In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria

He shows that essence is properly said of substances, but of accidents only in a qualified sense. The essences of simple substances are nobler than the essences of composite substances. The essence of a composite substance is neither matter nor form, nor the relation between them, nor finally anything added to the composite, but the composite itself.

But since being is said absolutely and first of substances, and later and in a qualified sense of accidents, it follows that essence is properly and truly in substances, but is in accidents in a certain way and in a qualified sense, and so forth.

Having completed the first of the proposed matters, he carries out in this second part of the treatise how essence is found in different things in different ways, which was proposed second. First he declares how essence is found in substances in three chapters; second, in separate substances in two chapters; third, in accidents in a single chapter. Concerning composite substances, three things are declared in those three chapters: in the first, what the essence of composite substances is; in the second, how the essences of composite substances differ from one another; in the third, how they are related to logical intentions. Beginning to carry out in this chapter how essence is found differently in different things, he first declares this in general, comparing all the essences of the universe with one another in two comparisons. Second, he explains what the essence of composite substances is through three negative conclusions and a fourth affirmative one. Third, he raises and solves a certain doubt concerning the affirmative conclusion. First he makes the first comparison between the essences of substances and accidents with this conclusion: Substance truly and properly has essence; accident has it in a qualified sense. He proves it as follows: each thing has essence in the same way as it is a being; but substance is a being without qualification, whereas accident is a being in a qualified sense; therefore substance has essence without qualification, whereas accident has it in a qualified sense. The major is evident from what was said in the preceding chapter. Although the minor is found at the beginning of VII Metaphysics, it is nevertheless proved in the text as follows: that is a being without qualification of which being is predicated absolutely and first, and that is a being in a qualified sense of which being is said later and in a qualified sense. But being is said absolutely and first of substance, and later and in a qualified sense of accident. Therefore substance is a being without qualification, whereas accident is a being in a qualified sense.

Whether being is said primarily of substance and secondarily of accident, or univocally of both.

This question asks whether being is said primarily of substance and secondarily of accident, or univocally of both. Five matters are treated: first, the title; second, Scotus’s opinion; third, arguments against it; fourth, St Thomas’s opinion; fifth, replies to the opposing arguments.

Regarding the first, something may be predicated primarily and secondarily in two ways: according to the being of the predicate, or according to its proper account. A predicate is analogical according to being when it has being more perfectly in one thing than another; thus every genus is predicated primarily and secondarily of its species. The Commentator says that this does not destroy the unity of the genus. That is not the question here: it is self-evident that being is more perfect in substance than in accidents, and is predicated primarily and secondarily in this sense.

A predicate is analogical according to its proper account when it is predicated of one without reference to another, but of another only with reference to the first. Thus healthy is predicated of an animal without reference to diet, medicine, or urine, but of these only with reference to the animal. An animal is healthy without qualification; urine is healthy because it signifies health in an animal, diet because it preserves health, and medicine because it causes it. The present doubt is whether being is predicated absolutely of substance but only relatively of accidents—equivalently, whether substance, insofar as it is being, does not include accident, while accident, insofar as it is being, includes substance. Everyone grants that accident as accident includes substance; the dispute with Scotus concerns accident as being.

Regarding the second, Scotus maintains: Being is univocal to substance and accident, God and creature. He proves it thus. Every intellect certain about one concept and doubtful about diverse ones has a concept about which it is certain distinct from the concept about which it is doubtful. Anyone can be certain that God or a proper passion is being while doubting whether it is finite or infinite, substance or accident. Therefore the concept of being is distinct from these concepts, and is included in neither by itself but in both; hence it is univocal. The major is evident from the terms; experience supplies the minor.

Second: if being is not univocal, God cannot naturally be known by us through any simple concept; but this is false. No concept can be produced in our intellect unless it is contained essentially or virtually in an object shining in the phantasm. A concept non-univocal to God and to that object is contained in it neither essentially nor virtually; therefore every simple concept we have of God is univocal with the creature, and consequently with the concept of being.

Third: every metaphysical inquiry about God proceeds by considering the formal account of something, removing the imperfection it has in creatures, retaining that formal account, and attributing supreme perfection to it in God. Therefore every inquiry about God presupposes that the intellect has the same univocal concept acquired from creatures.

Fourth: if being is not univocal to substance and accident, substance cannot naturally be known by us; but this is false. Since substance does not immediately move our intellect to an act concerning itself, but only sensible accident does, we could have no quidditative concept of substance unless one could be abstracted from the concept of accident; but no such concept can be abstracted unless being is univocal to accident and substance.

The assumption that substance does not immediately move our intellect is proved thus. Whatever moves the intellect by its presence can be naturally known by the intellect through its absence when the intellect is moved; sight, for example, knows darkness when light is absent because sight is then not moved by light. Therefore, if substance immediately moved the intellect to an act concerning it, its absence could be naturally known; and one could know that consecrated bread lacks the substance of bread, which is plainly false.

Fifth, authorities are cited. Aristotle, proving that the cause of being and truth is maximally being and true, assumes that whatever is maximally itself is said of others insofar as it inheres in them univocally. Thus being is univocally said of the cause of being, God, and of other things. Avicenna likewise says that substance and quantity have no common intention except being, of which some are quasi-species and others quasi-proper accidents. He also gives the argument from certainty and doubt. Algazel reports that some held being to predicate no concept other than its inferiors, saying that the being of accident is nothing other than the being of substance. Many other arguments are omitted, since they prove only the otherness of the concept of being, not its univocity.

Regarding the third, first: no univocal thing has, in the account of its univocal nature, more than another univocal thing. Substance and accident are per se univocals under being. Therefore accident has nothing more than substance in the account of its univocal nature, being.

The reasoning is sound, but its conclusion false; therefore one premise is false. It is not the major, which follows from the antepredicaments, but the minor, which is the opposing party’s conclusion. Its falsity is shown in the seventh book of the Metaphysics, where substance is said to enter the account of accident insofar as it is being; the Commentator says that sitting and standing are not beings without substance. Yet accident does not enter the account of substance insofar as it is being. Antonio Trombeta himself concedes that substance enters the definition of accident insofar as it is being. Thus Scotus may apparently answer the argument by glossing Aristotle, though the gloss destroys the text; Trombeta cannot answer it without contradicting his own concession.

Second: being is a univocal quid-predicate of many specifically diverse things, included quidditatively in no difference; therefore it is a genus. The consequence follows from the definition of genus. The first two parts are Scotus’s own; the third is proved thus. If being were included in a non-ultimate difference, adding that difference to the genus would be nugatory. This is false, since being would be posited twice, once as genus and once as difference.

Scotus’s response that “rational animal,” like “white animal,” is not nugatory does not address the point. One thing is to speak of being in its common account, under which the things above are univocal, and another to speak of being as particularized. Being taken formally in the account of whiteness cannot denote the first part of the account of animal. Since it is taken univocally in the same way, saying “rational animal” remains nugatory—indeed, by the same reasoning, so does “white animal.”

If someone says that being is not included quidditatively in rational and white, but in rationality and whiteness, this still yields our principal point: being is not quidditatively included in any difference. Rationality is not a difference but the principle of a difference, according to Avicenna; a difference is predicated of a species, rationality is not.

Third: being is univocal to substance and accident; therefore being explicitly enters the account of substance, and hence explicitly enters the definition of man. This is inconvenient and contrary to Aristotle and the common way; therefore being is not univocal. Every univocal superior explicitly enters the essential account of its inferior, as animal enters the account of man. Since substance enters man’s definition, and its account includes being, being ought explicitly to enter man’s definition. Scotus confirms this by holding being to be the first distinctly known, because it enters the quidditative concept of everything as the first quidditative predicate.

Regarding the fourth, note the difference between the univocal, pure equivocal, and analogical. Univocals have a common name and an absolutely same account; pure equivocals have a common name and an absolutely different account; analogates have a common name and an account partly same and partly different. Animal and medicine are analogates under healthy: both are called healthy, but an animal has health whereas medicine causes health.

There are two kinds of analogates: according to a determinate relation of one to another, and according to proportionality. Substance and accident are analogates of the first kind under being; God and creature are of the second, since the distance between them is infinite. In the first kind, the posterior is defined through the prior, as accident insofar as it is being is defined through substance. In the second it is not: creature as being is not defined through God. The first kind has a common name and an account same and different in a qualified sense because the posterior regards the prior; the second has this qualified sameness through identity of proportion.

Substantial form and matter and accidental form and matter are analogates under form and matter. Substantial form is to substance as accidental form is to accident; matter of substance is to substance as matter of accident is to accident. In both cases the proportion is identical while the natures differ. The Commentator expresses this in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, and Aristotle more clearly in the first book of the Ethics.

With these preliminaries, I posit two conclusions. First: Being is said analogically of substance and accident in both modes of analogy. Second: Being is said of God and creature only in the second mode. The first follows especially from the first argument against Scotus, and from Aristotle and the Commentator, who say that being is not one but related to one. The principles of the categories are alike only proportionally; what has no identity except proportion lacks univocal unity. This authority must be noted against Scotists who grant both analogical being and univocal identity, whereas Aristotle grants only proportional identity.

The second conclusion is now proved by St Thomas’s authority in the questions on truth. In examining how created knowledge is analogous to divine knowledge, he expressly says it is analogous in the second mode, not the first. Thus being is said of God and creature proportionally: as God is related to his being, so creature is related to its being. The formal concept of being is one, representing unequally the being of substance and accident, God and creature; the objective concept has only the unity of determinate proportion or of proportionality. Such unity suffices for a scientific object, so being need not be univocal in order to have properties and ground contradiction.

Regarding the fifth, replies are made in order.

To the first: if the argument proves anything, it proves otherness of concept, not univocity, as Scotus himself says. We readily concede this, as does Avicenna, who denies that being is a quidditative predicate but grants that it expresses another concept.

To the second, the consequence is denied. Virtual containment may mean either that a cause contains its effect by its power, or that an effect contains the power of its cause by participating in it. On the latter meaning the minor is false: every effect virtually contains God, and what contains in this way need not be prior but is necessarily posterior. If the word is pressed, the major is false, since there are three modes of containment: essential, virtual, and participative.

To the third, even granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied; analogy of the formal account suffices.

To the fourth, the consequence is denied. It falsely assumes that substance does not move the intellect through its proper species. The quantity and accidents in the Eucharist act and are acted upon as substance would be if present: just as they receive substance’s mode of being without a subject, they receive its acting and being acted upon. Thus many sensed hosts generate in the intellect the intelligible species and quidditative cognition of bread’s substance, and nourish as bread would; worms and ashes arise from consecrated hosts no less than from unconsecrated ones.

To the fifth, the middle term, when compared with one extreme as its opposite, takes on the other. Thus, although being is not univocal to substance and accident, it is not pure equivocal either, but analogical. Avicenna and Algazel therefore do not contradict this position: they establish otherness of concept, not univocity. ¹

Some substances are simple and others composite, and in both there is essence. In simple substances essence and being are identical; in composite substances essence and being differ, since being is received in matter and form.

Here substances are compared with one another in this conclusion: simple substances are more perfect than composite ones. This is not because they have a different kind of essence, but because their essence is subsistent and gathers all their perfection together indivisibly.

For this reason, since the essences of simple substances are more hidden from us, we must begin with composite essences, proceeding from what is easier to know. In composite substances form and matter are known, as soul and body in man. Neither alone can be called essence: matter is not the principle of cognition, nor does it determine a thing to species or genus; this is done only by what makes it actual.

Therefore beware Scotus’s opinion that simplicity is a perfection simply. Simplicity neither signifies perfection simply nor imperfection simply; it is a negation of composition. Immaterial substances are more perfect through subsistent simplicity, while our inquiry properly begins with composite substances because their essences are more accessible.

Perfect simplicity, according to Anselm’s Monologion XV, is what is better in each thing than its incompatible opposite. It requires two conditions: it must express perfection, and that perfection must be better in the individual being than anything incompatible with it. Relation and negation are excluded for failure of the first condition; reasoning, laughter, and barking are excluded for failure of the second, since they are better in an individual nature, not in being as such. “Not itself” must be understood as incompatible, not contradictory; otherwise every positive thing would be a perfection simply. Simplicity fails the first condition because it is a negative predicate.

Against Scotus one may argue that no perfection simply is preserved in relation as relation, whereas simplicity is preserved in relation as relation: the relation to God is utterly simple, and every ultimate difference of relation, according to Scotus, is simple. Therefore simplicity is not a perfection simply.

Moreover, what is divided into quantified and non-quantified is not a perfection simply, since that would imply that something non-quantified is a perfection simply. Simplicity is divided into relative and absolute simplicity; relative simplicity is non-quantified.

If one says that formally taken relation is not simple, but that simplicity is predicated of it denominatively, the argument remains. Relative simplicity is either a property or intrinsic mode of relation; neither can be more perfect in being than its subject. Therefore relative simplicity is not quantified and cannot be a perfection simply.

The same can be argued if simplicity is called a mode, though that seems less consonant with the truth. Immaterial substances are therefore more perfect not merely by simplicity, but by subsistent simplicity, which unites in itself, indivisibly, all the perfection they possess.

Since their essences are more hidden from us, we must begin with the essences of composites, so that instruction may proceed from what is easier. In composite substances form and matter are known, as soul and body in man. Neither alone is essence. Matter alone plainly is not essence: a thing is knowable through its essence and is placed in species or genus through it, while matter is not a principle of knowledge and determines nothing to species or genus except through what makes it actual. The second part of the chapter declares what essence is in composite substances and first establishes negatively that matter alone is not the essence of a composite substance. It proves this in two ways. First, the essence of a composite substance is its principle of knowing; matter alone is not its principle of knowing, since act, not potency, is the principle of knowledge.

Second, essence is that by which a thing is placed in genus and species; matter alone cannot do this, because what places a thing in species must be actual, whereas matter alone lacks actuality.

Essence cannot be form alone either. Essence is what the definition signifies, and the definitions of natural substances signify not only form but matter; otherwise natural and mathematical definitions would not differ. Matter is not added to the essence as something outside it, for that mode belongs to accidents, which do not possess a perfect essence. Hence the definition of a natural substance includes matter and form. ²

Here the second negative conclusion is established: the essence of a composite substance is not form alone. What is signified by the definition is the essence; form alone is not signified by the natural definition, since natural definitions signify form and sensible matter, whereas mathematical definitions signify form alone, that is, form without sensible matter.

One might answer that “signified by a definition” has two meanings: as a part of the defined thing, or as the subject bearing it. On this account a natural definition signifies form alone as the defined thing, while matter is signified as what bears the quiddity.

The text answers that what belongs to accidents because of the imperfection of their essence does not belong to specific substances. Receiving something outside its essence in a definition belongs to accidents because of that imperfection; therefore it does not belong to specific substances. The major follows from the terms, and the minor from the seventh book of the Metaphysics.

Although a part-form, such as the soul, can also be defined through something outside its essence, this is truly proper to accidents. Definition belongs to things in the direct line of a category possessing a complete species; since definition is composed of genus and difference, only accidents among beings with complete species are definable through an addition. The soul is defined through something outside its essence insofar as it shares the nature of an accident by being in another.

Nor can essence signify a relation between matter and form, or something added to them. Such a thing would necessarily be an extrinsic accident and would not be the principle through which the thing is known. These are all properties of essence. Through form, the act of matter, matter becomes an actual being and a this-something. What supervenes does not give matter being simply, but being such, as accidents make a thing actually white; therefore acquiring such a form is not generation simply, but generation in a qualified sense.

The third negative conclusion is: the essence of a composite substance is not a relation between matter and form, nor anything added to the composite of matter and form. Every such relation or addition is an extrinsic accident, while no essence of a composite substance is an extrinsic accident. Whatever comes to a being already simply and makes it formally such is an accident of an extrinsic nature; a relation between matter and form and every addition to the composite do precisely this.

The minor is explained by the fact that substantial form coming to matter gives being simply and makes this-something, whereas generation terminating in substantial form is generation simply, and generation terminating in accidental form is generation in a qualified sense. When Socrates’s matter acquires substantial form, Socrates is said simply to come to be; when, already formed, it acquires magnitude, Socrates is not said simply to come to be, but to become large.

The second argument is that no addition, whether the intervening relation or anything consequent upon the composite, is the proper a priori principle of complete knowledge of the composite substance. But the essence of a composite substance is the proper a priori principle of its complete knowledge. Therefore essence is not such an addition. It remains that the name essence in composite substances signifies what is composed of matter and form. This agrees with Boethius, who says that ousia signifies the composite; with Avicenna, who says that the quiddity of composite substances is the composition of form and matter; and with the Commentator, who calls the nature of generated species a middle, namely a composite of matter and form. Reason agrees: the being of a composite substance belongs neither to form alone nor matter alone, but to the composite itself. Essence is that according to which a thing is said to be; hence it must be both, although form alone is in its way the cause of this being. As sweetness is caused by heat digesting moisture, yet a body is called sweet from the taste embracing both, not from heat alone, so a composite is called being from what embraces both principles. The fourth affirmative conclusion is: essence in composite substances signifies the composite of matter and form. This follows from Boethius, Avicenna, and the Commentator, and from the argument that what denominates a composite substance as being through a complete principle is the composite. A thing constituted from several principles is not such through one principle alone, but through what embraces them all. A composite substance is constituted from matter and form; therefore it is a being through the composite embracing both. The example of flavors makes the point clear, while the claim that form alone causes being will be explained below.

Whether matter is part of the natural quiddity.

Concerning the foregoing, it is questioned whether matter is part of natural quiddity. In this question I shall do three things: first, set forth the opinion of the Commentator; second, set forth the opinion of St. Thomas; third, answer the opposing arguments. As to the first, the Commentator, in Metaphysics VI, commentaries XXI and XXXIV, holds that matter is not part of natural quiddity, but falls into the definition of the natural thing as that which bears the quiddity. In commentary XXXIV he adduces the following argument for this: the essence of a thing is a substance declaring the thing quiddatively; matter is not a substance declaring the quiddity of the thing; therefore matter does not belong to the essence of the thing. The minor is gathered from Physics I, text LXIX, where it is said that matter in itself is unknown, and consequently is not declarative of something else. From commentary XXI, moreover, the following argument can be elicited: if the quiddity of man were the composite man made of matter and form, then the quiddity of man would have a quiddity; and thus there would be a quiddity of a quiddity, which is false. The consequence holds, because whatever things are the same, whatever one has, the other also has: if, therefore, the quiddity of man and the composite man are the same, since the composite man has a quiddity, it follows that the quiddity of man has a quiddity. Aristotle seems to teach this same position in Metaphysics VII, text XXXIV, expressly saying that matter is not part of quiddity, and in Physics II, text XXXIII, placing the parts of a definition in the genus of formal cause. Hence also in Metaphysics X, text XXV, he says that male and female do not vary in species, because they are material differences. It may also be persuaded from the consequences of matter; for matter is the cause of corruption, of the distinction of supposit from nature, of sensibles, and of the like, whose opposites belong to quiddities: for the essences of things are ungenerated, incorruptible, insensible, and so forth. This concludes the first point.

CONCLUSION

Matter is part of the quiddity of a natural substance.

As to the second, St. Thomas, in Metaphysics VII at the cited text XXXIII, in the First Part, question LXXV, article 4, and here, holds that matter is part of the quiddity of a natural substance. He proves this conclusion with three arguments, two of which are placed in the text; the third is this: whatever belongs to the essence of all the individuals contained under a species, when universally conceived, belongs to the essence of the species. This is true because otherwise the specific essence would not be predicated essentially of the whole essence of the individual. But matter belongs to the essence of all natural individuals; therefore matter, universally taken, belongs to the essence of the species, and thus does not enter the species as that which bears it, but as an essential part. The opponents say concerning the first argument made in the text that it is proper to accidents to be defined by an addition of another genus; this does not belong to substances, but substances are defined by an addition of their own genus, for matter belongs to the genus in which the borne quiddity is. On the contrary: then there is no difference between the definition of the form of a part and the definition of the form of the whole, except perhaps according to the mode of signifying, since both are defined by an addition of their own genus; and thus the definition of soul and of the living thing will be the same. Then, just as no genus of the category of substance is placed in the definition of soul, so none will be placed in the definition of the living thing, and similarly with the others—which is manifestly false. St. Thomas’s position is further confirmed in three ways. First: in every object taken quiddatively to which some adequate property belongs, the cause of that property must be found intrinsically. But a body subject to contrariety, taken quiddatively, is a subject to which corruptibility belongs as an adequate property. Therefore, in a body subject to contrariety and taken quiddatively, the cause of corruptibility must be found intrinsically; and such a cause is none other than matter; therefore, and so forth. The major is self-evident, because a property flows from the intrinsic principles of the quiddity; otherwise it would not belong to it according to what it is. The minor is made clear by the fact that corruptibility is first concluded of a body subject to contrariety. That matter is the cause of corruptibility is especially clear according to the Commentator. Second: that which is part of human nature is part of human quiddity, because nature and quiddity are the same; but matter is part of human nature; therefore, and so forth. The minor is proved by the fact that matter is nature, Physics II, text XXI. And if it is not a part, then there must be in Socrates two non-partial natures, because they are not parts of any nature—which is impossible. Third, it is shown that this was Aristotle’s mind in Metaphysics I and VIII, texts XV and XVI, where he assigns the cause why the definition of composites is one: because from act and potency one thing naturally comes to be. Simple quiddities, he says, immediately possess unity through themselves, since they are forms alone. From this it follows that if the essence of a composite substance were form alone, Aristotle would not need to assign the reason why it is one: form is one through itself. But because it is composite, he therefore said that it has unity because one part is act and the other potency. Likewise, in Metaphysics IX, at the final text, he says that error occurs in the quiddities of composites, but not in those of simple things, because of the multitude of parts from which those quiddities are composed. Hence error can arise from their composition, whereas it has no place in simple things, since they lack parts. From this it is evident that he holds the essence of a composite to be composite and not simple, and that the quiddity of a material substance differs from a separate quiddity because the latter is essentially simple, while the former is essentially composite. This concludes the second point. As to the third, the opposing arguments must be answered. Concerning the first, the minor is denied: although matter in itself—that is, taken in isolation—is unknown, when joined to and underlying such a specific or generic form it is declarative of something else. Concerning the second, the consequence is denied. In proof of it, it is said that the major can be understood in two ways. In one way: whatever things are really the same, whatever is really joined to one is also really joined to the other; this is conceded, but it is not against us. In another way: whatever things are really the same, whatever is predicated of one is predicated of the other; in this way it is false. For something belongs to one insofar as it is conceptually distinct from the other, which does not belong to the other, as in the present case: to have a quiddity belongs to man insofar as he is conceptually distinct from his quiddity. For he is distinguished from it as the possessor from what is possessed. Since, therefore, the major must be distinguished in this way in the present case, the argument does not proceed. Concerning what is added from Aristotle, it is said that Metaphysics VII does not remove matter from quiddity, but removes particular matter and those parts which are accidental to the understanding of the species—hands and feet, for example—from the account of man: these flesh and these bones. That the parts of a definition are placed in the genus of formal cause is not contrary to what we say. For we must remember that every higher genus stands as formal with respect to the lower, as Aristotle establishes there. Male and female, although they do not differ in species in the genus of animal, as white and black do, nevertheless differ in species in the genus of sex; the differences of this genus are accidental to the genus of animal and arise from the side of matter, and therefore in that genus they do not cause specific diversity. Concerning the final confirmation from the properties of matter, it is said that those properties follow matter as it exists particularly, and do not follow matter abstracted from singulars, which is part of the specific quiddity. Therefore they need not be present in the quiddity, nor must matter be removed from quiddity because their opposites are present in the quiddity. But because the principle of individuation is matter, it may seem to follow that the essence which embraces matter and form together is merely particular and not universal; from this it would follow that universals have no definition, if essence is what is signified by a definition. In the third part of this chapter he objects against the fourth conclusion as follows: that which intrinsically comprehends matter in itself is particular; the essence of a composite substance intrinsically comprehends matter in itself; therefore the essence of substance is particular; therefore there is no universal essence of a composite substance—which is false. Further, it follows that natural universals are not definable, because among natural things only essences are definable, since a definition signifies the essence of a thing; but the essences of natural things, as has been established, are particular. The major is proved thus: that which has the principle of individuation intrinsically in itself in actuality is particular; that which intrinsically has matter has the principle of individuation in itself, because matter is the principle of individuation; therefore, and so forth. Accordingly, it must be known that matter is not the principle of individuation when taken in just any way, but only designated matter. I call designated matter that which is considered under determinate dimensions. This matter is not posited in the definition of man insofar as he is man, but would be posited in the definition of Socrates, if Socrates had a definition. In the definition of man, however, non-designated matter is posited: for this bone and this flesh are not posited in the definition of man, but bone and flesh absolutely, which are the non-designated matter of man.

Here he answers the objection by destroying the major together with its proof, saying that matter is taken in two ways: designated and non-designated. Designated matter is the principle of individuation; non-designated matter is posited as part of the specific essence. Designated matter would be posited in the definition of Socrates, if he were defined; non-designated matter is posited in the definition of universals. Hence it is clear that universals are defined and nevertheless include matter, but non-designated matter, which is the principle of particularity.

Whether matter is the principle of individuation.

Concerning this part, it is asked whether matter is the principle of individuation. In this question there are six matters to be handled. First, the title will be explained; second, Scotus’s opinion will be set forth; third, it will be refuted; fourth, the opinion of St. Thomas will be set forth; fifth, arguments will be made against it; sixth, the arguments on the contrary will be answered. As to the first, note that when the principle of individuation is discussed, since “individual” signifies two things, namely, what is undivided in itself and what is distinct from others, nothing else is being asked except by what specific nature is first made incommunicable, so that it is repugnant to it to be communicated to many, as it is communicated to inferiors by superiors, and by what this individual is first really distinguished from others of the same species. Therefore two things concurrent in individuation are asked: namely, by what specific nature is first made incommunicable, and by what it is first really distinguished from others of the same species. And observe carefully the individual parts of the title which we have explained, since I find some people err in this matter. For here we are dealing with incommunicability opposed to real communication, and not with incommunicability opposed to communication of form; no one doubts that the latter belongs first to matter. Likewise, here we are dealing with the real distinction of individuals under the same species, which exists only among real beings, and not with the distinction by which living Socrates and dead Plato are distinguished. Always observing that now we speak only of the individuation of material substances. So much for the first.

SCOTUS’S PROPOSITION.

Not matter, nor form, nor the composite, but an individual property, haecceity, is the principle of individuation.

As to the second, Scotus, in II Sentences, distinction III, question vi, holds that specific nature is individuated through something positive contracting it through itself and making one with it: so that this positive thing is neither matter, nor form, nor the composite, but is the mode of all things or the ultimate reality of matter, form, and composite, really identical with them; and thus he gives this conclusion concerning the principle of individuation: The principle of individuation is not matter, nor form, nor quantity, but an individual property, namely, haecceity. I now omit the proofs of this conclusion concerning the first three parts, to be brought forward later insofar as they pertain to the point at issue. For the fourth he argues as follows: unity follows being, proportionally speaking; for in the same way a thing is being and one; therefore ultimate unity simply, namely numerical or individual unity, follows individual being. But it is clear that this individual being is none of the things which are actually in the species, nor any accident, since all accidents are posterior; therefore it is an individual property, constitutive of individuals. And he argues as follows: that to which numerical unity first follows is the principle of individuation: that property or haecceity is what numerical unity first follows; therefore haecceity is the principle of individuation. The major is clear, because unity proportionally follows being. The minor is proved because numerical unity does not follow quiddity, as is evident, nor any accident, since it precedes the whole genus of accidents. Secondly, as follows: every difference of things differing is reduced to things first diverse, otherwise there would be no terminus among things differing; but individuals properly differ; therefore their difference is reduced to things first diverse. These are neither their natures, nor privations, nor any accidents; therefore they are haecceities. The proof of this last assumption concerning the third part is as follows: if the difference of individuals is reduced to an accident, it is reduced chiefly to quantity; but this is not so. This is clear as follows: let it be asked by what this quantity and that quantity differ; not through themselves, for thus they would be specifically distinct; therefore through something else, for example, places. But this cannot be, because either they are distinguished by place, which is a special category, and this is not so, because place is posterior to quantity, or by place, which is a difference of quantity, and this is not so, because it must be asked by what those places are distinguished: either through themselves, and this cannot be said, since they are not these places through themselves, or through something else, and so on to infinity. And therefore, since place, which is a difference of quantity, is integrated from the continuity and permanence of parts, it is the same to say that this quantity differs from that on account of another place, and that this quantity differs from that quantity through itself. Thirdly, as follows: that which through its whole self first constitutes some singular in its singular being and in the unity consequent upon such being, through its whole self first repugns division contrary to that unity, and consequently is the principle of individuation; but only an individual property or haecceity is of this kind; therefore, and so forth. The major is clear from the terms, and the minor is proved in the same way as above. So much for the second. As to the third, an argument is made against Scotus’s opinion in four ways. First, as follows: every singular act presupposes a singular potency which it actualizes; but haecceity is a singular act; therefore it presupposes a singular potency which it actualizes; but that potency is the nature or is in the nature of the individual; therefore the nature of the individual is singular before the arrival of haecceity, and thus haecceity is not the principle of individuation. All the propositions assumed are Scotus’s in this matter, including the major, which nevertheless is proved from the teaching of Aristotle, Physics II, text XXxvul, where he teaches the comparisons of causes; hence, just as a particular form presupposes particular matter, so act presupposes potency. If it is said that this is true where act and potency are really distinct, because according to Scotus, when two things are really united, they retain by nature the same order which they would have if they were really distinct: since therefore a singular act, if it were really distinct, would by its nature presuppose a singular potency, it is necessary that it should now require the same thing, since the order remains the same. Secondly, as follows: those things which are principles of individuation are through themselves first diverse; the haecceities of Socrates and Plato are not of this kind; therefore. The major is Scotus’s; the minor is proved as follows: that which agrees more with one than with another is not first diverse from the one with which it agrees more; but Plato’s haecceity agrees more with Socrates’ haecceity than with the haecceity of whiteness; therefore the haecceities of Plato and Socrates are not first diverse. The major of the prosyllogism is clear from the terms: for what is first diverse from another does not agree with it. The minor is proved in two ways: first, because the haecceities of Socrates and Plato agree in species, while the haecceities of Socrates and whiteness differ in genus; second, because those things agree more which are more alike, and those are more alike which are more comparable; but the haecceities of Socrates and Plato are more comparable than the haecceities of Socrates and whiteness, just as universally things of the same category are more comparable than things of different categories. Third, as follows: that which agrees with and repugns to another individual of the same species necessarily presupposes their distinction: an individual property, for example, Socrateity, agrees with Socrates and repugns to Plato, an individual of the same species; therefore an individual property presupposes the distinction of Socrates from Plato, and thus an individual property is not that by which Socrates is first distinguished from Plato. The conclusion is false according to Scotus; the reasoning is sound; therefore one of the premises is false; but both are his; therefore he is altogether proved false. The major is found in Scotus in every question II; the minor, however, is his conclusion which we are now attacking. Fourth, I show that this position contradicts the Peripatetics, Aristotle, and the Commentator. For in Metaphysics XII, text XLI, this consequence is made: the first heaven, that is, the first principle, is one in species and many in number; therefore it has matter; which consequence would be null if an individual property were posited as distinguishing individuals of the same species. But that Scotus’s gloss, understanding “matter” as an individual property, destroys the text, is clear from the Commentator there saying: everything which is one in species and many in number has matter; but it has already been declared that the principle of heaven has no matter; from these words it is clear that he is speaking of that matter which he declared not to be in the first principle. It also clearly appears that in text XXX he expressly declared the mover of heaven not to have matter either for place or for being, and made no mention of an individual property. The fiction of that gloss also appears from Metaphysics III, text I, where it is said that every multitude is either of things differing according to form or according to quantity, which same thing you have in the Commentator on Physics I, text VI. Nor is the gloss of Antonius Trombeta to be admitted, that it is understood concomitantly. For “according to” must be held in the same way and uniformly in the first member and in the second; in the first it denotes causality; therefore also in the other. It can also be detected that this new invention concerning haecceities is a pure fiction from On the Heavens I, texts XC and XCII, where Aristotle and the Commentator assign the unity and plurality of individuals in the same species, in material things, to matter alone. So much for the third.

CONCLUSION Designated matter is through itself the intrinsic principle of individuation, but not something aggregated from matter and quantity.

As to the fourth point, St. Thomas’s opinion, stated by him here and in many other places, is that designated matter is the principle of individuation. Concerning this conclusion, it should be noted that Thomists differ among themselves and agree. They all agree in this, that two things must concur in individuation: matter and quantity. They differ, however, because some hold that the aggregate of matter and quantity is the intrinsic principle of individuation: matter giving incommunicability, or indistinction in itself; quantity giving distinction from other things; and they call such an aggregate designated matter. Others, however, think much better, saying that the intrinsic principle of individuation, both as regards incommunicability and as regards distinction from others, is designated matter, not quantified matter, or an aggregate of matter and quantity. Since this, in my judgment, is the true doctrine of St. Thomas, as will be shown, we therefore wish to explain and defend it: first explaining what designated matter signifies; second excluding the first Thomist explanation; third proving the intended conclusion. Designated matter is nothing other than matter capable of this quantity, but not of that one; for this matter is an intrinsic part of Socrates, belonging to his definition if he were defined. For one must imagine that a particular agent—for example, this seed—continually appropriates matter for introducing a form in such a way that, just as human seed appropriates matter for a human soul, so this seed appropriates it for this soul. Hence, when at the first instant of Socrates’ generation—which is Socrates’ first being, the first non-being of the preceding form, and, in the first order of nature, of the accidents—a particular composite comes to be, and then, in natural order, all the accidents follow in that prior according to nature in which the particular composite terminates generation through itself and first, the matter that is its intrinsic part, namely Socrates’ matter, is so appropriated to Socrates by the particular agent that it is capable of no quantity other than the one Socrates determines for himself. For the magnitude and growth of everything constituted by nature are determined, as is said in On the Soul II, from Commentary XLI; and such matter is called designated matter. Designated matter therefore adds nothing to matter except the capacity for this quantity, but not for that one. The capacity of matter with respect to this quantity is nothing other than the receptive potency for this quantity, but not for that one; the receptive potency, however, says nothing really distinct in the direct signification, but adds to matter something real distinct only according to reason. Just as proper matter adds nothing really distinct from matter itself, yet says something real in matter which matter according to itself does not explain—for designated matter is definable only through this quantity, if it were defined—so proper potency is defined only through its proper act, as is said in Physics III, text X. Matter according to itself does not require this quantity in its definition. Hence the proper matter of an individual, designated matter, and matter under determinate dimensions signify the same thing. Therefore St. Thomas did not say “matter with determinate dimensions,” but “under determinate dimensions”; and elsewhere he says that just as matter, in relation to general forms—for example, the total and partial form—distinguishes heavenly bodies generically from lower bodies, so matter, in relation to this or that quantity, distinguishes things in material realities numerically. Designated matter therefore does not signify an aggregate of matter and quantity, but signifies matter directly and quantity obliquely; just as the potency of matter signifies matter directly and, obliquely, the act to which it is ordered, since it is definable only through that act. Thus it is clear what designated matter signifies. That the other Thomists do not explain it suitably is shown as follows: the principle that distinguishes an individual from its species and from another individual of the same species is the same; but matter not quantified, rather matter designated in the manner explained above, is the intrinsically distinguishing principle of an individual from its species; therefore it is not quantified matter, but designated matter, that is the intrinsic distinguishing principle of an individual from another individual of the same species. They concede the minor, and it is expressly St. Thomas’s in the treatise called On the Principle of Individuation—which, according to the truth and its ancient title, is called On Cognitive Powers, as it is held in the Supreme Pontiff’s library, where alone I have seen that treatise complete; for the one commonly possessed is truncated. The major, however, seems capable of being denied by the insolent only in words. For we universally see this to be true: whenever something common is divided into several subjective parts, the lower things differ from one another and from the superior through the same thing; thus man differs from animal and from lion through the same thing, namely his proper difference. Hence Porphyry gives three acts to difference: dividing the superior, constituting the inferior, and distinguishing the constituted thing from the superior and from its other coordinate members. This conclusion is therefore proved in the manner explained above, namely: designated matter is the intrinsic principle of individuation. That is the intrinsic principle of individuation to which it first belongs not to be communicated to many in the way a universal is communicated to a particular; but designated matter is that to which it first belongs not to be communicated as a universal to a particular; therefore, and so on. The major is conceded by all; the minor is proved.