In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria

Whether aptitudinal inherence belongs to the essence of an accident.

Regarding the first doubt, after the title has first been clarified, Scotus’s opinion will be brought forward; second, that of St. Thomas; third, the arguments on the contrary will be answered. The sense of the first doubt, then, is whether dependence upon a subject belongs to the essence of an accident: this is what others question under more specialized terms when they ask whether aptitudinal inherence belongs to the essence of an accident. Scotus, in IV Sent., dist. XII, q. I, decides this question with respect to absolute accidents, namely quantity and quality; and he says that those who turn this into a doubt are ignorant of the meaning of inherence itself. He is content with a single argument to prove that it is impossible for any inherence to belong to the essence of an absolute accident, as follows. No relation belongs to the formal concept of an absolute thing; every inherence is a relation; therefore no inherence belongs to the formal concept of an absolute thing.

The same argument is formulated differently by him, as follows: That which is essentially toward itself does not essentially include a relation, according to Augustine, On the Trinity VII, chapter II; but an absolute accident is toward itself; therefore an absolute accident does not essentially include a relation, whereas inherence is a relation; therefore.

Others confirm the same argument as follows: Everything that is said relatively is something beyond the relation; for the foundation of a relation is formally other than the relation; but an absolute accident, for example quality, is said relatively to be inherent; therefore it is something absolute beyond inherence. Moreover. Aptitudinal inherence belongs to the essence of an accident; therefore quantity and quality are not the most general genera. The consequence holds because then a common quidditative concept of the same account in all of them could be abstracted from quantity, quality, and the remaining accidents, inferior to the concept of being and superior to those nine genera, namely being in; and thus, since every such concept is a genus, the nine most general genera of accidents would not be most general, for they would have a genus supervening upon them.

The opinion of the Thomists, however, is that aptitudinal inherence belongs to the essence of an accident, and that it is not a relation.

For it must be known that something is absolute or relative in two ways, namely from a subject and from a term. An entity absolute from a subject is that which is not naturally received in another, such as substance. Something relative to another as a subject is that which is essentially naturally received in another, such as every accident. That which is absolute from a term is that which formally does not regard another precisely as a term toward which it is directed, such as substance, quantity, and quality. That which is relative to another as a term is that which formally regards another precisely as the term toward which it is directed, as does the category of relation. For in this the relation belonging to the category of relation differs from the other respects of the remaining genera, which some call transcendental: the respect belonging to the genus toward something is essentially toward another, not as a recipient or an efficient, final, or formal cause, but precisely toward another as a term; for one of the relatives is neither the form nor the end nor the efficient cause of the other, but a term. For this reason Albert the Great says that one of the relatives is not to be defined through the other, because the word through denotes causality.

The respect of the other genera, which for lack of vocabulary is called a respect, essentially regards another; but as a subject, matter, form, and things of this kind. Thus matter essentially regards form, and conversely, as was said above concerning the commensuration of the intellectual soul. Since, then, aptitudinal inherence imports a respect toward another as recipient, we say that it is not of the genus of relation, but identified with each genus, signifying now an absolute entity and now a relative one. Hence aptitudinal inherence is not prevented from belonging to the essence of an absolute accident by the fact that it is a respect; indeed, from the fact that an absolute accident is not absolute from a subject, though it is absolute from a term, it follows that an essential dependence upon a subject belongs to its essence, which aptitudinal inherence explains.

Our position is shown to be consonant with reason by the fact that just as being toward constitutes the accident of relation, so being in constitutes the universal accident. For being is contracted through being in into the nine genera of accidents; and therefore, just as toward belongs to the essence of relation, so in belongs to the essence of an accident. Hence Simplicius, in his commentary on the Categories, says that being in constitutes no genus, but encompasses every accident.

This is confirmed by the fact that unless aptitudinal inherence belonged to the essence of an accident, the accident itself could be conceived, once its definition were complete, without aptitudinal inherence being posited in its definition; which is impossible. For it must have in its definition an essential dependence upon a subject, which aptitudinal inherence explains; otherwise there would be no need of a subject for defining it. Therefore St. Thomas says in many places that the definition of an accident is this or something of the same kind: A thing to which being in another is due. So much for the second point.

To the first argument on the contrary it is said that the minor premise of the first argument is false, and Scotus appears to have been deceived because he did not see the difference between the respect In and Toward. For the respect In is not a relation. Although such a respect terminates at a subject, and consequently the subject is a term, nevertheless it does not terminate as a term, but as the recipient of that respect; and this must be carefully attended to here. For it is one thing to say, “A is the term of such a respect,” and another to say, “A terminates such a respect as a term,” as is clear from what has been said.

And through this the response is clear both to the second and to the third form of the same argument; for it always supposes that aptitudinal inherence is a relation.

To the last argument the consequence is denied: for it is said that being in has different accounts in the categories, just as being does. For in is analogical with respect to the nine genera of accidents, just as being is with respect to all genera.

From these things the solution of the second doubt is clear, in which Scotus agrees with us in IV, dist. XII, so that we unanimously confess that an accident cannot be completely defined without the addition of a subject, as has now been proved: this will become clearer below, when it has been explained from where genus and difference are taken in these things. Aristotle also testifies to this in Metaphysics VII, texts XV and XVII.

Let the third doubt, since it is too extensive, be left to be discussed elsewhere; for its full resolution would have to fill many quires.