De Consideratione

20. Let me beg you, then, in this consideration of yourself to walk with caution. Let perfect equity be your companion, so that you may not allow yourself more than is due, nor deprive yourself of more than is right. Now you fall into the first of these errors not only by claiming goodness which you have not, but also by taking credit for goodness which you have. Carefully distinguish how far you are what you are through your own efforts, and how far through the gift of God, and let there be no deceit in your spirit. Deceit there will be unless you faithfully separate what belongs to yourself, and honestly surrender to God the things which are God’s. I do not doubt that you are fully convinced that what is evil in you comes from yourself, your goodness from the Lord. Certainly while we consider what manner of man you are, we must also recall to memory the sort of man you were ; we must compare the end with the beginning. We must see whether you have advanced in virtue, in wisdom, in understanding, in sweetness of character, or whether, which God forbid ! you have fallen away. We must note whether you are more patient or more impatient than you were wont to be ; more prone to wrath, or more gentle ; more insolent, or more humble ; more affable, or more austere ; more easily entreated, or more obstinate ; more pusillanimous, or more magnanimous ; more earnest, or somewhat more careless ; more filled with the fear of God, or, it may be, more confident than you ought to be. What a wide field lies before you in this kind of consideration ! I therefore mention a few points, indicating, as it were, some seed plots, though I am not myself the sower, but only the giver of seed to the sower. You should have a clear idea of your zeal, your clemency, and also your discretion, which is the regulator of both those virtues ; you should see what you are like in forgiving injuries and in avenging them ; how far on both sides you prudently regard degree, place, and time. In the practice of these three virtues these three things must be thoroughly considered, lest if the conditions be not satisfied the ‘virtues’ cease to be virtues ; for there is nothing in their nature to make them virtues ; they are such only by the right practice of them. They themselves tell us that they are ‘indifferent’. It is possible for you, either by abusing them, or by confounding them with one another, to turn them into vices ; on the other hand you may by the good and methodical use of them make them virtues. When the eye of discretion is darkened, they are wont to jump to conclusions and occupy their own stand-points. Now there are two causes of this dim sight—anger and excessive tenderness. The rebuke of judgement is enfeebled by the latter, precipitated by the former. Must not a pious clemency be endangered on the one side, or a righteous zeal on the other ? The eye that is disordered through anger views nothing in the light of clemency ; the eye bedewed with tears of womanly tenderness does not see straight. You will not be innocent if you either punish him to whom, it may be, mercy should be shown, or spare him who ought to have been punished.