In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria

Whether being is first known in the order and way of origin.

For clarification of the minor premise, there arises a question well-worn in this study: namely, whether being is first known by our intellect in the order of origin.

In this question there are five parts. First, the difficulty of the question will be explained; second, Scotus’s opinion with its foundations will be set forth; third, St. Thomas’s opinion will be set forth and Scotus’s opinion refuted at the same time; fourth, arguments will be brought against what St. Thomas says and answered; fifth, the principal arguments will be satisfied.

As to the first, it should be noted that the universal—which we assume is directly known only by the intellect—has a twofold totality: it is both a definable whole and a universal whole. These totalities differ in three ways. First, definitive totality is founded upon the actuality of the thing, whereas universal totality is founded upon power or potency. Second, the former is ordered to higher things, if it has them, whereas the latter is ordered to lower things. Third, the former is naturally prior to the latter. And just as the universal itself has a twofold totality, so it has a twofold confused cognition and a twofold distinct cognition. The first confused cognition is by which it is known as a definable whole, without resolving it into its definitive parts. The second confused cognition is by which it is known as a universal whole, without composing it with its subjective parts. The first distinct cognition is by which the definable whole is known, resolving it into each of the parts of its definition; and this corresponds to the first confused cognition. The second distinct cognition is by which the universal whole is known, composing it with its subjective parts; and this corresponds to the second confused cognition. Those two confused cognitions differ from one another in three ways. First, the first cognition regards the object as a definable whole, whereas the second regards it as a universal whole. Second, the first does not tolerate along with itself any distinct knowledge of the same object, whereas the second does tolerate distinct knowledge of the same object insofar as it is a definable whole, since that knowledge is not opposed to it. For I am similarly ignorant of animal in its species and know what animal is. Third, the first is naturally prior to the second. From this I establish a verbal distinction: let the first be called actual confused cognition, and the second virtual confused knowledge. And rightly so, because by the first cognition what is actually found in the object is confusedly known, whereas by the second what is virtually included in the object is confusedly known.

Those two distinct cognitions also differ in three ways. First, by the first cognition the thing is penetrated as a definable whole, whereas by the second it is penetrated as a universal whole. Second, the first tolerates along with itself some confused universal cognition of the same object, since that cognition is not opposed to it, whereas the second tolerates no confused cognition along with itself; for when animal is known with its species, ignorance of animal in itself cannot stand with that knowledge. From this follows the third difference: the second distinct cognition entails the first, but not conversely. From this I also establish a verbal distinction here: let the first be called actual distinct knowledge, and the second virtual distinct knowledge, because by the first the thing is penetrated according to what is actually found in it, whereas by the second the thing is known according to what is virtually included in it.

From these points I first draw the definitions of these four cognitions, and then their fourfold coordination. And because privation is known and defined through its habit, beginning with the distinct cognitions, it is said that actual distinct cognition is that by which what is actually found in the object is penetrated. Actual confused cognition is that by which what is actually found in the object is known without penetration. Virtual distinct cognition is that by which the object is penetrated according to what is virtually included in it. Virtual confused cognition is that by which the object is not perfectly known according to what is virtually included in it.

The coordination of these cognitions is as follows: the first is of actual confused cognitions; the second, of virtual confused cognitions; the third, of actual distinct cognitions; the fourth, of virtual distinct cognitions. In the first are the cognitions by which substance is known in itself, though without penetration, and by which body, and animated body as such, and animal as such, and human being as such are known—always without penetration, that is, without possessing a clear and resolved formal account. In the third are the cognitions opposed to those just mentioned, namely, by which substance, body, animal, and human being are known quidditatively. In the second are the cognitions by which substance, body, animated body, and animal are known without composing them with their inferiors. In the fourth are the cognitions opposed to these, namely, by which substance is already composed with its inferiors through perfect cognition; that is, the universal whole with its parts; and by which body likewise is penetrated with its subjective parts, and so with the others. Since, as is clear from what has been said, the order of actual confused cognitions is prior to the others in the way of origin, the first known in the order of actual confused cognition will be the first known simply speaking. Thus, since here we ask what is simply first known by our intellect in the way of origin, we doubt about nothing other than what is first known in the order of actual confused cognition. The difficulty between us and Scotus therefore stands in this: whether, in the order of actual confused cognition by way of origin, the first known is being or the most specific species. From this the defect of Antonius Trombeta is clear: in raising this question he adduces St. Thomas’s opinion from the First Part, question 85, article 3. For St. Thomas made no comparison there among actual confused cognitions, which is the whole subject of this question; rather, he compared actual distinct cognitions with one another; he also compared the actual distinct cognition of a higher concept with the virtual distinct cognition of the same concept; he compared the virtual confused cognition of a higher concept with the virtual distinct cognition of the same concept; and he compared the actual confused cognition with the actual distinct cognition of the same object, as is clear to anyone who considers the passage. And this concerns the first part.

As to the second, Scotus, in I Sent. dist. III, q. 2, posits this conclusion: the first known by actual confused cognition is the most specific species, whose singular more effectively first moves the sense. And he proves it by three arguments.

The first is this. Unimpeded natural causes first produce the most perfect effect which they can first produce; this is clear because they act according to the utmost of their power. But the agents of the intellect’s first act are unimpeded natural causes. Therefore they first produce the most perfect effect which they can first produce; such an effect is nothing other than the actual confused concept of the most specific species. Therefore, and so on. The last assumption is proved as follows: if that concept, namely the most perfect one, were the concept of a more common thing, it would follow that those agents could never produce the concept of the most specific species. The consequence holds because no potency can produce an effect more perfect than its most perfect effect; but the concept of the most specific species is more perfect than the more common concept, as a whole is more perfect than its part. And Antonius Trombeta confirms this, saying: whenever two natural agents are equally proximate to a suitably disposed patient, what is more actual precedes what is less actual in acting upon the patient. But the objective accounts of the most specific species and of any higher concept are of this kind, namely, the most specific species is more actual. Therefore the most specific species produces its effect before the genus.

The second argument is this: metaphysical or most universal terms are last actually known by way of instruction. This is clear from Avicenna, I Metaph., cap. III, who says that metaphysics is last in the order of instruction. But those terms are most universal. Therefore the more universal things are not actually known first.

And Antonius Trombeta confirms it, saying that the order of the sciences, as regards us, is considered according to the order of things knowable as regards us. Therefore, if metaphysics is last as regards us, its terms will also be last known as regards us.

The third argument is this. If it were necessary to conceive the more universal things before conceiving the species, then, with the sense supposed to be in act and the intellect released, a great interval of time would occur before the intellect knew the species. The consequence holds because many intermediate predicates lie between the highest and the lowest.

Fourth, Antonius Trombeta argues for the same conclusion as follows: what is known first is what is more easily abstracted. But the most specific species is easiest to abstract. Therefore the most specific species is known first. The major is proved because, since the intellect understands only by abstracting, it is related to understanding as it is related to abstracting. The minor is clear because abstraction from things more alike is easier than from things less alike: individuals of one species are more alike among themselves than the species from which a genus, or any higher concept, is abstracted.

Fifth: that universal is known first by the intellect whose singular more powerfully moves the sense. But the singular of the most specific species moves the sense more powerfully than the singular of any higher concept. Therefore the most specific species is first known by the intellect. The major is clear because our intellectual cognition arises from sensory cognition. The minor is proved in two ways. First, the sense is moved by the singular. Therefore it is moved most by what is most singular—according to the topical rule, as from simply speaking to simply speaking. But what is most singular is the singular of the most specific species, because it is determined not only by the determination of singularity but also by a determinate nature no longer determinable by another nature; and this does not belong to the individuals of higher concepts. Therefore, and so on.

Second, the same minor is proved as follows. A more actual singular moves the sense more powerfully. But the singular of the most specific species is more actual, since it is more perfect, because it adds to the other singulars. Therefore the singular of the most specific species moves more powerfully.

Sixth, as follows. What is more composite is known first. The most specific species is more composite than all higher concepts. Therefore the most specific species is known before all higher concepts. The major is found in the Commentator, I Physic. text. tertio. The minor is found in Porphyry, who says that the species abounds beyond the genus. And this concerns the second part.

CONCLUSION

Being concrete with a sensible quiddity is first known by actual confused cognition.

As to the third, two conclusions are posited. The first is: being concrete with a sensible quiddity is first known by actual confused cognition.

Before this conclusion is proved, I shall premise two points. First, I shall explain the meaning of the subject of the conclusion, namely, what it means to say being concrete with a sensible quiddity. Second, something presupposed by the conclusion itself will be explained. Regarding the first, know that being can terminate an act of the intellect under three conditions. First, as having the condition called total abstraction—not, I mean, from singulars, but from species and genera. Second, as having the condition called formal abstraction, likewise from species and genera. Third, as having neither of these conditions, though abstracted from singulars. In the first way being does not pertain to this question, because being as such is a universal whole, whereas we are speaking of actual, not virtual, confused cognition. In the second way being is a metaphysical term, and perhaps it has not yet become known even to very learned men. In the third way being is the first known, and it is called being concrete with a sensible quiddity, because it is not separated from the specific or generic quiddity by either of the said abstractions.

For fuller understanding of these matters, note that just as there is a twofold composition—namely, of form with matter, and of the whole with its parts—so there is a twofold abstraction by the intellect: one by which the formal is abstracted from the material, and one by which the universal whole is abstracted from its subjective parts. According to the first, quantity is abstracted from sensible matter; according to the second, animal is abstracted from ox and lion. I call the first formal abstraction, and the second total abstraction, because what is abstracted by the first abstraction is as a form of that from which it is abstracted, whereas what is abstracted by the second abstraction is as a universal whole in relation to that from which it is abstracted.

These two abstractions differ in four ways. First, in formal abstraction each of the two concepts is possessed separately and completely: namely, the concept of what is abstracted and the concept of that from which it is abstracted, that is, the formal and the material, so that one concept does not include the other. For line, insofar as it is line, has its complete definition, which does not include sensible matter; and conversely, the sensible matter of line has its complete definition, which does not include anything of line insofar as it is line. Otherwise natural definitions would abstract from sensible matter. In total abstraction, however, the two concepts do not remain separately complete, so that one does not include the other; only one does, namely, the concept of what is abstracted. For when I abstract animal from human being, the concepts of human being and animal do not cut each other off; rather, only the concept of animal does not include the concept of human being, since human being is not intelligible without animal. The foundation of this difference is that this abstraction occurs through considering something belonging to the account of the inferior and removing—that is, not considering—something belonging to the account of that same inferior. For animal is abstracted from human being by the intellect considering animal in human being and not rational, both of which belong to the account of human being. That abstraction, however, does not occur through considering something belonging to the account of the matter and not considering something belonging to its account; rather, it occurs through separating those things belonging to the formal account from those belonging to the material account, and conversely, as the example given shows.

Second, they differ because through formal abstraction actuality, distinction, and intelligibility arise in what is abstracted. In total abstraction, however, potentiality, confusion, and lesser intelligibility arise in what is abstracted. Third, they differ because in formal abstraction, the more abstract something is, the more it is known by nature; in total abstraction, the more abstract it is, the more it is known by us. The foundation of these differences is that formal abstraction occurs through separation from material potentialities and things of that sort. Total abstraction, however, occurs through separation from specific actualities; and the more abstract something is from these, the more potential it is, since a genus contains its inferiors in potency, and the less intelligible it is, since act in itself is more known than potency, as stated in Metaph. VI, text. II. Fourth, speculative sciences are diversified according to the various modes of formal abstraction, as is clear at the beginning of Metaph. VI. Total abstraction, however, is common to every science. For this reason metaphysical things as such are not compared with natural things in the manner of a universal whole to subjective parts, but as formals to materials, just as mathematical things are. Although metaphysical degrees are more universal than others and can be compared with other things as with subjective parts, because both abstractions can belong to the same thing, nevertheless, insofar as they stand under metaphysical consideration, they are not universals with respect to natural things but forms, and natural things are their matter.

It is therefore clear how being sometimes has formal abstraction, namely, when it is taken with precision from the other generic and specific accounts; and how it sometimes has total abstraction, namely, when it is considered as a universal whole containing the other genera and species in potency. It can also be clear how we now intend being to be concrete with a sensible quiddity: namely, when it is supported by neither of those abstractions, but is viewed in a sensible quiddity abstracted from singulars without any separation. Thus it is evident what is signified by the name “being concrete with a sensible quiddity.”

What the conclusion presupposes is that being can be known by actual confused cognition. The Scotists deny this, holding that being can be known only by distinct cognition. They argue as follows. What has a concept simply simple cannot be known by actual confused cognition. Being has a concept simply simple. Therefore. The major is clear from the fact that actual confused cognition occurs when the intellect proceeds to the object according to what is actually included in that object, without knowing how to resolve it into the parts of its account. But in what has a concept simply simple, the intellect cannot proceed according to one aspect and not according to another; otherwise its concept would be composite. The minor is clear because the concept of being is irresolvable.

But to see that the conclusion presupposes nothing false, and to make clear the insufficiency of this argument, observe that it is not of the account of actual distinct cognition that the object be known by resolving it into the parts of its account, as is clear when being is distinctly known. Rather, its account consists in this: the object is penetrated by the intellect according to everything actually found in it, whether this occurs through resolving the object into the parts of its account or through a clear intuition of a simple object. Likewise, it is not of the account of actual confused cognition that the intellect understand the object according to one aspect and be ignorant of it according to another; it is enough that the intellect proceed to the object itself actually without penetrating its actuality. Thus the account of actual confused cognition consists in the intellect proceeding to the object according to what is actually in it, without penetrating it. Whether this happens because the object is resolvable into several concepts or for some other reason is accidental to actual confused cognition. Thus Scotus’s argument assumes a false major and its proof commits the fallacy of consequence, moving negatively from an inferior to its superior, from the negation of one mode of confused cognition to the negation of every mode.

That this is so, and that being and anything simply simple can be known by actual confused cognition, I prove as follows. Whenever the intellect proceeds to being, conceiving it actually, without knowing how to separate being from substance and accident, it has confused actual cognition of being. But the intellects of many people are like this. Therefore, and so on. The major is made clear as follows: when the intellect actually proceeds to being, yet does not know how to separate its proper account from the proper accounts of substance and accident, it either has confused or distinct cognition. It does not have distinct cognition, because the inseparable effect of distinct cognition is to know the difference of that object from others; therefore it has confused cognition. And since it was posited that the cognition is actual, it follows that it is actual confused cognition. Experience teaches the minor: we see many people trained in studies for several years who still do not know how to distinguish the proper account of being from substance and accident. To say that they do not have an actual concept of being is foolish and contrary to experience. For they consider being according to what it actually has in itself and attain the whole of it; but because they do not comprehend it totally, they do not know how to separate it from others. Therefore what is presupposed in our conclusion is sound, and it is false that being is known by actual distinct cognition alone.

It remains to prove the conclusion. As to its first part, you have it from St. Thomas and Avicenna, who say that being is what is first impressed upon our intellect. The conclusion is therefore proved as follows. The most imperfect concept of all is first in the way of origin. But the actual confused concept of being is the most imperfect concept of all. Therefore it is first in the way of origin. The major is clear because the more imperfect things are prior in the way of generation, IX Metaph. text. XV. The minor is also self-evident, because every other concept adds something to the concept of being and is therefore more perfect than it, as a whole is more perfect than its part.

Antonius Trombeta replies that the perfection of a concept is twofold: objective perfection and perfection of evidence. That concept is more perfect with objective perfection which has a more perfect object positively; but that concept is more perfect in evidence which has an object including fewer things, according to Aristotle in the proem of Metaph. Hence, if the argument speaks of objective perfection, the major is false and the minor true; if it speaks of perfection of evidence, the major is true and the minor false.

Against this, I prove that the minor is true when speaking of perfection of evidence, so that the actual confused concept of being is the most imperfect as regards evidence. That concept is the least evident of all under which the intellect is more remote from knowledge of all other things than it is under any other concept. The actual confused concept of being is such that the intellect possessing it is farther from knowledge of other things than when possessing any other concept. Therefore the actual confused concept of being is the least evident of all. The major is clear from the fact that the evidence of a concept, since it is a proper perfection of the intellect, makes the intellect proportionately nearer to knowledge of other things as it is greater, especially since the intellect naturally proceeds from evident things to things non-evident to it. The minor is proved as follows. Whenever there are two concepts, one of which actually includes the other, but not conversely, the intellect possessing the one that actually includes the other is in a nearer disposition to know the other than conversely. Now the concept of being is related to other concepts in this way: it does not itself include the others, whereas the others actually include it. Therefore the intellect possessing the concept of being is farther from knowledge of the others than one possessing any other concept.

This is confirmed by Scotus, who says that a part of an account actually understood is sufficiently near to the intellect, so near that it could not be nearer. But what is brought forward from the proem of Metaph.—that evidence is measured according to an object including fewer things actually—is not relevant to the point, because that certainty is objective certainty. Our discourse, however, concerns evidence belonging on the side of the intellect; for from such evident and certain things the intellect proceeds to what is non-evident and uncertain to it.

The same conclusion is proved secondly as follows. Knowledge of the first principles is the first complex cognition. Therefore knowledge of being is the first incomplex cognition. The antecedent is clear because cognition which is from nature must precede cognition which is from effort; because there is knowledge in everyone, even in childhood; and because the first principles are presupposed for every discourse, as is held in primo Post. The consequence is proved because being is the term from which the first principle is formed. If being were not first known but something else were, then another composition could be made by the intellect while knowledge of the principle had still not been acquired, and so on.

Scotus’s position itself is argued against as follows. The most specific species is not simply the most confused object. Therefore its actual confused cognition is not simply first, and consequently it is not the first known. The consequence follows from the opposing position, which says that the most specific species is first known precisely because it is the most confused.

The antecedent is proved as follows. A genus is more confused than a species. Therefore the species itself is not the most confused. The consequence is again evident. The antecedent is proved because what contains more things is more confused. A genus contains more things than a species; for animal contains more things than human being. Therefore, and so on.

He replies that containment is twofold: some is actual and some potential; and that which contains more actually, not potentially, is more confused. Now genus contains more in potency, whereas species contains more in act; and therefore species is more confused.

On the contrary, that which contains more without order is more confused than that which contains more with order. But that which contains actually contains more in an ordered way, for species contains its definitive parts in an ordered way; whereas that which contains in potency contains more without order. Therefore that which contains more potentially is more confused.

Anthony Trombetta replies that genus contains species in an ordered way and not without order, because it regards them only through the intermediacy of differences, which are very well ordered.

On the contrary, genus contains species and differences not in act but in potency, as Porphyry says. Therefore it contains them indistinctly. The inference holds, because it is act that distinguishes, Metaphysics VII, text XLIX. Then the other contains indistinctly; therefore it does not contain them in an ordered way. The inference holds, because order without distinction cannot be imagined (even if license to invent were granted). But what he said—that genus regards species only through ordered differences—does not help, because genus contains not only species but also the differences ordered among themselves without order, as has been proved.

Observe here that confusion does not follow from the containment of many things, as the Scotists imagine; for thus the universe would be most confused. Rather, it follows from the containment of many things without order; hence the proverb: where there is plurality without order, there is confusion, and so on.

The second conclusion is this: among the actual confused concepts of quidditative predicates there is no essential order of origin. It is proved as follows: whenever some concepts are essentially ordered by an order of origin, it is impossible for the extremes to be generated without the intermediates being generated. This is self-evident; otherwise there would be no essential order of origin among them. But as a matter of fact we have actual confused concepts of the extremes without concepts of the intermediates. Therefore there is no essential order of origin among them. Experience makes the minor clear: we experience that we conceive man and substance, and yet we are ignorant of the intermediates not only distinctly but even confusedly. For we lack their proper concepts, by which our intellect is actually directed in this matter; and we are not merely ignorant of resolving them into their definitive parts. And because this argument convinces me, I give it alone. From this the defect of the Scotists who say that there is an essential order among confused concepts is clear: they cannot solve this argument.

But an immediate objection is made against this as follows. Among the actual confused concepts of the superior and the inferior there is no essential order of origin; therefore the concept of the most specific species can be generated first just as the concept of being can—which is contrary to the first conclusion. The inference holds because a non-essential order is not necessary, or can vary.

To this I reply by denying the inference. For although there is no essential order among all confused concepts, there is nevertheless such an order between the concept of being and any other concept. This is true in two ways. First, the concept of being is a kind of most general form of the intellect itself, just as the form of corporeity is the most general form of matter itself. Hence, just as there is an essential order between the form of corporeity and the other forms, but not among the other forms among themselves, so there is an essential order between the concept of being and the others, but not among the others among themselves. For after the concept of being anything else can be conceived, whether substance, accident, species, or genus. The concept of being is also, as it were, natural to the intellect itself, just as is knowledge of the first principle: as soon as being is presented, it is known by everyone. Therefore it must be essentially prior to the others, just as universally a natural act precedes those that are wholly from outside. But the same reasoning does not apply to the other concepts among themselves. And this concludes the third point.

As for the fourth point, because Anthony Trombetta attacks something said by the holy Doctor in the First Part, question LXXXV, article 3, where he teaches the order of intellectual cognition according to the way of the Peripatetics, I therefore present and solve his attack. There are five statements against which he argues. The first is: the intellect is of universals, and first of more universal things. The second: our intellect proceeds from potency to act. The third: knowledge of things in the universal is incomplete knowledge. The fourth: knowledge in the universal is knowledge in a qualified sense and in potency. The fifth: sense, emerging from potency to act, first cognizes the more common before the less common.

Against the first he argues as follows. Saint Thomas holds that whatever is in the thing and according to the nature of the thing is singular. I add another proposition to this: namely, that which precedes the act of understanding is real. Thus: whatever is in the thing is singular. Whatever is understood by the first intellection is in the thing. Therefore whatever is understood by the first intellection is singular; therefore it cannot understand more universally. The major is Saint Thomas’s; the minor is clear from the second supposition, and is proved in four ways. First, because a being of reason is posterior to the act of the intellect’s comparison. Second, because such an object is the cause of a real being, namely, of the first act of understanding. Third, because such a first act is referred to the object by a real relation, which is only to a real term. Fourth, because such a first act depends on the object as on its measure. But a real being does not depend on a being of reason.

To this I reply that the major can have two senses. The first is that whatever is in the thing is singular—that is, whatever is in the thing is singularity—and in this sense it is false. For in Socrates there is not only singularity, but also humanity and animality. The second sense is that whatever is in the thing is singular—that is, whatever is in the thing has singularized being—and in this way it is most true among the Peripatetics. Hence, if the argument is to have three terms, the major is false in the first sense. In the second, the whole argument is conceded, since being as first cognized has real being only in singulars. But how much truth there is in what he adds will be shown below.

Against the second statement, namely, that our intellect proceeds from potency to act, he argues as follows. Saint Thomas assumes this proposition to prove the conclusion that the more universal is understood first. Either this proposition proves nothing relevant to the point, or it is simply false. For if it means that the intellect first understands something in potency rather than in act, it is true, but irrelevant. I concede that the intellect first understands the most specific species in potency rather than in act; but this does not entail that it understands genus before species. If, however, it means that the intellect proceeds from potency to act, that is, from imperfect knowledge to perfect knowledge, it is not universally true, as is clear when one proceeds from knowledge of the premises to knowledge of the conclusions, and from knowledge of the cause to knowledge of the effect. By this it is also clear that the claim that the intellect first reaches an imperfect act and then a perfect one is false. For something equally illuminated is not first imperfectly and then perfectly illuminated by the sun. Likewise, the intellect receives act before habit, and yet act is more perfect than habit. Therefore, for the proposition to be true, one must prove an essential order of incomplete act to complete act.

To this I reply that Saint Thomas understands that proposition precisely in neither of those ways, but in this way: an intellect emerging from potency toward an ultimately perfect act, passing through many intermediate acts, reaches an imperfect act before a perfect one. This proposition is found in Physics VIII, text LVIII, and Metaphysics IX, text XV, and in Book II of On the Parts of Animals: things prior in the way of generation are more imperfect. Under that major, then, let the minor be subsumed, namely: our intellect is emerging from potency toward an ultimately perfect act, say, distinct cognition of the most specific species, passing through many intermediate acts. Therefore it reaches an imperfect act before a perfect one. The minor is evident, because everyone grants that the cognitions of genera are intermediate acts. Thus the argument concludes that we distinctly cognize the more universal before the less universal, which blessed Thomas intended. But he was mistaken because he believed that Saint Thomas was speaking of actual confused cognitions, whereas, as stated above, he is speaking of the virtually confused cognition of the species and the distinct cognition of that species and of the genus. For the actual distinct cognition of the genus is there called the confused cognition of the genus and species, because in it the species and the power of the genus are cognized confusedly. As for what is added against this proposition—that the intellect proceeds from imperfect knowledge to perfect knowledge—I say that this proposition is most universally true, if it is understood in the proper sense.

For understanding this and resolving all the instances, observe first that the process of nature and of the intellect is twofold: one according to the order of generation alone, the other according to the order of generation and of efficient or final causality. The first process occurs when between the terms and the intermediates there is nothing except priority and posteriority according to generation. The second occurs when, beyond that priority, there is also in what is prior the priority of an efficient or final cause.

Second, observe that one thing is more perfect than another in two ways: absolutely, or in a qualified sense. It can happen that something is absolutely more perfect than another, that is, more perfect according to its nature, while nevertheless according to some condition it is less perfect than that other—for example, material substance is absolutely more perfect than an accident, yet in a qualified sense it is less perfect than the accident, insofar as it is actuated by it. He therefore says that both nature and the intellect, in a process of generation alone, always proceed from what is absolutely imperfect to what is absolutely perfect, because the order of generation is considered according to the genus of material cause, just as animal is generated before man, as is said in the book On Animals. In the second process, however, one proceeds from what is not absolutely but qualifiedly imperfect to what is more perfect in a qualified sense, just as substance is prior to accident in generation and, beyond this, is prior by final causality, because it is the accident’s end and sometimes its agent. Yet it is clear that substance is, in a qualified sense, less perfect than the accident, insofar as it is in potency with respect to it and participates in material causality.

To the first of the instances, then, it is said that the premises are prior to the conclusion not only by the way of generation, but also in the order of efficient causality, as is said in Physics II, text XXXI. In another wording, as Saint Thomas bears witness there and as can be gathered from the Posterior Analytics I. Therefore it suffices that their knowledge be less perfect in a qualified sense. Hence they are also placed in the genus of material cause, Physics II, in the same place, and Metaphysics V, text XXXII. I say the same in response to the second instance, concerning the process from knowledge of the cause to knowledge of the effect. The example of illuminated air is irrelevant, because illumination is not successive, whereas the concepts of genus and species succeed one another. It is also false that the act preceding a habit is absolutely more perfect than the habit. Although this is true of an act elicited by the habit itself, as you have in Nicomachean Ethics I, such an act is posterior to the habit. The essential order of the generic concept to the specific is also sufficiently known in distinct knowledge from what was said there; hence there will be no need to labor further.

Against the third statement, namely, that knowledge in the universal is incomplete knowledge, he argues as follows. Universal demonstration is superior to particular demonstration. Therefore knowledge in the universal, which is acquired through universal demonstration, is superior to particular knowledge.

To this I say that the argument errs through an equivocation on the term “universal.” For Aristotle calls that demonstration universal by which a property is known of its proper subject. This applies both to generic and to specific properties, and he means that the knowledge we acquire through a demonstration demonstrating a property of its first subject is superior to that produced by a demonstration through which that property is demonstrated of a part subject to the first subject. We, however, say that to know man in animal is to know man less perfectly than to know man in himself; and this we call knowledge in the universal. It is therefore clear to anyone of sound judgment that what we say does not conflict with Aristotle. It is one thing to say, “A is known in the universal,” and another to say, “A is demonstrated by a universal demonstration.” In the first way A is not known in itself, but in its superior; in the second way A is known in itself, in its being in its first subject.

Against the fourth statement, namely, that knowledge in the universal is knowledge in a qualified sense and in potency, because in the universal itself particulars are understood under a certain confusion, he infers: therefore knowledge in the universal is confused knowledge.

On the contrary, that proof is worthless which proceeds through an equivocation. This one is of that kind. Therefore, and so on. The minor is explained: it is one thing to speak of the actual knowledge of an object, and another to speak of the virtual knowledge of what is included in it. For although the virtual knowledge of particulars in the universal is confused, the actual knowledge of the universal itself is distinct. And because the confusion of knowledge is considered from those things that are actually confused in the object, since knowledge is specified by the object and by what is intrinsic to it, it ought not to be called confused knowledge but distinct knowledge.

To this I say that he does not understand Saint Thomas, who holds that the distinct knowledge of animal as the whole definable is the confused knowledge of animal as the whole universal, and consequently the confused knowledge of the species; therefore there is no equivocation. We grant that the knowledge by which the intellect is actually borne toward animal itself as universal, and not toward its species, is the confused knowledge of animal as it is the whole universal, and not merely the confused knowledge of its species, as Saint Thomas expressly says there. Hence animal can be known simultaneously distinctly and confusedly in different respects, as was said above. Nor is it necessary that, if these two knowledges are found together, they be identical when they are separated—for example, when animal is known distinctly both actually and virtually.

But what he adds, that such knowledge ought not to be called confused, is shown to be false by the fact that actual confusion is less than potential confusion. What is added lastly—that knowledge is specified by the object and by its intrinsic features—is irrelevant to the point. For confusion and distinction are not species of cognition; otherwise the confused and distinct cognition of the same object would not be of the same species, and thus knowledge would not be specified by the object. Hence his assumption involves a contradiction in the present case.

Against the fifth statement, namely, that sense, emerging from potency to act, cognizes the more common before the less common, he argues as follows. Sense cognizes nothing except the singular; therefore it does not cognize the more common first. If you say that sense does not cognize the more common in itself, but precognizes the more common singular, then, on the contrary, either it cognizes the more common singular in such a way that singularity is the reason for cognizing, or in such a way that common nature is the reason for cognizing. The first cannot be said, as is self-evident; nor can the second be said by Thomists, because then it would be so because that nature was the reason for moving sense.

Against this he argues as follows. That is not the reason for moving which is identical in reality and in conception with that to which the reason for moving is repugnant. But common nature is identical in reality and in conception with singularity, to which the reason for moving is repugnant. Therefore, and so on. The minor is proved because nature and singular are not really distinct—not according to the nature of the thing, in your view, nor according to reason. I prove it: a distinction of reason follows an act of the intellect, but in that prior stage there is no act of the intellect. It is confirmed because a real act does not depend on a being of reason. But sensation is a real act. Therefore it does not depend on a being of reason. Yet a sensible object possessing in itself a distinction of reason is either a being of reason or an aggregate of a real being and a being of reason. Therefore, and so on. The principal argument is confirmed as follows. Whatever things are wholly indistinct according to reality, if one terminates in some real action, the other will also terminate in the same action. But the more common and the less common nature are of this kind. Therefore, and so on, assuming due proximity to the sense.

It is confirmed a second time: the same sense first cognizes what the sensible species first represents. But the sensible species first represents the singular of the most specific species, once it has been placed at the proper distance. Therefore, and so on. The minor is proved. The sensible species first represents the object under the aspect under which it is impressed upon the sense. But it is impressed by the object under the aspect of specific nature, both because that nature is more actual and perfect, and because the sensible species is a natural likeness caused by the object, representing it adequately according to the aspect that belongs to it more essentially. Therefore it represents it more under the aspect that belongs to it more essentially and perfectly than under the aspect that belongs to it remotely and less principally.

To this it is replied that the response recited there is good and correct. To the attack I say that such a nature—for example, color—and not common nature, that is, common color, is the reason for moving. To the disproof, the minor is denied in both its parts. For according to Saint Thomas, in the First Part, question III, article 3, in material things nature and singularity are really distinct; and although the distinction of reason is actual only after sensation, fundamentally it precedes it, and this suffices. To the confirmation it is said, first, that a sensible object possessing a fundamental distinction of reason is neither a being of reason nor an aggregate of a real being and a being of reason. For a fundamental distinction of reason adds nothing to the thing. Second, it is said that sensation is not caused by a distinction of nature, but by nature itself possessing such a condition. Therefore, even if that distinction were a being of reason, it would still prove nothing. For it is not color insofar as it is distinct from its singularity that moves, but this color insofar as it is color, whose intelligible account includes neither distinction nor union. To the other confirmation it is said that the major is false with respect to actions that posit nothing real in their terms, such as immanent actions: for I can understand the wisdom of God without understanding his goodness.

Before answering the other confirmations, I premise that Saint Thomas does not say that sense always cognizes the more common before the less common; his words are these. And because sense emerges from potency to act, just as the intellect does, the same order of cognition also appears in sense, for first, according to sense, we judge the more common before the less common both according to place and according to time. From these words it follows only that sense first, according to place and time, cognizes the more common singular, and it does not follow that this is always so. Hence those arguments are not against Saint Thomas, although they do not conclude. For it is false that the sensible species first represents the singular of the most specific species, and its proof is false—namely, that the sensible species is first impressed by specific nature. Rather, the sensible species is first impressed by the per se first object of sense. But the first object of no sense is the most specific species, as is clear by running through the cases. Therefore the visible species is first impressed by the visible insofar as it is colored, and not by it insofar as it is white or black. Nor does it matter that whiteness is more actual than color, because this is not sufficient; it is required that it be the first object of the power. Nor is what he assumes true: namely, that the most specific nature belongs more essentially to the sensible than the nature of the genus does. On the contrary, for this visible thing as such, color is more essential than whiteness or blackness. This is clear from the fact that when whiteness or blackness is removed, the visible thing remains, but not conversely. And this concludes the fourth point.

As for the fifth point, the arguments made are answered in order. To the first, that final assumption is denied: namely, that the most perfect effect that agents directed toward intellection can first produce is a specific concept. For I say that the most perfect effect they can produce at that time is the concept of being; indeed, at that time they can produce no other. When it is argued against this that thus a specific concept would never be produced, the inference does not hold. To its proof it is said that no power can produce an effect more perfect than its absolutely most perfect effect. Nevertheless, any power can produce an effect more perfect than its most perfect effect in which it can operate at some prior stage, because that latter effect is not most perfect except in a qualified sense. For example, the generative power of a lion cannot produce an effect more perfect than a lion, because this is its absolutely most perfect effect. Yet it can produce an effect more perfect than the one it produces at the beginning of its action, because that effect was the most perfect one it could produce at that time. To the confirmation it is said that the minor is false. For an intellect existing in pure potency is not equally disposed to the concept of the specific as to the concept of being—not through the presence of some contrary disposition, but because of the order of the most general concept to the specific concepts. Just as prime matter, every contrary disposition being disregarded, is not equally disposed to specific forms and to the form of corporeity, but must first receive the form of corporeity because of the order of the general form to the specific forms. For this reason it is customary to say that it is privatively, not contrarily, indisposed.

To the second, the response is clear from what has been said. For metaphysical terms as such are not posited by us as first known; they are metaphysical terms abstracted by formal abstraction. Rather, we say that the signified content of this term “being,” namely, the concrete quidditative content of the sensible, is first known.

To the third I say that in the formation of a specific concept it is not always necessary to preform, one by one, the confused concept of being; it suffices that being was known first of all, for everything is conceived virtually in it. Further, it is said that, since we do not posit an essential order among these confused concepts, it is not necessary that there be so much time between them.

To the fourth it is said that the most specific species is not easier to abstract than being, speaking of the abstraction required for the present purpose. For just as two abstractions are required and sufficient for the confused concept of the most specific species—the first through the act of the agent intellect, namely, separation from singulars; the second through the act of the possible intellect, namely, actually beholding the species and not actually beholding the genus—so two abstractions are necessary for the actual confused concept of being. The first is from particulars, and this occurs when any species is abstracted by the agent intellect. The second occurs through the possible intellect, by the fact that, in whatever quiddity is first actually presented to it, it first conceives being without actually conceiving the other things that are in it. Hence the abstraction of being is just as extensive and just as easy as the abstraction of the most specific species. Indeed, this abstraction of being is easier, because it is easier actually to conceive what is prior without what is posterior than conversely. From this it is clear that the abstraction of which the argument speaks is not necessary for confused cognition.

To the fifth I say that the minor premise is false; and its first proof is denied as to the consequence, because the sense is not moved by the singular precisely insofar as it is singular. For that mode of arguing, according to the Topics rule, does not hold unless the predicate belongs to the subject according to the subject itself, as you have from S. Thoma in III contra Gentiles, cap. CXXXIX; and this is not found in the present case: for this color does not move sight insofar as it is this color, but insofar as it is color. To the other proof it is said that the major premise assumed is not universally true, because the colored moves sight more than this black, since it moves it from farther away. For the bodily agent appears to act more powerfully the farther away it acts. Secondly, it is said that many imperfect singulars move the sense more powerfully than one more actual and perfect singular; and because all singulars are singulars of being, therefore the cogitative power of the child, in whom a new cognition must arise, is moved more by the singulars of being than by the singulars of this species. And since the intellect receives the universal from many singulars, as is said in II Post. (et in prooemio Metaph.), it first knows being rather than the species. Accordingly, in response to the argument, it is said that the major is true, other things being equal; but not where some inequality, as in the present case, is found to outweigh it: for the many more singulars of being outweigh the fewer singulars of the species, just as a thousand men who are not very strong pull more than ten strong men.

To the sixth it is said that the major is simply false. To the authority of the Philosopher it is said, first, that the Commentator's text is corrupt; for it ought to be read “confused and not composed.” Secondly, so that we may preserve the Commentator, it is said that the composite is more known than its components in this respect, but not absolutely: hence I know a man confusedly before I know his definitive parts as such; absolutely, however, I know the more universal first. From these points the truth of the minor, approved by the authority of Avicenna, becomes evident.

Next he makes the hearers attentive by disclosing the difficulty of what is to be said and proposing three questions: what is signified by the name “essence” and by the name “being,” how essence is found variously in various things, and how they are related to the logical intentions. For the difficulty of these matters is not slight, as the diversity of opinions concerning them bears witness: they are the most universal things, which are the most difficult to know, as is said in I Metaphysics.

Concerning this passage, note that just as the whatness of the thing is the thing's whatness, so the whatness of the name is the name's whatness. Now, since a name is essentially a sign of those passions that exist objectively in the soul (ex I Perihermenias), it has no other whatness than this: that it is a sign of some thing understood or thought. A sign, precisely as such, is relative to what is signified; hence to know the whatness of a name is nothing other than to know that to which the name bears a relation as sign to signified. Such knowledge can be acquired through the accidents of what is signified, through common features, through essentials, through gestures, and in any other ways. For example, when we ask a Greek what the name anthropos means, if a man is pointed out with a finger, we already grasp the name's whatness; and similarly in other cases. But when we ask for the whatness of the thing, we must assign what belongs to the thing signified in the first mode of adequate per se being. And this is the essential difference between the whatness of the name and the whatness of the thing: namely, that the whatness of the name is the relation of the name to what is signified, whereas the whatness of the thing is the essence of the thing related to or signified. From this difference follow all the other differences usually mentioned: for example, that the whatness of the name can concern non-beings and complexes, and can be explained through accidents, common features, and extrinsic features; whereas the whatness of the thing belongs to beings that are incomposite, through their proper and essential features. For the relation of a word can terminate in things that are non-beings in the nature of things, and in complexes, and can be explained through accidents and the like; but the essence of a thing is grasped only through proper essentials in incomposite beings.

But since we must receive knowledge of simples from composites and proceed from posterior things to prior things, so that instruction may be more suitably conducted by beginning with what is easier, therefore we must proceed from the signification of being to the signification of essence.

In this third part of the proemium he makes the hearers teachable by proposing the order of what is to be said in this conclusion: We must proceed from being to essence. He proves this by two arguments. First, thus: we must proceed from composites to simples; but being is as it were composite, and essence as it were simple; therefore we must proceed from being to essence. Secondly, thus: we must proceed from posterior things to prior things; but being is posterior to essence; therefore we must proceed from being to essence. The major premise of both arguments is proved because we must begin with what is easier; but composites and posterior things are easier for us than simples.

Concerning the minor premise of the first argument, note that being, as will be said below, signifies that which has being. Now that which has being includes essence within itself; whereas essence signifies that which the definition conveys, as will be said, and which does not state being or non-being, according to the first chapter of the Posterior Analytics. Being, therefore, is related to essence in such a way that it embraces both within itself, namely essence and being; essence, however, embraces only one of them, and therefore being is called composite in relation to essence.

Concerning the major premise of the second argument, know that when we say “we must proceed from posterior things,” this is understood as proceeding from posterior things according to nature, which are prior with respect to us. For the way is innate in us from what is more known to us toward what is less known by nature, as is said in I Physic. text. I. The minor premise of the second argument is proved by the fact that a composite is posterior to its components, and being (as was said) is composite in relation to essence.