De docta ignorantia

It is well enough evident that the universe is many only contractedly, which actually are so, that none reaches the simply maximum. I will add further: if a contracted maximum actually subsisting for a species could be given, then it would actually be, according to the given species of contraction, all things which could be in the potency of that genus or species. For the absolute maximum is all possibles in absolute act, and in this it is most infinite absolutely; the maximum contracted unto genus and species is likewise in act the possible perfection according to the given contraction, in which, since a greater cannot be given, it is an infinity embracing every nature of the given contraction. And just as the least coincides with the absolute maximum, so too the contracted coincides with the contracted maximum. The clearest example of this is the maximal line, which suffers no opposition, and which is every figure, and the equal measure of all figures, with which the point coincides, as we showed in the first book. Hence if any maximum individual of contraction of any species could be given, it would necessarily be the fullness of that genus and species, as life, form, reason, and truth in the fullness of the perfection of all things which would be possible in that species. Such a contracted maximum, existing as the final limit above every nature of that contraction, enfolding in itself every perfection of it, would hold with any given thing above all proportion the supreme equality, so that it would be greater than none and less than none, enfolding in its fullness the perfections of all.

From this it is manifest that the contracted maximum itself cannot subsist as purely contracted, according to what we showed a little before, since nothing such can attain the fullness of perfection in the genus of the perfection of contraction. Nor would such a one, as contracted, be God, who is most absolute, but it would necessarily be the contracted maximum, that is, God and creature, absolute and contracted, by a contraction which could not subsist in itself except in the subsisting absolute maximality. For there is only one maximality, as we showed in the first book, through which the contracted could be called maximum; if the maximal power united the contracted unto itself in such a way that it could not be united more, natures being preserved, so that it is such a one, the nature of the contraction being preserved, according to which it is the contracted and created fullness of the species, on account of the hypostatic union God and all things; this admirable union would excel all our intellect; for if it were conceived as diverse things are united, it is an error. For the absolute maximality is not other or diverse, since it is all things. If it were conceived as two, first divided, now conjoined, it is an error; for the divinity is not disposed otherwise according to prior and posterior, nor is it rather this than that; nor could the contracted before the union have been this or that, as an individual person subsisting in itself; nor as parts are joined in a whole, since God cannot be a part. Who then could conceive so admirable a union, which is neither as form to matter, since the absolute God is unmixable, not informing matter? This would indeed be greater than all intelligible unions, where the contracted would not subsist, since it is maximum, except in the absolute maximality itself, adding nothing to it, since it is the absolute maximality, nor passing into its nature, since it is contracted. The contracted would subsist in the absolute in such a way that, if we conceived it as God, we would be deceived, since it does not change the contracted nature; if we imagined it to be a creature, we would be deceived, since the absolute maximality, which is God, does not abandon the nature; but if we thought it a composite of both, we would err, since composition of God and creature, of contracted and absolute maximum, is impossible. It is necessary, therefore, to conceive in mind such a one to be God in such a way that it is also creature, and creature in such a way that it is also creator, creator and creature without confusion and composition. Who, then, so excellent could be elevated so as to conceive in unity diversity and in diversity unity? This union would therefore be above all intellect.