In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria

What the essence of God is, and what it is in separated substances; whence the intention of genus and difference is drawn in them, and in what way they are multiplied, is investigated.

Having seen these things, it is clear how essence is found in diverse things. There are, however, three ways of having essence in substances. For one thing is like God, whose essence is his very being; and therefore some philosophers are found saying that God does not have an essence, because his essence is nothing other than his being. This is the beginning of the sixth chapter, which is divided into four parts. The first treats of the essence of God. The second treats of the essence of intelligences and of the soul. The third shows how these relate to logical intentions. In the fourth he returns to composite essences.

Therefore, about the essence of God, intending to posit two conclusions and exclude two errors, he posits the first affirmative conclusion as follows: Essence in God signifies his very being. He posits this conclusion by deducing it from what was said above and in no other way, for it was proved above and is conceded by all. The meaning of the conclusion is that the divine being of actual existence is his very quiddity, so that it is predicated of God as the predicate of the first mode of per se predication; thus “God is” is in the first mode of perseity. The common way concedes this of no one other than God, even if being and essence in creatures are held to be really the same. And because existing itself is the essence of God, some philosophers, namely the Platonists, say that God does not have an essence, as though he were pure existence.

From this it follows that he is not in a genus, because everything that is in a genus must have a quiddity besides its being. For the quiddity or nature of genus or species is not distinguished according to the account of nature in those of which it is the genus or species, but being is in diverse things in diverse ways.

Here is posited the second, negative conclusion: God is not in a genus. It is proved in the text from the foregoing as follows: Everything that is in a genus has a quiddity besides its being; God does not have a quiddity besides his being; therefore God is not in a genus. The minor is the preceding conclusion. The major is proved thus: All things that are in a genus are indistinct in the essence of the genus or species, but are distinct through possessing the being of that generic or specific nature in different ways; therefore the being of the generic or specific nature is besides the generic or specific nature itself; and thus everything that is in a genus has a nature besides its being. The antecedent of this consequence is self-evident: man and lion, for example, are indistinct in the nature of animal, but are distinguished from one another by the fact that they possess animate being in different ways; for a genus has diverse being in its species. Similarly, Socrates and Plato are indistinct in human nature, but are distinguished from one another because they have diverse human being; for it is not intelligible that man should have the same being in Socrates and Plato. The consequence is clear from the fact that it does not seem imaginable that that by which some things are distinguished should not be besides that by which some things agree.

And note that, for the purpose of this argument, it is enough that being be besides essence, that is, besides the quidditative concept. For it is enough that the principle of agreement differ from the principle of difference, as is clear of genus and differences: species agree through the one and differ through the other. And because in God alone being belongs to the quidditative concept, therefore God alone is placed outside a genus.

But since being is besides the quidditative concept because it is really distinct from essence, and therefore belongs to the quidditative concept because it is really identical with essence, from this root—namely, that being and essence are really identical—it is said to follow in God that God is not in a genus. Nor should it trouble you that this argument seems to depart from the being of actual existence to quidditative being. For although in the minor there is speech about the being of actual existence, and afterward in the proof of the major—where one must speak of the same being—it passes to quidditative being when it says that species agree in genus and differ in diverse being. For this is verified of quidditative being taken specifically: man and ox, for example, agree in animal, and are distinguished by specific differences, through which animal acquires diverse specific being in them. For this reason, I say, one ought not to be disturbed, since (as will become clear in this chapter) differences diversify generic nature only in relation to diverse being of actual existence. Thus, with admirable subtlety, St. Thomas has not departed from attending to the first reason for the distinction of generic nature in inferiors. This, however, will be better understood below, when the most common rule will be assigned, from which genus and difference are taken.

For clarity concerning what is presupposed here—namely, that in God being belongs to the quidditative concept because it is identical with essence—note three propositions. The first is: A quiddity that is its own actual existence is not determined to any genus. This is briefly declared by a single middle term taken from Against the Gentiles I, chapter XXV, as follows: Every quiddity limited within a genus is essentially designable through a difference from which it begs being in act; no quiddity identical with its actual existence is essentially designable through a difference from which it begs being in act; therefore no quiddity identical with its actual existence is determined to any genus. The major is made known by induction: animal, for example, is essentially determinable by the differences rational and irrational, and begs being in act from them, since it is impossible for animal to exist in actual existence unless it be rational or irrational. Similarly, color is essentially determinable by its differences, through which it obtains actual existence; for color cannot be found except as white or black, and so on. The minor, for those who understand the terms, is clear in itself. For how would actual existence formally beg being in act from something else? If it formally begs being in act from some difference, then, since being in act is nothing other than having actual existence, it would follow that actual existence would formally have actual existence through something else being: just as animal formally acquires actual existence through rationality. But this does not seem intelligible; therefore, and so forth. per rationale formaliter acquires actual existence: but this does not seem intelligible; therefore, and so forth.

The second proposition is this: Actual existence determined to no genus is pure existence. This is clear from similar cases: if animal is not determined to any species, it will be pure animal; and if whiteness is not restricted in some subject, it will be pure whiteness. Thus being, not determined to the capacity of any predicamental nature, must be pure being. This abstraction is through the work of the intellect; therefore the purity itself is according to reason. But if it were according to the thing, the purity itself would also be according to the thing, and this is self-evident.

The third proposition is this: Being belongs to the quidditative concept of pure being alone. This is clear under either interpretation, and under the first indeed because it is not intelligible that being itself should not be predicated quidditatively of pure being. For if something can be predicated quidditatively of it, that something must be pure being, and pure being is posited. That other things do not receive being in their quidditative concepts is clear from this: since they do not have being in its purity, but being is adapted to quiddities, they can be defined according to their quiddities without being and without not-being. From these points the purpose is deduced as follows: Existence belongs to God's quidditative concept because the whole of it is pure being; that thing is pure being because it is not limited to any genus; and that thing is not limited to any genus because it is identical with its existence. Therefore, from first to last: existence belongs to the quidditative concept of a thing because that thing is identical with its existence.

But since, for observation, affirmation is precisely the cause of affirmation and negation the cause of negation, from the fact that a created thing is not identical with its existence, being does not belong to its quidditative concept. Hence, since glorious God is his own being, he is nothing other than being itself, according to the thing separated from predicamental things and subsisting in its purity.

Nor, if we say that God is being alone, should we fall into the error of those who said that God is that universal being by which every thing formally is. For this being which God is has the condition that no addition can be made to it. Hence, through its very purity, it is being distinct from every other being, and for this reason the commentary on the ninth proposition of the Book of Causes says that the individuation of the First Cause, which is being alone, is through its pure goodness. But common being, just as its concept does not include any addition in the intellect, likewise does not include in its concept the exclusion of addition; for if this were so, nothing could be understood to be in which something were added above being.

Here the first error of certain persons is excluded, namely this: God is the common being of all. They imagined that, since all things agree in having being, the being itself of all things, by which things formally are in common or universally, is glorious God himself. They were moved by this argument: Being specified by no addition is common being; God is being specified by no addition; therefore God is common being. But that argument errs because of the multiple meaning of the major. For “being is specified by no addition” can be understood in two ways: one, by subsisting according to the thing outside the soul; the other, according to the thought of the intellect alone. In the first way the major is false but the minor true; in the second way the major is true but the minor false. For common being, taken by the intellect from its abstraction, includes no contraction; but insofar as it is outside the intellect it is not found without contraction, since every being is contracted to substance or accident. But the being that is the divine quiddity is pure, without any addition, according to the thing, and from its very purity is, according to the thing, distinct from the being of others; and this is in no way common, just as separate whiteness, by the very fact that it were pure whiteness, would be a whiteness distinct from other whitenesses mixed with substances, and would not be whiteness in common.

That major errs a second time, because it is still possible for being to be specified or contracted without addition in two ways: in one way in act alone, in another way in act and potency. In the first way the major is true but the minor false; in the second way the major is false but the minor true. For common being, although contracted by no addition, is nevertheless contractible; otherwise no thing would have being that adds anything above being itself, and thus man would not have being, since beyond being he has humanity, quantity, and so on. Hence common being lacks specification in act alone; but divine being has no specification in act and can have none in potency, and therefore lacks addition in act and potency. This is the solution that St. Thomas gives in the text under other words, saying that every common thing neither includes nor excludes addition—that is, it does not include it in act, although it can have it. But divine being not only does not include it; rather, it excludes it: not only does it fail to include it in act, it cannot include it even in potency, and so excludes it. For what is impossible to belong to something is wholly excluded from it. On these matters you have a detailed treatment in Against the Gentiles I, chapter XXV.

Likewise, although God is being alone, it does not follow that the remaining perfections or nobilities are lacking; rather, he has all the perfections that are in all the genera, on account of which he is called simply perfect, as the Philosopher and the Commentator say in Metaphysics V. But he has them in a way more excellent than all things, because in him they are all one, whereas in other things they have diversity. This is because all those perfections belong to him according to his simple being. Just as, if someone could produce the operations of all qualities through one quality, he would have all qualities in that one quality, so God has all perfections in his very being.

Here the second error is excluded, namely this: God is not simply perfect. The reason for this error in the present matter is: That which has being alone is imperfect in comparison with that which has being, life, and understanding; but God has being alone; therefore God is less perfect than other things. The major is self-evident. The minor is deduced from what has been said as follows: What is pure being is not mixed with other things, such as life and understanding; otherwise it would be pure and not pure. God is pure being; therefore he is not mixed with other things, namely life and understanding, and consequently God has nothing but being; which was to be proved. The defect in this argument is not explained in the text; but in Against the Gentiles I, chapter XXVI, it is shown that from this proposition, “God is subsisting pure being,” it follows that God is universally most perfect. And therefore the text deliberately says, “Rather, he has all perfections,” and so forth, as if saying that it does not follow from this that God lacks some perfection; rather, the opposite is concluded from it.

The way of deducing the purpose from that foundation is as follows: That to which being belongs according to the whole power or potency of being itself lacks no perfection or nobility of being; but subsisting pure being is that to which being belongs according to the whole power or potency of being itself; therefore subsisting pure being lacks no perfection or nobility of being. The major is explained by the fact that every perfection of any genus exists only according to some being. For wisdom does not perfect a man unless the man is wise through it; nor can justice be called a perfection of man unless the man is just through it. If, then, every perfection is considered according to some being, it is clear that that in which the whole fullness of being is found has every perfection; and thus it is incompatible that something should have being according to its whole amplitude and lack some perfection of being. The minor is made known by an example: just as, if separate whiteness were found, nothing of the power of whiteness could be lacking to it. For, as was said above, the reason why this whiteness does not possess the whole perfection possible to be found in the species of whiteness is that it is adapted to a receiver which does not receive it according to its whole capacity. So being itself, if it is received in another, is restricted to the limits of the nature receiving it, namely substance or accident, and consequently limited to the nobility of that genus. But if it is pure and not received in any nature, it is simply unlimited and infinite, and simply possesses beforehand all perfections capable of being found in a being. When you hear that, if whiteness were separate, it would have every perfection possible to its species, do not understand—as the opponents of truth object—that the negation, namely its reception in another, would give it that perfection. Rather, just as reception of whiteness is a condition required for its imperfection, so the negation of reception is a condition accompanying its unlimited perfection. Hence an efficacious argument is taken from its reception and separation as from necessary and inseparable conditions.

And since having the perfections of all genera can be understood in two ways—either in themselves, or in something of a higher order—therefore, to declare how God himself, who is being itself essentially, has all perfections, he says that God does not have all perfections in themselves, that is, distinct from one another in their proper natures, as man has wisdom, justice, prudence, and so on. For in that case there would have to be maximal composition in God. Rather, he has them indistinctly united in his most simple being. For that divine being is equivalent to all the perfections of all genera, and exceeds each one and all together, as a thing of a higher and inaccessible order. You have an example of this in the light of the sun, by which alone the sun can do whatever all inferior things can do through so many diverse qualities. For this reason the Philosopher and the Commentator say in Metaphysics V, in the chapter on the perfect, that God alone is a being simply perfect, possessing in himself the universe of perfections.

Whether the perfections existing in God are distinct in some way apart from every work of the intellect.

Here it is asked whether the perfections existing in God Himself are distinct in some way apart from every work of the intellect.

Five matters are to be treated in this question. First, the title of the question will be explained. Second, Scotus’s opinion with its foundations will be recited. Third, St. Thomas’s opinion will be explained. Fourth, Scotus’s opinion will be refuted. Fifth, the arguments for the opposite will be answered.

As to the first, know first that perfection is twofold: one is perfection simply, and the other perfection in this or that. Perfection simply is that which in its proper and formal concept states perfection with no imperfection, such as wisdom, goodness, and the like. Perfection in this or that is that which in its proper and formal concept states perfection mixed with imperfection, such as humanity, equinity, and the like. I said “in its proper and formal concept,” because including some imperfection in a concept common to it and others, or materially, does not detract from perfection simply. Although wisdom in the concept of its genus, say habit or quality, states imperfection—potentiality or dependence, and so on—because it does not formally include these in its differential concept, it is not prevented from being perfection simply. I said that it is called perfection because of the relation which, in its proper and formal concept, signifies no perfection together with no imperfection.

Know secondly that perfections can be in something in two ways: formally or virtually. To be formally in something is to be in it as a form is in that which possesses it, as humanity, whiteness, quantity, and the like are in a man. To be virtually in something is to be in it as an effect is in its efficient cause, as heat is in the sun. You can understand from one effect of these modes how greatly they differ: what is present in the first way intrinsically denominates the supposit, while what is present in the second way does not so denominate it. Thus the sun is called bright because of its light, but it is not called hot because of its heat.

Moreover, perfections can be formally in something in two ways. In one way they are distinct and limited in their proper natures, as being, understanding, and willing are in man. In another way they are formally in something of a higher order, united and unlimited, as the heating power, drying power, and other such powers are in the sun’s light. These modes differ greatly. It is far more excellent to be in something in the second way, as the example shows. Although, then, the perfections of all genera are in God more excellently than in creatures, nevertheless perfections not simply are in Him only virtually (for they do not denominate Him); perfections simply are formally in Him, not limited in their proper natures, but really indistinct and unlimited as in a thing of a higher order. Hence the doubt arises whether the perfections simply existing formally in God, with real identity, are distinct in some way apart from every work of the intellect. This concludes the first matter.

As to the second, Scotus, in I Sentences, distinction VIII, question IV, no. 17, thinks that these perfections are distinct, with every work of the intellect set aside, by a formal distinction from the nature of the thing. He calls a distinction from the nature of the thing one which arises from the nature of the things themselves, so that it exists apart from every operation of the intellect. He adds “formal” because not every distinction from the nature of the thing is formal, but only one arising from quiddities or formal notions. He proves his intention by many arguments; I judge it useful to bring forward those proceeding from natural principles alone, since we do not now intend to teach theology, and so on.

His first argument is: wisdom and goodness are absolutely formally distinct from the nature of the thing; therefore infinite wisdom and infinite goodness are formally distinct from the nature of the thing. The antecedent is evident. The consequence is proved because infinity does not vary the formal notion of that to which it is added. At whatever degree of perfection within its latitude it is understood, a perfection always retains the same formal notion. If, then, wisdom and infinite wisdom have the same formal notion, and wisdom’s formal notion is distinct from goodness’s formal notion, it necessarily follows that infinite wisdom’s formal notion does not include goodness’s formal notion from the nature of the thing.

Moreover, a distinction preceding the notion of the first distinctive is not through that distinctive; but the distinction of nature and intellect precedes intellection, which is first according to reason; therefore, and so on. The minor is proved because, if no distinction of them preceded, they would not be distinguished more by intellection as intellection than by nature as nature. Whatever is distinguished by intellection, while wholly indistinct from nature, is also distinguished by nature.

Moreover, things understood as formally distinct by an intuitive intellect have distinction as existing; but the divine perfections are understood as formally distinct from God Himself by an intuitive intellect; therefore they have distinction as existing in them. This cannot be a distinction of reason, for the divine intellect would by its intuition have to cause some relation of reason in its essence as existing, which is absurd. Therefore such distinction is from the nature of the thing. The major is clear from the difference between intuitive and abstractive intellect; the minor is self-evident.

Moreover, God understands His essence as true, but wills it as good; therefore truth and goodness are distinct before every act of the intellect. The consequence holds because the distinction of objects precedes the distinction of acts, as cause precedes effect.

Moreover, goodness and truth in God are not distinct from the nature of the thing; therefore they are formally synonymous. The consequence is against you; the proof is that goodness and truth signify only the pure perfections themselves in the thing, in no way distinct in it.

Moreover, among the divine perfections there is a demonstrative order by which doctors demonstrate one from another; there is also a distinction between formal and non-formal predications. It is said that wisdom is not formally predicated of goodness, and there is also equality according to Augustine, On the Trinity XV; therefore they are distinct from the nature of the thing. Why do the doctors fill so many volumes if all are formally the same? Further, before every act of the intellect there is contradiction among the divine perfections: God understands by intellect and does not will, while by will He wills and does not understand. Therefore there is a distinction from the nature of the thing among the divine perfections.

Moreover, for the completion of doctrine, a distinction grounding real distinction does not depend on the work of the intellect; but the distinction of the divine perfections grounds the real distinction of the divine emanations; therefore it is from the nature of the thing and not from the operation of the intellect. This concludes the second matter.

CONCLUSION

The perfections existing in God are distinguished in themselves, but virtually or fundamentally; in the same God, insofar as they terminate an act of the intellect, they are distinguished by reason, but actually.

As to the third, setting aside the Trinity of Persons, three propositions must be explained, in which St. Thomas’s judgment and the truth consist. First: in God in Himself there is no distinction actually. Second: in God in Himself there is a distinction of reason virtually or fundamentally. Third: in God as terminating an act of our intellect there is an actual distinction of reason.

For the evidence of the first proposition, know that judgment concerning the formal notions of things in their proper natures differs from judgment concerning the formal notions of those same things formally existing in some thing of a higher order. Things in their proper natures are formally distinct apart from every work of the intellect because they do not include one another in their formal notions. The formal notion of one is not that of another because each is itself in such a way that it is not the other. Thus heating power and drying power in their proper natures are formally distinct from the nature of the thing, because heating power is the principle of heating and not of drying, and conversely. But things united in something of a higher order are found in one simpler higher thing and are formally united in its one notion. They must therefore lack formal distinction from the nature of the thing, since the root of that distinction is absent: the limitation by which each is itself in such a way that it is not the other. Neither, when they are so united, is more itself than the other. Continuing the example, heating and drying power formally found in the sun’s light are united as in one nature of light; hence formally and indistinctly they are in light’s formal notion, so that once the complete definition of solar light is assigned there is no need to seek further definitions of them. The complete definition manifests its heating and drying power, since definition must correspond to the defined thing, whenever its heating power is no more itself than light and drying power, and conversely.

According to Dionysius, Divine Names V, perfections simply are in God not defined to their proper natures but elevated to the illimitation of His being. It follows that, just as all are formally united in one most simple thing, so they are formally and indistinctly in its one most simple formal notion. Divine wisdom is no more wisdom than goodness, truth, and divine being, and conversely; therefore the formal notion of divine being includes being no more than wisdom and goodness. If an adequate definition of the most simple thing which is God were given, whatever is God would be formally included in that one formal notion; otherwise the definition would not equal the excellence of the defined. Hence God, who understands Himself in His own mode, forms only one formal notion, namely the Word.

You can argue over this as follows: whatever is formally united in one adequate formal notion of God is not formally distinct from the nature of the thing; but the divine perfections, with every work of the intellect set aside, are united in one adequate formal notion of God; therefore, and so on. The minor is proved because the powers of inferior qualities are no more united in solar light than perfections simply are formally, as is evident and conceded by opponents. The major is proved because otherwise the definition would not equal the defined.

Secondly, for the first proposition: every actual distinction from the nature of the thing is founded on actual opposition from the nature of the thing; but there is no actual opposition from the nature of the thing among the perfections; therefore. The major is found in Metaphysics X, text XXIV. The minor is proved by induction. There is neither formally contradictory nor privative opposition, since in both one member is formally negation, and it is impious to posit negation formally in God. Nor is it enough that negation be there fundamentally, since actual distinction requires actual opposition, and actual opposition requires actual extremes. Nor is there contrary opposition, because one contrary is always defective, Metaphysics X, text XV. Relative opposition is plainly absent. Nor does it matter that this seems to imply that God has not many perfections but only one, deity: it is most true that God Himself is only one unlimited perfection, wholly pre-containing in Himself all perfections multiplied and capable of multiplication in others.

For the evidence of the second and third propositions, note that, as we said above in a certain question, the simplest thing we call God is that to which all perfections simply existing in proper natures are assimilated; likewise it is that to which all their formal concepts are assimilated, since these are nothing other than the perfections themselves in intentional being. Since God terminates these conceptions as the object understood in them, God Himself must be understood as correlated to each by several relations of reason according to their number. Thus He actually has a distinction of reason in Himself, so that God, as objected to several conceptions or formal notions, is said actually and formally to have a distinction of reason in Himself—objectively, because of the plurality of formal concepts to which He is objected and the plurality of relations of reason by which He is related, or understood as related, to the perfections spoken of, both in natural and intentional being.

Because in God, with every work of the intellect set aside, there is that from which He can cause and terminate these concepts, He is said to have a distinction of reason virtually or fundamentally. God has this from the supreme illimitedness of His perfection. Just as no creature can receive it in natural being, no created intellect can receive it in intentional being; every created intellect, even one seeing God through His essence, is powerless to form one concept adequate to the divine perfection. Thus for the second proposition: whatever has in itself that by which it can objectively cause, terminate, and verify distinct notions or formal conceptions has in itself a virtual distinction of reason apart from every work of the intellect; glorious God is such; therefore. For the third: whatever terminates several formal concepts actually has a distinction of reason in itself; God is such; therefore, and so on. This concludes the third matter.

As to the fourth, Scotus is opposed in three ways. First: formal distinction from the nature of the thing is greater than real distinction; therefore the divine perfections are not formally distinct from the nature of the thing. The consequence holds. Distinction through what is more intimate is greater than distinction through what is outside the intimates of the thing; formal distinction is through what is most intimate, while real distinction is through what is outside the intimates. Scotus says that formal distinction is through predicates of the first mode, present in the thing in the first sign, whereas real distinction is through what is present afterward. Distinction through what is somewhat intimate is somewhat distinction; through what is more intimate it is greater; therefore through what is most intimate it is greatest.

Second: the divine perfections, by the most precise abstraction, are formally infinite; therefore they are formally identical from the nature of the thing. The antecedent is Scotus’s. The consequence follows from distinguishing two infinities: infinity within a proper notion and infinity within the latitude of being. If the first is intended, it does not follow, since what is prior does not formally include what is posterior, and a divine perfection such as wisdom is prior to that infinity. If the second is intended, the conclusion follows: if divine wisdom, precisely and formally taken, is infinite with respect to the ultimate perfection of being simply, it must contain every perfection simply within its formal notion and exclude none formally. Consequently it is formally distinct from none. Once it is posited as distinct from other perfections, it is formally contracted within the latitude of being, contrary to the antecedent understood in this way.

Third: the divine perfections are formally distinct from the nature of the thing; therefore there is a relation among them. The consequence holds because distinction, being a relation existing in the nature of things, must be real, as everything existing in the nature of things is real. The consequence is against Avicenna, who says that there is no real relation of the same to itself.

As to the fifth, for answering the first argument and destroying Scotus’s foundation, note that something can be infinite in two ways: according to its proper notion, or according to being, that is, simply. What is infinite according to its proper notion is enclosed by no limits of its own latitude, although it is determined to such a degree of being that it does not have every perfection of being. What is infinite according to being or simply is limited by no limits within the whole latitude of being, but has every perfection of being. Consider quantity of bulk: if quantity were infinite, it would be infinite according to the notion of quantity, but would not be infinite according to being; it would still be finite and limited to the genus of quantity. Likewise, if whiteness were intensively infinite, it would be infinite according to its proper notion, but not infinite being, since it would be defined to a species. The first infinity leaves the formal notion with the formal limitation it finds; the second makes the thing and its formal notion unlimited and elevates it so that it is every possible perfection in being, and no more itself than any other perfection simply. Thus it does not permit the distinction and formal limitation by which it was distinguished from others to remain.

Descending to the issue, I say that although wisdom and infinite wisdom have wholly the same formal notion by the first infinity, infinite wisdom by the second infinity has a far higher formal notion. It includes every perfection simply within its formal notion; since all the perfections in God are infinite with the second infinity, all must be one simple formal notion.

To the argument, in whatever form it is made, answer by attending to the equivocation of infinity just explained. The first infinity does not vary the formal notion and is measured by degrees of a thing’s proper latitude, but the second is not. If the divine perfections were infinite only with the first infinity, the argument would conclude, because they have the second before every act of the intellect. Therefore it does not conclude. Nor does it matter that the first infinity of each perfection simply perhaps entails the second; it is enough that they are distinguished by reason for something to become second which was not first. Likewise, commonest perfections such as being, goodness, and the like can be considered in themselves or as received in a subject; in the first way they are formally one in God, but in the second they can be diverse according to the diverse capacities of creatures.

To the second, deny the minor. Before intellection there is a distinction of reason fundamentally, but not actually; nor is actual distinction required for the distinction of the acts of understanding and willing.

To the third, deny the minor. God’s intuitive understanding does not cause a new relation of reason in God, but discovers and terminates the concepts founded on the divine perfection.

To the fourth, deny the consequence. It suffices that the objects of intellect and will be distinguished fundamentally; an actual distinction at that time is not required, just as God’s intellect and will are not then distinguished except by a fundamental distinction of reason.

To the fifth, deny the consequence. Synonymy is a property of names and is not measured by the identity of the thing’s formal notion in itself, but by the identity of the formal or mental concept. Since truth and goodness in us have diverse concepts, they are not synonymous. Although they signify the same thing formally in itself, they also distinctly signify mental concepts as modes of signifying, and this destroys synonymy.

To the sixth, it is said that, on the side of the thing, a virtual or fundamental distinction of reason together with an actual distinction of reason on our side suffices. We speak as we conceive. We form distinct concepts, one arising from another, one not predicated of the other, and one having a relation the other lacks. Thus we make demonstrations and formal and identical predications, denying of God under one concept what we affirm under another. The doctors therefore fill books, stammering as they can, sounding forth the heights of God in human fashion: they can contemplate and teach that simplest formal notion, embracing formally whatever is in God, only through particular concepts—not because there is a distinction there from the nature of the thing. Equality among the divine perfections before every act of the intellect is only a fundamental non-excess among them, preserved among perfections distinguished only virtually.

It is said regarding the seventh that, since before every act of the intellect there is no contradiction formally but only fundamentally—for one contradictory member is formally a negation, which exists only through the work of the intellect—it is enough at that time that there be a distinction of reason fundamentally, which we concede; nothing else is required.

Regarding the last, it is said that emanations are distinguished both really and formally; and although the foundation of their formal distinction is the distinction of intellect and will, this is not so of their real distinction. The divine processions are not really distinct because one is from the intellect and the other from the will, but because they have a real relative opposition, as Boethius teaches. Therefore it is false that the distinction of the divine perfections grounds the real distinction of the divine emanations. To ground their formal distinction, a fundamental formal distinction between intellect and will suffices. Likewise the divine processions themselves, setting aside their real distinction, are not formally distinguished from the nature of the thing, but only by a virtual distinction of reason before every work of the intellect; without real relative opposition they are no more distinguished from the nature of the thing than are intellect and will.

More briefly, one may say regarding this and similar arguments that in divine things, before every act of the intellect, there is a formal distinction not formally but virtually—that is, contained eminently—in this way: each divine proper power performs its own act as though it were formally distinct from another. Intellect understands and does not will, and will wills and does not understand, as though there were a formal distinction formally between intellect and will, and similarly in other cases. This manner of possessing formal distinction is founded on the formally eminent formal unity of the deity; and it suffices for preserving all that is introduced by formal distinction, because it eminently equals it.

In intellectual created substances essence is found in a second way: their being is other than their essence, although their essence is without matter. Hence their being is not absolute but received, and therefore limited and finite to the capacity of the receiving nature. Their nature or quiddity, however, is absolute, not received in any matter. Thus it is said in the Book of Causes that intelligences are finite above and infinite below. They are finite as regards their being, which they receive from above, but are not bounded below, since their forms are not limited to the capacity of any matter receiving them. In such substances there is no multitude of individuals in one species, as was said, except in the human soul because of the body to which it is united.

In this second part of the chapter on the essences of created intellectual substances, which are placed in the second order, he gathers four propositions. First, in created intellectual substances being is other than essence. Second, matter is not found in them. Third, their being is finite, but their essence infinite. Fourth, none of them is numerically multiplied except the last, namely the human soul. He passes over the first and second as already explained, and explains the third by reason and authority.

For the evidence of the reasoning, note that act is limited by the potency in which it is received, and potency by the act which it receives, though in different ways. What is in potency is not determined but determinable by the act toward which it is in potency; once it has received that act, it is formally limited by it. Likewise an act, according to its essence, is receivable in this or that, and consequently determinable to this or that subject. Once received in this subject, its amplitude and indefiniteness toward this or that no longer remain, for it is determined to this. There are therefore two kinds of finitude and two of infinity: one on the part of act, the other on the part of potency. Infinity on the part of potency signifies imperfection, since it is through the absence of an act limiting potency. Infinity of act signifies supreme perfection, since it is through the absence of a potency limiting act. As a sign of this, forms not received in anything are far more perfect in reality than received forms. Since, then, the being of intellectual substances is received in their essence, it follows that it is finite in the way act is limited by potency; hence it is contracted and limited to the genus of its receiver, namely the nature of which it is. Since their essence is not received in anything, being a form not received in matter, it follows also that it is infinite with an infinity belonging to act: it is not determined to the capacity of any matter receiving it, as material forms are.

With these preliminaries, the argument is formed thus: that whose being is received but whose form is unreceived has finite being and infinite essence; intelligences are such; therefore. Note that here both finitude and infinity are always taken as belonging to act. By such finitude the being of intelligences is finite, and by such infinity their essence is infinite. If we speak of finitude belonging to potency, their essence is found finite, because the potency in them is terminated by the act of being.

This is confirmed by the authority of the Book of Causes, where it is said that intelligences are finite above and infinite below, because their being, which is supreme in them, is received, while their essence, which is lowest, is not received. Their essence, as it regards what is formally above it—namely the act of being—is finite, by receiving it; but as it regards what is below it, namely matter, it is infinite, since it is not received in matter, and so on. Thus avoid the error of those who, not understanding this foundation, say that if being is absolutely infinite because it is received in nothing, then the essence both of immaterial and of composite substances, since it is wholly received in nothing, will be absolutely infinite—which is absurd. Hence it seems very superficial to argue to infinity from non-reception.

Know, then, that this position is founded on the proposition: every thing which, according to its order, is receivable in another but is really unreceived is infinite with an infinity opposed to the finitude which a received thing of its order contracts. I said “according to its order receivable in another” because composites and matter, in their whole latitude, are unreceivable. I said “infinite with an opposed infinity,” etc., because just as not everything receivable is received in everything, but each act has its proper receiver, as is held in II On the Soul, texts XIV and XXVI, so every reception does not entail every finitude; a determinate reception entails a determinate finitude, and conversely such non-reception entails the corresponding infinity opposed to the finitude which the thing would contract if received. For example, whiteness, since it is receivable in a subject, if posited unreceived will be infinite—not with just any infinity, but with the infinity opposed to the finitude it has in a subject. In the present case, both being and form are, according to their order, receivable (for neither is opposed to being received), but in different receivers: the proper receiver of being is quiddity or supposit, while that of form is matter.

Therefore, just as the reception of form in matter is of another account than the reception of being in essence, so the finitude of form through matter is of another account than the finitude of being through essence, although both agree in being the way act is limited by potency. Likewise the infinity which form receives from being unreceived in matter is of another account than the infinity which being receives from there being no reception of it in quiddity. Form, because received in matter and enclosed within it, loses its amplitude, by which it is indefinite toward this or that particular; hence, when separated from matter, it is infinite only in lacking the limits of any matter’s capacity. Being, because received in a quiddity, is contracted to its genus and species; if posited unreceived, it will be defined to no genus and, lacking the limits of every genus, will consequently be absolutely infinite.

You therefore have the solution of the difficulty in this: we do not say that everything unreceived is infinite, but that a thing unreceived according to its order of receivability is infinite; and we do not say that every such unreceived thing is infinite in the same way, but in different ways. From the first it is clear that a composite substance has no infinity from its non-reception; from the second, that the essence of an intelligence, enclosed in the order of form, as a pure form separated from matter and not being being itself, is infinite from its non-reception in matter, but not absolutely, and so on; while divine being, contained under the order of being itself, is absolutely infinite from its non-reception in quiddity or essence.

Here too you can detect the error of the Scotists and of Scotus in I Sentences, dist. II, q. II, where they attribute to St. Thomas the argument last introduced there to conclude God’s infinity: form is limited by matter; therefore a form which is not apt to be in matter is infinite. For you know what sort of infinity this argument concludes, and that, according to St. Thomas, God’s infinity denies higher limits.

Notice three errors there. First, the stated argument is said by us to conclude absolute infinity, whereas for us it concludes only infinity in a certain respect. Second, the argument is asserted as the sophism of the fallacy of consequence, because form is finite in itself by nature before it is limited by matter: as in III Physics, body is limited by another body; therefore, if it is not limited by another body, it is infinite. The error is manifest. When it is said that form is limited by matter, “by” denotes the precise cause of the aforesaid finitude in a certain respect; form is not finite in itself in that way, since in itself it is indeterminate to this or that matter. Therefore it rightly follows: a form not apt to be received in matter is infinite in a certain respect. Just as affirmation is the precise cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation. The process in III Physics is not of this kind, because body is not causally and precisely limited by another body.

The third error is the attempt to deny what was said above, namely that the essence of an intelligence is finite above through its being. “Being,” he says, “is posterior to essence and its accident, according to you; therefore the essence of an intelligence in the first natural order seems intensively infinite, and consequently not limitable by being in a second order.” To this it is said that although being is posterior to essence in the order of generation, and is its accident—that is, outside its formal concept—nevertheless essence in that prior order is absolutely finite, because it is receptive of being and is not being itself. Just as essence, by being being itself, is absolutely infinite, as is clear in God from what was said, so by not being its own being it is not absolutely infinite, according to that maxim: if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, and so on. Since, therefore, in every prior order the essence of an intelligence is fundamentally receptive of being, and cannot be abstracted from this, although it does not possess it in every prior order, it follows that it is absolutely finite through its being—that is, through not being its own being, but being actualized or actuable by it, and so on. Thus it is understood when it is said that the essence of an intelligence is limited by its being. Let the first part of the fourth proposition, discussed above, be omitted. Its second part, namely that the intellectual soul, which is last among intellectual substances, is numerically multiplied, requires careful consideration. The text assigns its union with the body as the cause: every form so united to a body that it gives it being formally is necessarily multiplied according to the multiplication of that body; otherwise several bodies would have numerically the same being. From one form there comes only one numerically substantial being. The soul is rightly said to be numerically multiplied through union with the body, because numerical distinction, since it is not formal, must be according to quantity, as was explained above; but such distinction could not exist in the soul according to quantity if the form were not the form of a quantified thing, as intelligences show. The effective argument for concluding the numerical plurality of souls is therefore the union of the soul with a numerically multiplied body.

Although its individuation depends occasionally on the body as regards its beginning, since it does not acquire individuated being except in the body of which it is the act, it does not follow that, when the body is destroyed, individuation perishes. Since it has absolute being, from which it acquired individuated being by becoming the form of this body, that being always remains individuated. Hence Avicenna says that the individuation and multiplication of souls depends on the body as regards its beginning, but not as regards its end.

Here an objection against the fourth proposition is excluded. It is this: a form multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies does not remain in its multitude when the bodies are destroyed; the human soul is multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies; therefore many human souls cannot remain when the bodies are destroyed. The reasoning is good, but the conclusion is false; therefore one of the premises is false—not the major, as is proved, and hence the minor, which was the fourth proposition. The major is proved from the principle that when the cause is removed, the effect is removed. If the cause of the multitude of souls is the multitude of bodies, then when the multitude of bodies is removed the multitude of souls is also removed. The objection is excluded in the text by explaining that forms are multiplied with the multiplication of bodies in two ways: with dependence on matter, and without dependence on it. The former are destroyed when bodies are destroyed; the latter remain, since their individuation depends on bodies only occasionally. The intellectual soul belongs to the latter.

For clarity, note first that the same judgment applies to the being, unity, and multitude of a thing with respect to dependence and independence: what does not depend on matter for its being does not depend on matter for its unity or multitude; but what depends on matter for its being also depends on matter for its unity and plurality, since one and many are properties of being.

Note second that forms are of three kinds. Some come to be in matter and are educed from the potency of matter, such as material forms. Some come to be in matter but are not educed from the potency of matter, such as the intellectual soul, which comes from outside. Some neither come to be in matter nor are educed from the potency of matter, such as forms separated from matter, namely intelligences. There cannot be a fourth kind that is educed from the potency of matter but does not come to be in matter, since this is self-contradictory, as is clear in itself.

Those which are neither educed from the potency of matter nor come to be in it are wholly independent and separated from matter, and are not numerically multiplied, as was proved above. The first and second kinds, because they agree in coming to be in matter, also agree in needing to be adapted and proportioned to their receiving matters, in which they come to be; proper acts must occur in proper matters, as is said in II On the Soul, texts XXIV and XXVI. The form of a lion must be commensurate with a leonine body and not an equine one; and the form of this lion must be commensurate with this leonine body and not that one, and so on. Consequently they also agree in this, that both must be multiplied together in their proper bodies. Whatever must be mutually adapted and proportioned together receives multitude and unity together, as appears by considering each case: the multiplication of forms in one species is always accompanied by multiplication of bodies in that species, and conversely; otherwise one form would be in diverse matters, or diverse matters under one form, both of which are impossible.

Because the first forms are educed from the potency of matter and the second are not, they differ in this: the first have being dependent on matter as on the material cause causing and sustaining their being; the second have being exceeding the whole capacity of matter and independent of it, since they are not caused from matter. Consequently they differ secondly in this: both the unity and multitude of the first depend on matter, as does their being, and therefore, just as they are destroyed when bodies are destroyed, so are their unity and plurality. But the unity and multitude of the second are independent of matter, as is their being; therefore, just as their being remains when their bodies are destroyed, so do their unity and plurality. This is what St. Thomas intends here when he says the individuation of the soul, that is, its unity. The same is to be understood of plurality depending occasionally on the body. It depends in this way because the soul comes to be in a body, but not because it is educed from the potency of bodily matter. This is what he adds: it does not acquire it in the body; and he gives the reason, namely that, since it has absolute being, that is, independent of the body, it can remain without it when the body is corrupted. Hence Avicenna says that the individuation of the soul depends on the body at its beginning but not at its end, because it comes to be only in a body. It can, and in fact does, exist after death without a body. Thus the objection is solved, because the major is false of the second order of forms, such as the human soul.

It is now clear what must be said for its proof: the multiplication of bodies is not properly the cause but the occasion, and only in the coming-to-be, of the multitude of souls; when the cause in coming-to-be ceases, the effect does not cease as regards being.

On the individuation and numerical multiplication of the intellectual soul.

Here there is doubt concerning the individuation of the intellectual soul, namely, by what it is individuated. Three things must be done in this question. First, Scotus’s opinion will be recounted. Second, St. Thomas’s opinion will be explained. Third, the arguments for the opposite will be answered.

As to the first, Scotus, in II Sent., dist. 1, last question, and in Quodlibet II, following his position concerning haecceities, holds that the soul is individuated by its own haecceity; and he argues thus against St. Thomas. That by which something is first in act outside a cause and the intellect is that by which it is first this; but the soul, like every entity especially absolute, is first in act outside a cause and the intellect through itself; therefore the soul is first this through itself. The major is proved because universality, or being-not-this, belongs to a thing only in the intellect. The minor is clear from the fact that a thing first withdraws from non-being through itself.

Moreover, every formal distinction, or distinction not through matter, is specific according to you: intellectual souls are formally distinguished, or distinguished not through matter; therefore they are specifically distinguished. The conclusion is false; therefore one of the premises is false. Not the minor, because separated intellectual souls lack matter; therefore the major is false, although it is the foundation of his position. But if you say that souls have inclinations to different bodies and are distinguished through these, the contrary follows: the soul is by nature first the term of creation, which as such is formally this, before it is united to matter; therefore by nature the soul is this before it is united to matter: therefore the soul is individuated, and not through union with the body. The antecedent is proved thus: that which can be without another, while the other cannot be without it, is prior, from Metaphysics V, text XVI. The soul can be without union to matter not only according to essence but also according to existence, but not without being the term of creation and being this; therefore by nature the soul is the term of creation and this before it is in matter.

If it is said that the soul is not this through actual union, or existence in matter, but through an aptitude to exist in it, this does not escape the difficulty, because an absolute nature is prior by nature to its very aptitude. For because the soul is this, it has this aptitude toward this, and the other aptitude is repugnant to it, and so forth, as the argument may be formed thus. What belongs to one and is repugnant to another of the same species does not belong per se to this one according to what is common to them; or at least it necessarily presupposes their distinction, namely, of this from that. But this aptitude belongs to this soul and is repugnant to that one; therefore it necessarily presupposes the distinction of this from that; therefore souls are not individuated by aptitudes.

This is confirmed. The formal account of aptitude is not toward itself, nor is it the account of a being in act; therefore it cannot be the individuating principle of the soul. The antecedent is proved as to the first part, because if it were toward itself, it could be understood as not toward another, as toward a term, which is false. The second part is likewise proved, because what necessarily requires something nonexistent is itself nonexistent in act; but aptitude is toward a nonexistent term; therefore its account is not the account of a being in act. The consequence is clear, because relative distinction presupposes absolute distinction: because the soul is this, it therefore has this aptitude, and not conversely; and because this soul is singular with actual, or in-act, singularity, it is not this through an aptitude toward this body. Such is what these men think concerning this matter.

But following Peripatetic foundations, we say that the soul is individuated by substantial commensuration to this body, and that this soul and that soul are distinguished by their commensurations to this and that body. The proofs of this were given above, when it was deduced that numerical distinction can originate only from quantity. Hence it is now enough to explain how what we say is so. Commensuration is taken in two ways. In one way, for the relation of commensuration; in another, for the substantial coaptation of the thing itself. In the first way, commensuration is essentially a relative thing and belongs to the genus of relation. In the second way, it is an absolute thing and belongs to the predicament of the thing commensurated: for it is essentially the same as that thing, differing from it only in account. I say the same likewise of inclination, aptitude, coaptation, signification, and similar terms, which are assumed to express the point at issue. The absolute too is now taken in two ways. In one way, from the term; thus we say that substance, quantity, and quality are absolute beings. In another way, from the recipient or subject; thus none of the predicaments of accidents is absolute, for they are essentially receivable in substance. Therefore, when it is said that souls are individuated by their commensurations, this must be understood of substantial commensurations, which are absolute things with respect to terms, though not with respect to recipients, and not of commensurations that are relations, and so forth. For just as it belongs to the essence of soul in general to be essentially proportioned to an organic physical body, which is placed in its definition, so it belongs to the essence of a human soul to be commensurated to a human body: for it is the perfection of a human body in such a way that it is not the perfection of an ox’s body. So too it belongs to the essence of this soul to be commensurated to this body; and thus commensuration to a human body does not follow upon the human soul, but constitutes the human soul itself. For the soul of a man first differs from the soul of an ox by this: the former is the proper act of a human body, while the latter is the proper act of an ox’s body. Now it is clear that to be the proper act of a human body is the same as to be a substance substantially commensurated to its perfection. Thus the substantial commensuration of this soul to this body does not follow upon this soul, but constitutes this soul as this; for this soul is substantially the proper act of this body. Hence this soul first differs from that soul because this is the proper act of this body, while that is the proper act of another. This is what St. Thomas teaches in II Contra Gentiles, chapter LXXXI, in the Questions on the Soul, and wherever he speaks of this matter.

This proposition is in agreement with Aristotle’s principles. For in the first book of On the Parts of Animals he teaches that the proper differences of something divided must distinguish it per se insofar as it is such. For example, the proper differences of animal should not be white and black, which do not divide animal insofar as it is animal. The identity of animal stands together with their diversity. Nor should they be capable of navigation and capable of flight, because these do not diversify the sensitive nature per se; rather, the differences should be this sort of sensitive thing or that sort. For animal, insofar as it is animal, is constituted together with the sensitive, and is diversified per se only through differences of sensing. Therefore, since the soul, insofar as it is such, is essentially the act of a physical body, it is divided by its proper differences according as it is the act of such a body or such another; and again, the act of such a body, for example a human body, is divided by proper, though material, differences according as it is the act of this body or that. Souls, therefore, are individuated by substantial commensurations that are not absolute from their recipients, just as souls themselves are essentially not absolute from the bodies they perfect and receive them.

Failure to consider this is the cause of the error of those who want to judge everything in the same way, as the Scotists do. Since they do not consider the proper natures of things and want to make things commensurate with their concepts, it happens that they pronounce the same judgment concerning the individuation of everything, and belong to the number of those of whom it is said in On the Heavens II, text LXXX, that they inquire until they have no contradiction with themselves.

Having seen these points, we must proceed to the solution of the arguments.

To the first it is said that the major is false. Although every thing posited outside the intellect and a cause is this, nevertheless it is not first this by the same principle by which it is first a being. For it is first by its very being; but it is first this by haecceity. Many things accompany one another inseparably, yet are not first possessed by the same principle. Thus every being other than God exists outside the intellect and a cause, and is dependent; nevertheless it is not by the same first principle that it exists and that it depends. The minor too is false: a thing is not really distinguished from itself first through itself, but through actual existence, as was explained above, and so forth.

To the second, the minor is denied. For two separated souls are not formally distinguished, but through matter, although they are pure forms abstracted from matter. It is one thing to say, “Every formal distinction is specific,” and another to say, “Every distinction of forms is specific.” For formal distinction, since it is that which consists in definitive principles, is specific; whatever things have diverse definitions differ in species, and at least have different ultimate differences, whose diversity suffices for specific diversity. But there is no such distinction between Socrates’ soul and Plato’s: they have the same definition. A distinction of forms, however, wherever division among forms occurs, is found in two separated souls because they are coapted to different bodies. Hence the account is not the same for them and for other separated substances, which cannot be united to bodies. Thus the answer given there is good, provided it is rightly understood in the manner explained: souls are distinguished by substantial inclinations to different things.

To the first objection against this, it is said that it does not establish the intended conclusion. It concludes, “Therefore by nature the soul is this before it has actual union with the body,” whereas it ought to conclude, “Therefore by nature the soul is this before it is coapted or inclined to this body.” For we do not say that the soul is formally individuated through actual union with the body, but through substantial coaptation to this body. That this is naturally prior to the actual union is clear from the fact that everything here per se terminates creation, and not the soul existing in this; and from the fact that inherence presupposes existence, while particular existence is more immediate than inherence. Hence the answer recited there is good, though with a grain of salt. For we say that souls are formally individuated through substantial aptitude or commensuration; but through actual union with the body conditionally, that is, as a condition without which not: and because the formal account of a thing is naturally prior to a condition without which not, therefore, and so forth.

The answer to the argument against this is clear from what has been said. For it assumes the falsehood that the nature of this soul is prior to its substantial aptitude. Hence the major of the argument formed there for the second disjunctive part is false, namely, that “whatever belongs to one and is repugnant to another of the same species necessarily presupposes their distinction.” It can happen that it does not presuppose their distinction, but makes their distinction. Just as what belongs to one species and is repugnant to another species of the same genus need not presuppose the distinction of those species, but it is enough that it make their distinction. For example, rational belongs to man and is repugnant to a lion, while irrational belongs to a lion and is repugnant to man; yet rational and irrational do not presuppose the distinction of man and lion, but make it. Therefore add under that major: “But the haecceity of Socrates’ soul belongs to it and is repugnant to Plato’s soul; therefore haecceities presuppose the souls already distinct.” In this way you will recommend to the Scotists the force of their argument, and so forth.

To the confirmation, when it is said that the account of aptitude is not toward itself, I say that the account of substantial aptitude of which we speak is toward another, but not toward another as toward a term, rather as toward a recipient. The proof against this does nothing: I concede that it can be understood as not toward another as toward a term, but not as not toward another as toward a recipient, just as quantity and quality are absolute from a term, but not from a subject.

To what is placed second in the antecedent, namely, that the account of aptitude is not the account of a being in act, I say first that this is false. For the aptitude for laughing, namely risibility, has the account of a being in first act, although it has potency for second act. Both propositions of the proof are false. The major, namely, “What necessarily requires something nonexistent is itself nonexistent in act,” is false because every active potency in first act merely requires its operation not yet to exist, and yet the potency itself exists in act. The minor is false because the substantial aptitude of the soul for the body does not exclude the body; rather, it is the composition from contraries that makes the soul’s aptitude exist without actual union.

Second, I say that we equivocate concerning aptitude. For this aptitude that we understand in the soul is nothing other than the commensuration, or substantial sealing, of the soul itself to this body, which is clearly in act both while it is united to the body and while it is separated from it, as is clear in the example given above concerning wax. The argument proceeds as though this aptitude were something potential, awaiting something to reduce it to act, and so forth. As to the consequence, it is clear what must be said: it is not such a relative distinction, but an absolute one relative to what is received, and so forth.

And because in these substances quiddity is not the same as existence, they are orderable in a predicament; for this reason genus, species, and difference are found in them, although their proper differences are hidden from us. In sensible things too the essential differences themselves are unknown to us; hence they are signified through accidental differences, which arise from the essential ones, just as a cause is signified through its effect, and as biped is posited as the difference of man. But the proper accidents of immaterial substances are unknown to us; hence their differences can be signified to us neither through themselves nor through accidental differences.

In this third part of this chapter, St. Thomas, about to explain how the quiddities of separated substances are related to the logical intentions—namely genus, species, and difference, and so forth—settles the matter with four observations, excluding two objections afterward. He therefore first proposes this conclusion: Intelligences are in a predicament. He proves it thus: everything in which existence differs from essence is in a predicament; intelligences are of this kind; therefore, and so forth. The minor was proved above. The major can be proved thus: everything having limited existence is in a genus. For if it has limited existence, it is determined to some definite genus; but what is determined to no definite genus subsists through itself—so whence or how could it have limited existence? Moreover, every being in which existence is distinguished from its essence has limited existence, as was explained above; therefore everything of this kind is in a predicament. From this it follows as a corollary that they have genus, species, and difference. He adds that their differences are hidden from us. He does so to answer the doubt of someone who might say: how do you know that there are differences in them if we do not know them? To know of them immediately the question whether they are, and to be ignorant of the question what they are, are different. We know, I say, that there is a difference in them, but what those differences are is hidden. The differences of intelligences are hidden in themselves, because it is common to all substances to have their proper differences hidden in themselves. In this they agree with lower substances: their differences are hidden according to accidental properties, which are their passions, because these exceed the natural power of the human intellect, which is related to what is most manifest in nature as the eye of an owl is to the light of the sun. In this they differ from sensible substances, whose proper differences are signified by the names of their properties, just as causes are signified by the names of their effects. Hence the differences of intelligences are altogether unmanifest to us with respect to what they are, and so forth.

Whether intelligences can be known quidditatively by us in this life.

Concerning this point it is questioned whether intelligences can be known quidditatively by us in this life, etc.

In this question seven things are to be done: first I shall explain the title and intention of the question; second, the opinion of Averroes will be brought forward; third, it will be attacked; fourth, his reasons will be answered; fifth, the opinion of St. Thomas will be explained; sixth, the reasons of John of Jandun against St. Thomas will be brought forward; seventh, they will be answered.

Regarding the first, note that knowing a quiddity, or knowledge of a quiddity, is one thing, and quidditative knowledge, or knowing quidditatively, is another. For whoever knows some essential predicate of a lion knows the lion’s quiddity. But only he knows it quidditatively who knows all its quidditative predicates down to the ultimate difference, etc. Since we know that intelligences are substances and intellectual, etc., it is clear that we know their quiddities; hence this is not in doubt. The question is whether we can know them quidditatively, that is, penetrate as far as their ultimate differences. Although this question has many opinions, as is clear in III On the Soul, commentary 36, since here the dispute is only with Scotists and Averroists, and the Scotist opinion does not differ in its conclusion, as is clear in I Sentences, distinction 3, we have to dispute with Averroes alone. So much for the first.

Regarding the second, Averroes in III On the Soul, commentary 36, presupposing his fiction in commentary 5, holds that the possible intellect, as appropriated to us, after acquiring all the speculative intelligibles, and thereby being joined to the agent intellect as to its form, will through it understand separate substances; and consequently we, for whom the agent intellect will thereby become a form, just as the possible intellect is now, will then understand separate substances through the agent intellect, just as now we understand material things through the possible intellect.

He proves his intention by two arguments. The first rests on two propositions. The first is: the intellect and the first speculative intelligibles are related as form and matter. It is proved thus: things having one and the same operation, such that the operation of one is communicated to the other, are related as agent and instrument, or as form and matter. But the operation of the agent intellect and of the first speculative intelligibles is one and the same, such that the operation of the agent intellect, namely, making intelligibles in act, is communicated to the first speculative intelligibles. Therefore the agent intellect and the first speculative intelligibles are related as agent and instrument, or as form and matter. The minor is clear, because the intellect in habit can not only understand but make intellectual conclusions that are intelligible in potency into intelligibles in act; in both respects we experience that it is in our power to understand and to make conclusions actually understood through the first intelligibles, which by the sole light of the agent intellect become intelligibles in act. is communicated to the first speculative intelligibles. Therefore the agent intellect and the first speculative intelligibles are related as agent and instrument, or as form and matter. The minor is clear, because the intellect in habit can not only understand but make intellectual conclusions that are intelligible in potency into intelligibles in act; in both respects we experience that it is in our power to understand and to make conclusions actually understood through the first intelligibles, which by the sole light of the agent intellect become intelligibles in act. In the major, however, it is expressly said “such that the operation of one is communicated to the other,” because several people pulling a ship cooperate in the same operation, yet not as matter and form, nor as agent and instrument, since neither takes on the proper operation of the other. But that which communicates its operation to another by cooperating in the same thing is related to it as a principal agent to an instrument, as a carpenter communicates the making of a chair to a saw; or as form to matter, as heat communicates the heating of water, etc. Although either part of the disjunction concluded is true, since the first is more evident and less relevant to the purpose, the Commentator explains the second part: namely, that the first speculative intelligibles and the agent intellect are related as matter and form. He does this by explaining that the agent intellect, and not only the first but all speculative intelligibles, are related as form and matter.

He manifests this as follows: whenever there is something receptive of two things ordered among themselves, what is more perfect and more formal is as form, while what is less perfect and less formal has the character of matter. But the possible intellect is receptive of speculative intelligibles and of the agent intellect, which are ordered among themselves, so that the agent intellect is more perfect and formal than the speculative intelligibles. Therefore the agent intellect and the speculative intelligibles are related as form and matter. The major says “ordered among themselves,” because otherwise the proposition would not be true, as is clear of the whiteness and sweetness of milk, neither of which is the form of the other. For when things are ordered, the proposition is necessarily verified, as when air receives color and odor. The minor is clear from the fact that the intelligible is received in the one understanding. But the possible intellect understands both the agent intellect and the speculative intelligibles, etc.; thus the first proposition is clear.

The second proposition is: the possible intellect appropriated to us sometimes receives the speculative intelligibles and the agent intellect in pure potency; sometimes partly in act and partly in potency; sometimes wholly in act. This proposition, as regards the speculative intelligibles, is most clear: the intellect of an infant is in pure potency, like a blank tablet on which nothing has been depicted; afterwards it receives knowledge of the first principles; then it successively acquires knowledge of many conclusions. Thus in one respect it is in act, for example with respect to principles, and in another in potency, for example with respect to conclusions; finally, having acquired all conclusions, it is wholly and in every respect in act, with respect both to principles and conclusions. If you join the first proposition to these, this second proposition will become clear to you with respect to its second part. For if the agent intellect is the form of the speculative intelligibles, the proportion of its union with the agent intellect will be the same as that between the possible intellect and the speculative intelligibles, in this respect: if it is wholly united to one, it will be wholly united to the other; and if partly united to one, it will be partly united to the other.

With these premises, Averroes’ first argument is formed thus: whatever is moved toward acquiring something as a form can, once it has perfectly acquired it, operate with the proper operation of that form. But the possible intellect appropriated to us is moved toward acquiring the agent intellect as a form. Therefore, once it has acquired it, it can operate with its proper operation. But the proper operation of the agent intellect is to understand separate substances quidditatively. Therefore the possible intellect will be able through it to understand separate substances; and since the possible intellect’s new activity denominates us, consequently we understand substances through the agent intellect, etc. The major is clear by example: when water is moved by the form of heat, once it has acquired it, it can heat; and the same appears in all cases. The minor is proved in two ways. First, from the two foregoing propositions: whenever something is moved to receive two things ordered among themselves, it is moved to the more formal and perfect one as to a form, by the first proposition. But the possible intellect is moved to the speculative intelligibles and to the agent intellect, because it is sometimes in pure potency and sometimes partly in act and partly in potency, according to the second proposition; these are ordered among themselves because the agent intellect is received through the speculative intelligibles, and the agent intellect is more formal and perfect. Therefore the possible intellect is moved to acquire the agent intellect as a form.

Second, the minor is proved thus: the possible intellect is moved to acquire the agent intellect as an end; therefore, as a form. The antecedent is clear from the fact that the agent intellect itself is the efficient cause of that movement by which the possible intellect is moved toward it; for among things separate from matter, the efficient cause and the end of motion are the same, as is stated in commentary 36 of XII Metaphysics. The consequence is clear from II Physics, text 70, where it is said that end, motion, and form are the same; Averroes touches on this proof in XII Metaphysics, at the end of commentary 38.

Averroes’ second argument is set out in III Metaphysics, commentary 1. If intelligences could not be known by us, nature would have acted uselessly; the consequent is false. The consequence is proved because nature would have made what is naturally intelligible in itself not intelligible by another, as if it had made the sun not comprehended by any sight. Since St. Thomas judges this consequence and its proof ridiculous, because what cannot attain its end is useless, and the end of intelligences is not to be understood by us—for even if being understood were their end, it is enough for their intelligibility that they be understood by themselves; it does not follow that, since they are not understood by the human intellect, they are understood by no intellect, just as it does not follow that, since the sun is not seen by an owl, it is seen by no sight—

John of Jandun therefore proves that consequence in two ways in III On the Soul. First, he says that the Commentator does not suppose that the end of separate substances is to be understood by us; rather, it is supposed that intelligences are of themselves intelligible to our intellect, since they are contained under its first object, namely being. Then it rightly follows: intelligences are naturally knowable by us in themselves; therefore our intellect is naturally born to understand them. For a natural passive power, such as the intellect, must correspond to a natural active power, such as intelligence; otherwise an active power would be useless in nature. Second, the same consequence is derived from this: although the primary end of intelligences is not to be understood by our intellect, it is nevertheless their secondary end. For they act primarily for themselves and secondarily for other things, as is said in II On the Heavens, commentary 21; therefore it follows that intelligences, at least with respect to their secondary end, would be useless, and thus nature would have made something useless. Hence, he says, the Commentator’s consequence is close to propositions known per se and is not ridiculous. A third derivation can still be made from the Commentator’s statements in III On the Soul, commentary 36, where, examining Themistius’ argument, he says that if our intellect is immaterial, this consequence holds: our intellect understands sensible things made immaterial; therefore it understands things immaterial in themselves. This statement is based on Aristotle’s word in III On the Soul, text 7, saying that the intellect, after apprehending an excellent intelligible, is strengthened to understand something higher. From this it follows in the present case that immateriality is a sufficient cause for a cognitive power to be able to understand separate substances. Thus the consequence is proved: intelligences are not knowable by our intellect; therefore they are knowable by no other; therefore it is useless for them to be knowable, just as the sun would be uselessly visible if it could be seen by no one. The first consequence holds because, if immateriality does not give our intellect the power to understand them, it will give this power to none, since it has already been shown that immateriality is a sufficient cause of it. Thus, because the sensory power is a sufficient cause of the sense of touch, if it did not produce touch in one species of animal, it would produce it in none. The second consequence is clear by the example. Therefore every intellect can know separate substances from its immate-

With respect to the third, the opinion is attacked in two ways. First it is proved that the posited continuation does not bring the possible intellect appropriated to us to understand separate substances: that which is joined to the agent intellect only as the form of speculative intelligibles cannot through it understand separate substances quidditatively. But the possible intellect appropriated to us is joined to the agent intellect only as the form of speculative intelligibles. Therefore the possible intellect appropriated to us cannot through such continuation understand separate substances quidditatively.

The major is proved by supposing that the agent intellect has proportions of different orders to higher and lower things, namely immaterial substances and speculative intelligibles. For it is related to higher things as contemplative, not as their form; to lower things, however, as productive and as form. Given this, the force of the major is clear.

Whenever one thing has a proportion of different order to different things, what is joined to it according as it has a proportion to lower things is not thereby joined to it according as it has a proportion to higher things. For a manifest fallacy of accident is committed by concluding one thing from another. Therefore what is joined to the agent intellect as the form of speculative intelligibles is not thereby joined to it as the contemplative intellect of immaterial substances. The minor is had from the Commentator’s statements, since he posits no other way in the present matter by which the possible intellect is joined to the agent except through speculative intelligibles. Hence he says that when it is in pure potency with respect to speculative intelligibles, it is also in pure potency with respect to the agent intellect; when it is partly in act and partly in potency with respect to them, it is likewise with respect to this; and when it is wholly in act according to the speculative intelligibles, it will be wholly joined to the agent intellect.

Second, it is proved that even if such continuation brought the possible intellect to this, it can never bring us to it, and I argue thus: what is joined to the agent intellect only as colored is joined to light, and to the possible intellect only as colored is joined to sight, cannot be denominated as operating with the proper operation of light or sight, that is, of the agent or possible intellect. But a man imagining has this sort of continuation with these intellects. Therefore he cannot be denominated as making intelligibles and understanding immaterial substances, which are operations of the agent intellect, nor as understanding sensible things, which is the operation of the possible intellect. The minor is evident from the terms: it cannot truly be said that a colored thing illuminates or sees. The minor is also clear from III On the Soul, texts 18 and 30. Nor does it at all obstruct the likeness given that a man by his own act of the cogitative power spiritualizes phantasms. A colored thing does not spiritualize colors. For if we imagine a colored thing unable in itself to be presented either to the eye or to light, but spiritualized only in a mirror, whose proper operation would spiritualize the species of the colored thing in itself, the likeness would run on all four feet; yet such a mirror, presented to light and sight, could not truly be called illuminating or seeing. This argument appears to me demonstrative; and on another occasion, if God grants us life, we shall show its efficacy more fully. So much for the third.

Regarding the fourth: to Averroes’ first argument it is said that the major is universally false if it is held as it must be held in order to conclude the intended point. It must be held universally not only with respect to the subject but also with respect to the predicate, as follows: everything moved to acquire some form, once that form has been perfectly acquired, can operate with every operation proper to that form; otherwise it would not conclude. But this is clearly false, since it is enough that what has acquired a form participate in some operation of that form, namely the operation belonging to the form according to its relation to the receptive subject. The reason was assigned in the first argument against Averroes: a thing joined to a form having different proportions to lower and higher things need not, because it is perfectly joined to it with respect to the lower, be joined to it with respect to the higher. Hence, from the fact that the possible intellect acquired the agent intellect as a form, it follows that it can operate with the operation of the agent intellect as the form of speculative intelligibles, since it is acquired in this respect, namely to form intelligibles in act and extend itself to all things to which the agent intellect extends itself as productive; but it does not follow that it can understand everything to which the agent intellect is related as contemplative.

To the second argument the consequence is denied. To the first proof it is said that a fallacy of consequent is committed, affirmatively from a superior to its inferior. Even granted that intelligences are knowable by our intellect because they are contained under its first object, it does not follow that they are intelligible by us quidditatively. For not everything contained under being is quidditatively intelligible by us, since being, although extensively the adequate object of our intellect, is not adequate by mutual adequation intensively. That is to say, although every being can be understood by us, not every being can be penetrated by our intellect down to its ultimate differences. In this way the quiddity of a material thing is the adequate object of our intellect, namely by intensive adequation; our intellect is naturally born to understand quidditatively that alone and the whole of it.

The same answer is given to the second way of deriving the consequence: even if it is granted that being understood by us is a secondary end of intelligences, it does not follow that being understood quidditatively by us is their secondary end; indeed, this is impossible.

Likewise, regarding the third way, it is said that although immateriality is a sufficient cause for a cognitive power to be able to understand separate substances, it does not follow that from immateriality it has the ability to know them quidditatively.

The authority of Aristotle that was brought forward does not obstruct the argument when correctly understood. It must be noted that, with respect to an excellent sensible, the sense has two effects: it does not perfectly know it, and it suffers a corruptive passion from it. With respect to an excellent intelligible, however, the intellect has only the first: it does not perfectly understand it, for it is immune from passion. The reason is that the second follows matter, whose act is the sensory power, but not the intellectual power; the first follows the disproportion of the power to the object, which is preserved in an immaterial power just as in a material one. Just as an owl, by its species, has sight disproportionate to bright light, so man by his nature has an intellect disproportionate to a bright separated intelligible, that is, to one really separate from matter. Thus intellect and sense agree in the first respect but differ in the second.

From this difference Aristotle says there arises the fact that sense is weakened after sensing an excellent sensible; the intellect, however, is not altered after understanding an excellent intelligible, but can understand other things more, which must be understood according to the mode possible to it. From this it is not permitted to infer that it can know immaterial substances quidditatively; rather, it does not follow from its alteration that it cannot comprehend them, which we freely grant. For man has a discursive intellect, which arises in the shadow of intelligence, according to Isaac; and therefore he is naturally proportioned to behold not a pure and clear intelligible, but one overshadowed by matter, such as the quiddity abstractable from sensible things. So much for the fourth.

Regarding the fifth, I set down the opinion of St. Thomas, which I take from I, question 88, III Against the Gentiles, chapter 45, and II Metaphysics. He maintains this conclusion: the human soul joined to the body cannot know immaterial substances quidditatively. This is presently proved in two ways. First: an intellect existing in potency only for receiving intelligibles abstracted by the agent intellect cannot understand immaterial substances quidditatively; the human intellect is of this kind; therefore. The major is clear from the terms, for the opposite of the predicate entails the opposite of the subject. What can understand separate substances quidditatively is not merely in potency to receive abstractions from the agent intellect, since separate substances are not abstracted from matter through the operation of the agent intellect. The minor is gathered from Aristotle, III On the Soul, text 17, where it is said that the agent intellect can make all things that the possible intellect can become.

Second: no sensible effect can lead to quidditative knowledge of separate substances; therefore the human intellect joined to the body cannot know them quidditatively. The consequence holds because nothing is in the intellect unless it was first in the sense. The antecedent is proved from the fact that an effect can lead to quidditative knowledge of its cause in two ways. Either by way of likeness, as when a univocal effect is known, we know its cause quidditatively because they are of the same nature; and in this way it is clear that no sensible thing can lead to the natures of immaterial substances, since they differ not only in species but in genus. Or an effect leads to quidditative knowledge of its cause not by way of likeness, but by showing the whole power of its cause. Thus understanding shows the whole power of the intellectual soul, and therefore from such an operation we proceed to knowledge of its quiddity. Nor can sensible things lead us to quidditative knowledge of intelligences in this way. For no particular effect equals the whole power of a universal cause; and every sensible thing is a particular effect, as the material conditions of each show. Therefore through no sensible thing can we arrive at quidditative knowledge of immaterial substances, which are the most universal causes, etc.

Regarding the sixth, the aforementioned John of Jandun argues in many ways against this determination in III On the Soul. First against the phrase in the conclusion, “joined to the body”: no form is prevented from its noblest operation because of its union with its proper matter. But understanding the quiddities of separate substances is the noblest operation of the human soul, as is clear in I and X Ethics. The human body is its proper matter. Therefore the human soul is not prevented by its union with the body from contemplating immaterial substances.

Furthermore, for the same conclusion: the human soul is either naturally born to understand separate substances through its substance, or through an infused species, or through a species caused from a phantasm. If through its substance, since its substance is not impeded by union with the body, it will be able to understand them. If through a species taken from a phantasm, union with the body will help. If through an infused species, one asks how union with the body impedes or does not permit such infusion. For this does not seem reasonable in any way, because the generation of one species is not impeded by a body unless the body has a disposition contrary to the disposition required for its generation. For example, because color requires transparency in air in order to be received in it, no body will impede the generation of the species of color unless it has opacity contrary to transparency. But the human body has no disposition contrary to the disposition required for the reception of an intelligible species to be infused, as is clear; therefore.

The argument is confirmed thus: the unqualified good of a nature is not impeded because of the unqualified good of that same nature. For what impedes the unqualified good of a nature is an unqualified evil for it. But understanding the quiddities of immaterial substances is an unqualified good of the human soul. Therefore it is not impeded by union with the body, since this too is an unqualified good for it.

Third, an argument is made against the conclusion itself from the words of St. Thomas as follows. They say that we know the existence of the intelligences, not their quiddities: either existence is the same as quiddity, or different. If different, then both fall within our cognition; for whoever knows the diversity of some things knows the extremes of that diversity, as is said in On the Soul II, text 36. If the same, then, once one is known, the other is also known.

If it is said that we know those quiddities, but not perfectly, there is an objection. First, because this conflicts with two statements of the Thomists. The first is that we do not understand the quiddities of separated substances. The second is that we know their existence, not their quiddities. From the first the argument is: man does not understand separated quiddities; therefore he does not understand them at all. The inference holds by the place from the whole in mode to its negative part. From the second the argument is: the cognition that is denied of the quiddity is affirmed of existence; but existence is known by us only imperfectly; therefore they intend to deny even imperfect cognition of quiddities. For if we know both imperfectly, why is one rather denied to be known, or the other affirmed?

Second, it is proved that the response is false in itself as follows. If we know those quiddities imperfectly, either this is because we do not know them as perfectly as they are known by themselves—and this is not so, because it would be ridiculous to cast this into doubt—or because we do not know them with the perfection due to us according to our nature—and this is voluntary, for it can be compelled by no reason. Union with the body cannot impede this, as has been proved. This concerns the sixth point.

Regarding the seventh point, as a preliminary to the response to these arguments, it should be noted that according to the teaching of St. Thomas in Summa I, questions 88 and 89, the difference between the cognition of the conjoined and separated soul is this: just as the conjoined soul has its mode of existence by involving the body, so it has its mode of understanding by turning toward phantasms. Thus, from the conformity of its mode of operation to its mode of existence, it follows that the conjoined soul is turned toward phantasms in its possible intellect, as passive toward active, so that it can receive species only from them together with the agent intellect. But when separated from the body, just as it has another mode of existence without informing the body, so it has another mode of understanding; and, again from the conformity of its mode of operation to its mode of existence, it follows that the separated soul is turned in its intellect toward superior active things, so as to receive from them an influx of species, having been made like them in its mode of existence and, with the body left behind, having become in a certain way freer and no longer bound to phantasms.

From this there arises another difference: the conjoined soul cannot know immaterial substances except through species received from sensible things. Its intellect is bound to phantasms. But the separated soul can know them through their own species, since it is already turned toward superior things.

From these there also arises a third difference, noted by those who speculate subtly: the soul is part of the species and is united to the body for the sake of what is better. For the cognition that the soul has through acquired species is distinct and quidditative cognition, reaching to the ultimate differences of things. But the cognition that the separated soul receives from infused species is confused and makes things known in general. Since the soul is naturally part of man, it claims for itself, from its own nature, a natural mode of understanding: to understand through species received from phantasms, and not through infused species. For this mode of understanding is natural to intelligences by their nature; and therefore, just as intelligences have perfect knowledge of things through infused species, so the soul can have perfect knowledge of sensible things through acquired species. Infused species exceed the natural capacity of its intellect. This mode belongs connaturally and properly to a higher order, and belongs to the soul only through a deficient participation.

Moreover, since there is such an order among intellectual substances that the closer they are to the first substance, which penetrates all things by understanding through its own substance alone, the more naturally they grasp a perfect knowledge of things through more universal species, the last among them—the intellectual soul—by its nature requires species so articulated that it must have a likeness of each quiddity individually. For this reason it is united to the body, so that it may receive them from it. Consequently, when its intellectual power attempts to understand through superior species, such as infused species, it is in a way overwhelmed and has only confused knowledge, just as a student unable to grasp the teacher’s universal concepts remains without distinct cognition. A sign of this is that among human beings of keen intellect, once principles are proposed they immediately proceed to conclusions and derive many particular conclusions from the same principles. Those of dull intellect, however, perceive a distinct truth only when principles are applied by the teacher to each conclusion, in syllogistic form, and with material examples.

From this you can now understand that the soul, neither conjoined nor separated, can naturally have quidditative cognition of immaterial substances. What is more, from this you see that the separated soul, through infused species, knows neither an ox nor a lion quidditatively, but knows everything besides its own nature in general. Wherever else you find St. Thomas saying that the separated soul knows the quiddities of immaterial substances, remember that he calls quidditative cognition the cognition that the separated soul has of them through their proper species, which it cannot have.

To the first argument, then, it should be said that although understanding immaterial substances is the most noble operation of the intellectual soul, understanding them quidditatively is nevertheless an operation impossible for it. Nor did Aristotle say the opposite in Ethics I or X; indeed, the question raised by him in On the Soul III, text 36, is nowhere found solved. For he placed human happiness in the contemplation of separated substances, insofar as that is possible for us, whatever it may be.

To the second, similarly, it is said that the soul’s union with the body does not impede quidditative cognition of immaterial substances, since that cognition is impossible for the soul in every state of nature.

If these two arguments are framed to conclude that the united soul can have such knowledge of immaterial substances as the separated soul has through their species, the answer to the first is by denying that understanding immaterial substances in this way is, absolutely speaking, the soul’s most noble operation, although it is the most noble in a qualified respect. For understanding sensible substances distinctly and quidditatively, and immaterial substances through sensible effects and common notions, places absolutely a greater perfection in the soul than understanding them confusedly, although that confused understanding is in a qualified respect nobler because it is through their species and in a more immaterial manner. Hence I say that it is not unreasonable for our soul to be impeded from an operation most noble in a qualified respect, for the sake of acquiring through union with its proper matter the perfection that is absolutely most noble for it. It therefore does not follow that union is unnatural, but rather most natural, since it is for the sake of its absolute perfection—especially because the cognition it has when separated is, for it, quasi-unnatural, as is also the mode of existence it has.

To the second, let it be said that the soul is impeded by union with the body from receiving such an influx because its mode of operation follows its mode of existence in the body only through turning toward phantasms. For the soul’s natural turning toward phantasms impedes its turning toward superior things. The proof against this accomplishes nothing, since an impediment can be given in another way, as is now clear. To the confirmation, it is said that the minor is false. Understanding immaterial substances in this way is a good of the soul in a qualified respect, and not absolutely; whereas union with the body, together with what follows from it, is its good absolutely. To the third, it is said that whether existence and essence are distinguished or are the same, the point does not change. In God they are the same, while in the other intelligences they are distinguished; yet we state the same judgment about both, saying that we know existence, not quiddity. The response given there is therefore true, because it says that we know quiddity imperfectly. Nor does this conflict with the statements of the Thomists. Not with the first, because that must be understood of quidditative cognition, and not of cognition of every kind. Thus the inference “therefore we know nothing at all” is invalid; rather, “therefore we do not know quidditatively at all.”

Nor does it conflict in any way with the second statement. When, accustomed to Peripatetic language, we say that we know existence and not quiddity, we mean that we know how to settle for them the question whether it is, which asks about existence, and that we do not know how to settle for them the question what it is, which investigates quiddity—even if we know how to settle it according to some quidditative predicate. We call that knowledge that it is, and not quidditative knowledge, following Aristotle’s footsteps: in the Posterior Analytics he calls knowledge of a thing through common notions knowledge that it is. For this reason the Thomists proportionally deny of quiddity the knowledge that they affirm of existence: we are said not to possess knowledge concerning the proper question of quiddity, whereas we do not lack knowledge concerning the proper question of existence itself.

To the last argument, by which it is proved that the response is false in itself, I say that our intellect is said to know immaterial substances imperfectly because it cannot apprehend them quidditatively, and more imperfectly in this life because it knows them through species of other things. Although knowing them in the first way belongs only to the substances themselves, and it would be ridiculous to doubt whether what belongs to intelligences alone belongs to others, it is necessary to doubt whether knowing them quidditatively belongs to them alone or also to our soul. That knowing them in the second way is impossible for us in this life is said not voluntarily but by compelling reason. For the body united to the soul turns the soul toward itself and toward sensible things, as has been explained.

This, however, should be understood: genus and difference are not taken in the same way in those substances and in sensible substances. In sensible things, genus is taken from what is material in the thing, while difference is taken from what is formal in it. Hence Avicenna says at the beginning of his On the Soul that form, in things composed of matter and form, is the simple difference of that which is constituted from it—not that the form itself is the difference, but because it is the principle of the difference, as he says in his Metaphysics. Such a difference is called a simple difference because it is taken from what is a part of the thing’s quiddity, namely, form. But since spiritual substances are simple quiddities, their difference cannot be taken from what is a part of quiddity, but from the whole quiddity. Therefore Avicenna says at the beginning of On the Soul that only species whose essences are composed of matter and form have a simple difference. Likewise, in them genus is taken from the whole essence, but in a different way: one separated substance agrees with another in immateriality. They differ from one another in degree of perfection according to their recession from potentiality and approach to pure act. Therefore genus is taken in them from what follows them insofar as they are immaterial, such as intellectuality or something of this kind; but difference is taken from what follows in them according to their degree of perfection, which is nevertheless unknown to us.

Here is posited the second note, by which he explains, in comparison with sensible substances, from where difference is taken, and from where genus is taken, in immaterial substances.

For clarity on this point, know that in things composed of matter and form four things are understood: matter, which is one part of the specific composite; form, the remaining part; the whole quiddity insofar as it has the character of something capable of further formal perfection; and that same whole quiddity insofar as it has its ultimate formal perfection. For example, in man you can consider the matter in which his form is received, and the form received in it. You can also consider man himself insofar as he is a substance: man is a substance, and as a substance he has the character of something capable of perfection through corporeality, rationality, and so on. Consider also man insofar as he is of a rational nature, which is his ultimate formal perfection. These four stand in relation to genus and difference as follows. Matter, which is a part, the whole itself, and what is capable of perfection ground genus, though in different ways. Form, which is a part, and the whole itself insofar as it is perfected by a subsequent formal perfection, likewise ground difference in different ways. Since genus contains differences potentially, explains the nature of the thing incompletely and potentially, and signifies the whole according to what can still perfect it—and since the root of potentiality in sensible things is matter—it is rightly said to be taken from the whole insofar as it can be formally perfected, and from matter itself. Similarly, since to differ is to divide, delimit, and actualize, and to explain the whole according to a subsequent perfection and actuality—and since the root of actuality and perfection is form—difference is rightly taken from the whole insofar as it is perfected, and from form.

The parts of the thing—matter, form, and the whole quiddity as capable of and as possessing perfection—ground genus and difference in different ways. Genus is taken from the whole essence insofar as it has the character of what is capable of perfection, as from the thing formally signified or denominated by it; but from matter as from the root of its formal signification. Similarly, difference is taken from the whole essence according to a further perfection, as from the thing formally signified or denominated by it; but from form as from the root of its formal signification. Matter, which is a part of man, is not denominated his genus, nor form his difference; rather, man himself receives the denomination of genus insofar as he is a substance or animal, and has the denomination of difference insofar as he is corporeal or rational. Since matter and form radically ground genus and difference, Aristotle says in Metaphysics VII, text 33, that as the whole account stands to the whole thing, so a part of the account stands to a part of the thing. In Metaphysics VIII, text 9, you will find genus taken from matter and difference from form. Moreover, the Commentator says in On the Heavens II, commentary 49, that if heavenly bodies agree in genus and differ in species, they are composed of matter and form. You will also find distinguished men sometimes saying that genus is not taken from matter and difference not from form, because genus and difference are taken from the whole essence as from the thing signified by a name of first intention and denominated by a name of second intention, and not from a part. Once you have considered their reasons, you will see that they do not conflict with what was said above.

Since this is so, ascending from material substances to immaterial substances, we do not say that genus is taken from matter or difference from form, because they lack these parts. It therefore remains that in them both genus and difference are taken from the whole essence, not only formally but also radically. Hence Avicenna, as the text says, assigns a difference between the differences of composite and simple substances, saying that the difference in species composed of matter and form is simple, but the difference of non-composite things is not. He calls that a simple difference which does not proceed radically from the whole, but comes from a part of it that is simple. Thus in immaterial substances genus and difference are taken from the whole essence, but differently: genus is taken from the whole essence according to that in which one essentially resembles another, for intelligences agree in some quidditative predicate. Difference, however, is taken from the whole essence according to that in which one differs substantially from the others. This is a certain formally indivisible degree of formal perfection; the closer an intelligence has been allotted to the most pure act, the glorious God, the more perfect it will be. For they differ from one another in that one is closer than another to pure act and recedes farther from the nature of potentiality.

For a fuller understanding of these matters, we must begin more deeply. It should be known that speaking of genus and difference simply and according to what happens to them and belongs to them per se is one thing; speaking of them insofar as they are applied to such natures is another. If we speak of them in themselves, then for the account of both genus and difference it is required and sufficient that difference explain a certain limited degree of being, belonging to no extraneous nature relative to the nature of the genus, of which it is formally divisive, while genus explain a certain nature formally determinable. The first of these points follows from the fact that difference, coming to genus, constitutes the species and places it in the determinate degree of being that it explains. Hence in Metaphysics VIII, commentary 10, species are likened to numbers: just as numbers are changed by subtracting or adding a unit, so difference itself diversifies beings when added or subtracted. The second follows from the fact that difference must diversify genus, so that not only is one species different from another, but the nature of the genus in one species is different from the nature of the genus in another, as is found in Metaphysics X, text 24. Hence Aristotle says in On Animals XI that if figure were to be divided, its differences would not be “having angles equal to two right angles” and “having angles equal to many right angles,” because these are accidents of figure. Genus must signify a certain nature, so that transcendentals are excluded, and it must be formally determinable, so that the most specific species are set apart.

If we speak of genus and difference as applied to material substances, genus not only explains the thing as formally determinable, but is also radically taken from matter; and difference likewise not only signifies the determination and actualization of genus, but is radically taken from form. These features accrue to genus and difference because the essence whose predicates they are is composed and really integrated from two principles, namely determinable matter and determining form. It belongs per se to animal to signify a sensitive nature formally determinable by rationality. But because sensitive nature is determinable by rationality because it has matter, it happens to this genus, animal, insofar as it is a genus, that it is taken from matter. If sensitive nature were determinable by rationality and not by reason of matter, animal would be no less a genus. Similarly, rationality per se signifies a reasoning perfection essentially determinative of sensitive nature. But because the intellectual grade determines the sensitive grade because the intellectual soul is the form of the body, it happens to this difference, rationality, insofar as it is a difference, that it is taken from form. Rationality would be no less a difference if reasoning perfection determined the sensitive without informing a body. For this reason it is commonly said that genus is taken from what is material rather than from matter, and difference from what is formal rather than from form. The former belongs to them per se; the latter accidentally.

Since the simple essence of immaterial substances is determined and defined to a certain degree of perfection, since it is not of infinite being, it follows that in it there is something from which genus and difference can be taken. From the fact that the nature is limited, difference is taken from its very determination. From the common nature, which is understood as determinable, genus is taken. But from the fact that it is simple, it is terminated by itself, so that it does not have two real parts, one of which is terminated and the other terminates, as sensible substances have matter and form.

Thus, in taking genus and difference in immaterial substances, what belongs per se is preserved: genus signifies a certain nature formally determinable, and difference explains a determinate substantial perfection formally constituting it in a certain degree of being. What belongs accidentally is not preserved, namely, that genus is taken from matter and difference from form.

For a deeper investigation of this matter, three propositions must be noted. The first is that every individual really distinct from its own existence has several quidditative predicates, by the succession of which it approaches more and more closely to its existence. The second proposition is this: among the aforesaid quidditative predicates there is such an order that each is more actual the more closely it approaches existence, and more potential the farther it is from existence. These propositions are explained first by examples, then by reasoning.

Socrates, really distinct from his existence, has several quidditative predicates, namely substance, body, living thing, animal, and man. It is certain that Socrates insofar as he is a substance is very far removed from his existence: for Socrates to be, it is required not only that he be a substance, but also that he be a body. When you take Socrates insofar as he is a body, he appears closer to having existence, although he is still quite far from it: for Socrates to be, it is required not only that he be a corporeal substance, but also that he be living. When you consider Socrates as living, you will see him approach being more closely, though he is still remote: for Socrates to be, it is required not only that he be an animate substance, but also that he be an animal. When you inspect him insofar as he is an animal, you will find him closer to existing, though still remote, because for Socrates to be it is required not only that he be an animate, sensible substance, but also rational; for nothing can be contained in nature under some genus unless it is contained under some species. When he is considered as an animate, sensible, rational substance, he can then receive actual existence: nothing else intrinsic and formal is required for him to be, although extrinsic causes and an individual property are required as the condition of an existent. The predicates introduced plainly stand in such a relation that what is closer to existence, compared with what is more remote, stands as actual to potential: man to animal, animal to living thing, living thing to body, and body to substance. Consequently, what is closer to existence itself is more actual, while what is farther from existence is more potential; and thus both propositions are exemplified.

I prove it by reasoning. Since existence is the most actual of all things in a thing, and is of such actuality that it is the proper act only of a completed essence, for an essence to become its recipient it must be intrinsically complete and determined. Just as, for air to receive light, it must first be perfected by transparency, so substance is terminated, perfected, and completed by these quidditative predicates. Therefore, the more a quidditative predicate determines the essence, the more it appropriates the essence to be the proper recipient of existence itself. Conversely, the less a quidditative predicate determines the essence, the less it appropriates it so that it may be capable of existence itself. Since each thing is more actual the closer it is to what is most actual, and more potential the farther it is from it, there is therefore among quidditative predicates such an order that what is closer to existence itself is more actual, while what is remote is more potential.

Once these two propositions have been given, if you add a third—namely, that genus is taken from what is potential, while difference is taken from what is actual—the most general rule follows: genus and difference in all things are taken from the whole essence of the thing according to its remoteness from and proximity to existence itself. For the ultimate difference, since it constitutes the species and gives it its proper degree among beings, is the ultimate completion of the essence, so that it may be. Beyond it, as has been said, the individual expects no other intrinsic completion in order to be. The most general genus, since it explains the essence as most determinable, is taken from that by which the essence is most remote from existence: namely, as determinable and perfectible by all the differences so that it may receive existence. Intermediate genera and differences are taken from intermediate factors (and for this reason it is said that definition explains the defined thing from first potency to ultimate act). For it includes the first genus, taken from that by which the essence can first have existence, and all the differences by which the essence is gradually determined and actualized up to the ultimate difference, which is the act finally determining and perfecting it so that it may have existence. Hence Porphyry also says that, for those who investigate more deeply, difference is what concludes toward existence.

Yet by what we have said we do not mean that genus and difference are taken from actual existence; for we know that definitions abstract from existence. We mean that genus and difference are taken, in St. Thomas’s words, from their order to actual existence. When we say “from order,” we do not mean the relation of order, but its foundation: from that by which the essence approaches existence as something receptive, and from that by which the essence is remote from existence. From these principles you can see where genus and difference are taken in intelligences, material substances, and accidents, as anyone practiced in these matters can readily work out in each case. For this reason God alone lacks genus and difference. His quiddity, being his actual existence, cannot be conceived as remote from existence or close to it. Thus St. Thomas assigned a most sufficient reason at the beginning of this chapter why God is not in a genus while intelligences are in a category: he is his own existence, whereas their essence is distinct from their proper existence.

Nor need these differences be accidental, since they are according to greater and lesser perfection, which does not diversify a species. A degree of perfection in receiving the same form does not diversify a species, as something whiter and less white in participating in whiteness of the same species; but degrees of perfection in the forms or natures themselves that are participated do diversify a species. Thus nature proceeds by degrees from plants to animals, through certain things that are intermediate between animals and plants, according to the Philosopher in On Animals.

Here the first objection is excluded. It was said that differences in intelligences are taken from diverse degrees of perfection, by which one is closer than another to the first act. The objection runs as follows: whatever differ according to a perfecter and a less perfect act differ only by accidental differences; intelligences differ only according to what is more and less perfect; therefore they differ only by accidental differences. The reasoning is valid, but the conclusion is false; therefore one of the premises is false. It is not the major, as will be proved, and so it is the minor, which is the position stated above. The major is proved because more and less do not vary a species: perfect and less perfect whiteness belong to one species; but whatever belong to the same species are distinguished only by accidental differences, since they agree in all essential respects. This objection is excluded by the beautiful distinction that perfecter and less perfect may be considered either with respect to the mode of possessing one form simply, or with respect to the forms themselves, possessed in greater or lesser perfection. In the first way they do not vary a species, but in the second they do. For whatever receive a single form according to diverse degrees of perfection are distinguished only numerically as such, as is clear of white things, in On White IV and VI. But those that receive diverse degrees of perfection not of one form but of several forms must be distinguished essentially or specifically, as is clear of man and ox. The answer to the objections is therefore clear: in the first way the minor is false, in the second way the major is false. The reason why the proof of the major seems to be commonly given without qualification is that the comparison signified by “more” and “less” properly occurs only within an atomic species, as is said in Physics VII, commentary 27.

Nor again is it necessary that the division of intellectual substances always be by real differences, since it is impossible for this to occur in all things, as the Philosopher says in On Animals XI.

Here the second objection is excluded. The objection against the same statement is made as follows: wherever there are a true genus and true species, there must be an artificial division of that genus by two true differences; but in intelligences there are a true genus and true species; therefore there must be a division there by two true differences. The conclusion conflicts with the division assigned above, in which it was said that the genus of intelligences descends to its species through more and less perfect, which are not true differences. The major is proved because wherever a true genus with true species is found, there must be differences that divide the genus and constitute the species; and because a division according to art must be two-membered, as Boethius testifies. St. Thomas excludes this objection by saying that the major is universally impossible according to Aristotle’s view in Book II of On Animals. For clarity, note that since true differences are called positive differences, not extraneous, contrary to one another, and convertible with the things whose differences they are, as Aristotle says there in chapter III, a genus that immediately contains more than two species cannot be divided immediately by two true differences. If it is to be divided by true differences that exhaust its power, it must be divided by more than two, and the division will not be two-membered. If it must be divided into two members, one difference must not be true, for it will be taken with the privation of the other. Thus, if animal immediately contains man, ox, and lion, it must be divided by three true differences, or by one true difference, say rational, and another not true but privative and common to the other two, say irrational.

Since, then, some things in the world immediately contained under some formally divisible common thing are more than two in number, it is said to be universally impossible that every division be by two true differences. This occurs in our case. Since intelligences lack a subaltern genus, as St. Thomas testifies in his treatise On the Nature of Genus, chapter V, because their perfection does not arise from several combinations of differences as the perfection of species among lower things does, and since a common genus and difference are insufficient for those lower things, all intelligences will be immediately contained under one genus. If their genus must descend to them by true differences, the division would have to be many-membered and unknown to us. If it is contracted by a twofold division, one member must simply not be true, because it is privative; and, because of the weakness of our intellect, unable to descend to any proper difference of theirs, the other must also not be true. Such were the differences assigned in the text: the more perfect and the less perfect.

The answer to the objection is now clear, since the universal impossibility of the major has been explained. Boethius’s statement does not conflict with this. Although he says that every division is reduced to a two-membered division, he does not say that every two-membered division is made through true differences of the lower things to be taken by that division.

In a third way this is found in substances composed of matter and form. In them existence is received and finite, and therefore they have existence from another; moreover, their nature or quiddity is received in designated matter. Hence they are finite both above and below, and in them, through the division of designated matter, the multiplication of individuals in one species is possible. What was said above explains how essence and logical intentions stand in these substances.

In this fourth and final part of the chapter he gathers four points about the essences of composite substances. First, their existence is limited, because they have it from another, being really distinct from themselves; and by this they are first distinguished from the first being, whose existence is infinite and really identical with its quiddity.

Second, their essence is received in designated matter: they are determined to this or that, to a here and now, as the formal is determined through its material.

Third, what follows as a corollary from these two is that they are finite above and below. Above, because they have limited existence, and their essence is terminated by that existence, which it regards as above. Below, because their forms are received in matter and are terminated to this and that, which they regard as below, by being received in these and those material conditions as in a material part.

Fourth, their essence can be multiplied numerically within the same species because of the division of designated matter. By these three points they differ from intelligences, placed in the second order, which are free from matter and, being infinite below, admit no equal to themselves. Thus the second treatise of this book comes to an end.