9. And herein you may observe a delightfully harmonious connexion between the virtues, and their dependence one upon another. In the present instance, for example, Prudence is the mother of Fortitude, nor ought any deed of daring to be called fortitude, but rather rashness, if it be not the child of prudence. It is consideration, too, which sits as it were umpire of the strife between our pleasures and our necessities, settles the boundaries on either side, allotting and allowing to the latter what is sufficient, taking from the former what is excessive, and then from both fashioning a third virtue known as Temperance. For consideration deems the man who denies himself what is necessary no less intemperate than the man who indulges to excess. Temperance, therefore, consists not only in cutting down superfluities, but in allowing necessities. The Apostle appears to be not merely the supporter of this view, but its author, for he teaches us that the care of our flesh is not perfected in the gratification of its desires.1 When he says that the 'care of the flesh is not perfected', he checks all excess; when he adds 'in the gratification of its desires', he does not exclude what is necessary. I therefore think there is good sense in the definition of Temperance given by the writer who tells us that it neither cuts off what is necessary, nor goes beyond it. This agrees with the philosopher's maxim, 'Moderation in all things.'
10. Now as regards Justice, which is one of the four, is it not certain that there must be previous consideration in order that Justice may be a mental habit? The mind must first reflect upon itself in order that it may frame a rule of Justice, and not be inclined to do to another what it would not have done to itself, nor refuse to another what it desires for itself. These two assuredly comprise the whole sphere of Justice. But Justice does not abide alone. Permit me to point out to you the beautifully close and harmonious connexion which exists between it and Temperance, and between both these and the two former virtues, Prudence and Fortitude. For if it be a part of Justice to refrain from doing to another man what we would not have done to ourselves, and if perfect Justice,2 as our Lord says, consists in doing to other men whatsoever we would they should do to us, neither of these will be possible unless the will itself, which entirely determines the nature of an action, be so ordered that it neither desires anything superfluous, nor superstitiously refuses anything necessary; and this is the work of Temperance. In a word, if Justice itself is to be just, it must be regulated by Temperance. 'Be not righteous over much' saith the wise man,3 showing us hereby that Justice without the curb and restraint of Temperance is by no means to be approved. It is noteworthy that Wisdom itself does not refuse the bridle of Temperance, for Paul, according to the wisdom given to him by God, bids us not to be wiser than we ought, but to be soberly wise.4 But, on the other hand, that Temperance cannot dispense with Justice, our Lord shows us in the Gospel, when He rebukes the temperance of those who abstained that they might seem to men to fast.5 There was temperance in respect of food, but there was not justice in the heart, because their aim was not to please God but to please men. Again, how can you have either one or the other unless you have Fortitude, since Fortitude, and no slight Fortitude, is required, if what you desire, and what you decline, are to be confined to the narrow channel which lies between too little on the one side, and too much on the other, so that the will may be content with that bare, unmixed, unalloyed, consistent, nicely balanced, as it were neatly trimmed, moderation, which alone, we are agreed, partakes of the quality of virtue.
11. Tell me, pray, if you can, to which particularly of these three virtues you think this middle place should be given, which so borders upon all that it seems to belong to each. Are virtue and the mean identical? If so, virtue would not be manifold, but all the virtues would be included in one. Is it not better to maintain that unless the mean be kept there can be no virtue? and that this middle region of which we speak is in a sense the very pith and marrow of all virtues, wherein they are so united that they must all seem to be one, all the more because by sharing in it they do not divide it, but it is as an unbroken whole the property of each? For example, what is so characteristic of Justice as Moderation? This is so certain, that if Justice be tainted with excess, it clearly does not give to every man his due ; yet this giving to every man his due is the very object of Justice. Again, what is more characteristic of Temperance, which is surely what it is for no other reason than that it allows nothing immoderate ? But you will, I suppose, admit that the observance of the mean is no less a mark of Fortitude. Is not Fortitude above all things necessary to put forth its power and rescue Moderation from the assaults of vices which on every side try to strangle it ? And once it is free, is it not Fortitude that makes it a solid foundation of goodness, and the abode of virtue ? Therefore, to keep the mean is Justice, Temperance, Fortitude. Perhaps the difference between them may be thus stated—Justice is concerned with the affections ; Fortitude makes Justice efficacious ; possession as well as use are the domain of Temperance. It remains for us to show that Prudence is not excluded from this communion of the virtues. Is it not Prudence which first discovers and gives attention to Moderation when it has been too long neglected and despised, imprisoned as it were through the jealousy of the vices, and hidden out of sight in the darkness of inveterate habit ? Why do I tell you this ? Few pay attention to Prudence because few possess it. So Justice seeks, Prudence finds, Fortitude frees, Temperance possesses. I do not propose to now discuss these virtues, but this much I would say because I am urging you to find some time for consideration, through whose kindly service these and such like truths receive the attention they deserve. To bestow no labour in life on securing leisure so pious and so profitable, is not this to lose life itself ?