De aeternitate mundi

Supposing according to the Catholic faith that the world had a beginning of duration, a doubt has been raised whether it could have always existed. To explain the truth of this doubt, we must first distinguish wherein we agree with our adversaries, and what it is wherein we differ from them. For if it be understood that something besides God could have always existed, as though something could be, yet not made by Him, it is an abominable error, not only in faith but even among the philosophers, who confess and prove that whatever is, in whatever way it is, cannot be unless it is caused by Him who has being maximally and most truly. But if it be understood that something always existed, and yet was caused by God in respect of everything that is in it, it must be seen whether this can stand. And if it be said that this is impossible, this will be said either because God could not make something that always existed, or because it could not be made, even though God could make it. On the first point all agree, namely that God could make something that always existed, considering His infinite power; it remains therefore to see whether it is possible for something to be made that always existed.

But if it be said that this cannot be made, this can be understood in only two ways, or have two causes of its truth: either on account of the removal of passive potency, or on account of the incompatibility of the things understood. In the first way it could be said, before the angel is made, 'The angel cannot be made', because there pre-exists for its being no passive potency, since it is not made from pre-existing matter; yet God could make the angel, and could also make it so that the angel comes to be, for He made it and it was made. Thus understanding it, it must be granted without qualification according to faith that the thing caused cannot always be, since to posit this would be to posit that passive potency always existed, which is heretical. Yet from this it does not follow that God cannot make it so that something everlastingly existing comes to be.

In the second way something is said not to be able to be made on account of the incompatibility of the things understood, as that affirmation and negation cannot be made to be true at the same time — although God could make this, as some say, while others say that not even God could make this, since it is nothing; yet it is manifest that He cannot make it so that this comes to be, since the positing by which its being is posited destroys itself. If it were posited, however, that God can make such things come to be, the positing would not be heretical, although, as I believe, it would be false — as that the past should not have been includes a contradiction in itself. Hence Augustine says in the book Against Faustus: 'Whoever says thus: if God Almighty makes it so that the things that were made were not made, does not see that he is saying this: if God makes it so that the things that are true, by the very fact that they are true, are false.' And yet some great men have piously said that God can make it so concerning the past that it was not past, nor was it reckoned heretical. It must be seen, therefore, whether in these two there is incompatibility of the things understood: that something be created by God, and yet have always existed. And whatever be true concerning this, it will not be heretical to say that this can be made by God — that something created by God always existed. Yet I believe that if there were incompatibility of the things understood, it would be false. But if there is no incompatibility of the things understood, not only is it not false, but it is impossible for it to be otherwise, and erroneous if otherwise be said. For since it belongs to God's omnipotence to exceed every intellect and power, he expressly detracts from omnipotence who says that something can be understood in creatures which cannot be made by God. Nor is there an objection in sins, which insofar as they are such are nothing. In this, therefore, the whole question consists: whether to be created by God in respect of the whole substance, and to have no beginning of duration, are incompatible with each other, or not.

That they are not incompatible with each other is shown thus. For if they are incompatible, this is only on account of one of two things, or on account of both: either because the efficient cause must precede in duration, or because non-being must precede in duration on account of its being said that what is created by God comes to be from nothing.

First I shall show that it is not necessary for the efficient cause, namely God, to precede its effect in duration, even if He had willed it. First thus: no cause suddenly producing its effect necessarily precedes its effect in duration; but God is a cause producing His effect not through motion but suddenly: therefore it is not necessary that He precede His effect in duration. The major is clear by induction in all sudden changes, as illumination and the like; nevertheless it can also be proved by argument, thus.

In whatever instant a thing is posited to be, there can be posited the beginning of its action, as is clear in all generable things, since in the instant in which fire begins to be, it heats; but in sudden operation, the beginning and the end of it are at once, indeed are the same, as in all indivisibles: therefore in whatever instant an agent suddenly producing its effect is posited, there can be posited the terminus of its action. But the terminus of the action is simultaneous with the thing done; therefore it is not incompatible with the things understood if there be posited a cause suddenly producing its effect not preceding its effect in duration. It is incompatible, however, in causes producing their effects through motion, since the beginning of the motion must precede its end. And since men are accustomed to consider such makings as come about through motions, they do not easily grasp that an efficient cause does not precede its effect in duration; and hence it is that many of the inexperienced, looking to few things, readily pronounce.

Nor can this argument be met with the objection that God is a voluntary cause, and that therefore it is not necessary that He precede His effect in duration; nor that He is an agent through will, except on the presupposition of deliberation — far be it from us to posit this in God.

Moreover, since what produces the whole substance of a thing can do no less in producing the whole substance than a cause producing a form in producing the form — indeed much more, since it does not produce by drawing from the potency of matter, as does one who produces a form. But some agent producing a whole thing, for instance God, produces the thing in this, that the form produced by Him be whenever He Himself is, as is clear in the sun illuminating: therefore with much greater reason God, who produces the whole substance of a thing, can make it so that His effect be whenever He Himself is.

Moreover, if there be any cause such that, once it is posited in some instant, its effect proceeding from it cannot be posited in the same instant, this is only because something of completeness is lacking to the cause: for the complete cause and the thing caused are simultaneous. But to God there never was lacking anything of completeness; therefore His effect can always be posited once He is posited, and thus it is not necessary that He precede in duration.

Moreover, the will of one willing takes nothing from his power, and especially in God. But all who answer Aristotle's arguments by which it is proved that things always existed from God, through the fact that the same always makes the same, say that this would follow if there were not an agent through will; therefore even if an agent through will be posited, it nevertheless follows that He can make it so that what is caused by Him never not be. And thus it is clear that it is not incompatible with the things understood that it be said the agent does not precede its effect in duration, since regarding those things that are incompatible with the things understood, God cannot make it so that they be.

It remains now to see whether it is incompatible with the things understood that something made never not have been, on account of which it would be necessary for its non-being to precede in duration, on account of its being said to be made from nothing. But that in no respect is this incompatible is shown through the saying of Anselm in Monologion, chapter 8, explaining how the creature is said to be made from nothing. 'The third', he says, 'interpretation by which something is said to be made from nothing is when we understand it indeed to be made, but that there is not something from which it is made; by a similar meaning it seems to be said when a man grieved without cause is said to be grieved over nothing. According to this sense, therefore, if there be understood what was concluded above — that besides the highest essence all things that are were made by it from nothing, that is, not from something — nothing unfitting will follow.' Hence it is clear that according to this exposition there is posited no order of what was made to nothing, as though what was made must have been nothing and afterwards be something.

Moreover, suppose that the order implied in the preposition remains affirmed, so that the sense is: the creature was made from nothing, that is, was made after nothing — this word 'after' implies order without qualification. But order is manifold, namely of duration and of nature; if therefore from the common and universal the proper and particular does not follow, it would not be necessary that, because the creature is said to be after nothing, nothing was before in duration and afterwards there was something: but it suffices if nothing be naturally prior to being. For what belongs to each thing in itself is naturally prior in it to what is had from another. But the creature has being only from another; left to itself, however, considered in itself it is nothing: hence nothing is naturally prior to it than being. Nor need it be on this account at once nothing and being, since it does not precede in duration: for it is not posited, if the creature always was, that at some time it be nothing; but it is posited that its nature would be such that it would be nothing if it were left to itself — as if we say the air was always illuminated by the sun, we must say that the air was made lucid by the sun. And since whatever is made is made from what does not coincide, that is, from what does not happen to be at the same time as what is said to be made, we must say that it was made lucid from the non-lucid, or from the darksome; not so that it ever was non-lucid or darksome, but because it would be such if the sun left it to itself. And this is more expressly clear in the stars and orbs, which are always illuminated by the sun.

Thus, therefore, it is clear that in its being said to have been made by God and never not to have been, there is no incompatibility in what is understood. For if there were any, it is marvelous how Augustine did not see it: since this would be the most efficacious way to disprove the eternity of the world, yet he attacks the eternity of the world with many arguments in XI and XII City of God, while this way he passes over entirely. Nay rather, he seems to hint that there is no incompatibility of the things understood there, whence he says in X City of God, chapter 31, speaking of the Platonists: 'How they understand this, they have found out: that this is the beginning not of time but of derivation. For thus, they say, if a foot had always existed from eternity in the dust, the footprint would always be beneath it, yet no one would doubt that the footprint was made by the treader; nor would one be prior to the other, although one was made by the other. Thus, they say, both the world and the gods created in it always were, with Him who made ever existing; and yet they were made.' Nor does he ever say that this cannot be understood, but proceeds against them in another way. Likewise he says in book XI, chapter 4: 'Those who confess that the world was indeed made by God, yet want it to have a beginning not of time but of its creation, so that in some scarcely intelligible way it is everlastingly made, do indeed say something', etc. The cause why it is scarcely intelligible was touched upon in the first argument.

It is marvelous also how the noblest of the philosophers did not see this incompatibility. For Augustine says in the same book, chapter 5, speaking against those of whom mention was made in the preceding authority: 'With these we deal, who with us perceive God to be the creator both of bodies and of all natures that are not what He is'; concerning whom he afterwards adds: 'These have surpassed the other philosophers in nobility and authority.' And this is also clear to one who diligently considers the saying of those who posited that the world always was, since they nevertheless posit it made by God, perceiving nothing of this incompatibility of the things understood; therefore those who so subtly perceive it are alone men, and with them wisdom is born.

But since certain authorities seem to favor them, it must be shown that they afford them weak support. For Damascene says in book I, chapter 8: 'What is led from non-being to being is not apt by nature to be coeternal with what is without beginning and always is.' Likewise Hugh of St. Victor, at the beginning of his book On the Sacraments, says: 'The might of unspeakable omnipotence could not have anything coeternal besides itself, by the making of which it would be aided.'

But the understanding of these and similar authorities is clear through what Boethius says in the last book of the Consolation: 'Some do not rightly, when they hear that to Plato this world neither had a beginning of time nor will have an end, suppose in this way that the created world becomes coeternal with the Creator. For it is one thing to be led through unending life, which Plato attributed to the world, and another for the presence of unending life to embrace the whole all at once, which it is manifest is proper to the divine mind.' Hence it is clear that neither does it follow what some object, namely that the creature would be made equal to God in duration.

And that in this way it is said that in no way can anything be coeternal with God, since namely nothing can be immutable except God alone, is clear through what Augustine says in book XII City of God, chapter 15: 'Since time passes by mutability, it cannot be coeternal with unchangeable eternity. And hence, even if the immortality of the angels does not pass in time, nor is past as though now it is not, nor future as though it is not yet, yet their motions, by which times are traversed, pass from the future into the past; and therefore to the Creator, in whose motion it must not be said either that there was what now is not, or that there will be what is not yet, they cannot be coeternal.' Likewise also he says in VIII On Genesis: 'Since the nature of the Trinity is altogether unchangeable, for this reason it is so eternal that nothing coeternal with it can be.' Similar words he says in XI Confessions.

They also add arguments for their side, which the philosophers too touched upon and answered — among which the most difficult is that concerning the infinity of souls: for if the world always was, it is necessary that there now be infinite souls. But this argument is beside the point; for God could make the world without men and souls, or make men then, when He made them, even if He had made the whole world from eternity: and thus infinite souls would not remain after bodies. And moreover it is not yet demonstrated that God cannot make it so that there be infinite things in act.

There are also other arguments, from answering which I refrain for the present: both because they were answered elsewhere, and because some of them are so weak that by their weakness they seem to lend probability to the opposite side.