In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria

In what way being a genus, species,

or difference belongs to essence, he shows.

Having seen what is signified by the name essence in composite substances, we must see how it relates to the notion of genus, species, and difference. Since whatever has the notion of genus, species, or difference is predicated of this designated singular, it is impossible for that notion to belong to essence insofar as it is signified in the mode of a part, as by humanity or animality. Hence Avicenna says that rational is not a difference but the principle of a difference, and for the same reason humanity is not a species, nor animality a genus.

In this fourth chapter, intending to determine how the essence of composite substances relates to the logical intentions—genus, species, and difference—he does four things: first, he determines the point at issue in six conclusions; second, he excludes an error of Averroes; third, another objection; fourth, an unspoken objection.

For understanding the first part, two distinctions should be noted. The nature or essence of a composite substance can be taken three ways: as signified in the mode of a part; as existing in itself, separated from singulars; or as signified in the mode of a whole. The last can in turn be taken according to itself, according to the being it has in singulars, or according to the being it has in the intellect.

With these preliminaries, know that according to the members of these divisions he posits individual conclusions: according to the first two members of each division, four negative conclusions; according to the last members, two affirmative conclusions. Thus each division first gives two negatives and then a third affirmative, making six conclusions.

The first negative conclusion is: The essence of a composite substance signified in the mode of a part, such as animality, humanity, or rationality, is neither genus, species, nor difference. Genus, species, and difference are predicated directly of this particular supposit, for example Socrates; but essence signified in the mode of a part is not so predicated; therefore it is neither genus, species, nor difference. Hence Avicenna says that rationality is not a difference but its principle, animality not a genus but the principle of a genus, and humanity not a species but the principle of the species of which it is a part.

Nor can the notion of genus, species, or difference belong to essence as a thing existing outside singulars, as the Platonists held; for then genus and species would not be predicated of this individual. Socrates cannot be said to be what is separated from him. Nor does that separated thing assist knowledge of this designated singular.

The second negative conclusion is: The essence of a composite substance existing in itself and not in singulars is not a species or genus. Genus or species is predicated of this particular; essence subsisting in itself and not in singulars is not predicated of it; therefore it is not genus or species. A subject is that of which something is predicated directly; Socrates is not a separated human being; therefore Socrates is not its subject, and a separated human being is not predicated of Socrates. Moreover, genus or species is that by which individuals are known; essence subsisting outside singulars is not that by which they are known, since each thing is known quidditatively through what is in it, not through what is not in it.

It therefore remains that genus, species, or difference belongs to essence insofar as it signifies in the mode of a whole, as by human being or animal, implicitly and indistinctly containing all that is in the individual.

The third affirmative conclusion is: The essence of a composite substance signified in the mode of a whole is species, genus, or dif- difference, etc. Genus, species, or difference substantially and implicitly contains all that is in individuals; the essence of a composite substance contains the whole being of individuals only when signified in the mode of a whole; therefore it is genus, species, or difference. Thus animal is a genus, human being a species, and rational a difference.

Nature or essence so taken can be considered in two ways. First, according to its proper nature and notion: this is its absolute consideration, and nothing is true of it except what belongs to it as such. Thus rational and animal belong to a human being as human, but white or black, not belonging to the notion of humanity, does not. If asked whether this nature is one or many, neither should be conceded, since both are outside the understanding of humanity and either may befall it. If plurality belonged to its notion, it could never be one, although it is one in Socrates; if unity belonged to its notion, the nature of Socrates and Plato would be one and the same and could not be multiplied. Second, it is considered according to the being it has in this or that, and then something is predicated of it accidentally by reason of that in which it is: a human being is white because Socrates is white. This nature has being in singulars and in the soul, and accordingly multiple being in diverse singulars; yet no such being belongs to it in its absolute consideration. It is therefore true that a human being as human does not have it that it is in this singular or that one. Nature absolutely considered abstracts from every being without excluding any of them, and this is what is predicated of all individuals.

Here, before the fourth conclusion, the second division is begun, whose terms must be explained. Nature signified in the mode of a whole according to itself means nature considered according to the conditions belonging to it from its definition, or in the first mode of being per se. Nature according to being in singulars means nature according to predicates belonging to it because it has being in a singular or singulars. Nature according to being in the intellect means nature according to predicates belonging to it because it has being in the intellect. The conditions of nature according to itself are essential predicates: a human being according to itself is only a rational animal. Those belonging to nature in the other two ways are denominative: a human being is not the whiteness belonging to it in Socrates, but is denominated white from it; nor is it the relation of universality or species belonging to it in the intellect, but is denominated universal or species. The former denominative predicates add something real, as white adds whiteness; the latter add nothing real, but a negative or relative denomination according to a relation of reason. When I say, “a human being is a species,” species adds only the relation of reason by which it regards its genus.

Second, these members differ because nature absolutely taken is neither numerically one nor numerically many. If it were one in number, it could not be in several things, which is false since human nature is in Socrates and Plato. If nature according to itself is one in number, it cannot be numerically distinct or be in several. Likewise, if it were many in number, human nature could not be in Socrates, since it could not have numerical unity. Nature according to being in singulars acquires both numerical unity and distinction: a human being is one because Socrates is one, and is distinct in several because Socrates and Plato are numerically distinct.

Third, nature according to itself claims no being for itself: neither being in a singular or singulars, nor being in the intellect, nor the negations of these. If being in a singular were of its notion, it would never be outside that singular; if being in singulars were of its notion, it could not be in one; if being in the intellect were of its notion, it could never be outside the intellect. Likewise, if non-being in singulars or in the intellect were of its notion, it could never have being there. Nothing can have the opposite of what belongs to its notion. Nature absolutely taken therefore abstracts from being and non-being without precision: it neither includes nor excludes either. Nature in the second and third ways includes one and excludes the other: a human being as in singulars is not in the intellect, and conversely.

Fourth, nature signified in the mode of a whole according to itself is what is predicated of individuals: “Socrates is a human being.” Nature taken as in singulars or in the intellect is not predicated of individuals. What is predicated is what is attributed in the proposition; in “Socrates is a human being,” nothing is attributed to Socrates except being a rational animal, the condition of human nature absolutely taken. Nothing owed to being in singulars or in the intellect, nor human nature with an addition, is attributed. Nature taken in the first way is therefore predicated of individuals, not nature in the second or third ways. +At this point, before proceeding further, certain doubts must be examined. First, there is a doubt concerning the first difference assigned, where it was said that only quidditative predicates belong to nature according to itself. This is difficult because of the transcendentals and certain negative predicates. If being, thing, one, something, true, and good belong to nature taken absolutely, they will be quidditative predicates and will be placed in the definition, since no definition is complete unless it includes all quidditative predicates; but everyone denies that the transcendentals are placed in a definition.

The consequence is confirmed by St Thomas’s words in the text, where what belongs to nature absolutely is said to belong to its definition. But if the transcendentals do not belong to nature absolutely, then a human being according to itself is neither something, nor a thing, nor one—which is wholly denied.

Regarding negative predicates, there is this difficulty: if negations of disparate natures belong to absolute nature, they will be quidditative predicates, and negation will thus be in the definition of substance. But if they belong to nature according to being in singulars or in the intellect, then, taking a human being absolutely, this will be false: “A human being is not a lion,” which seems irrational.

For resolving these matters, first consider how the transcendentals relate to the natures of things over which they fall. No transcendental imports another degree or nature than that of the thing to which it is added. “Being” signifies humanity insofar as it has being; “one,” insofar as it is not formally divided; “thing,” insofar as it has fixedness; “good,” insofar as it perfects appetite; “true,” insofar as it perfects the intellect; and “something,” insofar as it is one thing distinct from others. The same is to be said of any generic degree.

Second, since being is first among the transcendentals, and the others are convertible with it as its passions, once it is explained how being belongs to the natures of things, the rest will be clear. Scotus, in I Sentences, distinction III, question III, holds that being is univocal and is predicated of all inferiors except ultimate differences. Supposing the first claim as self-evident, he gives two arguments for the second.

First, if differences include being said univocally of them and are not altogether the same, they must be diverse beings that are something the same. Consequently ultimate differences will be properly different, and so will have other differences and will not be ultimate.

Second, just as a composite being in reality is composed of act and potency, so a composite concept per se one is composed of an actual concept and a potential, determinable and determining concept. As the resolution of a real composite stops at ultimate act and potency, so the resolution of a concept should stop at simply simple concepts: an actual concept and a merely determinable potency, including nothing determining, and a determining concept alone, including nothing determinable. Such are the concepts of being and ultimate difference; therefore ultimate difference does not formally include being.

Against the first I argue that it would follow that being would be placed in the definition, contrary to Aristotle, VIII Metaphysics, text XVI.

Moreover, it would follow that there would be a tautology in the definition, as we established above in the question concerning the univocity of being.

Against the second: everything of which the passions of being are predicated in the second mode, formally taken, formally includes being; but those passions are predicated in the second mode of ultimate difference formally taken; therefore ultimate difference formally includes being. The minor is clear because ultimate difference is per se one and intelligible. The major follows because whatever formally includes the proper a priori middle through which the passions of being are demonstrated includes being, the concept of being being that middle. If A did not formally include the proper middle for concluding B, B could not be demonstrable a priori of A taken formally.

I argue secondly: every passion belonging to several things formally taken belongs to them by reason of something common formally included in them, to which it first belongs; but unity or intelligibility belongs to all ultimate differences formally taken; therefore it belongs to them by reason of something common formally included in them, namely being; therefore all ultimate differences include being. Nor can one say that it is enough for the subject to be included denominatively. What formally excludes the subject excludes its passion; but ultimate differences formally taken do not exclude the passions of being in the second mode; therefore they do not exclude being in the first mode. Nor should you tolerate Francis of Mayronis saying that Aristotle’s rule does not hold in the transcendentals: it is a voluntary gloss destructive of all metaphysics.

To Scotus’s arguments it is said that since both presuppose one simple objective concept of being, they prove nothing. In reply to the second, the argument from likeness limps: the parts of a natural composite mutually exclude one another as particular things, whereas the parts of an intellectual composite cannot do so, because one—being—is so universal that nothing can evade it.

Avicenna, Alfarabi, and Algazel, as Albert reports in Post-Predicaments, chapter IX, hold that being does not belong to nature absolutely. Hence they say this consequence is invalid: “A human being is a substance; therefore a human being is a being,” because being signifies something added to the essence of the thing. The Commentator reports the same of Avicenna in IV Metaphysics, commentary III, and X Metaphysics, commentary VIII.

St Thomas expressly reproves Avicenna on this point in IV Metaphysics, lecture II on text III and lecture II on text VIII. His view therefore should not be judged identical with Avicenna’s, although it is difficult to see the difference, since he holds that nothing other than God is a being through its essence, but through something added to it; and says in the second Quodlibet, question II, article I, that being is not an essential predicate, and in I Against the Gentiles, chapter XXVI, that being does not fall within the concept of substance, the most general genus.

For this reason some say that being is taken in two ways, nominally and participially. Being nominally is predicated quidditatively and intrinsically of all things: each thing is a being through its essence. Being participially, signifying the same as existing, is not a quidditative predicate: nothing other than God is a being through its essence. Thus being nominally belongs to nature absolutely, but being participially does not. They add that being nominally is divided into the ten categories and is a transcendental convertible with the others, properly speaking, and that Avicenna was blameworthy for omitting this distinction.

I, however, find that another account must be given. I say that being participially is what is transcendental and divided into the ten categories. St Thomas, in the First Part, questions V and VI, and in the Questions on Truth, question XXI, shows that good, also divided into the ten categories, is convertible with being participially, not nominally, for two reasons.

First, he says that when good and being are convertible, just as a thing is a being, so it is good; but it is not a being through its essence; therefore neither is it good. To avoid equivocation, this concerns only being participially. Second, he says that that by which a thing is formally good is not being; but this is false of being nominally, because the actual being of existence, by which a thing is a being and good, is being participially. Therefore the being convertible with good, transcendental and divided into the ten categories, is being participially.

But in the name “being” two things can be considered: namely, that from which the name “being” is taken, namely being itself, by which a thing is; and that to which the name “being” has been imposed, namely that which is. For above, at the beginning of the work, it was said that being signifies that which is in any category; and that it differs from essence, which signifies that by which a thing is placed in a category. Hence, in Physics I, text XIII, Aristotle, in place of “being,” posits “that which is.” Avicenna, therefore, attending to that by which a thing is, from which the name “being” is taken, simply said that being is a predicate outside the essence of a thing. But St. Thomas, looking to that which is, to which the name “being” has been imposed, did not follow Avicenna. For that which is itself does not predicate something outside the essence of a thing. Moreover, observing that that by which a thing is, namely actual exsistence, is not of an extraneous nature from that which is itself, but is constituted through the proper principles of that which is itself, he did not wish to number being among accidental predicates: for this cannot be asserted of anything else outside the essence of a thing. For nothing outside the essence of a thing is constituted through the proper principles of that thing except the existence of the thing. Anything else, however, is constituted through the proper principles of another genus, namely its proper genus and its proper difference, and universally through the proper principles of that category.

But existence itself is constituted only through the genus and difference and the principles of that which is. And this is the reason by which St. Thomas argues against Avicenna in Metaphysics IV, at the place cited above; hence, when being is predicated of something, for example a man, since it does not draw man outside his proper genus and proper difference, neither by reason of that which is nor by reason of that by which he is, it remains a substantial predicate, together with Aristotle and the Commentator, at the place cited above, although it is not substantial in altogether the same way as those predicates which fall within the definition. With these preliminaries, I say in response to the doubt that the transcendentals are not proper predicates of nature according to its absolute consideration, nor according to its being in singulars, nor according to its being in the intellect; rather, they are common predicates of nature however it is taken, belonging to it not only concomitantly but also causally. And this is clear concerning nature taken both in the second and in the third way: for from the fact that man is found in singulars, he has the notion of being, of one, of thing, and of the others. Similarly, from the fact that he has being in the intellect, being is in some way undivided; etc.; for thus some being, although being of reason, is due to him. Concerning nature taken in the first way, this can be clear from what has been said, and from the fact that wherever a later transcendental is found, an earlier one is also found. But it is manifest concerning the later transcendentals, which are one, thing, something, etc., that they belong to nature absolutely. Hence, speaking absolutely of man, this is true: Man is a being. Thus St. Thomas too says in Metaphysics X, at the place cited above, that being predicates the natures of the ten genera according as they are in act or potency, and not only according as they are in act.

To the argument raised in the doubt, by which it was said, “If this is so, then the transcendentals ought to be placed in the definition,” it is said first that it is not necessary for all essential predicates to be placed in the definition, but only those which explain another essential grade of the thing defined; the transcendentals are not of this kind, since it was said that they predicate the same grade which the genus or difference conveys. Hence Aristotle says in Metaphysics VIII, commentary XIX, that being and one are not placed in definitions for this reason: being is immediately each thing; for the definition is complete when all the grades of the thing are explained from the first potency up to the ultimate intrinsic act, which is done without the transcendentals, since they add no grade. It is said secondly concerning being that, because being in some way imports being itself, which pertains to the question whether it is, and not to the question what it is, it therefore deviates somewhat from quidditative predicates.

To St. Thomas’s statement it is said that the transcendentals have two aspects: that the aforesaid notion is posited in no definition, and that they are included in every concept. As is said concerning being in Metaphysics III, text X, I think this statement should be understood according to the fact that the transcendentals accompany every grade; and therefore they are absent from no concept. And thus I say that those things which belong to nature absolutely, and fall within its notion, belong to the thing insofar as it is such; for man, insofar as he is man, is being, thing, something, etc. From these points, diligent reader, you have the basis for rightly understanding the various statements of St. Thomas.

Concerning negative predicates, however, it is said briefly that those negations can be taken in two ways, namely formally and fundamentally. If formally, it is false that they belong to nature absolutely: for they are attributed to it through the operation of the intellect, since negations are beings of reason. If fundamentally, since negation is founded upon affirmation, it is conceded that they are quidditative predicates; but taken in this way they are nothing other than the genus and proper difference. For the foundation of the negations of disparate natures predicated of man is nothing other than human nature: for from the fact that man is a rational animal, he is neither a lion nor an ox, etc.

Whether nature taken absolutely has unity or plurality.

The second doubt concerns St. Thomas’s statement in the text, in assigning the second difference, where it is said that nature taken absolutely has neither unity nor plurality.

For this seems impossible, since what is not one cannot be defined, as is said in Metaphysics VII, text XII, indeed cannot be understood, as is held in Metaphysics VI, commentary X. And if it is granted that nature absolutely has unity, it is not easy to say what sort of unity it is: for it is neither numerical, as has been explained, nor specific nor generic, since these are made by the intellect, nor analogical, as is evident in itself—for man is not one analogically. Nor will anyone easily say whether that unity is real or not.

For clarity about this doubt, five things must be done. First, what any unity is must be seen. Second, whence unity has reality. Third, how any unity is outside the soul. Fourth, the doubt raised must be answered. Fifth, certain objections must be excluded.

Concerning the first, it must be known that, since one adds nothing to being except the privation of division—so that one is nothing other than undivided being, as is said in Metaphysics IV, text III—any unity is nothing other than the indivision of a thing. And since every privation is known through its habit, unity, which signifies indivision, must be known from the nature of the division it privates, and its multiplicity must correspond to the multiplicity of division.

Division, then, is twofold. One is material, caused by principles of individuation; the other is formal, made through essential principles. The latter has a range: one kind proceeds through proper essential principles, another through common essential principles. This too has a range, according as common essential principles are more or less common. For example, between Socrates and Plato there is numerical, not formal, division, because their distinction is caused not by essential but by individual principles. Between Socrates and this lion, supposing lion and man to be under the same first genus, there is formal division through proper essential principles, namely through the ultimate differences alone. Between Socrates and this plant there is a greater formal division, through essential principles common to Socrates and many other species, namely sensible and insensible. Between Socrates and this stone there is still greater formal division, through more common principles, namely animate and inanimate. Thus, ascending continually, formal division increases, so that between Socrates and this whiteness there is the greatest formal division, through proper and most common essential principles, namely substantial and dispositional modes, constitutive of the modes of being in the categories.

The same must be said in every respect of unity. Unity is twofold: numerical and formal. Numerical unity is considered according to the privation of numerical division. Formal unity is considered according to the privation of formal division, and this has a range. One kind privates every formal division causable through proper and common principles; this is formal unity simply. Another privates formal division not simply but in a determinate way, namely division causable through common principles; this is formal unity in a qualified sense, and it ranges according as the privated division is causable through more or less common essential principles. Thus Socrates is numerically one because he is not divided in himself by material differences. Man is formally one simply because he does not admit any formal division. Animal is formally one insofar as it does not admit division through sensible and insensible, but it is not one simply, since it admits division through rational and irrational. Body is less formally one: it is one because it is not divided in itself into corporeal and incorporeal, but it is less one because it admits the greater formal division into animate and inanimate. Being is least one: it is one insofar as it is not proportionally divided in itself, but least one insofar as it tolerates such formal diversity together with its unity. From this the first point is clear: any unity is indivision, and such unity is such indivision, that is, the privation of division. Thus to say “Socrates is numerically one” is to say “Socrates is a being lacking numerical division”; and “man is formally one” is to say “man is a being lacking formal division.” This concludes the first point.

Concerning the second, it must be known that real being is understood in two ways: first, as distinguished from being fabricated by the intellect; second, as distinguished from what does not actually exist. In the first way every categorical thing is real being, whether it exists or not. In the second way only what really exists outside its causes is real being. And since this is properly real being according to St. Thomas, who says in Questions on the Power of God, question III, article 5, ad 2, that a thing before it exists is nothing—and this agrees with Aristotle in the Categories, who says that when the first substances are destroyed nothing can remain—unity, like everything else, properly has reality insofar as it actually exists outside the soul and its causes.

Concerning the third, I propose three propositions. The first is: every unity mentioned above, both numerical and formal, exists outside the soul. The second is: no common unity exists outside the soul in nature in several supposits distinct in supposit. The third is: every formal unity existing outside the soul is really multiplied when the things themselves are multiplied. The first proposition is so evident that no sane person can deny it. In Socrates, apart from every operation of the intellect, both unities appear. For he lacks in himself numerical and formal division causable through proper and common principles, and thus has numerical and formal indivision. Hence in Socrates there is not merely numerical unity, but a plurality of formal unities according to the multitude of quidditative predicates. And just as not only Socrates’s individuality exists outside the soul, but each of his quidditative predicates, so not only numerical unity but each of his formal unities must be said to exist outside the soul.

To understand the second, it must be noted that a thing can be understood as common outside the soul in two ways: positively or negatively. A thing is positively common when it remains undivided while found in several supposits distinct in supposit. It is negatively common when it is proper to no supposit. In the first way, no one rightly asserts that a common thing exists outside the soul except the divine essence, according to the Christian faith. In the second way some seem to posit a thing common outside the soul; we shall speak of them below. Since this seems foreign to truth, I prove the second proposition in two ways.

First: no thing requiring a quiddity to be found outside the soul in isolation exists in nature; but a common unity outside the soul in several supposits distinct in supposit is a thing requiring a quiddity to be found outside the soul in isolation; therefore no such common unity exists in nature. The major is proved thus: nothing requiring something impossible for its existence is found; but a quiddity’s being found alone outside the soul is impossible, since it must be in some supposit; therefore what requires it to be found alone never exists in nature. The minor is proved thus: what requires a quiddity not proper to any supposit outside the soul requires it to exist alone; but a common unity outside the soul in several supposits distinct in supposit requires a quiddity not proper to any supposit; therefore it requires a quiddity to be found alone in nature. The premises are evident from the terms. The major is so because a quiddity not proper to any supposit is necessarily alone: if it is not alone, it is in some supposit, and if it is in some supposit, it is proper to that supposit. The minor is clear because common and proper are opposites: common includes the negation of proper, and conversely. As soon as a thing is appropriated to someone, it ceases to be negatively common, because it lacks the negation of appropriation; and as soon as it is negatively common, it is not appropriated, because it has that negation. Thus the opposite of the predicate entails the opposite of the subject in both premises.

Moreover, I prove it a second way: every thing existing in nature is a particular thing; no common unity outside the soul in several supposits distinct in supposit is a particular thing; therefore no such unity exists in nature. The major is known from the common Peripatetic opinion. The minor is proved thus: every particular thing is proper to one supposit, otherwise it would not be particular; but no common unity in several distinct supposits is proper to one supposit, as is evident from the terms; therefore no such unity is particular.

The third proposition is proved thus: whenever two things are really and convertibly the same, when one is really multiplied the other is multiplied also; but one thing and one are really convertibly the same; therefore when a thing is really multiplied its unity is really multiplied. But numerical plurality is real; therefore when a thing is numerically multiplied its unity is multiplied likewise. Hence in Socrates and Plato there are two corporeities, animalities, and humanities; so there are two formal unities following corporeity, two following animality, and two following humanity. For the number of formal unities in each individual must correspond to the number of essential predicates. Just as each quidditative predicate gives some being, so it must give some unity; for one and being are the same, as is said in Metaphysics IV, text III.

From this the third point is clear: unities have being outside the soul because they are not common but particularized and numerically multiplied according to the number of the individuals of which they are unities.

Concerning the fourth, I say that nature taken absolutely has a certain unity, as the argument brought forward, which is St. Thomas’s in his treatise On the Nature of the Genus, chapter VII, effectively concludes.

When it is asked whether that unity is numerical or specific, I say that it is formal unity, different from numerical unity, just as formal division differs from material division. Nor is that formal unity specifically or generically formal; rather, it is the foundation of specific and generic unity. For these unities are made formally by the intellect, whereas that unity precedes every act of the intellect. What is said in the text—that nature taken absolutely is neither one nor many—is to be understood of numerical unity and plurality.

As to the added doubt, whether this unity is real or not, I say that in itself it is real in the first of the senses we set out above, taking real being as nature itself is taken absolutely. And just as nature according to its being in singulars is real being in the second sense, so that unity, which always accompanies nature in particulars, is truly and properly posited as real. The judgment concerning nature and its unity is the same. This concludes the fourth point.

Concerning the fifth, two proper doubts arise. The first concerns the second proposition, in which it was said that there is no common unity outside the soul.

The second concerns what was just said: in what respect formal unity is different from numerical unity existing in Socrates.

Against the first, one objects thus. Whatever supposits distinct in supposit are formally one outside the soul have some unity common to them outside the soul; Socrates and Plato are formally one outside the soul; therefore Socrates and Plato have some unity common to them outside the soul. The major seems evident because, if supposits distinct in supposit are one, they are not distinguished in that in which they are one; thus that one is common to both outside the soul, by which they are one.

Moreover, humanity in Socrates, as far as it is of itself, is not determined to Socrates or Plato; therefore the formal unity of humanity in Socrates, as far as it is of itself, is negatively common to Socrates and Plato. The consequence is clear, since formal unity too, as far as it is of itself, is not determined to Socrates and Plato. The antecedent is evident in itself: therefore some unity common negatively to several supposits distinct in supposit is given outside the soul.

Concerning the second doubt, it seems that there is a real difference between formal and numerical unity existing in Socrates. For whenever the habits of privations are really distinct, the privations themselves are also really distinct; thus, since sight and hearing are really distinct, blindness and deafness also really differ. But the habits of formal and numerical unity are really distinct; therefore, and so forth. This is clear because formal division and numerical division are so distinct that in things separated from matter formal division is found without numerical division, while in these lower things individuals of the same species have numerical division without formal division.

To anyone considering the contrary arguments, however, it will appear that the difference is only one of reason. For as formal nature is related to individual nature, so formal unity is related to numerical unity; but nature taken formally is the same as nature taken numerically, and differs from it only in reason; therefore formal unity is really the same as numerical unity, and differs from it only in reason.

For resolving the first doubt, note that two things distinct in supposit can be formally one in two ways. In one way, the two are united in something outside the soul common to both and undivided in each. I find no example of this in nature except, as was said, the Trinity according to the Christian faith. In the other way, the two have a mutual negation of formal division between them. This is found in all individuals of the same species. For Socrates, with no intellect considering, has this negation: he is not formally divided from Plato; and Plato likewise is not formally divided from Socrates. Since being formally one requires nothing other than being formally indistinct, it is simply true that Socrates and Plato are formally one outside the soul. The argument therefore commits the fallacy of consequent, affirmatively passing from a superior to its inferior. Being formally one is superior both to having something common and undivided in them outside the soul and to having two natures with a mutual negation of formal division.

One must not imagine that Socrates and Plato are formally one because they agree in something in which they are not distinguished outside the soul, but because each enjoys a negation of formal division from the other. For formal one is nothing other than not formally divided. What we say of simple formal unity between Socrates and Plato should be understood of formal unity in a qualified sense between Socrates and this lion, this stone, and this intelligence. Just as Socrates and Plato, because they have two natures between which no formal division falls, are therefore simply formally indistinct outside the soul, so, because no formal division of the kind naturally caused by sensible and insensible falls between Socrates’s nature and this lion’s, Socrates and this lion are formally indistinct in a qualified sense. Likewise, because between Socrates and this stone there is no formal division through corporeal and incorporeal, Socrates and this stone are formally indistinct in a qualified sense. And because between Socrates and Gabriel there is no formal division of the kind naturally caused by the modes of being, namely in itself and in another, Socrates and Gabriel are formally indistinct in a qualified sense, and consequently are formally one without any operation of the intellect. For it has already often been said that one signifies the same as undivided being.

To the second I say that it is one thing to say, “Human nature existing outside the soul in itself is negatively common to several, or negatively indifferent,” and another to say, “Human nature existing outside the soul is negatively common to several, or negatively indifferent.” The first is true, the second false. The truth of the first is clear from what was said above: nature outside the soul—for example, Socrates’s nature—taken in itself, that is, taken alone, is not determined or appropriated to anyone, and consequently is negatively indifferent or common. The falsity of the second is clear because every proposition is simply false in which the predicate conflicts with the subject by reason of a condition explicitly implied in it. Thus “fire not brought near combustible matter burns” is simply false, because burning conflicts with fire not brought near a passive object. But the second proposition—“nature existing outside the soul is negatively common to several”—is of this kind; therefore it is false.

For clarity about the minor, know that when I say “nature in itself,” or “nature absolutely,” I say two things: nature and solitude as its condition. Likewise, when I say “nature existing outside the soul,” I say two things: nature and the particular existence joined to it as its condition. Thus something belongs or is repugnant to nature absolutely by reason of nature, and something by reason of solitude. Similarly, something belongs or is repugnant to nature existing outside the soul by reason of nature, and something by reason of its association with a particular. Since negative community, the predicate in our proposition, does not belong to nature absolutely by reason of itself—that is, by reason of nature, since it is not its quidditative predicate—but belongs to it by reason of the explicit condition expressed by “in itself” or “absolutely,” which is solitude, for nature is negatively common precisely because it is taken alone without determination to this or that, it must be repugnant to nature taken under the opposite condition, by reason of that opposite condition. Nature existing outside the soul expresses the condition opposed to solitude, since it expresses its conjunction with particular existence, which removes its solitude. Therefore negative community is repugnant to nature existing outside the soul, not by reason of nature but by reason of the condition expressed by “existing outside the soul”; consequently the proposition whose subject is nature existing outside the soul and whose predicate is negative community is simply false. As soon as nature loses solitude, it also loses community. It loses solitude as soon as it is in another.

Hence the answer to the argument appears. Although both nature and formal unity, as far as they are of themselves—that is, taken alone—are negatively common, yet, existing outside the soul, they are not common. Taken in itself, nature is not with another; yet existing outside the soul it is necessarily with another. Thus one may not infer: “Taken in itself it is not with another; therefore, existing outside the soul, it is not with another.” Likewise one may not infer: “Taken in itself it is negatively common; therefore, existing outside the soul, it is negatively common.” In both cases the same fallacy occurs, namely the fallacy of accident.

If you attend to this, you will see how Scotus’s position in Sentences II, distinction III, question I differs from ours, and how he fell into that opinion. He says that specific nature, for example humanity, by reason of itself follows these two things: formal unity and negative community, or indifference to several numerically. At the end of that question he says that one need not seek the cause why nature is common, since nature itself is a sufficient cause of its community; but one must seek the cause why it is singular, since it is not singular of itself. Thus, just as one nature is found outside the soul formally, so a nature common to several is found there.

We do not disagree with him in the first matter, but in the second. We say that nature by reason of itself follows formal unity, but we maintain that negative community does not follow it by reason of itself, but by reason of its solitude, just as we said that singularity follows it by reason of its association with existence. Since the condition of solitude does not belong to nature by reason of itself, nor by reason of the being it has outside the soul, but by reason of the intellect, which is naturally disposed to unite what has been divided, no community is found in nature before every act of the intellect. And just as one must seek the cause from which nature has solitary being and being outside the soul, since of itself it has neither, so one must seek the cause from which it has community and singularity, since of itself it has neither.

The cause from which the falsity in this Scotist opinion proceeded seems to be twofold. First, there is equivocation in the term “of itself” or “from itself.” Each can be understood in two ways. Positively, it signifies some relation of cause; negatively, it signifies solitude, that is, not being with another. Scotus understood nature to be common of itself in the first way, so that it is itself a sufficient cause of its community, as his words there show, although he should have understood it in the second way. For nature “of itself,” that is, not with another, is indifferent and common; just as when one says “nature of itself is alone,” “of itself” signifies no causality, but only the negation of conjunction with another.

The second cause is the distance between a negative proposition and an affirmative proposition with an infinite predicate, when reduplication is added. Without reduplication, an affirmative proposition with an infinite predicate entails a negative one, and conversely, as is said in On Interpretation II. With reduplication, however, an affirmative proposition with an infinite predicate entails a negative proposition with a finite predicate, but not conversely. For “man, insofar as he is man, is not white” does not entail “man, insofar as he is man, is non-white.” If man, insofar as he is man, were non-white, whiteness could never be joined to man, because what belongs to something according to itself belongs to it always, necessarily, and per se. Scotus’s reasoning plainly failed here. Since “negatively common” signifies the same as “not proper,” he argued: “Nature, for example humanity, insofar as it is such, is not proper to anyone; therefore humanity, insofar as it is humanity, is non-proper.” The defect just described is explicit.

That this was his procedure is clear from his argument. His conclusion is affirmative with an infinite predicate, for he concludes, “therefore nature of itself is common,” that is, non-proper. But the antecedent is negative: “nature is not of itself this,” that is, proper to anyone. It is likewise clear from another argument he introduces there: “It is not repugnant to Socrates’s humanity, by reason of itself, to be in another; therefore Socrates’s humanity of itself is common.” Here too the defect is evident. In the first argument “of itself” expresses reduplication, and in the second “by reason of itself,” and so forth. This is highly important in this matter and in the matter of universals, since everything depends on it. Therefore one must attend carefully: if the proposition “Nature of itself is common” is to be true, both “of itself” and “common” must be taken negatively, according to our account. Then it means: “Nature taken not with another is not proper to anyone,” which is evidently true. According to Scotus, however, “of itself” is taken positively, and wrongly; the sense is: “Nature, by reason of itself, or insofar as it is such, is not proper to anyone,” which is plainly false.

Be still more attentive: it is one thing to say, “Nature, for example humanity, insofar as it is such, is not proper to anyone,” and another to say, “Humanity, insofar as it is such, is non-proper, or common,” which has the same sense here. The first is true, because humanity, insofar as it is humanity, is not appropriately attributed to anyone.

The second point, however, is shown to be false from the same root: for it does not belong to humanity, precisely as humanity, to be appropriated to no individual. For it abstracts from both, namely from being proper and from being non-proper. For if humanity, precisely as humanity, were not appropriated, humanity would never be appropriated to anyone, because, as was said from the First Posterior Analytics, what belongs to something according to itself presupposes that it belongs to every such thing, necessarily and per se. But although it was indirectly proved above that this community does not belong to nature by reason of itself, when the falsity of this proposition was established by two arguments—“a unity existing outside the mind is common to several supposits distinct in supposit”—the falsity of that follows from the falsity of this: for what does not belong to a thing outside the mind does not belong to it by reason of itself.

I now prove it directly as follows: whatever follows a nature by reason of itself is predicated simply, that is, without any addition, of the supposit of that nature; but according to you community follows human nature by reason of itself; therefore community is predicated simply, that is, without any addition, of the supposit of human nature. The reasoning in the third figure is sound, but the conclusion is false; therefore one of the premises is false. Not the major, as will be shown; therefore the minor, which is your position. The falsity of the conclusion is clear, because “Socrates is common to several” is simply false; and even if “of itself” is added, it remains false to say, “Socrates of himself is common to several.” The truth of the major is explained thus: what follows a nature by reason of itself is either a passion, a mode, or a per se, per accidens, separable, or inseparable predicable. Now all these, if they accompany a nature by reason of itself, are so related that, just as the nature is predicated essentially of the individual—man of Socrates, for example—so these are predicated denominatively, each in its own order, of that same individual, as is clear by considering each case.

This is confirmed because, in our case, according to you formal unity and community follow human nature by reason of itself. Hence no other cause need be sought for either than nature itself; therefore, just as formal unity is predicated simply of Socrates—for “Socrates is formally one” is simply true—so community will be predicated simply of Socrates, by saying, “Socrates is common.” This is false; therefore, and so forth. What greater reason is there for unity than for community, and why should some things that follow a nature by reason of itself be predicated of individuals and others not? It will not be easy to invent the reasons Scotus gives there, since they do not conclude that community exists outside the mind, but unity; for that reason I judged it superfluous to adduce them. If any arguments from them, or from what he explains in Metaphysics VII to prove community, were brought forward, it would not be difficult to take the answer from what was said concerning the two introduced here.

For clarity concerning the second doubt, it must be known that “one,” since it signifies an undivided being, implies something positive and something privative. If we speak of formal unity and substantial numerical unity with respect to the positive element they imply, then they are really the same and differ only in reason. Thus Socrates and man are really the same and differ in reason, since the same thing is formally and numerically one. But if we speak of these unities with respect to the privations of division which they imply, then I say that they are really distinct, provided no objection is made that a real distinction must be a passion of a real being; for one is the privation of formal division and the other the privation of numerical division, just as formal division is one thing and numerical division another. Nor is it impossible for one thing to contain several substantial unities really distinct with respect to the privations implied; but it would be impossible for one thing to contain several substantial unities really distinct with respect to the positive realities they imply. Therefore the conclusion of both arguments brought forward must be granted, with different senses attached to the terms; no other answer is necessary.

Whether nature taken absolutely is that which is predicated of individuals.

There is a third difficulty concerning the assignment of the fourth difference. For it does not seem true that nature taken absolutely is that which is predicated of individuals, since nature taken absolutely is neither universal nor common. Yet in propositions of this kind—Socrates is a man, Socrates is an animal, and the like—the universal and the superior are predicated of the particular and inferior. Likewise, when it is asked whether “Socrates is a man” is a predication of equal of equal, or of superior of inferior, it does not seem possible to answer this while holding that absolute nature is predicated, since it is neither equal nor superior.

It must be said that, just as in an external nature we consider its very account of acting and also its condition without which it does not act—for example, in color we consider its nature, from which it is visible, and its particularity, which is the condition without which it is not visible—so in a predicable nature we must consider two things: what is predicated and attributed to the subject, and the condition without which it is not attributed to it. In “Socrates is a man,” what is attributed to the subject is human nature itself and nothing else. The condition without which “man” is not predicated of Socrates is its being a universal, superior, common nature, or something of this sort. As will be clear below, and as Aristotle says in Metaphysics VII, text 46, nothing is predicated unless it has being in the intellect, since predication depends on the intellect. Hence I say that, according to its own account, nature is what is predicated of the individual itself. For it is a predication of thing of thing. Superiority, universality, and the like are its conditions. Therefore, to the question whether these predications are of equal or of superior, I say that it is a predication of superior.

Nor does it matter that superiority is not intrinsic to the absolute nature that is predicated, since St. Thomas does not say that this condition—predication of individuals—belongs to absolute nature insofar as it abstracts from every kind of being. Rather, he says that the thing to which that condition belongs is absolute nature, and not an aggregate of nature and being in the intellect or in the singular. When I say “Socrates is a man,” the sense is not “Socrates is a man according to being in the intellect, or in the singular, or superior, or equal”; the sense is “Socrates is one who has humanity.”

Therefore, the distinction between what is predicated and the condition of the predicate must be carefully observed. If it is not observed, some may perhaps have been deceived into saying that from this text it is absolutely established that “Man is an animal” is neither a predication of superior, nor of inferior, nor of equal. The sense of the text, then, is this: absolute nature is what is predicated—that is, nature according to the conditions due to it by reason of itself is what is attributed to singulars, and not according to the conditions due to it from being in the intellect or in the singular. This is compatible with being in the intellect, universality, and superiority being conditions without which nature itself is not predicated of singulars.

Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the account of universal belongs to nature taken in this way, since the account of universal includes unity and community. Neither belongs to human nature according to its absolute consideration. If community belonged to the intelligibility of man, then wherever humanity were found community would be found; and this is false, because no community is found in Socrates, but whatever is in him is individuated.

Here the fourth negative conclusion is set down: The essence of a composite substance taken absolutely is not universal as a species, etc. It is proved as follows: a universal is one common to many; the essence of a composite substance in itself is not one common to many; therefore the essence of a composite substance in itself is not universal, and so forth. The major is Aristotle’s, from Posterior Analytics II. The minor is proved because, if the essence of a composite substance in itself were one and common, then wherever that essence were found it would be one and common to many, which is impossible. The consequence is clear from the fact that whatever belongs to something in itself belongs to it wherever it is posited, as appears from Posterior Analytics I. The impossibility of the consequent is so evident that Avicenna says in Metaphysics II that no sane person can think its opposite. Who could be so foolish as to say that Socrates’ essence is common to himself and to Plato?

But a difficulty arises concerning the proposition on which the whole argument rests: “Whatever belongs to something in itself belongs to it wherever it is posited.” For this seems to have many counterexamples. Motion in itself is infinitely accelerable, according to Physics VI, text 15; but motion placed in the heavens is not so, but is the fastest, as is said in On the Heavens II, text 28. Likewise, the continuum in itself is infinitely divisible, according to Physics VI, text 3; but a continuum placed in a natural thing is not, since the magnitude of every natural body is determined, as is said in On the Soul II, text 41. Likewise, motion in itself has a contrary, according to Physics V, texts 8 and 14; but motion placed in the heavens lacks a contrary, On the Heavens I, text 20.

To these and similar objections it is said, by first noting that it is one thing to say “A belongs to something in itself,” and another to say “A is not incompatible with something in itself.” For the truth of the first requires that A claim that thing for itself in the first, second, or fourth mode of essential predication. For the truth of the second it is enough that, to A considered as such, the thing not be incompatible. The first entails that it belong to A wherever A is posited; the second does not. There are many things that are not incompatible with animal insofar as it is animal, yet are not found in every animal. Whatever belongs to animal in the first, second, or fourth mode of essential predication, however, is found in every animal. Hence I say that none of the proposed counterexamples is against the assumed proposition, because everything said in them is understood by non-repugnance and compatibility. When motion is said to be infinitely accelerable, we understand that infinite acceleration is not incompatible with motion as such. Likewise, when the continuum is said to be infinitely divisible, infinite divisibility is understood not to be incompatible with the continuum as such. Likewise, when motion is said to have a contrary, we understand that having a contrary is not incompatible with motion as such.

If this is not satisfactory, say that it is one thing to say “A, insofar as it is A, belongs to something,” and another to say “A, insofar as it is A, does not belong to something,” as is evident. Whatever belongs to A insofar as it is A belongs to every A; but whatever does not belong to A insofar as it is A need not be denied of every A. The risible does not belong to animal insofar as it is animal, yet it is not denied of every animal, since it belongs to animal in man. Add that all the propositions in the proposed examples are to be understood negatively: “motion is infinitely accelerable,” that is, motion as such is not of a determinate velocity; “the continuum is infinitely divisible,” that is, the continuum as such is not of a determinate division; “motion has a contrary,” that is, motion as such does not determine itself to be without a contrary. Thus, according to either manner of answering, the assumed proposition remains universally true.

One could also answer these counterexamples in another way; but because I attend more to the form of the proposition than to its matter, I pass over it for the present.

Likewise, it cannot be said that the account of genus accrues to human nature according to the being it has in individuals, because human nature is not found in individuals according to unity, as one thing belonging to each, which the account of universal requires.

Here the fifth negative conclusion is set down: The essence of a composite substance according to the being it has in singulars is not universal. It is proved thus. A universal is one in many; the essence of a composite substance according to the being it has in individuals is not one in many but diverse in many; therefore the essence of a composite substance according to the being it has in individuals is not universal, and consequently neither species, nor genus, nor difference, which presuppose universality.

It remains, then, that the account of species accrues to human nature according to the being it has in the intellect. For nature itself has being in the intellect abstracted from all individual things, and has a uniform account toward all individuals outside the soul, insofar as it is essentially the image of all and leads to knowledge of all insofar as they are men. From the fact that it has such a relation to all individuals, the intellect discovers the account of species and attributes it to nature. Hence the Commentator says in On the Soul I that it is the intellect that makes universality in things; Avicenna says the same in Metaphysics VII.

Here, by the method of division, the sixth affirmative conclusion determining the difficulty proposed is inferred: Essence according to being in the intellect is universal, genus, species, difference, etc. It is proved thus: what is one in and of many is universal; nature according to being in the intellect is one in and of many; therefore it is universal. The minor is proved: what is uniformly related to many, as their essential image, is one in and of many; nature according to being in the intellect is of this kind, because it has being abstracted from every dissimilarity of individuals and essentially produces knowledge of them; therefore, and so forth.

For clarity concerning this conclusion and argument, since terms are used in many ways according to Aristotle’s teaching and must be distinguished, note first the distinctions among the terms placed in the conclusion. Being in the intellect occurs in two ways: subjectively and objectively. Being subjectively in the intellect is inhering in it as an accident in its subject, like whiteness in a surface. Being objectively in the intellect is terminating an act of the intellect. The intellect in us is twofold, agent and possible, as is said in On the Soul III, text 17. The agent intellect abstracts the intelligible species from phantasms. The possible intellect receives intellection in itself. The universal is twofold, in representing and in predicating. The universal in representing here is what represents a thing without representing its individual conditions. The universal in predicating is what is predicated of many differing according to being.

With these distinctions seen, know that the conclusion “Nature according to being in the intellect is universal” is verified in three ways. First: nature according to objective being in the agent intellect is universal in predicating. Second: nature according to subjective being in the possible intellect is universal in representing. Third: nature according to subjective being in the possible intellect is universal in predicating.

Second, it must be known that an external thing, insofar as it is actually intelligible, is objectively in the agent intellect. For thus it terminates its action, since Aristotle posited the agent intellect to make what is potentially intelligible actually intelligible, as the Commentator says in On the Soul III, commentary 18. An external thing becomes actually intelligible through the agent intellect, not because it receives or loses anything in being through that action, but because its intelligible species is produced by the agent intellect. Through this the external thing is represented without its individual conditions, with which it was potentially, not actually, intelligible. Thus the production of the intelligible species is the making of the external thing actually intelligible. The action has two terms: one within the soul, namely the intelligible species, newly produced in the possible intellect; the other external, namely the thing of which it is the species. The thing acquires nothing real from this, but only an extrinsic denomination: that it is abstracted from here and now and is actually intelligible.

An external nature, insofar as it is actually understood, is objectively in the possible intellect. Thus it terminates its action, which is understanding. An external thing becomes and is actually understood, not because it receives or loses something through the action of the possible intellect, but because its concept is formed by the possible intellect; for a thing is understood when we form its concept. Thus the formation of the concept is the making of the external thing actually understood. This action too has two terms: one within the soul, namely the concept, which really comes to be and is nothing other than an expressed likeness of the thing, making the thing present objectively to the possible intellect; the other external, namely the thing extrinsically denominated actually understood by the produced concept.

From this it is clear what difference and agreement there are between a thing objectively in the agent intellect and in the possible intellect. The difference is that, from being objectively in the agent intellect, it is actually intelligible but not actually understood; from being objectively in the possible intellect, after it was already actually intelligible, it becomes actually understood. The agreement is that, both from being objectively in the agent intellect and from being objectively in the possible intellect, it is represented without individual conditions and consequently is abstracted from here and now, and so forth.

Third, from Avicenna, Metaphysics V, chapter 1, it must be known that the universal in predicating is what is not impossible in the intellect to predicate of many. And this can be related in three ways:

First, those many may actually exist in nature: thus man, as an object of the intellect, is universal with respect to Socrates and Plato.

Second, those many may not exist but may be able to exist: thus a heptagonal house, as an object of the intellect, is universal with respect to several heptagonal houses that do not exist but can exist.

Third, those many may neither exist nor be able to exist: thus the moon, as an object of the intellect, is universal with respect to several moons that cannot exist. Gabriel, as an object of the intellect, is universal with respect to several Gabriels, whose existence involves contradiction. The universal in the first way is called by St. Thomas in Summa I, q. 13, a. 9, universal according to thing and according to account, because that thing really exists in many and not merely as an object of the intellect. The universal in the third way is there called universal or common according to account alone, because the thing is not really found in many, but only as an object of the intellect. The universal in the second way is distinguished there from the universal in the first way. It could nevertheless properly be called universal according to account and thing, but only potentially. St. Thomas assigns not merely these names, but also their subtle rationale, founded on four propositions.

The first is that universality and predicability do not belong to a thing in itself, nor according to the being it has outside the soul; this is clear from what has been said.

The second is that a material thing, which alone is known by us through its proper species, insofar as it is objectively in our intellect is represented without individual conditions; this too is clear from what has been said.

The third is that an immaterial thing, even God himself, insofar as it is objectively in our intellect is represented in the manner of material things, namely without its individual properties. This is clear because such things are not known by us as they are in themselves, but in the manner of material things, and not through their proper species but through the species of material things.

The fourth is that every thing represented without individual conditions regards one individual no more than many. This is clear because, insofar as it is abstracted, it is equally related to one and to many. Nothing can be imagined by which the abstract, as abstract, would regard one more than many, or the reverse. Hence Avicenna deliberately added to the definition of universal the phrase “insofar as it is in the intellect.” For many things are universal which, both according to being outside the soul and according to their proper account, are incompatible with being predicated of many, as will be said of the intelligences. But no universal, insofar as it is represented in the intellect without its own particular existence, property, and hypostasis, is incompatible with being predicated of many. From these propositions the following argument is formed: every thing, and only a thing, equally related to one and to many individuals is actually universal in predicating; every thing, and only a thing, as represented to our intellect is equally related to one and to many inferiors; therefore every thing, and only a thing, as represented to our intellect is actually universal in predicating. The major is clear from Aristotle’s definition of universal in On Interpretation I. The minor, as to its second part, is clear from the first proposition; as to its first part, from the other three.

As a corollary I infer that, for something to be actually universal in predicating, an actual relation of the nature as an object to particulars is not required. It is enough that the thing itself be in a disposition such that the intellect can freely attribute that relation to it as true, adding nothing beyond the actual relation itself.

With these preliminaries, the intended conclusion can now be seen according to all three assigned senses.

For the first sense one can argue thus: what is not impossible in the intellect to predicate of many, or, in Aristotle’s words, is naturally apt to be predicated of many, is universal in predicating; but a thing according to objective being in the agent intellect is of this kind; therefore a thing according to objective being in the agent intellect is universal in predicating. The major is clear from Avicenna and Aristotle. The minor is proved thus: a thing abstracted from individual conditions as such is naturally apt to be predicated of many; a thing according to objective being in the agent intellect is abstracted from individual conditions; therefore, and so forth. All the premises are manifest from what has been said.

From this you see how badly Scotus spoke in Sentences II, dist. 3, q. 1, in answer to the first objection, saying that nature before the act of the possible intellect has nothing except what belongs to it outside the soul. For it is now clear that, according to Aristotle’s view, it is actually intelligible, abstracted from here and now, and consequently actually universal before the act of the possible intellect.

For the third sense no other argument is needed, since the procedure would be the same.

The second sense is clear to those who understand the terms from the accounts of the terms. For nature according to subjective being in the possible intellect is nothing other than an immaterial likeness representing itself, existing in that intellect. An immaterial likeness abstracted from singulars necessarily represents the thing universally, precisely because it is abstracted. For if it did not represent the thing universally, but were mingled with particular conditions and not abstracted from material conditions, it would not be universal. Therefore, in representing it, the thing is universal insofar as it is subjectively in the possible intellect—that is, the species or likeness of the nature itself insofar as it represents that nature without representing individual conditions.

And note that, since nature itself has two likenesses in the soul, namely the intelligible species and the concept, or the impressed species and the expressed species, it is universal in representing according to both species. Why it is necessary to posit two species, and how this is so, will be said elsewhere, if God grants us life. Although the second conclusion can be verified in all the ways mentioned, the first and third are relevant to the text. For here we intend the universal in predicating, which expresses a logical second intention, and not the universal in representing, which is not called universal by any logical second intention, but from the proper being it receives according to the thing.

You can gloss the text as follows. Nature itself has being in the agent or possible intellect, both objectively and subjectively, abstracted from all individual conditions. It has a uniform account—objectively in predicating and subjectively in representing—toward all individuals outside the soul, insofar as it is essentially the likeness of all objectively in being and subjectively in representing, leading to knowledge of all insofar as they are men, because as such they are assimilated. From the fact that nature has toward all individuals this relation, namely uniformity and essential or representative likeness, the intellect discovers the account of species, that is, the second intention which is species, and attributes it to nature uniformly related to individuals because it is represented without every dissimilarity that individuates.

Whether universals in act exist outside the mind.

Concerning what has been said, there is no small question: whether universals in act exist outside the mind, or are made through the operation of the intellect, as was said. In this question, first the title will be explained. Second, Scotus's opinion will be set forth. Third, St. Thomas's opinion will be set forth. Fourth, the arguments on the contrary side will be answered.

As to the first: because this question, understood in different ways, has been determined by philosophers in different ways, assuming for the present the Peripatetic position, namely that universals do not subsist outside singulars, it must be explained how it is to be understood.

By the name “universal” we understand three things. First, universality, which is a relation of reason. Second, the thing which is denominated universal by that universality. Third, aptitude for being in many, which is something intermediate between those two and is the proximate foundation why the thing receives that relative denomination; for the intellect attributes the relation of universality to the thing precisely because that thing is naturally apt to be in many. It is not in doubt whether that relation, which is called the universal formally, is outside the mind; for all say that it is made by the intellect. Nor is it asked whether the thing which is denominated universal, which is called the universal objectively in potency, is outside the mind. For the common opinion is that sometimes that thing is outside the mind and sometimes it is not. If that thing is a real thing, such as a man, an ox, and the like, it is posited outside the mind. But if that thing is a being of reason, it is not posited outside, as subject, predicate, proposition, syllogism, and the like. But the doubt is whether aptitude for being in many is outside the mind: so that, without any operation of the intellect, a thing is found naturally apt to be in many, which is called the universal objectively in act; or whether only the thing is outside the mind, while aptitude for being in many belongs to the thing through the operation of the intellect. And because that aptitude completes the account of the universal in act, taking “universal” objectively, though not formally, to ask whether all this is found outside the mind—namely, a thing naturally apt to be in many—is to ask whether the universal objectively in act exists outside the mind.

And you must know, for clarity concerning the terms, that just as “white” is taken in two ways, namely formally and subjectively, so “universal” is taken in two ways, namely formally and objectively. It cannot be taken subjectively, since universality is not subjectively in anything, being a being of reason. The universal formally is universality itself, which is a relation of reason. The universal objectively is subdivided into the universal objectively in act and the universal objectively in potency. The universal objectively in act is all this, namely one thing naturally apt to be in many. The universal objectively in potency is the one thing itself formally, without adding to it aptitude for being in many. From these points it is clear where the difficulty lies, and it is clear what the terms placed in the title of the question mean. For we intend neither the universal formally nor the universal objectively in potency, because we agree about these, but the universal objectively in act. Therefore, when we speak of the universal in act without qualification, we wish it to be understood objectively, lest we labor over an equivocation. So much for the first.

As to the second: Scotus, above, Metaphysics VII, question XVI, following his foundations—namely, that formal unity and community follow nature outside the mind—opines that one thing naturally apt to be in many is given outside the mind; for this he says that the universal in act is in the nature of things without any operation of the intellect. He also adduces many arguments for this, to bring which forward would exceed the limits of our intention; therefore I shall bring forward those from whose solution the weakness of the rest becomes known.

First he argues from the definition to the thing defined as follows: with every act of the intellect excluded, a thing is naturally apt to be in many; therefore the universal in act is given outside the mind. The consequence holds because the universal objectively in act, as distinguished against the singular, is defined at the beginning of On Interpretation: “The universal is that which is naturally apt to be in many.” The antecedent is proved because, if not, then aptitude for being in many is repugnant to it, nor could it be conferred on it even by the intellect; for then, by the same reasoning, it could give such aptitude to Socrates.

Furthermore, the universal in act is the proper object of the intellect; therefore it precedes the act of the intellect. The consequence holds from On the Soul II, where it is said that the object is prior to the act.

Furthermore, the object of real science is a being outside the mind; the universal in act is the object of real science; therefore the universal in act is a being outside the mind.

Furthermore, the relation of measure is real, Metaphysics V; but it is founded on some universal. This is proved because there must be some one thing measuring other species; but not one numerically, according to Aristotle; therefore a universal.

Furthermore, a real operation or passion is first and adequately in the universal, as understanding is in man, from the first book of the Posterior Analytics; therefore a universal exists outside the mind. Furthermore, contrariety is a real opposition, and its extremes are universals, not singulars; therefore universals exist outside the mind. Furthermore, if the universal is made by the intellect, how is one thing predicated of another? And how is the universal everywhere and always, incorruptible and eternal? And how do matter and form belong to the quiddity of the physical universal? And how is there definition only of universals? And how are genera and species, and universally the categories, beings outside the mind?

Furthermore, if there were nothing in the thing except the singular, there would be no real unity except numerical unity, which is proper to the singular; the consequent is false; therefore, and so on. So much for the second.

As to the third, know that we, following St. Thomas and therefore the common Peripatetic doctrine, put forward the opposite position in this matter. For we say that of the three things understood in the name “universal,” only one is sometimes outside the mind, namely the thing itself formally one, while the other two follow through the operation of the intellect. This is also proved by arguing in a similar way to the argument above: whatever follows a nature on account of itself is simply predicated of an individual of that nature; but aptitude for being in many, according to you, follows nature—say, humanity—on account of itself; therefore aptitude for being in many is simply predicated of an individual of human nature; therefore this will be true: “Socrates is naturally apt to be in many,” which is impossible. The major was clear above, from the fact that all things which accompany a nature on account of itself are not separated from it when it is posited in an individual, and consequently are predicated of it: for being in grounds being said of.

Furthermore, every aptitude flowing from some nature is found in every singular nature inferior to it; but this aptitude, namely for being in many, flows from some nature, say from humanity; therefore aptitude for being in many is found in every human nature. The reasoning is sound, and the conclusion is false; therefore one of the premises is false—not the major, which is clear from the terms; therefore the minor, which is the conclusion of the adversaries. The falsity of the conclusion is proved thus: that aptitude must not be attributed to every humanity which in every humanity is impossible to reduce to act. This is clear, because otherwise such aptitude would have been given uselessly; for aptitude is for the sake of act. But aptitude for being in many is of this kind, namely, that when posited in any humanity it is impossible to reduce it to act, because it is impossible for Socrates's humanity actually to be in Socrates and Plato, or to migrate from Socrates into Plato; therefore aptitude for being in many must not be attributed to each humanity individually. Let us therefore say that the one thing is outside the mind, but that aptitude for being in many belongs to the thing according to the being which it has in the intellect, because it belongs to it when posited under the condition of solitude. For a nature taken in isolation is naturally apt to be in many, at least according to reason. But solitude, since it implies separation of the nature from individual properties, belongs to the thing only when it is presented to the agent or possible intellect.

And notice, for greater clarity of our position, that here a defect similar to the one attributed above to Scotus occurs. Since aptitude for being in many is the same as non-repugnance to being in many, he argues as follows: nature—for example, humanity, insofar as it is humanity—is not repugnant to being in many; therefore humanity, insofar as it is humanity, has aptitude, or non-repugnance, for being in many, and consequently humanity is universal without the operation of the intellect. But the error in this reasoning is plainly apparent, since an affirmative proposition about an infinite predicate with reduplication added is inferred from a negative one. The first proposition, which is negative, is true. The second, however, which is affirmative, is impossible: this is clear from the fact that humanity insofar as it is humanity abstracts from repugnance to being in many and from non-repugnance to being in many, just as it abstracts from white and not-white. For if humanity, insofar as it is humanity, claimed for itself non-repugnance to being in many, in no way could repugnance to being in many belong to humanity; and thus it could neither per se nor accidentally be repugnant to humanity to be in many, which is plainly false.

For it is repugnant to Socrates's humanity, on account of the haecceity added to it, to be in many. The consequence holds because the opposite of what belongs to something according to itself can in no way be found in that thing, as you have from Posterior Analytics I. Therefore, although nature on account of itself is not repugnant to being in many, it does not claim for itself, on account of itself, non-repugnance to being in many; and since it does not claim this for itself according to the being which it has in singulars, it remains that it will claim it for itself according to the being which it assumes in the intellect. And because, for something to be a universal in act, it is required that it claim for itself non-repugnance to being in many, since this is placed in its definition—for what is placed in a definition belongs per se to the thing defined—therefore a thing cannot be a universal in act on account of itself; but as soon as it is presented to the agent or possible intellect, it becomes a universal in act, having been a universal in potency. But how this reduction from potency to act occurs has already been said: it is done by the agent intellect through the production of the intelligible species, and by the possible intellect through the formation of the concept.

But if someone were to imagine that the universal in act is constituted by negation of repugnance to being in many, and does not require an affirmation of non-repugnance, let him notice that he errs for three reasons.

Second, because if negation of repugnance to being in many suffices for the universal, negation of repugnance to being in one alone will likewise suffice for the singular. For just as the universal is related to many, so the singular is related to one alone; and if this is so, then humanity, insofar as it is humanity, will be both universal and singular, since both repugnances are denied of it as such.

Third, because since the universal in act is distinguished against the singular, just as it is repugnant to the singular to be in many, so it is repugnant to the universal to be in one alone. But it is not repugnant to humanity, of which repugnance to being in many is denied, to be in one alone; therefore such negation of repugnance does not suffice to constitute the universal in act. And this argument can be formed against the principal argument as follows: it is repugnant to the universal in act to be in one alone; but it is not repugnant to humanity insofar as it is humanity to be in one alone, otherwise it could not be preserved in a single individual; therefore humanity as such is not a universal in act. Say the same similarly of any other nature. So much for the third.

As to the fourth, the arguments on the contrary side must be answered. In the first, the antecedent is denied, and in proof of it the consequence is denied. For this does not follow: “With the act of the intellect excluded, a thing is not a genus; therefore it is repugnant to it to be a genus.” It can stand that it abstracts from both; and so it is in the matter at hand. For nature itself, with the act of the intellect excluded, abstracts from aptitude for being in many and from repugnance to being in many, as is clear from what was said.

The second is answered in two ways, and both are sound. First, the consequence is denied if the agent intellect is under discussion, because an active power does not presuppose its object but makes it. If the possible intellect is under discussion, then, once the first consequence is granted, it will not follow that the universal in act is outside the mind, because it is made through the act of the agent intellect. Second, it is said that since the universal in act names two things, namely the thing and aptitude, and so on, the thing itself is the object, while aptitude is the mode or condition of the object, without which the thing is not an object. It is enough that the thing itself, which is the object, precede the act of the intellect; its mode need not precede it. For Aristotle says that the object is prior to the act, not the mode of the object. Hence, as to the form of the argument, the consequence must be denied: although the posteriority of the aptitude does not prevent it from being a mode of the object, it does prevent the conclusion from being inferred from that fact; for the priority of the mode cannot be inferred from the posteriority of the object.

The same answer is given to the third: the thing which is the object of real science is outside the mind, not the mode of the thing that is the object. But the universal in act names both, namely the thing and the mode; and therefore it does not follow that the universal in act is outside the mind from the fact that the thing of which there is science is outside it.

As to the form of the argument, it is said that, while the major is true, the fallacy of figure of speech is committed: the thing which is the object is changed into the mode of the thing, or into the thing together with its mode.

Against these answers Scotus argues there. First against the first as follows: whatever is through the agent intellect is a first intention; therefore no universal is in the category of substance; consequently there is no predication in quid of superiors concerning inferiors.

Furthermore, the universal precedes sense, as was proved elsewhere; therefore it precedes the agent intellect.

Furthermore, the agent and possible intellects are one power; otherwise every man would have two intellects. But one power has one object; therefore, if it precedes the act of one, it precedes the act of the other.

Furthermore, on this account there would be no univocal generation without the action of the agent intellect. It may perhaps be said that generator and generated do not have some real unity, but a likeness. Against this: the proximate foundation of likeness is one, Metaphysics V; but neither the generator nor the generated is one; therefore there is something common to both.

Against the second answer, however, he argues: when no intellect is considering it, there will be no universal in act, and thus habitual science would not be of an object that is a universal in act.

Furthermore, the object, insofar as it is prior to the act, is not understood under this mode; therefore either under no mode or under the opposite mode. But not under no mode; therefore, and so on.

Furthermore, either that mode is made by the intellect or it is not. If not, the intended conclusion is obtained; if so, then it is not necessary in the object, because the object is first understood without that mode caused by the intellection of the object.

To these objections it is answered by presupposing what has often already been said: the universal signifies two things, the thing and aptitude, or universality. The universal as a thing placed in a category is predicable, knowable, and an object of the intellect, definable, and the like. But the universal as aptitude is the mode or condition of the categorical thing, which is predicable, knowable, definable, and so on. Neither the agent nor the possible intellect makes the thing, but only the mode.

To the first, therefore, it is conceded that the universal insofar as it is made by the agent intellect is not in the category of substance; but the further consequence has no appearance of validity.

To the second, the antecedent is denied. For although sight is universally of color, as you have from St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I–II, question XXIX, article 6, it is not of a universal color.

Likewise, to the third, the antecedent is denied. For it is necessary, as is said in On the Soul III, text XVII, that there be two intellects in our soul, namely the agent and the possible, which cannot be the same power, since active power and passive power are not the same according to Aristotle.

To the fourth, the consequence is denied, and it is said that the response given there is indeed the best, when properly understood. To its refutation it is said that likeness is founded upon the things themselves, namely two whitenesses or two humanities, as upon its foundation; and that unity is not the foundation of likeness, but a condition of the foundation. For likeness properly so called is founded upon two things possessing that condition, namely mutual negation of formal distinction, such as two whitenesses; and Aristotle, Metaphysics V, is to be understood in this way. And granted that unity were the foundation, it still would not follow that there is something common and one to both: for I shall say that likeness is founded neither upon the one which is generating nor upon the one which is generated, but upon the one which the generating and the generated are. Now it has already been declared above that the fallacy of consequent is committed if one proceeds thus: the generating and the generated are formally one; therefore they have something common and one to both.

To the first of the points brought against the second response, it is said that, speaking precisely of the possible intellect, the universal is divided just as science is: thus science in act is universal in act; science in potency is universal in potency; and science in habit is universal in habit, which occurs when, whenever we wish, we make it actual. Proceeding, however, to the agent intellect, it is said that, provided an intelligible species has been produced, a universal in act is given without any intellect considering it: for, while the philosopher is asleep, the rose, whose intelligible species is preserved in his intellect, is called represented, without being actually intelligible here and now, and so on.

To the second it is said that the object, as previously actual, claims no mode for itself; for quiddity abstracts from every being and mode.

To the third it is said that this mode is made by the agent intellect, and when it is inferred, “therefore it is not necessary,” the consequence is denied, because an active potency does not presuppose the condition of its object, but makes it. It is said secondly that, granted it were not made by the agent intellect, it is made by the possible intellect, and that consequence is likewise denied. To the proof it is said that it assumes something false, namely that the intellect first understands the thing and then makes its mode: both are made simultaneously. For, by forming the conceived thing without the here and now in itself, the intellect makes it; nor can one imagine that it first makes the thing and then makes it without the here and now, just as Socrates simultaneously generates this human being, and does not first generate a human being and then this one.

To the fourth it is denied that the relation of measure is founded upon some universal: for it is founded neither upon the universal nor upon the singular as such, but upon one nature formally, which is found in the singular; and thus, as such, it is not one numerically as the measure of other things, but one formally.

To the fifth it is said that it concludes nothing else than that the universal as a thing is outside the soul: for, when the universal is taken in this way, a passion or real operation inheres in it first; for it is man who is the first to whom laughing belongs, not universal man. Otherwise the laughable would not be found in non-universal man, such as Socrates.

To the sixth it is likewise said that the extremes of contrariety are the things themselves, not particular things as such, nor universals; otherwise non-universal things, namely this whiteness and this blackness, would not be contrary.

To the seventh it is said that these two stand together: the universal is predicated of things, and the universal is made by the intellect. For the universal as a thing is that which is predicated, and in this respect it is not made by the intellect; but the universal as aptitude is a condition of the thing which is predicated, and such a condition is made by the intellect. For predication is not owed to things unless they possess some intentional condition. Hence Aristotle too, Metaphysics VII, text XLVI, says that substance is not said of a subject, because he was speaking of it according to its nature. But in the Categories, where he was speaking of substance clothed with intentional accidents, he said that substance is said of a subject.

To what is added there it is said that all those things are verified of the universal as a thing; but the affirmative proposition must be explained negatively, so that its sense is: universals are everywhere, and so forth—that is, the very natures denominated universal do not delimit a place or time for themselves. Likewise, to what follows, it is said that form and matter belong to the quiddity of the universal, that is, of the physical thing which is denominated universal. Likewise, only universals have definition, that is, things which are denominated universal. Likewise, things denominated genera, species, and differences are outside the soul; but their conditions are through the work of the intellect.

To the eighth it is said that by “singular” we can understand two things: sometimes singularity itself, sometimes the whole, namely the singular thing. Taking singular in the first way, the consequence is conceded, but the antecedent is not true. In the second way, the antecedent is Peripatetic, but the consequence has no force: for we have already said above that many unities exist in the singular, and not only numerical unity.

And although this understood nature has the character of a universal insofar as it is compared with things outside the soul, because it is one likeness of all, nevertheless, insofar as it has being in this intellect or in that, it is a certain particular understood species. Thus the defect of the Commentator in On the Soul III is clear: he wished to conclude the unity of the intellect from the universality of the understood form, because the universality of that form is not according to the being which it has in the intellect, but according as it is referred to things, as a likeness of things. Likewise, if there were one corporeal statue representing many human beings, it is clear that that image or species of the statue would have singular and proper being insofar as it was in this matter; but it would have the character of community insofar as it was a common representation of many.

In this second part of this chapter he intends to remove Averroes’ error, by which in On the Soul III, commentary V, he wished to declare the unity of the intellect from the universality of the understood form in this way: that which is universal, retaining its universality, is numerically undistinguished; the understood form, that is, nature according to its subjective being in the intellect, is universal, retaining its universality; therefore it is numerically undistinguished; therefore its subject, which is the possible intellect, is not numerically distinct, and thus one intellect in all human beings is concluded. The major seems self-evident, because numerical distinction is opposed to universality. The minor is clear from the fact that the intelligible species represents the universal. Although this argument requires a further principle for its dissolution and its proof, nevertheless, insofar as concerns the present intention, it is destroyed from what has been said as follows: the universal is twofold, namely in being and in representing. A universal in being would exist if there were a separated nature of man, like Plato’s idea; and of such a universal the major is true but the minor false. The major is true because, since such a universal receives universality according to being, numerical distinction will likewise be repugnant to it according to being; hence it is impossible to imagine several universal human beings. The minor is false because the intelligible species is not universal in being, since it is in a singular subject, namely the possible intellect, which is a certain individual, although immaterial. But a universal in representing, as was said, is that which represents a universal thing; and of such a universal the major is false, although the minor is true. The falsity of the major can indeed be known from this: such a universal does not have universality according to its being, by which it regards the subject, and hence numerical unity or plurality arises in accidents; but it has universality according to representation, which regards the object. Hence it does not represent numerically distinct objects, but one and the same object: all the species of the same thing represent one and the same object, such as the species of humanity in you and in me, just as the same face of Socrates is seen by many through many species representing exactly the same thing. The truth of the minor understood in this way is clear from the foregoing: for the intelligible species represents the nature without representing its particular conditions, as was said. This is the meaning of the text in this part.

And because it belongs to human nature according to its absolute consideration that it be predicated of Socrates, whereas the character of species does not belong to it according to its absolute consideration, namely the consideration of human nature, but is among the accidents which follow it according to a certain being which it has in the intellect, therefore the name “species” is not predicated of Socrates, so that one says, “Socrates is a species.” This would necessarily occur if the character of species belonged to man according to the being which it has in Socrates, or according to its absolute consideration, namely insofar as it is man; for whatever belongs to man insofar as he is man is predicated of Socrates.

In this third part of this chapter he intends to exclude the following objection from what has been said: what is predicated of a predicate is predicated also of the subject; but species is predicated of man, which is a predicate with respect to Socrates; therefore species is predicated of Socrates, and thus Socrates will be a species. The conclusion is false; the major is true, as is found in the antepredicaments. He shows from the distinction stated above of the things which belong to nature where the error of this objection arises, while also indicating how suitably the doctrine was given, since accidental difficulties are dissolved by it. For since it has been said that there are three kinds of things predicated of nature—some absolutely, some according to being in the intellect, and some according to being in the singular—those which belong to nature according to being in the intellect do not belong to it absolutely or according to being in the singular, since these are opposed; and therefore an error occurs in the stated process, because specific denomination belongs to man according to being in the intellect, while it is concluded of man according to being in the singular, when one infers: therefore Socrates is a species.

To make the form of the argument clear, he indicates the following distinction: being predicated of a predicate occurs in two ways. In one way, as a predicate, that is, according as it is predicated of another, as animal is predicated of the predicate of Socrates, namely man, according to that according to which man is predicated of Socrates. For according to the same thing man receives the predication of animal and is predicated of Socrates according to his nature; and in this way the major is true, but the minor false. In another way, something is predicated of a predicate not as a predicate, that is, not according to that character by which the predicate is predicated of its subject. Thus in the present case species is not predicated of man insofar as man is the predicate of Socrates, that is, species is not predicated of man according to the being by which man is predicated of Socrates, since man is predicated of Socrates according to his quiddative being absolutely. But species is predicated of man not according to quiddative being, but according to the being which it has in the intellect. In this way the major is false and the minor true; therefore one of the premises is false. This is what is said in the text: the character of species does not belong to man according to his absolute consideration, according to which it belongs to him to be predicated of Socrates, because in that case it would also have to belong to Socrates, as was said above; but it belongs to him according to being in the intellect, according to which being it is predicated of Socrates.

And yet being predicated belongs to genus per se, since it is placed in its definition. For predication is something completed through the action of the intellect composing and dividing, yet having a foundation in the thing, namely the very unity of those things one of which is said of the other. Hence the character of predicability can be enclosed in the character of this intention, which is genus, and which likewise is completed through the action of the intellect. Nevertheless, that to which the intellect attributes the intention of predicability, composing it with another, is not the intention of genus itself, but rather that to which the intellect attributes the intention of genus, such as what is signified by the name “animal.” Thus it is clear how essence or nature is related to the character of species: the character of species is not among those things which belong to it according to its absolute consideration, nor among the accidents which follow it according to the being which it has outside the soul, such as whiteness or blackness; but it is among the accidents which follow it according to the being which it has in the intellect. In this way the character of genus or difference belongs to it.

In this fourth part of this chapter he intends to respond to a tacit objection, which is this: what is predicated per se of species belongs to the species themselves; but “genus” is predicated per se of species, namely of man and ox; therefore “genus” belongs to the species themselves, and thus man will be a genus, and likewise ox. The major is evident from the terms; for it implies that something be predicated per se of something in any mode of per se predication and not belong to it. The minor is proved thus: that in whose definition it is placed that it is predicated of species is predicated per se of them; but “genus” is that in whose definition it is placed that it is predicated of species; therefore genus is predicated per se of species. The major of this syllogism is clear from the fact that every part of a definition in the nominative, in the first mode of per se predication, belongs to the defined thing. The minor is clear from Porphyry, who says: genus is predicable of many things differing in species.

The same argument can wholly be made concerning species with respect to the individual, since in the definition of species too it is placed that it is predicated of individuals; and thus it seems that it was wrongly said that Socrates is not a species. The motive of this objection is merely touched upon in the text, when it says: nevertheless, being predicated per se belongs to genus, since it is placed in its definition.

The response is set down in what remains, where, for a full discussion of this matter, he indicates two distinctions. The first is that being predicated is taken in two ways, namely formally and fundamentally or materially. The second is that genus is taken in two ways, namely formally and fundamentally or materially. And you must know, in order to understand the terms, that in this proposition, “man is an animal,” there are three things: “man,” “is,” and “animal.” Outside the soul these are nothing other than the human nature imported by “man,” the sentient nature imported by “animal,” and the unity or conjunction of these with one another imported by “is.” For apprehending these three in its second operation, the intellect forms the proposition “man is an animal”; and, once it has been formed, reflecting upon those three insofar as they terminate the act of its composition, it discovers and attributes certain relations to them. To “man” it attributes the relation of subject; to “animal,” the relation of predicate; and to “is,” the relation of predication. Hence predication formally is that relation discovered by the intellect; fundamentally or materially, it is the conjunction of the predicated thing with the subject thing. Likewise, when the intellect apprehends the sentient nature and reflects upon it as it stands under its act, and sees it as indifferently related to the species in which it had first inspected that nature as being preserved, it attributes to the sentient nature or animal as object the relation of genus. Thus genus formally is that relation, while genus fundamentally or materially is the nature itself, namely the sentient nature. Thus the terms of the distinctions are clear.

From these three things are deduced. First, since genus fundamentally, namely animal, includes in its definition neither fundamental predication—for the conjunction of animal with man or ox is not placed in the definition of animal—nor formal predication—for a second-intention thing is not placed in the definition of a thing—it follows that genus is taken formally when defined by Porphyry.

Second, since in the formal definition of genus fundamental predication of a species, namely of man, does not fall, because the generic relation is not really joined to the thing denominated species, it follows that “predicated of many” placed in the definition of genus must be taken formally, namely for the relation of predication. For one relation can fall within the definition of another, so that the concept of the relation which is predication of many falls within the concept of the relation which is genus, and so forth. From this you see how consistently with St. Thomas those speak who assert that genus and species are defined as second intentions in the concrete.

Third, it is to be deduced that something is said to be predicated of a species in two ways. In one way, as the thing denominated predicable of species; thus animal is predicated of man and ox. In another way, as that by which the thing is denominated predicable of species; thus genus, in whose definition it is placed that it is predicated of species, is predicated of its species. Likewise, something is called dispersive of sight in two ways. In one way, as the thing denominated dispersive of sight; in this way snow is called dispersive of sight. In another way, as that by which the thing is denominated dispersive of sight; thus whiteness is called dispersive of sight, since in its definition it is placed that it disperse sight. And just as these two stand together—namely, that the thing defined by “to disperse sight” is whiteness and not snow, while the thing denominated dispersive of sight is snow and not whiteness—so precisely in the present case these two stand together: the thing defined by “to be predicated of species” is the generic relation, while the thing denominated predicable of species is the nature underlying that relation, namely animal. Thus the thing defined by “to be predicated,” and so forth, is genus formally but not materially, while the thing denominated predicable is genus materially but not formally. Hence the text says that the character of predicability is enclosed in this intention which is genus; nevertheless, that to which the intellect attributes the intention of predicability is not the intention of genus itself, but the thing to which the intellect also attributes the intention of genus.

From these the response to the objection is clear. Speaking of that which is predicated per se of species as the thing denominated predicated, the major is true but the minor false; speaking of that which is predicated per se as the character of denominating, the major is false although the minor is true. Hence, since one of the premises is always false, nothing is concluded. Using the distinction now assigned in simple terms, you can say this: the predicable of species is twofold, formally and denominatively. What is predicated denominatively of man and ox is animal; what is predicated formally of man and ox is genus. Of the predicable denominatively the minor is false; of the predicable formally the major is false. When you apply these statements to species with respect to individuals, to difference, property, accident, and the rest of this kind, you will solve many objections, and the truth of many propositions which appear obscure will shine upon you. The remainder of the chapter is an epilogue: they are self-evident, and so forth.