nor is one without another in act.

That we may here recount at least summarily what can make our ignorance learned, let us discuss somewhat the trine modes of being already named, beginning from possibility. Concerning which many things indeed have been said by the ancients, whose common sentence was that from nothing nothing comes to be, and therefore they affirmed a certain absolute possibility of being all things, and that eternal, in which they believed all things to be enfolded possibly. Which matter, or possibility, they conceived by reasoning in a contrary way as concerning absolute necessity, as by abstraction of the form of corporeity from body, understanding body not corporally. And so they attained matter only ignorantly. For how is body understood without form in body?

They said this whole thing to precede nature, so that it was never true to say: God is, but it would also be true to say Absolute possibility is. They did not, however, affirm it coeternal with God, since it is from him, which is neither something nor nothing, neither one nor many, neither this nor that, neither what nor quale, but possibility to all things, and nothing of all things in act. Which the Platonists, since it lacks all form, called lack; and since it lacks, it desires; and through this is aptitude, which obeys necessity, which commands it, that is, draws it to be in act, as commanded wax draws the artificer wishing to make something from it. Unformedness, however, proceeds from lack and aptitude, connecting itself, that absolute possibility be as it were trine uncomposed, since lack, aptitude and unformedness cannot be its parts, otherwise something would precede absolute possibility, which is impossible. Whence they are modes without which absolute possibility would not be such. For lack is contingently in possibility. For from this that it does not have the form which it can have, it is said to lack; from which lack. Unformedness, however, is as it were the form of possibility, which, as the Platonists wished, is as it were the matter of forms. For the soul of the world is connected to matter according to it; which they called the vegetable stalk, so that, when the soul of the world is mingled with possibility, that unformed vegetability is led into vegetative soul in act through motion descending from the soul of the world and through motion of possibility or vegetability. From which they affirmed unformedness itself as it were the matter of forms, which is formed through the sensitive, rational and intellectual, that it be in act.

Whence Hermes said it to be the nurse of bodies and that unformedness the nurse of souls; and one of ours said chaos naturally preceded the world, and was the possibility of things, in which was that unformed spirit, in which all souls are possibly.

Whence the ancient Stoics said all forms to be in possibility in act, but to lurk, and to appear through removal of the covering, just as if a spoon from wood comes to be through ablation of parts only.

The Peripatetics, however, said forms to be in matter only possibly, and to be educed through the efficient. Whence this is truer, namely that forms are not only from possibility, but from the efficient. For he who takes parts from wood, that from wood a statue come to be, adds of form. And this indeed is manifest; for that from stone an ark cannot be made through the artificer is defect of matter, and that another than the artificer cannot effect it from wood is defect in the efficient. Matter therefore and efficient are required. And hence forms are in a certain way possibly in matter, which are led to act according to the conveniency of the efficient. So in absolute possibility they said the universality of things possibly, and absolute possibility itself is interminate and infinite on account of lack of form and aptitude to all, as the possibility of figuring wax into the figure of a lion or hare, or any other whatever, is interminate. And this infinity is contrary to the infinity of God, since this is on account of lack, God's on account of abundance, since all things are in him in act. So the infinity of matter is privative. God's negative. This is the position of those who spoke concerning absolute possibility. We, however, through learned ignorance find that absolute possibility cannot be. For since among possibles nothing can be less than absolute possibility, which is closest about non-being, according to the position of the authors too: hence one would come to the minimum and to the maximum in receivers of more and less, which is impossible. Hence absolute possibility in God is God, outside him it is not possible, for never is anything givable to be able which be in absolute potency, since all things, besides the first, are necessarily contracted. For if diverse things are found in the world so disposed that from one more things can be than from another, one does not come to the maximum and minimum simply and absolutely; but since these are found, it is clear that absolute possibility is not givable. Every possibility, therefore, is contracted; through act, however, it is contracted. Hence pure possibility is not found, wholly indeterminate through any act whatever, nor can the aptitude of possibility be infinite and absolute, lacking all contraction. For God, since he is infinite act, is only cause of act; but possibility of being is contingently. If therefore possibility is absolute, to whom does it befall? Possibility, however, befalls through this, that being from the first cannot be wholly and simply and absolutely act. Hence act is contracted through possibility, that it be absolutely only in potency, and potency is absolutely only contracted through act.

Differences and gradations, however, fall, that one be more in act, another more in potency, without coming to the maximum and minimum simply, since maximal and minimal act coincides with maximal and minimal potency, and they are the maximum said absolutely, as was shown in the first book.

Further, unless the possibility of things were contracted, the reason of things could not be had, but all things would be by chance, as Epicurus falsely wished. For that this world proceeded rationally from possibility was necessarily from this, that possibility had aptitude only to being this world.

Contracted, therefore, and not absolute was the aptitude of possibility; so of earth and sun and the rest, which, unless by a certain contracted possibility they had lurked in matter, there would have been no greater reason why they proceeded to act rather than not. Whence, although God be infinite, and according to this could have created an infinite world, yet since possibility was necessarily contracted, and aptitude was not wholly absolute nor infinite, hence according to possibility of being the world could not be actually infinite or greater or otherwise.

The contraction of possibility, however, is from act, and act is from the maximal act itself. Hence, since the contraction of possibility is from God and the contraction of act from contingency, hence the world is necessarily contracted, from contingency finite. Whence from knowledge of possibility we see how contracted maximality comes about from necessarily contracted possibility: which contraction indeed is not from contingency, because through act, and so the universe has a rational and necessary cause of contraction, that the world, which is only contracted being, be not contingently from God, who is absolute maximality.

And this indeed is to be considered more singularly. Whence, since absolute possibility is God, if we consider the world as it is in it, then it is as in God and is eternity itself; if we consider it as it is in contracted possibility, then possibility precedes the world only in nature, and that contracted possibility is not eternity, nor coeternal with God, but falling from it, as contracted from absolute, which are distant by infinity. In this way those things which are said concerning potency or possibility or matter must be limited according to the rules of learned ignorance. How, however, possibility proceeds by degrees, we leave to be touched in the book On Conjectures.

All the wise agree in this, that posse-be cannot be led to be in act except through be in act; since nothing can lead itself to be in act, lest it be cause of itself; they said that which makes possibility to be in act acts from intention, that by reasonable ordination possibility come to be in act and not by chance. This lofty nature some named mind, some soul of the world, some fate in substance, some, as the Platonists, necessity of complexion, who esteemed possibility to be determined by necessity through itself, that it be now in act what before it could be in nature. For in that mind they said the forms of things to be intelligibly in act, as in matter possibly; and that necessity of complexion itself, having in itself the truth of forms, with those which accompany them, would move the heaven according to the order of nature, that through the medium of motion as an instrument it lead possibility to act and, as conformably as could be, adequated to the intelligible concept of truth, conceding the form, as it is in matter, through this operation of mind, through the medium of motion, to be the image of the true intelligible form, though not true, but verisimilar. And so the Platonists said true forms to be prior not in time, but in nature, in the soul of the world than in things. Which the Peripatetics do not concede, since they say forms to have no other being except in matter and through abstraction in the intellect, which follows the thing, as is clear. It pleased the Platonists that such distinct exemplars in necessity of complexion be many with natural order from one infinite reason, in which all things are one, yet they did not believe those exemplars to be created by it, but so to descend that it was never true to say: God is, but it would also be true: the soul of the world is, affirming it to be the unfolding of the divine mind, that all things which in God are one exemplar be in the soul of the world many and distinct; adding that God naturally precedes this necessity of complexion and the soul of the world itself naturally precedes motion and the instrument of temporal unfolding of things, so that those things which would be would be truly in soul, possibly in matter, temporally unfolded through motion. Which temporal unfolding indeed follows the natural order, which is in the soul of the world and is called fate in substance; and its temporal unfolding is fate descending from it, named in act and work by most. And so the mode of being in the soul of the world is that according to which we say the intelligible world. The mode of being in act through determination of possibility, that is through unfolding, as has now been said, is the mode of being according to which the world is sensible according to them. Nor did they wish those forms, as they are in matter, to be other than themselves which are in the soul of the world, but to differ only according to mode of being, as in the soul of the world truly and in themselves, in matter verisimilarly, not in their purity, but with adumbration; adding that the truth of forms is attained only through intellect; through reason, imagination and sense only according to images, as forms are mixed with possibility; and that therefore we do not truly attain anything, but opinatively. From this soul of the world they thought all motion to descend, which they said to be whole in the whole and in any part whatever of the world, although it does not exercise the same powers in all parts; as the rational soul in man does not exercise the same operation in the hairs and in the heart, although it be whole in the whole and in any part whatever. Whence they wished all souls to be enfolded in it, whether in bodies or outside, since they said it to be diffused through the whole universe, not through parts, since simple and impartible, but whole in earth, where it connects earth, whole in stone, where it works tenacity of parts, whole in water, whole in trees, and so of singulars. Since it is itself the first circular unfolding with the divine mind holding itself as the central point, and the soul of the world as the circle unfolding the center, and the natural enfolding of every temporal order of things, therefore they called it for discretion and order number moving itself and affirmed it to be from the same and the diverse; which they also thought to differ from the soul of man by number alone, that as the soul of man holds itself to man, so it to the universe, believing all souls to be resolved from it and into it finally, if demerits did not hinder.

Many Christians assented to that Platonic way, from this especially, since the reason of stone is one, of man another, and in God distinction and otherness does not fall, they thought it necessary that these distinct reasons, according to which things are distinct, be after God and before things, since reason precedes the thing; and this in the intelligence ruling the orbs; and that such distinct reasons or notions themselves be never destructible things in the soul of the world itself. Indeed they wished the soul itself to be from all notions of all things, so that all notions in it be its substance, although they assert this difficult to say and to know. This indeed they fortify by authority of divine Scripture. For God said: let light be and light was made. For if the truth of light had not naturally been before, how would he have said: let light be? After, however, that light was temporally unfolded, which would rather have been called light than anything else, if the truth of light had not been before? And many like things such bring for fortification of this.

The Peripatetics, however, although they confess the work of nature to be the work of intelligence, yet do not admit those exemplars; whom certainly, unless by intelligence they understand God, I think to fail. For if there is no knowledge in intelligence, how does it move according to purpose? If there is knowledge of the thing to be temporally unfolded, which is the reason of motion, such could not be abstracted from the thing which is not yet temporally. If therefore there is knowledge without abstraction, certainly then it is that of which the Platonists speak, which is not from things, but things according to it. Whence the Platonists did not wish such reasons of things to be something distinct and diverse from intelligence itself, but rather that such distinct among themselves effect a certain one simple intelligence, enfolding in itself all reasons; that, although the reason of man be not the reason of stone, but they be distinct reasons, yet humanity itself, from which man descends, as white from whiteness, has no other being than in intelligibility itself according to the nature of intelligence intelligibly, and in the thing itself really; not that there be one humanity of Plato and another separate, but the same according to diverse modes of being, existing prior naturally in intelligence than in matter, not prior in time, but as reason precedes the thing in nature.

Acutely enough and reasonably the Platonists spoke, perhaps unreasonably reprehended by Aristotle, who strove to refute them as known in the bark of words than in medullary understanding. But what be truer, we shall elicit through learned ignorance. For it has been shown that one does not arrive at the maximum simply, and so there cannot be either absolute potency or absolute form or act which be not God, and that there be no being besides God uncontracted, and that there be only one form of forms and truth of truths, and there is no other maximal truth of circle and of square. Whence the forms of things are not distinct, except as they are contracted; as they are absolute, they are one indistinct, which is the Word in divinity. The soul of the world, therefore, has no being except with possibility, through which it is contracted, and is not mind separate from things or separable. For if we consider of mind as it is separate from possibility, it is itself the divine mind, which alone is wholly in act. It is therefore not possible that there be many distinct exemplates; for anything whatever to its exemplates would be maximal and most true; but this is not possible, that there be many maxima and most true; for one infinite exemplar alone is sufficient and necessary, in which all things are as ordered in order, most adequatedly enfolding all however distinct reasons; so that infinite reason itself is the truest reason of the circle and not greater nor less nor diverse or other; and itself is the reason of the square, not greater nor less, nor diverse; and so of the rest, as can be comprehended from the example of the infinite line. We, however, seeing diversities of things, marvel how the one most simple reason of all is also of singulars, which yet we know to be necessary from learned ignorance, which shows diversity in God to be identity. For in this, that we see the diversity of reasons of all things to be most truly, then in this, that this is most true, we apprehend the one most true of all reasons, which is maximal truth itself. When therefore it is said that God created man by one reason, stone by another, it is true having respect to things, not to the creator, as in numbers we see: the ternary is the most simple reason, receiving neither more nor less, in itself one; but as it is referred to diverse things, according to this another reason exists. For another is the reason of the ternary of triangles in triangle, another of matter, form and composite in substance, another of father, mother and son, or of three men and three asses. Whence necessity of complexion is not, as the Platonists posited, a mind less than the begetter, but is the Word and Son equal to the Father in divinity, and is called logos or reason, since it is the reason of all things. Nothing, therefore, is that which the Platonists said concerning imaginations of forms, since there is only one infinite form of forms, whose images all forms are, as above in a certain place we said.

These things, therefore, must be acutely understood, since the soul of the world is to be considered as it were a certain universal form enfolding in itself all forms, yet not existing in act except contractedly in things, which in anything whatever is the contracted form of the thing, as was said above concerning the universe. God, therefore, is efficient and final and formal cause of all things, who effects in one Word all things however diverse among themselves; and there can be no creature which be not from contraction diminished from this divine work by infinity falling. God alone is absolute, all other things contracted. Nor does a mean fall in this way between absolute and contracted, as those imagined who thought the soul of the world a mind after God and before contraction of the world. For God alone is soul and mind of the world in that way in which soul is considered as it were something absolute, in which all forms of things are in act. The philosophers indeed were not instructed concerning the divine Word and the maximally absolute sufficient; therefore they considered mind and soul and necessity in a certain unfolding of absolute necessity without contraction. Forms, therefore, are not in act except in the Word the Word itself and in things contracted. The forms, however, which are in created intellectual nature, although according to intellectual nature they be more absolute, yet are not without contraction, as is intellect, whose operation is to understand through abstractive likeness, as Aristotle says, concerning which some things in the book On Conjectures. And let these things said concerning the soul of the world suffice.

Motion, through which is the connection of form and matter, some opined to be a certain spirit as it were a mean between form and matter, and considered it diffused in the aplanes and in the planets and in terrestrial things. The first they called Atropos as it were without conversion, since they believed the aplanes to be moved with simple motion from east to west. The second they called Clotho, that is conversion, since the planets are moved through conversion against the aplanes from west to east. The third Lachesis, that is lot, since chance dominates terrestrial things. The motion of the planets is as the evolution of the first motion, and the motion of temporal and terrestrial things is the evolution of the motion of the planets.

In terrestrial things lurk certain causes of events as corn in seed; whence they said that those things which in the soul of the world are enfolded as it were in a globe are unfolded and extended through such motion. As if an artificer wishes to carve a statue in stone, having in himself the form of the statue as it were the idea, through certain instruments which he moves he effects the form of the statue itself in the figure of the idea and in its image, so the wise thought mind or soul of the world to bear in itself the exemplars of things and through motion to unfold them in matter; and this motion diffused through all things they called as the soul of the world; which in the aplanes, in the planets and in terrestrial things as it were fate descending in act and work from fate in substance they said to be the unfolding of fate in substance, since the thing is actually determined to being so through this such motion or spirit. This spirit of connection they said to proceed from both, namely possibility and soul of the world. For matter, since it has from the aptitude of receiving form itself a certain appetite, as the base desires the good and privation habit, and since form desires to be in act and cannot subsist absolutely, since its being is not nor is it God, descends, that it be contractedly in possibility; that is, with possibility ascending toward be in act, form descends, that it be finishing, perfecting and terminating possibility. And so from ascent and descent arises motion connecting both, which motion is the mean of connection of potency and act, since from mobile possibility and formal mover moving itself arises the mean.

This spirit, therefore, is diffused and contracted through the whole universe and its singular parts, which is called nature. Whence nature is as it were the enfolding of all things which come to be through motion. How, however, this motion is contracted from the universal even to the particular with order preserved through its degrees, is considered by this example. For while I say: God is, this speech proceeds with a certain motion, but in such order that I first utter letters, then syllables, then words, lastly speech, although hearing does not discern this order by degrees; so indeed motion descends by degrees from the universe into the particular and is there contracted in temporal or natural order. This motion or spirit, however, descends from the divine spirit, which through this motion itself moves all things. Whence as in one speaking there is a certain spirit proceeding from him who speaks, which is contracted into speech, as is preferred, so God, who is spirit, from whom descends all motion. For Truth says: It is not you who speak, but the spirit of your father who speaks in you. And so of all other motions and operations. This created spirit, therefore, is spirit, without which nothing is one or can subsist, but this whole world and all things which are in it through this spirit itself, which fills the orb of earth, naturally are connectedly that which they are, that potency through its medium be in act and act through its medium in potency. And this is the motion of the loving connection of all things to unity, that all things be one universe. For while all things are moved singularly, that they be this which they are in the better way, and none equally as another, yet the motion of anything whatever each contracts and participates in its own way mediately or immediately, as the motion of heaven the elements and elemented things, and the motion of the heart all members, that there be one universe. And through this motion things are in a certain better way in which they can be, and to this they are moved, that in themselves or in species they be conserved through the natural connection of diverse sexes, which with complicating nature moving are united and contracted divisively in individuals. There is therefore no motion simply maximal, since it coincides with rest. Hence there is no absolute motion, since the absolute is rest and God; and it enfolds all motions. As therefore all possibility is in the absolute, which is eternal God, and all form and act in absolute form, which is the Word of the Father and Son in divinity, so all motion of connection and proportion and harmonizing union is in the absolute connection of the divine Spirit, that there be one principle of all things God, in whom all things and through whom all things are in a certain unity of trinity contracted similitudinarily according to more and less within the maximum and minimum simply according to their degrees, that one be the degree of potency, act and connection of motion in intelligences, where to understand is to be moved, and another of matter, form and nexus in corporeals, where to be is to be moved, concerning which we shall touch elsewhere. And let these things concerning the trinity of the universe suffice for the present.