De docta ignorantia

Nicholas of Cusa

De docta ignorantia

Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464)

De docta ignorantia (On Learned Ignorance, 1440), in three books: the absolute maximum (God), the contracted maximum (universe), and Jesus Christ. Latin text transcribed from the Rotta 1913 Bari edition.


Prologue

Liber primus

Capitulum I: Book One: How Knowing Is Being Ignorant.

Capitulum II: Book One: Preliminary Elucidation of What Follows.

Capitulum III: Book One: That Precise Truth Is Incomprehensible.

Capitulum IV: Book One: The Absolute Maximum Is Understood Incomprehensibly, with Which the Minimum Coincides.

Capitulum V: Book One: The Maximum Is One.

Capitulum VI: Book One: The Maximum Is Absolute Necessity.

Capitulum VII: Book One: On the Threefold and One Eternity.

Capitulum VIII: Book One: On the Eternal Generation.

Capitulum IX: Book One: On the Eternal Procession of the Connexion.

Capitulum X: Book One: How the Understanding of the Trinity in Unity Surpasses All Things.

Capitulum XI: Book One: That Mathematics Aids Us Greatly in the Apprehension of Diverse Divine Things.

Capitulum XII: Book One: How Mathematical Signs Are to Be Used in This Inquiry.

Capitulum XIII: Book One: On the Properties of the Maximal and Infinite Line.

Capitulum XIV: Book One: How the Infinite Line Is a Triangle.

Capitulum XV: Book One: That That Triangle Is a Circle and a Sphere.

Capitulum XVI: Book One: How the Maximum Stands Translatively to All Things, as the Greatest Line Stands to Lines.

Capitulum XVII: Book One: The Profoundest Doctrines from the Same Source.

Further concerning the same point: the finite line is divisible, and the infinite indivisible, because the infinite has no parts, in which the maximum coincides with the minimum. But the finite line is not divisible into non-line, since in magnitude one does not arrive at a minimum than which less cannot be, as shown above; hence the finite line in the reason of line is indivisible. A foot-long line is not less a line than a cubit-long one; it remains, therefore, that the infinite line is the reason of the finite line. So the maximum simply is the reason of all things, and reason is measure. Hence Aristotle rightly says in the Metaphysics that the first is the meter and measure of all things, because the reason of all. Further, just as the infinite line is indivisible, which is the reason of the finite line, and consequently immutable and perpetual, so too the reason of all things (which is blessed God) is everlasting and immutable. And in this is opened the understanding of great Dionysius saying the essence of things is incorruptible, and of others who said the reason of things is eternal. As the divine Plato himself, who, as Calcidius reports, said in the Phaedo that there is one exemplar of all things, or idea, as it is in itself; but in respect of things, which are many, many exemplars are seen. For when I consider a two-foot line, and another three-foot one, and so on, two things occur: the reason of line, which is in both and in all one and equal, and the diversity which is between the two-foot and the three-foot. And thus the reason of the two-foot seems other than that of the three-foot. But it is manifest that in the infinite line there is not one two-foot and another three-foot, and it is the reason of the finite. Hence the reason is one of both lines, and the diversity of things or lines is not from diversity of reason, which is one, but from accident, because they do not equally participate the reason; hence there is but one reason of all, which is participated in diverse modes. But that it is participated in diverse modes happens because it was proved above that there cannot be two equally like things, and consequently participating one reason precisely equally. For reason is not participable in supreme equality except through the maximum, which is infinite reason itself; just as there is but one greatest unity, so there cannot be but one equality of unity. Which, because it is maximal equality, is the reason of all; for just as there is but one infinite line, which is the reason of all finite lines, and through this, that the finite line necessarily falls short of that which is infinite, then also through this it cannot be the reason of itself, just as it cannot be finite and infinite at once. Hence just as no two finite lines can be precisely equal, since precise equality, which is maximal, is nothing but the maximum itself, so no two lines are found equally participating the one reason of all.

Moreover, the infinite line is not greater in the two-foot line than the two-foot line, nor smaller, as said above, and so of the three-foot and beyond; and since it is indivisible and one, it is whole in any finite line whatever, but it is not whole in any finite line whatever according to participation and finitation, otherwise when it were whole in the two-foot it could not be in the three-foot, just as the two-foot is not the three-foot. Hence it is whole in each in such a way that it is in none, as one is distinct from others through finitation. The infinite line is therefore whole in any line whatever, so that each is in it. And this must indeed be considered conjointly. And it is clearly seen how the maximum is in each thing and in none, and this is nothing other than the maximum, since it is in the same reason in each thing, as each thing is in it, and is the reason itself, that then the maximum is in itself. To be the maximum meter and measure of all things is therefore nothing other than the maximum simply being in itself, or maximum. No thing is therefore in itself except the maximum, and every thing, as in its reason, is in itself, because its reason is the maximum. From these the intellect can indeed help itself and in the likeness of the infinite line to the maximum simply profit greatly above all intellect in sacred ignorance, for now we clearly see how we find God through the removal of the participation of beings. For all beings participate beingness. With participation therefore removed from all beings, there remains beingness itself most simple, which is the essence of all beings, and we do not behold such beingness except in most learned ignorance, since when I remove from mind all things participating beingness, nothing seems to remain. And therefore great Dionysius says the understanding of God approaches nothing more than something. But sacred ignorance instructs me that what seems nothing to the intellect is the incomprehensible maximum.

Capitulum XVIII: Book One: How from the Same Source We Are Led by the Hand to the Understanding of the Participation of Beingness.

Capitulum XIX: Book One: The Transfer of the Triangle to the Greatest Trinity.

Capitulum XX: Book One: Still Concerning the Trinity, and That Quaternity and Beyond Are Not Possible in Divine Things.

Capitulum XXI: Book One: The Transfer of the Infinite Circle to Unity.

Capitulum XXII: Book One: How the Providence of God Unites Contradictories.

Capitulum XXIII: Book One: The Transfer of the Infinite Sphere to the Actual Existence of God.

Capitulum XXIV: Book One: On the Name of God and Affirmative Theology.

Capitulum XXV: Book One: The Gentiles Named God Variously in Respect of Creatures.

Capitulum XXVI: Book One: On Negative Theology.

Liber secundus

Book Two: Prologue

Capitulum I: Book Two: Preliminary Corollaries for Inferring the One Infinite Universe.

Capitulum II: Book Two: How the Being of the Creature Is Unintelligibly from the Being of the First.

Capitulum III: Book Two: How the Maximum Enfolds and Unfolds All Things Intellectually.

Capitulum IV: Book Two: How the Universe, the Contracted Maximum, Is Only a Likeness of the Absolute.

Capitulum V: Book Two: Each Thing in Each Thing.

Capitulum VI: Book Two: On the Enfolding and the Degrees of Contraction of the Universe.

Capitulum VII: Book Two: On the Trinity of the Universe.

Capitulum VIII: Book Two: On the Possibility or Matter of the Universe.

Capitulum IX: Book Two: On the Soul or Form of the Universe.

Capitulum X: Book Two: On the Spirit of Universals.

Capitulum XI: Book Two: Corollaries on Motion.

Capitulum XII: Book Two: On the Conditions of the Earth.

Capitulum XIII: Book Two: On the Admirable Divine Art in the Creation of the World and the Elements.

Liber tertius

Book Three: Prologue

Capitulum I: Book Three: That a Maximum Contracted to This or That, Than Which a Greater Cannot Be, Cannot Exist Without the Absolute.

Capitulum II: Book Three: That the Contracted Maximum Is Also Absolute, Creator and Creature.

Capitulum III: Book Three: How in the Nature of Humanity Alone Such a Maximum Is Possible.

Capitulum IV: Book Three: How He Himself Is Jesus, the Blessed God and Man.

Capitulum V: Book Three: How Christ, Conceived Through the Holy Spirit, Was Born of the Virgin Mary.

Capitulum VI: Book Three: The Mystery of the Death of Jesus Christ.

Capitulum VII: Book Three: On the Mystery of the Resurrection.

Capitulum VIII: Book Three: That Christ, the Firstfruits of Them That Sleep, Ascended into the Heavens.

Capitulum IX: Book Three: That Christ Is the Judge of the Living and the Dead.

Capitulum X: Book Three: On the Sentence of the Judge.

Capitulum XI: Book Three: The Mysteries of Faith.

Capitulum XII: Book Three: On the Church.

Epistle of the Author

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