In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria

In what way being a genus, species,

or difference belongs to essence, he shows.

Having seen what is signified by the name essence in composite substances, we must see how it relates to the notion of genus, species, and difference. Since whatever has the notion of genus, species, or difference is predicated of this designated singular, it is impossible for that notion to belong to essence insofar as it is signified in the mode of a part, as by humanity or animality. Hence Avicenna says that rational is not a difference but the principle of a difference, and for the same reason humanity is not a species, nor animality a genus.

In this fourth chapter, intending to determine how the essence of composite substances relates to the logical intentions—genus, species, and difference—he does four things: first, he determines the point at issue in six conclusions; second, he excludes an error of Averroes; third, another objection; fourth, an unspoken objection.

For understanding the first part, two distinctions should be noted. The nature or essence of a composite substance can be taken three ways: as signified in the mode of a part; as existing in itself, separated from singulars; or as signified in the mode of a whole. The last can in turn be taken according to itself, according to the being it has in singulars, or according to the being it has in the intellect.

With these preliminaries, know that according to the members of these divisions he posits individual conclusions: according to the first two members of each division, four negative conclusions; according to the last members, two affirmative conclusions. Thus each division first gives two negatives and then a third affirmative, making six conclusions.

The first negative conclusion is: The essence of a composite substance signified in the mode of a part, such as animality, humanity, or rationality, is neither genus, species, nor difference. Genus, species, and difference are predicated directly of this particular supposit, for example Socrates; but essence signified in the mode of a part is not so predicated; therefore it is neither genus, species, nor difference. Hence Avicenna says that rationality is not a difference but its principle, animality not a genus but the principle of a genus, and humanity not a species but the principle of the species of which it is a part.

Nor can the notion of genus, species, or difference belong to essence as a thing existing outside singulars, as the Platonists held; for then genus and species would not be predicated of this individual. Socrates cannot be said to be what is separated from him. Nor does that separated thing assist knowledge of this designated singular.

The second negative conclusion is: The essence of a composite substance existing in itself and not in singulars is not a species or genus. Genus or species is predicated of this particular; essence subsisting in itself and not in singulars is not predicated of it; therefore it is not genus or species. A subject is that of which something is predicated directly; Socrates is not a separated human being; therefore Socrates is not its subject, and a separated human being is not predicated of Socrates. Moreover, genus or species is that by which individuals are known; essence subsisting outside singulars is not that by which they are known, since each thing is known quidditatively through what is in it, not through what is not in it.

It therefore remains that genus, species, or difference belongs to essence insofar as it signifies in the mode of a whole, as by human being or animal, implicitly and indistinctly containing all that is in the individual.

The third affirmative conclusion is: The essence of a composite substance signified in the mode of a whole is species, genus, or dif- difference, etc. Genus, species, or difference substantially and implicitly contains all that is in individuals; the essence of a composite substance contains the whole being of individuals only when signified in the mode of a whole; therefore it is genus, species, or difference. Thus animal is a genus, human being a species, and rational a difference.

Nature or essence so taken can be considered in two ways. First, according to its proper nature and notion: this is its absolute consideration, and nothing is true of it except what belongs to it as such. Thus rational and animal belong to a human being as human, but white or black, not belonging to the notion of humanity, does not. If asked whether this nature is one or many, neither should be conceded, since both are outside the understanding of humanity and either may befall it. If plurality belonged to its notion, it could never be one, although it is one in Socrates; if unity belonged to its notion, the nature of Socrates and Plato would be one and the same and could not be multiplied. Second, it is considered according to the being it has in this or that, and then something is predicated of it accidentally by reason of that in which it is: a human being is white because Socrates is white. This nature has being in singulars and in the soul, and accordingly multiple being in diverse singulars; yet no such being belongs to it in its absolute consideration. It is therefore true that a human being as human does not have it that it is in this singular or that one. Nature absolutely considered abstracts from every being without excluding any of them, and this is what is predicated of all individuals.

Here, before the fourth conclusion, the second division is begun, whose terms must be explained. Nature signified in the mode of a whole according to itself means nature considered according to the conditions belonging to it from its definition, or in the first mode of being per se. Nature according to being in singulars means nature according to predicates belonging to it because it has being in a singular or singulars. Nature according to being in the intellect means nature according to predicates belonging to it because it has being in the intellect. The conditions of nature according to itself are essential predicates: a human being according to itself is only a rational animal. Those belonging to nature in the other two ways are denominative: a human being is not the whiteness belonging to it in Socrates, but is denominated white from it; nor is it the relation of universality or species belonging to it in the intellect, but is denominated universal or species. The former denominative predicates add something real, as white adds whiteness; the latter add nothing real, but a negative or relative denomination according to a relation of reason. When I say, “a human being is a species,” species adds only the relation of reason by which it regards its genus.

Second, these members differ because nature absolutely taken is neither numerically one nor numerically many. If it were one in number, it could not be in several things, which is false since human nature is in Socrates and Plato. If nature according to itself is one in number, it cannot be numerically distinct or be in several. Likewise, if it were many in number, human nature could not be in Socrates, since it could not have numerical unity. Nature according to being in singulars acquires both numerical unity and distinction: a human being is one because Socrates is one, and is distinct in several because Socrates and Plato are numerically distinct.

Third, nature according to itself claims no being for itself: neither being in a singular or singulars, nor being in the intellect, nor the negations of these. If being in a singular were of its notion, it would never be outside that singular; if being in singulars were of its notion, it could not be in one; if being in the intellect were of its notion, it could never be outside the intellect. Likewise, if non-being in singulars or in the intellect were of its notion, it could never have being there. Nothing can have the opposite of what belongs to its notion. Nature absolutely taken therefore abstracts from being and non-being without precision: it neither includes nor excludes either. Nature in the second and third ways includes one and excludes the other: a human being as in singulars is not in the intellect, and conversely.

Fourth, nature signified in the mode of a whole according to itself is what is predicated of individuals: “Socrates is a human being.” Nature taken as in singulars or in the intellect is not predicated of individuals. What is predicated is what is attributed in the proposition; in “Socrates is a human being,” nothing is attributed to Socrates except being a rational animal, the condition of human nature absolutely taken. Nothing owed to being in singulars or in the intellect, nor human nature with an addition, is attributed. Nature taken in the first way is therefore predicated of individuals, not nature in the second or third ways. +At this point, before proceeding further, certain doubts must be examined. First, there is a doubt concerning the first difference assigned, where it was said that only quidditative predicates belong to nature according to itself. This is difficult because of the transcendentals and certain negative predicates. If being, thing, one, something, true, and good belong to nature taken absolutely, they will be quidditative predicates and will be placed in the definition, since no definition is complete unless it includes all quidditative predicates; but everyone denies that the transcendentals are placed in a definition.

The consequence is confirmed by St Thomas’s words in the text, where what belongs to nature absolutely is said to belong to its definition. But if the transcendentals do not belong to nature absolutely, then a human being according to itself is neither something, nor a thing, nor one—which is wholly denied.

Regarding negative predicates, there is this difficulty: if negations of disparate natures belong to absolute nature, they will be quidditative predicates, and negation will thus be in the definition of substance. But if they belong to nature according to being in singulars or in the intellect, then, taking a human being absolutely, this will be false: “A human being is not a lion,” which seems irrational.

For resolving these matters, first consider how the transcendentals relate to the natures of things over which they fall. No transcendental imports another degree or nature than that of the thing to which it is added. “Being” signifies humanity insofar as it has being; “one,” insofar as it is not formally divided; “thing,” insofar as it has fixedness; “good,” insofar as it perfects appetite; “true,” insofar as it perfects the intellect; and “something,” insofar as it is one thing distinct from others. The same is to be said of any generic degree.

Second, since being is first among the transcendentals, and the others are convertible with it as its passions, once it is explained how being belongs to the natures of things, the rest will be clear. Scotus, in I Sentences, distinction III, question III, holds that being is univocal and is predicated of all inferiors except ultimate differences. Supposing the first claim as self-evident, he gives two arguments for the second.

First, if differences include being said univocally of them and are not altogether the same, they must be diverse beings that are something the same. Consequently ultimate differences will be properly different, and so will have other differences and will not be ultimate.

Second, just as a composite being in reality is composed of act and potency, so a composite concept per se one is composed of an actual concept and a potential, determinable and determining concept. As the resolution of a real composite stops at ultimate act and potency, so the resolution of a concept should stop at simply simple concepts: an actual concept and a merely determinable potency, including nothing determining, and a determining concept alone, including nothing determinable. Such are the concepts of being and ultimate difference; therefore ultimate difference does not formally include being.

Against the first I argue that it would follow that being would be placed in the definition, contrary to Aristotle, VIII Metaphysics, text XVI.

Moreover, it would follow that there would be a tautology in the definition, as we established above in the question concerning the univocity of being.

Against the second: everything of which the passions of being are predicated in the second mode, formally taken, formally includes being; but those passions are predicated in the second mode of ultimate difference formally taken; therefore ultimate difference formally includes being. The minor is clear because ultimate difference is per se one and intelligible. The major follows because whatever formally includes the proper a priori middle through which the passions of being are demonstrated includes being, the concept of being being that middle. If A did not formally include the proper middle for concluding B, B could not be demonstrable a priori of A taken formally.

I argue secondly: every passion belonging to several things formally taken belongs to them by reason of something common formally included in them, to which it first belongs; but unity or intelligibility belongs to all ultimate differences formally taken; therefore it belongs to them by reason of something common formally included in them, namely being; therefore all ultimate differences include being. Nor can one say that it is enough for the subject to be included denominatively. What formally excludes the subject excludes its passion; but ultimate differences formally taken do not exclude the passions of being in the second mode; therefore they do not exclude being in the first mode. Nor should you tolerate Francis of Mayronis saying that Aristotle’s rule does not hold in the transcendentals: it is a voluntary gloss destructive of all metaphysics.

To Scotus’s arguments it is said that since both presuppose one simple objective concept of being, they prove nothing. In reply to the second, the argument from likeness limps: the parts of a natural composite mutually exclude one another as particular things, whereas the parts of an intellectual composite cannot do so, because one—being—is so universal that nothing can evade it.

Avicenna, Alfarabi, and Algazel, as Albert reports in Post-Predicaments, chapter IX, hold that being does not belong to nature absolutely. Hence they say this consequence is invalid: “A human being is a substance; therefore a human being is a being,” because being signifies something added to the essence of the thing. The Commentator reports the same of Avicenna in IV Metaphysics, commentary III, and X Metaphysics, commentary VIII.

St Thomas expressly reproves Avicenna on this point in IV Metaphysics, lecture II on text III and lecture II on text VIII. His view therefore should not be judged identical with Avicenna’s, although it is difficult to see the difference, since he holds that nothing other than God is a being through its essence, but through something added to it; and says in the second Quodlibet, question II, article I, that being is not an essential predicate, and in I Against the Gentiles, chapter XXVI, that being does not fall within the concept of substance, the most general genus.

For this reason some say that being is taken in two ways, nominally and participially. Being nominally is predicated quidditatively and intrinsically of all things: each thing is a being through its essence. Being participially, signifying the same as existing, is not a quidditative predicate: nothing other than God is a being through its essence. Thus being nominally belongs to nature absolutely, but being participially does not. They add that being nominally is divided into the ten categories and is a transcendental convertible with the others, properly speaking, and that Avicenna was blameworthy for omitting this distinction.

I, however, find that another account must be given. I say that being participially is what is transcendental and divided into the ten categories. St Thomas, in the First Part, questions V and VI, and in the Questions on Truth, question XXI, shows that good, also divided into the ten categories, is convertible with being participially, not nominally, for two reasons.

First, he says that when good and being are convertible, just as a thing is a being, so it is good; but it is not a being through its essence; therefore neither is it good. To avoid equivocation, this concerns only being participially. Second, he says that that by which a thing is formally good is not being; but this is false of being nominally, because the actual being of existence, by which a thing is a being and good, is being participially. Therefore the being convertible with good, transcendental and divided into the ten categories, is being participially.

But in the name “being” two things can be considered: namely, that from which the name “being” is taken, namely being itself, by which a thing is; and that to which the name “being” has been imposed, namely that which is. For above, at the beginning of the work, it was said that being signifies that which is in any category; and that it differs from essence, which signifies that by which a thing is placed in a category. Hence, in Physics I, text XIII, Aristotle, in place of “being,” posits “that which is.” Avicenna, therefore, attending to that by which a thing is, from which the name “being” is taken, simply said that being is a predicate outside the essence of a thing. But St. Thomas, looking to that which is, to which the name “being” has been imposed, did not follow Avicenna. For that which is itself does not predicate something outside the essence of a thing. Moreover, observing that that by which a thing is, namely actual exsistence, is not of an extraneous nature from that which is itself, but is constituted through the proper principles of that which is itself, he did not wish to number being among accidental predicates: for this cannot be asserted of anything else outside the essence of a thing. For nothing outside the essence of a thing is constituted through the proper principles of that thing except the existence of the thing. Anything else, however, is constituted through the proper principles of another genus, namely its proper genus and its proper difference, and universally through the proper principles of that category.

But existence itself is constituted only through the genus and difference and the principles of that which is. And this is the reason by which St. Thomas argues against Avicenna in Metaphysics IV, at the place cited above; hence, when being is predicated of something, for example a man, since it does not draw man outside his proper genus and proper difference, neither by reason of that which is nor by reason of that by which he is, it remains a substantial predicate, together with Aristotle and the Commentator, at the place cited above, although it is not substantial in altogether the same way as those predicates which fall within the definition. With these preliminaries, I say in response to the doubt that the transcendentals are not proper predicates of nature according to its absolute consideration, nor according to its being in singulars, nor according to its being in the intellect; rather, they are common predicates of nature however it is taken, belonging to it not only concomitantly but also causally. And this is clear concerning nature taken both in the second and in the third way: for from the fact that man is found in singulars, he has the notion of being, of one, of thing, and of the others. Similarly, from the fact that he has being in the intellect, being is in some way undivided; etc.; for thus some being, although being of reason, is due to him. Concerning nature taken in the first way, this can be clear from what has been said, and from the fact that wherever a later transcendental is found, an earlier one is also found. But it is manifest concerning the later transcendentals, which are one, thing, something, etc., that they belong to nature absolutely. Hence, speaking absolutely of man, this is true: Man is a being. Thus St. Thomas too says in Metaphysics X, at the place cited above, that being predicates the natures of the ten genera according as they are in act or potency, and not only according as they are in act.

To the argument raised in the doubt, by which it was said, “If this is so, then the transcendentals ought to be placed in the definition,” it is said first that it is not necessary for all essential predicates to be placed in the definition, but only those which explain another essential grade of the thing defined; the transcendentals are not of this kind, since it was said that they predicate the same grade which the genus or difference conveys. Hence Aristotle says in Metaphysics VIII, commentary XIX, that being and one are not placed in definitions for this reason: being is immediately each thing; for the definition is complete when all the grades of the thing are explained from the first potency up to the ultimate intrinsic act, which is done without the transcendentals, since they add no grade. It is said secondly concerning being that, because being in some way imports being itself, which pertains to the question whether it is, and not to the question what it is, it therefore deviates somewhat from quidditative predicates.

To St. Thomas’s statement it is said that the transcendentals have two aspects: that the aforesaid notion is posited in no definition, and that they are included in every concept. As is said concerning being in Metaphysics III, text X, I think this statement should be understood according to the fact that the transcendentals accompany every grade; and therefore they are absent from no concept. And thus I say that those things which belong to nature absolutely, and fall within its notion, belong to the thing insofar as it is such; for man, insofar as he is man, is being, thing, something, etc. From these points, diligent reader, you have the basis for rightly understanding the various statements of St. Thomas.

Concerning negative predicates, however, it is said briefly that those negations can be taken in two ways, namely formally and fundamentally. If formally, it is false that they belong to nature absolutely: for they are attributed to it through the operation of the intellect, since negations are beings of reason. If fundamentally, since negation is founded upon affirmation, it is conceded that they are quidditative predicates; but taken in this way they are nothing other than the genus and proper difference. For the foundation of the negations of disparate natures predicated of man is nothing other than human nature: for from the fact that man is a rational animal, he is neither a lion nor an ox, etc.