De Consideratione

Name: De Consideratione
Author: Bernard of Clairvaux

First published 1839

De Consideratione ad Eugenium (On Consideration, to Eugene) is Bernard of Clairvaux's last major treatise, composed between 1149 and 1152 and addressed to Pope Eugene III, a former monk of Clairvaux whom Bernard had personally formed before his elevation to the papacy. Written in five books, the work is at once a spiritual manual and a mirror for princes: Bernard urges the newly burdened pope not to let the ceaseless business of Rome — litigation, petitions, the "malicious occupations" of the Curia — extinguish the interior life of consideratio, the reflective self-examination that alone keeps action rightly ordered. The treatise moves outward in careful stages, following the fourfold scheme Bernard sets as its architecture: the pope's consideration of himself, of what lies beneath him (the clergy and people of Rome), of what surrounds him (the cardinals and household), and finally of what lies above him, culminating in Book V's ascent toward the contemplation of God, angelic hierarchy, and the divine nature itself. Alongside its mystical and pastoral concerns, the work is notable for its unsparing critique of curial corruption, its meditation on the proper limits of papal power (including the celebrated distinction between the "two swords"), and its warning — startling in an address to a reigning pope — that Eugene's worldly pomp descends "not from Peter, but from Constantine." Blending rhetorical intensity, biblical exegesis, and Cistercian spirituality, De Consideratione stands as one of the most influential texts of twelfth-century ecclesiology and remains a foundational witness to the monastic critique of ecclesiastical power.

Liber Quintus

[In this book St. Bernard considers the things above us (ch. i), first discussing the respective provinces of Opinion, Faith, and Understanding (ch. ii, iii), then proceeding to the Holy Angels (ch. iv, v), the Being of God (ch. vi, vii, viii, xi), the Person of Christ (ch. ix, x). In ch. xii we have God the Judge, and a conception of Hell in striking accord with much of the exposition of modern times. The book concludes (ch. xiv) with an impressive illustration of the mystical interpretation of Holy Scripture (Eph. iii. 18)—God regarded as ‘length, breadth, height, depth’, and our ‘comprehension’ of Him as such.

The Schoolmen. The term scholastic originally denoted a teacher in the schools founded throughout his empire by Charlemagne under the direction of our countryman, Alcuin of York. Used as an adjective, the word described the subjects taught—‘scholastic history,’ ‘scholastic philosophy,’ ‘scholastic theology,’ during the thousand years of the Transition Period, from the sixth to the sixteenth century.

In a movement so extended there were, of course, many developments. Of the schoolmen by whom St. Bernard may have been influenced, directly or indirectly, we need only mention John Scotus Erigena, John the Irishman (b. between A. D. 800 and A. D. 810, d. about A. D. 877); Berengarius of Tours (A. D. 999–1088); Lanfranc, his opponent (b. A. D. 1005, d. A. D. 1089, Abbot of Bec, and from A. D. 1070 Abp. of Canterbury); Roscelin, the reputed founder of Nominalism (condemned at the Council of Soissons, A. D. 1092); William of Champeaux (b. A. D. 1070, d. A. D. 1121); Abelard, pupil of the two preceding (b. A. D. 1079, d. A. D. 1142); Anselm (b. A. D. 1033, d. A. D. 1109, also Abbot of Bec and Abp. of Canterbury); and Gilbert of Poitiers, whose views were discussed at Rheims (A. D. 1148).

Whatever may be said of after times when Dialectics became a branch of professorial study in the Universities of the Middle Ages, it would be doing great injustice to represent these men as mere triflers, hair-splitters, verbal quibblers, syllogistic conjurers, and so forth. They ‘often described wearisome circles, rushed vehemently into culs-de-sac, wandered about a labyrinth, vainly demanding an outlet'. Many of their folios may be fossils, but 'we may surely believe that their way was foreseen, that they had a Guide, that there was a method which all these bewilderments were to help them in finding out'. There were deep fires burning in their bosoms, and both the intellect and the affections were in training for the better future.

Nor would it be right to represent them as in revolt against authority. The human reason was awaking after its long slumber, and the giant was not easily controlled. The revolt was not so much against authority, as against logic. John the Irishman rightly felt that Aristotle's 'Categories' belonged to the regions of sensible and intelligible things, but that when we ascend to the consideration of Him who transcends sense and intelligence, logical categories are out of place—God is neither Genus, Species, nor Accident. There was an earnest desire, not to uproot the Faith, but to find an intellectual basis for it, not to discard either reason or faith, but to reconcile their claims. 'Realism', 'Nominalism', 'Conceptualism,' to vast numbers are only names, but to those who have eyes to see they stand for the profoundest controversy which has ever engaged the thought of man, and are expressions of man's determination to get, if possible, to the bottom of things, and ascertain if reality anywhere exists, or life is but a dream. Even Abelard—all grudges between him and Bernard were set at rest; let us, too, think tenderly, and speak gently of him¹—is entitled to our gratitude and respect. There were doubtless faults in his intellectual temper, he may or may not have been the first 'champion of free inquiry', but he strove for the emancipation of reason, without which magna est veritas et praevalebit will never be a maxim of the possible.

From the time when Boethius (about A.D. 520) wrote his treatise on The Unity of God against the Arians, Nestorians, and Eutychians, the name into which we are baptized was all through the Middle Ages the subject of ceaseless speculation and discussion. We may deplore the fact that so sacred a theme should be the shuttlecock of logic, but once reason began to move, it would infallibly set itself problems, ontological, psychological, metaphysical, in trying to solve the mystery of God—the highest and greatest object of thought, the answer of both Anselm and Bernard to the question, 'What is God?' And it is not difficult to see the working of the principle of compensation: 'wisdom is justified of her children.' If theology 'received from logic a portion of its dryness and formality', it is no less true that 'logic received from theology its personality and vehemence'. Some powerful stimulus to thought was needed in the days of barbaric indifference. What likely to be so potent as the dogmas of predestination, Christ's presence in the Eucharist, and, underlying these, the being and nature of God, 'the root of all things and all thought'?

St. Bernard was neither by taste nor training qualified to take a distinguished part in the dialectics of his time. He could not speculate like Anselm, nor argue like Abelard. He hated heresies 'as foes to practical life, as disturbers of the devotion of monasteries, as hinderers of the common action of the Christian nations against the Infidels': he was no less a determined opponent of the logic of the schools; he was, however, a saint, not a doctor; and if he overcame the objects of his fiery wrath, if Abelard and Gilbert both submitted, it was not because of the fine temper of his sword or the skill with which he used it, but because he bore them down by his earnestness, his impetuosity, his reputation for holiness, and the sheer weight of his unrivalled authority.

Once more there is perhaps reason for gratitude. If St. Bernard had been differently constituted, our libraries might have been encumbered with more 'fossil folios', to the loss of his inspiring exhortations and such helpful meditations on the Godhead as he communicated to Eugenius. St. Anselm thus poured out his soul—'I do not attempt, O Lord, to penetrate Thy profundity, because in no sense can I compare it with my intellect: but I do desire to comprehend Thy truth, even though imperfectly, that truth which my heart believes and cherishes. For I seek not to comprehend in order to believe, but I believe in order to comprehend. I believe, because if I did not believe, I should never comprehend.' St. Bernard's attitude was somewhat different. It cannot be better expressed than in the words of Frederick Denison Maurice—'Bernard did not dislike Abelard mainly as a rebel against authority, but as outraging what he conceived to be the divine charity or love. Righteousness was not so much the foundation of his mind as it was of Anselm's. He was not nearly so just a man. But no writer of any age has dwelt more upon love as constituting the very being and nature of God, and as the perfection of man because he is made in the image of God. This is the characteristic feature of his mind; in it, we believe, lay the secret of his power. The idea of the Trinity was in him the idea of the absolute, all-embracing love. Any other basis of divinity he abhorred. The intellectual conceptions of Abelard were indifferent to him when they were applied to any other subject, were utterly offensive when applied to theology. The explanations which were welcomed with so much enthusiasm by Abelard's youthful hearers, were to him the dry, hard substitutes for a living truth. That which appeared to quicken and inspire them, smelt in his nostrils of the grave and the charnel-house.' Hence St. Bernard's portrait of Abelard laid before the Pope—Ponit in coelum os suum et scrutatur alta Dei.²

Mysticism. ‘The name given to a school of thought which arose in the way of recoil from the cold and exact logic of Scholasticism in the twelfth century. Its leading idea is that perfect holiness and spiritual knowledge are to be attained by devout contemplation rather than by outward means of grace and theological study. The three stages of such perfection are defined as Purification, Illumination, and Perfect Union with God’ (Dict. of Doctrinal and Historical Theology, p. 501). It was no novelty in St. Bernard’s century; contemplative natures must have been at all times disposed towards it; the older monastic systems are said to have been characterized by it in a high degree; and the writings of the fifth century, falsely attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite (Acts xvii. 34) had great influence on the religious thought of the Middle Ages. John the Irishman was the first to combine Mysticism with Scholasticism. In his leading work, the De Divisione Naturae, he puts the following prayer into the mouth of the student—‘God, our salvation and redemption, who hast given us nature, grant to us also grace. Manifest Thy light to us, feeling after Thee, and seeking Thee, in the shades of ignorance. Recall us from our errors. Stretch out Thy right hand to us weak ones who cannot, without Thee, come to Thee. Show Thyself to those who seek nothing besides Thee. Break the clouds of vain phantasies which suffer not the eye of the mind to behold Thee in that way in which Thou permittest those that long to behold that face of Thine, though it is invisible, which is their rest, the end beyond which they crave for nothing, seeing that there cannot be any good beyond it that is higher than itself.’ The orthodox mystics of the twelfth century had a common aim, viz. to reconcile the claims of contemplative piety with those of scientific theology, but expressed themselves very differently. Bernard held that not argument but holiness comprehends the things of God; Hugo of St. Victor (A.D. 1097–1141) laid down the principle that ‘the uncorrupted truth of things cannot be discovered by reasoning’; Richard of St. Victor, disciple of this last (d. A. D. 1173) treated the faculty of mystical contemplation as superior to the imagination and the reason. Another Victorian, Walter (about A. D. 1180) gave to Abelard, Peter Lombard, Gilbert, and Peter of Poitiers the name of the four labyrinths of France. In the following century Bonaventura (d. A. D. 1274) rose to the full height of sublimity, or extravagance, by subordinating all human wisdom to divine illumination. He did not see—how could he, when the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, the Source of all life, physical, intellectual, moral, spiritual, was so little understood?—that true human wisdom is ‘divine illumination’. It is related that Thomas Aquinas, the ‘angelical’ doctor, on a visit to Bonaventura, whose ‘Itinerary of the mind to God’ had won for him the title of the ‘seraphic’ doctor, asked to be permitted to see the latter’s library. Bonaventura pointed to the crucifix, and said it was there that he had learnt all he knew. This is the ‘spirit’ of the Mystics, and a beautiful spirit it is. With the Mysticism of later periods we are not concerned.]

Caput I: The things ‘above’ us, namely, God and things Divine, to which we rise by means of the Creatures

1. The former books, although they bear the title ‘On Consideration’, have very much in them relating to action, inasmuch as they teach or admonish that some things should be not only considered, but also done. But the present book will treat of Consideration only. For the things which are above you—and that is our topic—do not call for action, but for contemplation. It is impossible to take a part in those things which in one sense ever are, and ever will be: some of which, moreover, ever have been. And I would have you, my dear Eugenius, wisest of men, shrewdly observe what I am going to say, namely, that your consideration goes from home as often as it turns from the things above to the visible things below, whether these have to be studied with a view to knowledge, or sought for use, or administered and performed in the discharge of duty. Still, if your consideration so engages in the things below as to seek the things above, it is not banished far. Consideration thus employed is a returning home. That is a higher and worthier use of things present, when, according to the wisdom of Paul, 'the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made.'¹ The citizens, doubtless, have no need of the ladder; exiles have, as the author of the words I have quoted himself observed; for, although he said that things invisible are clearly seen through things visible, he significantly added, 'from the created world.'² And, indeed, what need of steps for him who is already on the throne? Consideration is one of the 'creatures' of heaven, and is equipped for deeper insight into the things of heaven. It sees the Word, and in the Word the things made through the Word. It has no need to beg the knowledge of the Maker from the things which have been made. For even to gain a knowledge of these things, it does not descend to them: it sees them where they are far better seen than in themselves. Hence it is that to reach them Consideration does not seek the medium of the senses: it perceives them immediately, and is self-percipient. That is the best sort of vision when you lack nothing, when you have your heart's desire, and find contentment in yourself. Otherwise, you run some risk of seeking satisfaction elsewhere, and this is to fall beneath the standard of perfection, and enjoy less freedom.

2. And why should you want the lower things? Is it not absurd and unworthy of you? Clearly, by longing for the things below, you do some wrong to the things above: though I admit that mortal man will never be guiltless of such wrongdoing until the time come when he will have escaped into the freedom of the sons of God. For they will all then be taught of God,³ and without the medium of any creature will be blessed in God alone. This will be a returning home, when we leave the country of our bodies and reach the realm of spirits—I mean our God, the Mighty Spirit, the great abiding place of the spirits of the blessed. There is no place here for the intrusion of sense or imagination; this realm is truth, it is wisdom, virtue, eternity, the highest good. For a while we are absent from it; our present abode is a valley, the vale of tears, where the senses have dominion, and Consideration is an exile: where the bodily sense freely and powerfully manifests itself, but the eye of the spirit is veiled in darkness. What wonder, then, if Consideration, being a foreigner, needs a native's help? And in passing through time to eternity the traveller is to be congratulated who has been able to win for himself the indispensable services of the citizens; using them, not delighting in them; compelling them, though not master of them; demanding them, not begging for them.

Caput II: The Steps of Consideration

3. He is a great man who makes it his concern to utilize the senses, spending, as it were, the wealth of the citizens in thus providing for his own salvation and the salvation of many. And he is no less a man who has made philosophy a stepping-stone to the things invisible. The only difference is that there is more pleasure in the latter, more profit in the former: the one has more happiness, the other indicates more strength. But he is the greatest of all who, scorning the use of sensible things, so far as human frailty permits, has accustomed himself, not by gradual steps, but by sudden ecstatic flights¹ to soar aloft to the glorious things on high. I suppose Paul's ecstasies² were of this last description: they were departures [from the senses], not the ascent [of the senses]; for he himself relates that he did not ascend into Paradise, but was rather caught up thither. This is what he means by saying 'If we mentally depart, it is to the glory of God'.³ Moreover, when Consideration, even in the place of its sojourning, through the pursuit of virtue, and with the help of grace, has gained the upper hand, these three results follow:—it either checks the senses,⁴ lest they assert themselves too strongly: or draws them in, lest they go too far afield: or shuns them, lest they defile. In the first case the mark of Consideration is strength, in the second freedom, in the third purity. For such a flight of the spirit is only made with the wing of purity on the one side, and of rapture on the other.

4. You would like to know the distinguishing names of these various kinds of Consideration. Let us say, if you please, that the first is economical, the second estimative, the third speculative. The meaning will appear from the definitions. Consideration is ‘economical’—that of the steward⁵—when it makes systematic use of the senses and of sensible things in daily life so as to win the favour of God. It is ‘estimative’—that of the valuer—when it wisely and diligently searches everything, and weighs everything, to find God. It is ‘speculative’ when it retires within itself, and so far as Divine help is given, detaches itself from human affairs in order to contemplate God. I suppose you carefully observe that the last is the fruit of the others, and that the others, if they stand unrelated to it, may seem to be what they are called, but are not really so. And unless the first keeps the last in view, it sows much and reaps nothing; moreover, unless the second makes the last its goal, it walks, but does not walk forth. So then, what the first desires, the second scents,⁶ the third tastes. To this taste, however, the others also bring us, though more slowly; and there is a further difference—the first is the more toilsome road, the second the more peaceful.

Caput III: Opinion, Faith, and Understanding

5. Enough about the way up, you say ; I have still to tell you whither you must ascend. You deceive yourself if you expect me to do that ; it transcends the power of speech. Do you think that I can utter what eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, and has not entered into the heart of man ?¹ ‘ God ’, the apostle says, ‘ has revealed them to us by His Spirit.’² So then the things which are above are not taught by words, they are revealed by the Spirit. But what speech does not explain let Consideration seek, prayer desire, the life merit, purity attain. At all events, when I admonish you to consider the things which are above you, do not think that I am sending you to gaze at the sun, moon, and stars ; no, not the firmament itself, nor the waters which are above the heavens. For all these things, though locally ‘ above ’, are in point of value ‘ beneath ’ you, even in dignity of nature, as they are material existences. Your portion is the spirit, whereby you in vain look for anything above you which is not spirit. Moreover, God is a Spirit, and so are the holy angels, and they are above you. But God is a Spirit in virtue of His nature, the angels are your superiors through grace. The special excellence both of yourself and of angelic beings is reason ; but in God there is no peculiar excellence ; He is altogether excellent. He, and the blessed spirits who are with Him, must in three ways, as it were along their several paths, be by our Consideration sought after—the paths of opinion, faith, and understanding. Of these, understanding depends on reason, faith on authority, while opinion safeguards itself by probability only. Two of them attain to the certainty of truth, but faith possesses truth out of sight and implied, understanding has it naked and manifest; opinion, having no certainty, does not so much apprehend truth as seek it through probabilities.

6. The utmost caution must be exercised so as to avoid confusion, lest the uncertainties of opinion crystallize into articles of faith, or the foundation verities of faith become the questionable matter of opinion. And we should bear this in mind—that opinion venturing on assertion is rash; faith, if it hesitate, is weak; and understanding, if it try to break into the sealed mysteries of faith, is deemed a burglar, and a spy upon the secrets of the throne. Many have taken their own opinion for understanding, and have thus erred. And in truth opinion may be taken for understanding; understanding cannot be taken for opinion. How so? Surely because opinion may be deceived, understanding cannot be; if it could, it would not be understanding, but opinion. For true understanding has not only certain truth, but the knowledge of truth. We may thus define each of them. Faith is, by the exercise of the will, a sure foretaste of truth not yet manifested. Understanding is the sure and clear knowledge of some invisible thing. Opinion is the holding something provisionally true which you do not know to be false. So then, as I have said, faith is free from doubts; if it have doubts it is not faith, but opinion. How, then, does it differ from understanding? Inasmuch as, although there be no more uncertainty in it than there is in understanding, still it has a veil before its eyes, which is not the case with understanding. In short, if you understand a thing, further inquiry is needless; if further inquiry be necessary, you do not understand. But there is nothing we would rather know than what we already know by faith. When the veil shall have been utterly removed from the things of which we are now assured by faith, the cup of bliss will be full.

Caput IV: The Angels

7. Well now, having thus cleared the way, let us turn our consideration to our mother, Jerusalem above, and with caution and close attention, by all three ways enumerated, search out the things unsearchable, so far, I mean, as may be lawful, or rather, so far as shall be given to us. And first let us remember that the citizens of that country are spirits, mighty, glorious, blessed, separate personalities, of graduated rank, from the beginning standing in their own order, perfect of their kind, having ethereal bodies, endowed with immortality, passionless ; not so created, but so made—that is, through grace, not by nature ; beings of pure mind, benignant affections, religious and devout ; of unblemished morality ; inseparably one in heart and mind, blessed with unbroken peace, God's building, dedicated to the divine praises and service. All this we ascertain by reading, and hold by faith. But as regards their bodies, some authorities hesitate to say not only whence they are derived, but whether in any real sense they exist at all. If any one is inclined to think the derivation of these bodies a matter of opinion, I do not dispute the point. Further, if we hold that the angelic beings are endowed with understanding, this is not of faith, nor is it mere opinion ; it is a conclusion of our understanding ; for if they had not understanding, they could not be partakers of the Divine nature. There are likewise certain names, known to us by the hearing of the ear, by means of which the duties, merits, ranks, orders, of these blessed ones, things only faintly heard by mortal ear, in one way or another may be conjectured and distinguished. But, in truth, what does not come by hearing is not of faith, for faith cometh by hearing.¹ And so we may speak conjecturally of these topics. For what is the good of our knowing the names of the celestial beings if we may not, without prejudice to faith, form some opinion as to the things the names denote? Angels, Archangels, Virtues, Powers, Principalities, Dominions, Thrones, Cherubim, and Seraphim—these are the names. What do they signify? Is there no difference between those spirits who are simply called Angels and those who are called Archangels?

8. What, then, is the meaning of this difference in degree? Let us suppose (unless your consideration has showed you something better) that they are called Angels who are believed to have been given as guardians of individual men, sent to minister, as Paul teaches,² on behalf of those who are the heirs of salvation; it was of these the Saviour said, ‘Their angels do always behold the face of your Father.’³ Let us suppose that over these are the Archangels, who, admitted to a knowledge of the Divine secrets, are not sent except for particular and very weighty reasons. From among these the great Archangel Gabriel was, as we read, sent to Mary,⁴ and for the greatest of all reasons. Let us suppose that above these are the Virtues, by whose command or operation signs and wonders wrought in the elements, or through the elements, appear for the warning of mortal men. Perhaps this explains why it is that after reading in the Gospels,⁵ ‘There shall be signs in the sun, and the moon, and the stars,' a little farther on you have, 'for the Virtues of the heavens shall be moved':⁶ the spirits, no doubt, through whom the signs are wrought. Let us suppose that the Powers are their superiors, and that by their vigour the power of darkness is checked, and the malignant spirits of this lower air are restrained, that they may not do harm to their full intent: that they may not be able to show their malignity, except for beneficial ends. Let us suppose that the Principalities are also preferred to these last, and that by their regulating wisdom all sovereignty upon earth is established, ruled, limited, transferred, curtailed, changed. Let us suppose that the Dominions tower above the aforesaid orders to such a height that in comparison of these all the rest appear to be administrative spirits, and that to the Dominions, as it were to their masters, the Principalities account for their commands, the Powers for their defences, the Virtues for their operations, the Archangels for their revelations, the Angels for their care and foresight. Let us suppose that the Thrones have winged their flight far away beyond even the Dominions, that they are called Thrones because they sit on thrones, and that they therefore sit because God is seated in them. For He could not be seated in those who were not themselves seated. Do you ask what I mean by that sitting? The deepest tranquillity, the utmost calmness and serenity, the peace which passes all understanding. Such is the Lord of Hosts, who sitteth in the Thrones, tranquilly judging all things, perfectly calm, serene, peaceful. And such He made the Thrones, most like Himself. Let us suppose the Cherubim to drink at the very fount of wisdom, the mouth of the Most High, and in turn to pour forth the streams of knowledge for all their fellow citizens. May not this be the 'rushing river, the streams whereof make glad the city of God,'⁷ of which the prophet spake? Let us suppose the Seraphim to be spirits inflamed with the Divine fire, kindling all things, so that the citizens may be each a burning and a shining lamp, burning with charity, shining with knowledge.

9. How good it is, Eugenius, for us to be here! But how much better will it be if we ever altogether follow on whither we have in part gone before! Our hearts lead the way, but not our whole hearts; only a part, and too often a small part. While our affections are weighed down by the bodily tabernacle, and our desires cleave to the mire, contemplation, thin and spiritless, is left to wing its flight all alone. And yet out of the depths of its poverty it will cry, 'O Lord, I have loved the beauty of Thine house, and the place where Thy glory dwelleth.'⁸ But suppose the soul were to collect itself, and the affections were brought back from all places wheresoever they are kept captive, through fearing what they ought not, loving what they should not, sorrowing in vain, rejoicing still more in vain. Suppose the soul, I say, accompanied by these affections and possessed of full freedom, were to wing its vigorous unimpeded flight, satisfied, as it were, with the marrow and fatness of grace; once it begins to travel round the abodes of light, and more intently gaze upon Abraham's dear bosom, and see 'beneath the altar', whatever that may mean, the souls of the martyrs with utmost patience waiting in their first robe to be clothed with the second, will it not then much more earnestly say with the prophet, 'One thing have I asked of the Lord, that will I seek after : that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, to behold the fair beauty of the Lord, and to visit His temple' ?⁹ What prevents the heart of God being there revealed ? Why should it not there be proved what is ' the will of God, the good, acceptable, and perfect will ' ?¹⁰—good in itself, pleasing in its effects, acceptable to those who have fruition of it, perfect to the perfect who seek nothing beyond it. Bowels of mercy are disclosed, thoughts of peace, the riches of salvation, the mysteries of the good will, secrets of loving-kindness, which, shut out from mortal ken, are only guessed at even by the elect. But even in this there is something salutary : men might otherwise cease to fear before they are found fit to worthily love.

10. In the heavenly beings who are called Seraphim we may discern how He loves who has no cause to love, and who also hates nothing that He has made ; how He cherishes those whom He has made for salvation, teaches them to go,¹¹ embraces them, how the fire of His love consumes the sins of His elect youth, and the chaff of their ignorances, throughly purifying them for Himself, and making them most worthy of His love. In the Cherubim, who have a name for fullness of knowledge, we may perceive that the Lord is a God of knowledge, who only knoweth all things, and in Him is no ignorance at all ; who is altogether light, and in Him is no darkness at all ;¹² who is all eye, and who cannot possibly be deceived, because that eye is never closed ; who seeks not outside Himself for light which He may approach that He may see, for He sees in the light of His own Being. In the Thrones we may behold how the Judge, trusted by all that is innocent, sits in them ; He who will not deceive, and cannot be deceived, inasmuch as He loves, as has been said, and sees, as has been said. Nor is this His 'sitting' without significance; it indicates tranquillity. May my sentence go forth from such a presence¹³ where love is found, but no error, no confusion! In the Dominions we may see how majestic is the Lord, who at His pleasure establishes His empire, that empire which is as wide as the universe and shall endure for ever. In the Principalities we may perceive the fount of all things; as a door turns on its hinge, so the universe depends on the King Himself. In the Powers we may see how powerfully the First Cause protects those over whom He rules, keeping off and driving back the hostile powers. In the Virtues we may see everywhere equally present that one Virtue through which are all things, life-giving, active, invisible, unmovable, yet moving all things for beneficial ends, and holding them in its grasp. When this Virtue breaks forth into effects less familiar amongst men, we hear of miracles or prodigies. Lastly, as we contemplate the Angels and Archangels, we may see, and marvel, how true it is in our experience that 'He careth for us';¹⁴ He who never ceases to delight us with the visits of such glorious beings, to instruct us with their revelations, admonish us through their suggestions, solace us by their zealous attention.

Caput V: God is the Source of Angelic Gifts and Graces

11. All these gifts and graces were bestowed on these spirits by their Creator, one and the self-same Spirit dividing to them severally as He willed. It is He who worketh them in His creatures, it is He who has given to His creatures the power of working them, but in different ways. The Seraphim burn, but with the fire of God, or rather with fire for God. Their chief characteristic is their love, but they love not as much, nor in the same way, as God. The Cherubim shine, and excel in knowledge, but by participation in the truth; and accordingly they know not as the Truth knows, nor as much. The Thrones sit, but by the favour of Him who sitteth in them. They also tranquilly judge, but not so fully, nor in the same way, as the Peace that giveth peace, the Peace which passes all understanding. The Dominions rule, but they rule in subjection to a ruler, and serve Him as well. What is this in comparison with the supreme, everlasting, unparalleled dominion? The Principalities lead and govern; but they themselves are governed: so that they would no longer know how to govern, if they ceased to be governed. In the Powers there is surpassing strength; but He to whom they owe their strength has more strength, and of a different kind: He is not so much strong, as strength itself. The Virtues, in accordance with their ministry and their might, are busy rousing the sluggish hearts of men by the novelty of signs; but it is Virtue itself, immanent in them, that does the works. They also do them, but in comparison with that doing they do them not. In short, so great is the difference that the prophet says to Him, as standing apart from all others, ‘Thou art God who doest wondrous things,’¹ and also concerning Him, ‘Who alone doeth great and marvellous things.’² Angels and Archangels are with us, but He is more our own who is not only with us but in us.

12. But if you say that an Angel may also be in us, I do not deny it. I remember that it is written, 'The Angel who spake in me.'³ And yet there is a difference even here. The Angel is in us suggesting what is good, not bestowing it: stimulating us to goodness, not creating goodness. God is so in us as to give the grace, and infuse it into us; or rather, so in us that He Himself is infused and partaken of, so that one need not fear to say that He is one with our spirit, although He be not one with our person, nor one with our substance.⁴ For you know, 'He that is joined unto God is one spirit.'⁵ The Angel, therefore, is with the soul, God is in the soul. The Angel is in the soul as a comrade, God as life. It follows that as the soul sees in the eyes, hears in the ears, smells in the nostrils, tastes in the palate, has the sense of touch in all the rest of the body, so God worketh different effects in different spirits: for instance, in some He manifests Himself as love, in others as perception, in others as action of various kinds, according as the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal.⁶ What are we to think of Him who is so common a topic of our speech, but who is so far removed from us in reality? How is it that He whom we describe with mortal words hides Himself in the depths of His own Majesty, and altogether shuns our human forms⁷ and affections? Hear what He says to men, ‘As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts.’⁸ We are said to love, so is God: we are said to know, so is God: and much to the same purpose. But God loves like Charity, knows like Truth, sits in judgement like Equity, rules like Majesty, governs like Authority, guards like Safety, works like Virtue, reveals like Light, stands by us like Affection. All these things the Angels also do, and so do we, but in a far inferior way, not, of course, by our native goodness, but by the goodness whereof we partake.

Caput VI: The Eternal Self-existence of God

12. Now, then, let us pass from these spirits, if haply you too may be able to say with the spouse, ‘It was but a little I passed from them when I found him whom my soul loveth.’¹ Do you ask, ‘What is His name?’ That is surely not a better question than ‘What is His character?’ The answer which God wished to be given respecting Himself, the answer which He Himself taught Moses, and which Moses at God’s command told the people was—‘I am what I am; He who is hath sent me unto you’.² Fitly was this answer given. Nothing could better describe eternity, and God is eternal. If you say that God is good, great, blessed, wise, or any such thing, the starting-point is this—God is. Of course, the very meaning of God's existing is that all these attributes constitute existence. If you add a hundred others you have not got away from the fact of His existence. By naming them you have not added anything; if you do not name them, you have not diminished aught. If you now perceive the nature of this unparalleled, unique, supreme existence, will you not agree that in comparison thereof whatever is not included therein may more accurately be said not to exist than to exist? Do we ask further, 'What is God?' We reply, 'That without which nothing is.' We say nothing can exist without Him, just as He Himself cannot exist without Himself. He is self-existent. He is existence to all else. And so, in a certain sense, He is alone, who is the source of His own existence, and of the existence of all beside. What is God? The Beginning,³ as He Himself replied concerning Himself. In the world of sense many things are called beginnings, but in respect of things that come after. If, instead of looking forwards you look backwards, you will allow Him to be the beginning of all. Wherefore, if you wish to find the true, unconditioned 'beginning', you must discover that which has no beginning. That from which all began could not possibly have had a beginning. For if it had, there must of necessity have been some source from which it sprang, since nothing is self-originating. If it be imagined that the non-existent⁴ could give itself a beginning, or that something may be before it is, I reply that both these alternatives are contrary to reason, and it clearly follows that nothing was its own beginning. Moreover, whatever had not its beginning from itself was not the first beginning. The true beginning, therefore, by no means began, but was altogether the fount of its own being.

14. What is God? He for whom the ages have neither come nor gone, and yet with whom they are not co-eternal. What is God? He 'from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things'.⁵ 'From whom', by creation, not by propagation.⁶ 'Through whom', lest you should suppose there is some other author and some other maker. 'In whom', not locally, but potentially. 'From whom', as the one beginning, the one author of all. 'Through whom', lest some other beginning be brought in as the originator. 'In whom', lest a third term, place, be introduced. 'From whom', not as though God were the matter of which things are made; He is the efficient, not the material cause. In vain do philosophers look to matter to solve the difficulty; God has no need of matter. For He did not seek a workshop, nor an artificer. He, through Himself, in Himself, made all things. Whence? Out of nothing; for if He made them out of anything, He did not make that, and therefore did not make all things. God forbid that out of His own incorrupt and incorruptible substance He should be thought to have made so many things that are doubtless good, but are nevertheless corruptible. You ask, 'If all things are in God, where is God Himself?' Still, I find no place which can contain Him. You ask where He is not? I cannot tell this either. What place is without God? God is incomprehensible;⁷ but you have apprehended not a little if you have ascertained this much about Him, that He is nowhere who is not enclosed by space, and that He is everywhere who is not shut out by space. In His own sublime and incomprehensible way, as all things are in Him, so He is in all things. In a word, as the Evangelist says, 'He was in the world.'⁸ But in a different way He is there, where He was before the world was made. You must not ask where He was; except Himself there was nothing. Therefore He was in Himself.

Caput VII: The Divine Trinity in Unity

15. What is God? The best object of thought.¹ If you approve, you ought not to countenance the belief that there is something which is the essence of Godhead, and yet is not God.² If there were, it would doubtless be better than God. Must it not of necessity be better than God if it is not God, but constitutes His being? But it is wiser for us to confess that the divinity which men say is the essence of God is the same as God. Unless it be God it cannot be in God. 'What', say our opponents, 'do you deny that God has divinity?' No; but what God has, that He is. 'Do you deny that God exists in virtue of His divinity?' No; but we say that He exists in virtue of no other divinity than that which He Himself is. If you have discovered some other divinity, I fall back upon the doctrine of the Tri-une God, and stiffen my back against your new-found 'divinity'. You may divide the world into four quarters if you please: you must not so map out the Godhead. God is a Trinity: God is each of the three Persons. If you like to add a fourth divinity, I have already fully convinced myself that no divinity which is not God ought to be worshipped. I suppose you think so too: for 'thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve'.³ That is truly a glorious divinity which dare not claim for itself divine honours. But we do better in rejecting the fourth term altogether than in receiving it without due honour. We say that there are many things in God—it is sound Catholic doctrine—but the many are but one. Otherwise, if we regard them as individually distinct, we have God not only fourfold, but a hundredfold. For example, we speak of His greatness, goodness, justice, and innumerable other attributes; but unless you consider them all as one in God, and with God, you will have a manifold God.

16. It is not difficult for me to frame a better idea of God than this of yours. 'What is your view?' you say. I regard God as absolute simplicity.⁴ A sound judgement prefers simplicity of nature to that which is manifold. I know the usual answer to this. ‘We maintain’, say they, ‘that the many attributes do not constitute the being of God, but only one divinity composed of them all.’ You assert, then, that although God is not manifold, He is twofold, and you have not reached the highest conception of God as absolute simplicity. That is as far from being simple which involves even one form,⁵ as she is no longer a virgin who is known to even one man. I speak freely; even a twofold God shall not be my God: I have a better one. Suppose I do prefer a twofold Divine Being to a God multitudinous and manifold; I nevertheless utterly despise such a God in comparison with a God of a ‘simple’ nature. My God is none other than what He is in the catholic sense. We must not institute a comparison between what He includes and excludes. He is what He is. We are not told all that He is. He is pure spirit, simple, complete in Himself, self-consistent, adding nothing to Himself from time, place, material things, losing nothing of Himself in them; incapable of numerical division, and not composed of several parts to make a collective whole. For He is a unit, not a union. He has no corporeal parts like our bodies; no different affections, like our souls; He is not susceptible of many ‘forms’, like all creation; nor does He assume even one form, as our opponents conceive of 'form'. Surely God is greatly to be praised for that He is content with one 'form', so that He may exempt Himself from all deformity. This is equivalent to saying that the nature of all else is conditioned in many ways, but that God's nature is absolute. What? Will He, through whose goodness all things exist, stoop for His being to the goodness of another? That praise, to use a common expression, means blasphemy. Is it not higher excellence to need nothing than to need one thing? Have reverence for God, so that you may give Him the best. If your heart has been able to rise to this level, how will you place your God lower down? He is His own 'form',⁶ His own essence. For a while I look up to Him at this elevation; if a higher rank were revealed to me, I would rather give it to Him. We surely need not fear that thought will soar above Him. However high it may attain, He is still beyond. To look for the Most High beneath the summit of man's thought is absurd; to place Him there is impious. He must be sought beyond it, not on this side of it.

17. Ascend thus far if you can; lift up your heart, and God will be exalted. God is not dependent on form. He is pure form.⁷ God is not a feeling, He is a state of feeling; He is not compound, but absolute simplicity; and you know full well what I mean by 'simplicity': the word is synonymous with unity. In proportion as God is one, He is simple. Now He is one in such a sense as nothing else is. If the phrase be permissible, He is most of all one.⁸ There is one sun as no other can be; one moon also, as no other can be. So it is with God, but more so. How 'more so'? He is one even to Himself. Would you like a little light upon this? He is always the same, and never changes. It is not so with the one sun, or the one moon. Both proclaim that they are not one to themselves, the sun because of its movements, the moon on account of her phases. But God is not only one to Himself, He is also one in Himself. He has nothing in Himself but Himself. He knows no change through time, no difference in His substance. Hence the saying of Boethius⁹ concerning Him—'This is the true unity which is indivisible, and admits nothing foreign to itself. Nor can this unity be reduced to "forms", for it is pure form.'¹⁰ Compare with this unity all that can be called unity; God's unity will not be found there. Yet God is Three in One. What follows? Do we upset what has been said about the Unity by bringing in the thought of the Trinity? No; but we establish the Unity. We speak of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; still we maintain there are not three Gods, but one God. What, if I may so speak, is the meaning of this number which is not a number? If there are three particulars, must there not be numerical distinction? If there is but one, what becomes of the enumeration? But I have, you say, something that can be numbered, and yet not numbered. There is one substance, there are three Persons. Is there anything strange or obscure in this? Nothing, if the persons are conceived of separately from the Substance. The truth is that, inasmuch as the three Persons are one Substance, and the one Substance is the three Persons, there is no denying that we do number them, for they are really three; yet on the other hand we do not number them, for they are really one. If, again, you think an easy explanation is found by calling them three, tell me what it is you have numbered. Natures? There is one nature. Essences? There is one essence. Substances? There is one substance. Godheads? There is one Godhead. 'I do not number these', you say, 'but the Persons, and they are not that one nature, that one essence, that one substance, that one divinity.' You are a Catholic; you are not in the least likely to make such a concession.

Caput VIII: The plurality of Persons in the Godhead, and their several 'properties'. The unity and simplicity of the Essence

18. The Catholic Faith confesses that the 'properties' of the Persons are identical with the Persons themselves; and that the Persons themselves are nothing else than one God, one Divine Substance, one Divine Nature, one Divine and Supreme Majesty. Number, therefore, if you can, either the Persons without the Substance, which they themselves are, or the characteristics without the Persons with whom they are identical. Or, if any one endeavour to separate the Persons from the Substance, or the characteristic attributes from the Persons, I am at a loss to understand how he can profess to be a worshipper of the Trinity after dividing the Godhead into such a vast multitude of particulars. Let us therefore maintain that there are three Persons, but not to the prejudice of the Unity : let us hold that there is one God, but not so as to confound the Trinity ; for these are not mere names, nor idle words void of meaning. If any one asks how this can be, let him be content to hold that it is so, though I must add that if the doctrine be not clear to reason, it is no halting opinion, but the firm conviction of faith. This is a great mystery, worthy of all veneration, not to be keenly scrutinized. How can plurality consist with unity, or unity with plurality ? To closely examine the fact is rashness, to believe it is piety, to know it is life, and eternal life. Wherefore, Eugenius, if you think it worth while, let me have your undivided consideration as I run through the many arguments which tend to show the greatness of this unique unity. There is a unity which we may call ‘collective’, as, for example, when many stones make one heap. There is a ‘constitutive’ unity, as when many members make one body, or many parts constitute one whole. There is a unity such as that of man and wife, whereby two are no longer two, but one flesh. And there is a ‘natural’ unity, whereby soul and body are one man. There is a ‘potential’ unity, the realization of which is the constant endeavour of a virtuous man, so that he may not be unstable, nor unlike himself. There is the unity of agreement, when the love of many men leads to their being of one heart and one soul. There is also the unity of devotion, when the soul, cleaving to God with complete surrender, is one spirit. And there is the unity of condescension, whereby our poor nature was taken by the Word of God to make one person in Himself.

19. But what are all these compared with that supreme, and, so to speak, unique unity which results from the consubstantiality of the three Persons? If you find a likeness between any one of the foregoing and this unity, the resemblance is but partial; if you compare them with it, there will be no true resemblance. Therefore, among all things which are rightly called 'One', the unity of the Trinity, whereby three Persons are one Substance, is the highest. Next comes that surpassing unity, whereby, conversely, three substances are in Christ, one Person. Moreover, real sober consideration proves that the foregoing, and whatsoever else can be called 'One', have the title in virtue of their resemblance to that supreme Unity, not because they allow of comparison therewith. Nor do we forsake this profession of the Unity by our upholding of the doctrine of the three Persons, since, when we speak of the Trinity, we do not mean a multiplicity of gods any more than in speaking of unity we imply loneliness. Wherefore, when I speak of One I am not disturbed by the consideration of number, which does not multiply the essence, nor change it, nor divide it. Again, when I speak of three things, if I view them as one, whatever the three things may be, I am not proved wrong. Nor, if I speak of the three Persons of the Godhead, am I obliged to confound the Persons, or reduce the three to the One.

Caput IX: As in God there are three Persons and one Nature: so in Christ there are two Natures and one Person

20. My views, I confess, are similar respecting the unity which I have ranked next in honour to that which is unique. I say that in Christ the Word, the human soul and body, are without confusion of the essences one Person, and I further maintain that the human and divine remain numerically distinct without prejudice to the unity of person. Nor would I deny that this unity is of the same class as that unity whereby soul and body are one man. It was fitting that a mystery devised for man's welfare should have a more intimate relation to man's nature and more closely resemble it. It was fitting, too, that it should harmonize with that highest unity which is in God and is God, so that as three Persons in the Trinity are one Essence, so in the Incarnation, by a most appropriate contrast, the three Essences are one Person. Do you not see how beautifully the unity of Christ is set between the unity of God and the unity of man? I mean, of course, the unity of the Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus. Most beautiful, most appropriate, I say, that the mystery of salvation should so fitly correspond to both, to God our Saviour on the one side, to saved humanity on the other. Thus this unity of the two natures, standing between the other two unities, must be pronounced inferior to the one and superior to the other, being as much above the lower as it is below the higher.

21. In a word, so closely and so clearly are the natures united in the Person of the one Christ, who is God and Man, that you can without error in speaking of them use either mode of expression, and with the true Catholic Faith¹ declare both that God was man and man was God. But you cannot, without sheer absurdity, similarly assert either that the soul is the body, or the body the soul, although in like manner soul and body is one man. And it is not surprising if the soul, with all its vital energy, considerable though it is, and notwithstanding its affections, cannot so closely bind the body to itself as the Divinity united to itself that man who was predestined to be the Son of God with power.² The divine predestination is a long and strong chain for binding close: for it reaches from the Eternal. What is longer than eternity? What more mighty than Deity? Hence it is that this unity could not possibly be severed by death, although soul and body were separated from one another. And perhaps John felt this when he professed himself unworthy to undo the latchet of His shoe.³

Caput X: The Parable of the three Measures of Meal

22. We remember the three measures in the Gospel, which were mixed and leavened to make one loaf.¹ If any one were to apply the parable to the mystery of the Incarnation I should think he was not far wrong in so doing. How well the woman leavened them! And so, in the parallel, without dividing the body and soul, the Word was distinct from the body and soul, yet so that in the separation the inseparable union was maintained. For the partial separation is no objection against the unity which remained between all three. Whether two of the three were conjoined or dissevered, the personal unity none the less continued in all three. The one Christ and one Person, the Word, soul and body, remained just the same even after the death of the man Christ Jesus. In my opinion this mingling and leavening took place in the Virgin's womb; she was the woman who mixed and leavened the three measures. For I should not, perhaps, err greatly in saying that the leaven was Mary's faith. She was clearly blessed in believing, since the things which were told her by the Lord were accomplished in her.² But they would not have been accomplished if anything had hindered the whole from being leavened, and continually leavened, according to the word of the Lord, so as to preserve for us, as well in His death as in His life, the one perfect Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus in union with His own Godhead.

23. In this admirable mystery, corresponding to the number of the measures, we may observe, most beautifully distinguished, the three steps of the new, the old, and the eternal. By the 'new' I mean the soul, which is believed to be created out of nothing when it is infused into the body; by the 'old', the flesh, which we know to have been transmitted even from Adam, the first of human kind; by the 'eternal', I mean the Word, whom, as a certain truth, we assert to be co-eternal with the Father, and to be begotten of Him. And in the foregoing, if you carefully notice, there is a triple exhibition of Divine power, inasmuch as there was something made out of nothing, the new out of the old, the eternally blessed out of that which was sentenced to death. How does this concern our salvation? Much every way. Firstly, because, reduced to nothing through sin, we are through the mystery as it were created anew, that we may be a sort of first fruits of His creatures.³ Secondly, because, translated from our old slavery into the liberty of the children of God, we walk in newness of the spirit. Lastly, because we have been called from the power of darkness to the kingdom of the eternal glory, wherein He has already made us to sit with Him in Christ. May they be no friends of ours who endeavour to estrange from us the flesh of Christ, impiously asserting that it was newly created in the Virgin, not taken from the Virgin. Well did the Spirit of Prophecy long before meet this opinion, or rather blasphemy of wicked men, when He said, ‘A shoot shall spring from the root of Jesse, and a flower out of his root.’⁴ He might have said that the flower should come from the shoot, but He preferred to say ‘from the root’, that He might show the flower and the shoot to have the same origin. So we see that the flesh was taken thence whence the Virgin sprang; it was not newly created in the Virgin, but came from the root.

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Prologue

Liber Primus

Caput I: St. Bernard sympathizes with the Pope in his many cares

Caput II: The strength of evil custom

Caput III: The rulers of the Church ought not to be for ever hearing and deciding lawsuits

Caput IV: What service is worthy, what unworthy, of the servants of God

Caput V: The Pope should not be so absorbed in other men's affairs as to neglect himself

Caput VI: The administration of justice concerns temporal governors rather than bishops

Caput VII: Nothing more deserving of consideration than piety and things eternal

Caput VIII: The four primary virtues

Caput IX: The recent practice of the Pope to be gradually corrected, the old imitated

Caput X: The shameless trickery of advocates, judges, and procurators

Caput XI: Such iniquitous greed to be sternly rebuked

Liber Secundus

Caput I: St. Bernard apologizes for the failure of the Second Crusade

Caput II: Consideration distinguished from Contemplation

Caput III: Consideration fourfold—(1) The Pope himself, (2) things below him, (3) things around him, (4) things above him

Caput IV: The threefold Consideration leading to self-knowledge. Firstly, What the Pope is

Caput V: Secondly, Who the Pope is, and whence he comes

Caput VI: The zeal befitting ecclesiastical rulers

Caput VII: Who the Pope is—(continued)

Caput VIII: The dignity and power of the Pope

Caput IX: St. Bernard invites the Pope to consider what he is by nature

Caput X: What manner of man the Pope is

Caput XI: The necessity for self-examination

Caput XII: The spiritual effects of prosperity and adversity

Caput XIII: Idleness, trifling, and profitless conversation to be shunned

Caput XIV: The Pope warned against accepting the person of any

Liber Tertius

Caput I: The Pope should aim not at subjecting all men to himself, but at bringing them into the bosom of the Church

Caput II: The limits of appeals to the Apostolic See

Caput III: Church rulers are for the profit of their people

Caput IV: Ecclesiastical rank and dignity to be respected. The abuse of privileges and exemptions

Caput V: The Sovereign Pontiff should uphold the Apostolic decrees and ancient ordinances throughout the world

Liber Quartus

Caput I: The things 'around' the Pope

Caput II: The clergy and people of Rome. The care and watchfulness of shepherds in olden time

Caput III: The necessity of curtailing extravagance in dress, &c.

Caput IV: The Pope’s colleagues and coadjutors at the Lateran

Caput V: The Pope should refuse bribes. Martin and Gaufrid. The arrogance of the Pope's attendants

Caput VI: It is not becoming in the Pope to be absorbed in the management of his household to the neglect of weightier matters. He should have a steward

Caput VII: The ideal Pope