In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria

Whether the perfections existing in God are distinct in some way apart from every work of the intellect.

Here it is asked whether the perfections existing in God Himself are distinct in some way apart from every work of the intellect.

Five matters are to be treated in this question. First, the title of the question will be explained. Second, Scotus’s opinion with its foundations will be recited. Third, St. Thomas’s opinion will be explained. Fourth, Scotus’s opinion will be refuted. Fifth, the arguments for the opposite will be answered.

As to the first, know first that perfection is twofold: one is perfection simply, and the other perfection in this or that. Perfection simply is that which in its proper and formal concept states perfection with no imperfection, such as wisdom, goodness, and the like. Perfection in this or that is that which in its proper and formal concept states perfection mixed with imperfection, such as humanity, equinity, and the like. I said “in its proper and formal concept,” because including some imperfection in a concept common to it and others, or materially, does not detract from perfection simply. Although wisdom in the concept of its genus, say habit or quality, states imperfection—potentiality or dependence, and so on—because it does not formally include these in its differential concept, it is not prevented from being perfection simply. I said that it is called perfection because of the relation which, in its proper and formal concept, signifies no perfection together with no imperfection.

Know secondly that perfections can be in something in two ways: formally or virtually. To be formally in something is to be in it as a form is in that which possesses it, as humanity, whiteness, quantity, and the like are in a man. To be virtually in something is to be in it as an effect is in its efficient cause, as heat is in the sun. You can understand from one effect of these modes how greatly they differ: what is present in the first way intrinsically denominates the supposit, while what is present in the second way does not so denominate it. Thus the sun is called bright because of its light, but it is not called hot because of its heat.

Moreover, perfections can be formally in something in two ways. In one way they are distinct and limited in their proper natures, as being, understanding, and willing are in man. In another way they are formally in something of a higher order, united and unlimited, as the heating power, drying power, and other such powers are in the sun’s light. These modes differ greatly. It is far more excellent to be in something in the second way, as the example shows. Although, then, the perfections of all genera are in God more excellently than in creatures, nevertheless perfections not simply are in Him only virtually (for they do not denominate Him); perfections simply are formally in Him, not limited in their proper natures, but really indistinct and unlimited as in a thing of a higher order. Hence the doubt arises whether the perfections simply existing formally in God, with real identity, are distinct in some way apart from every work of the intellect. This concludes the first matter.

As to the second, Scotus, in I Sentences, distinction VIII, question IV, no. 17, thinks that these perfections are distinct, with every work of the intellect set aside, by a formal distinction from the nature of the thing. He calls a distinction from the nature of the thing one which arises from the nature of the things themselves, so that it exists apart from every operation of the intellect. He adds “formal” because not every distinction from the nature of the thing is formal, but only one arising from quiddities or formal notions. He proves his intention by many arguments; I judge it useful to bring forward those proceeding from natural principles alone, since we do not now intend to teach theology, and so on.

His first argument is: wisdom and goodness are absolutely formally distinct from the nature of the thing; therefore infinite wisdom and infinite goodness are formally distinct from the nature of the thing. The antecedent is evident. The consequence is proved because infinity does not vary the formal notion of that to which it is added. At whatever degree of perfection within its latitude it is understood, a perfection always retains the same formal notion. If, then, wisdom and infinite wisdom have the same formal notion, and wisdom’s formal notion is distinct from goodness’s formal notion, it necessarily follows that infinite wisdom’s formal notion does not include goodness’s formal notion from the nature of the thing.

Moreover, a distinction preceding the notion of the first distinctive is not through that distinctive; but the distinction of nature and intellect precedes intellection, which is first according to reason; therefore, and so on. The minor is proved because, if no distinction of them preceded, they would not be distinguished more by intellection as intellection than by nature as nature. Whatever is distinguished by intellection, while wholly indistinct from nature, is also distinguished by nature.

Moreover, things understood as formally distinct by an intuitive intellect have distinction as existing; but the divine perfections are understood as formally distinct from God Himself by an intuitive intellect; therefore they have distinction as existing in them. This cannot be a distinction of reason, for the divine intellect would by its intuition have to cause some relation of reason in its essence as existing, which is absurd. Therefore such distinction is from the nature of the thing. The major is clear from the difference between intuitive and abstractive intellect; the minor is self-evident.

Moreover, God understands His essence as true, but wills it as good; therefore truth and goodness are distinct before every act of the intellect. The consequence holds because the distinction of objects precedes the distinction of acts, as cause precedes effect.

Moreover, goodness and truth in God are not distinct from the nature of the thing; therefore they are formally synonymous. The consequence is against you; the proof is that goodness and truth signify only the pure perfections themselves in the thing, in no way distinct in it.

Moreover, among the divine perfections there is a demonstrative order by which doctors demonstrate one from another; there is also a distinction between formal and non-formal predications. It is said that wisdom is not formally predicated of goodness, and there is also equality according to Augustine, On the Trinity XV; therefore they are distinct from the nature of the thing. Why do the doctors fill so many volumes if all are formally the same? Further, before every act of the intellect there is contradiction among the divine perfections: God understands by intellect and does not will, while by will He wills and does not understand. Therefore there is a distinction from the nature of the thing among the divine perfections.

Moreover, for the completion of doctrine, a distinction grounding real distinction does not depend on the work of the intellect; but the distinction of the divine perfections grounds the real distinction of the divine emanations; therefore it is from the nature of the thing and not from the operation of the intellect. This concludes the second matter.

CONCLUSION

The perfections existing in God are distinguished in themselves, but virtually or fundamentally; in the same God, insofar as they terminate an act of the intellect, they are distinguished by reason, but actually.

As to the third, setting aside the Trinity of Persons, three propositions must be explained, in which St. Thomas’s judgment and the truth consist. First: in God in Himself there is no distinction actually. Second: in God in Himself there is a distinction of reason virtually or fundamentally. Third: in God as terminating an act of our intellect there is an actual distinction of reason.

For the evidence of the first proposition, know that judgment concerning the formal notions of things in their proper natures differs from judgment concerning the formal notions of those same things formally existing in some thing of a higher order. Things in their proper natures are formally distinct apart from every work of the intellect because they do not include one another in their formal notions. The formal notion of one is not that of another because each is itself in such a way that it is not the other. Thus heating power and drying power in their proper natures are formally distinct from the nature of the thing, because heating power is the principle of heating and not of drying, and conversely. But things united in something of a higher order are found in one simpler higher thing and are formally united in its one notion. They must therefore lack formal distinction from the nature of the thing, since the root of that distinction is absent: the limitation by which each is itself in such a way that it is not the other. Neither, when they are so united, is more itself than the other. Continuing the example, heating and drying power formally found in the sun’s light are united as in one nature of light; hence formally and indistinctly they are in light’s formal notion, so that once the complete definition of solar light is assigned there is no need to seek further definitions of them. The complete definition manifests its heating and drying power, since definition must correspond to the defined thing, whenever its heating power is no more itself than light and drying power, and conversely.

According to Dionysius, Divine Names V, perfections simply are in God not defined to their proper natures but elevated to the illimitation of His being. It follows that, just as all are formally united in one most simple thing, so they are formally and indistinctly in its one most simple formal notion. Divine wisdom is no more wisdom than goodness, truth, and divine being, and conversely; therefore the formal notion of divine being includes being no more than wisdom and goodness. If an adequate definition of the most simple thing which is God were given, whatever is God would be formally included in that one formal notion; otherwise the definition would not equal the excellence of the defined. Hence God, who understands Himself in His own mode, forms only one formal notion, namely the Word.

You can argue over this as follows: whatever is formally united in one adequate formal notion of God is not formally distinct from the nature of the thing; but the divine perfections, with every work of the intellect set aside, are united in one adequate formal notion of God; therefore, and so on. The minor is proved because the powers of inferior qualities are no more united in solar light than perfections simply are formally, as is evident and conceded by opponents. The major is proved because otherwise the definition would not equal the defined.

Secondly, for the first proposition: every actual distinction from the nature of the thing is founded on actual opposition from the nature of the thing; but there is no actual opposition from the nature of the thing among the perfections; therefore. The major is found in Metaphysics X, text XXIV. The minor is proved by induction. There is neither formally contradictory nor privative opposition, since in both one member is formally negation, and it is impious to posit negation formally in God. Nor is it enough that negation be there fundamentally, since actual distinction requires actual opposition, and actual opposition requires actual extremes. Nor is there contrary opposition, because one contrary is always defective, Metaphysics X, text XV. Relative opposition is plainly absent. Nor does it matter that this seems to imply that God has not many perfections but only one, deity: it is most true that God Himself is only one unlimited perfection, wholly pre-containing in Himself all perfections multiplied and capable of multiplication in others.

For the evidence of the second and third propositions, note that, as we said above in a certain question, the simplest thing we call God is that to which all perfections simply existing in proper natures are assimilated; likewise it is that to which all their formal concepts are assimilated, since these are nothing other than the perfections themselves in intentional being. Since God terminates these conceptions as the object understood in them, God Himself must be understood as correlated to each by several relations of reason according to their number. Thus He actually has a distinction of reason in Himself, so that God, as objected to several conceptions or formal notions, is said actually and formally to have a distinction of reason in Himself—objectively, because of the plurality of formal concepts to which He is objected and the plurality of relations of reason by which He is related, or understood as related, to the perfections spoken of, both in natural and intentional being.

Because in God, with every work of the intellect set aside, there is that from which He can cause and terminate these concepts, He is said to have a distinction of reason virtually or fundamentally. God has this from the supreme illimitedness of His perfection. Just as no creature can receive it in natural being, no created intellect can receive it in intentional being; every created intellect, even one seeing God through His essence, is powerless to form one concept adequate to the divine perfection. Thus for the second proposition: whatever has in itself that by which it can objectively cause, terminate, and verify distinct notions or formal conceptions has in itself a virtual distinction of reason apart from every work of the intellect; glorious God is such; therefore. For the third: whatever terminates several formal concepts actually has a distinction of reason in itself; God is such; therefore, and so on. This concludes the third matter.

As to the fourth, Scotus is opposed in three ways. First: formal distinction from the nature of the thing is greater than real distinction; therefore the divine perfections are not formally distinct from the nature of the thing. The consequence holds. Distinction through what is more intimate is greater than distinction through what is outside the intimates of the thing; formal distinction is through what is most intimate, while real distinction is through what is outside the intimates. Scotus says that formal distinction is through predicates of the first mode, present in the thing in the first sign, whereas real distinction is through what is present afterward. Distinction through what is somewhat intimate is somewhat distinction; through what is more intimate it is greater; therefore through what is most intimate it is greatest.

Second: the divine perfections, by the most precise abstraction, are formally infinite; therefore they are formally identical from the nature of the thing. The antecedent is Scotus’s. The consequence follows from distinguishing two infinities: infinity within a proper notion and infinity within the latitude of being. If the first is intended, it does not follow, since what is prior does not formally include what is posterior, and a divine perfection such as wisdom is prior to that infinity. If the second is intended, the conclusion follows: if divine wisdom, precisely and formally taken, is infinite with respect to the ultimate perfection of being simply, it must contain every perfection simply within its formal notion and exclude none formally. Consequently it is formally distinct from none. Once it is posited as distinct from other perfections, it is formally contracted within the latitude of being, contrary to the antecedent understood in this way.

Third: the divine perfections are formally distinct from the nature of the thing; therefore there is a relation among them. The consequence holds because distinction, being a relation existing in the nature of things, must be real, as everything existing in the nature of things is real. The consequence is against Avicenna, who says that there is no real relation of the same to itself.

As to the fifth, for answering the first argument and destroying Scotus’s foundation, note that something can be infinite in two ways: according to its proper notion, or according to being, that is, simply. What is infinite according to its proper notion is enclosed by no limits of its own latitude, although it is determined to such a degree of being that it does not have every perfection of being. What is infinite according to being or simply is limited by no limits within the whole latitude of being, but has every perfection of being. Consider quantity of bulk: if quantity were infinite, it would be infinite according to the notion of quantity, but would not be infinite according to being; it would still be finite and limited to the genus of quantity. Likewise, if whiteness were intensively infinite, it would be infinite according to its proper notion, but not infinite being, since it would be defined to a species. The first infinity leaves the formal notion with the formal limitation it finds; the second makes the thing and its formal notion unlimited and elevates it so that it is every possible perfection in being, and no more itself than any other perfection simply. Thus it does not permit the distinction and formal limitation by which it was distinguished from others to remain.

Descending to the issue, I say that although wisdom and infinite wisdom have wholly the same formal notion by the first infinity, infinite wisdom by the second infinity has a far higher formal notion. It includes every perfection simply within its formal notion; since all the perfections in God are infinite with the second infinity, all must be one simple formal notion.

To the argument, in whatever form it is made, answer by attending to the equivocation of infinity just explained. The first infinity does not vary the formal notion and is measured by degrees of a thing’s proper latitude, but the second is not. If the divine perfections were infinite only with the first infinity, the argument would conclude, because they have the second before every act of the intellect. Therefore it does not conclude. Nor does it matter that the first infinity of each perfection simply perhaps entails the second; it is enough that they are distinguished by reason for something to become second which was not first. Likewise, commonest perfections such as being, goodness, and the like can be considered in themselves or as received in a subject; in the first way they are formally one in God, but in the second they can be diverse according to the diverse capacities of creatures.

To the second, deny the minor. Before intellection there is a distinction of reason fundamentally, but not actually; nor is actual distinction required for the distinction of the acts of understanding and willing.

To the third, deny the minor. God’s intuitive understanding does not cause a new relation of reason in God, but discovers and terminates the concepts founded on the divine perfection.

To the fourth, deny the consequence. It suffices that the objects of intellect and will be distinguished fundamentally; an actual distinction at that time is not required, just as God’s intellect and will are not then distinguished except by a fundamental distinction of reason.

To the fifth, deny the consequence. Synonymy is a property of names and is not measured by the identity of the thing’s formal notion in itself, but by the identity of the formal or mental concept. Since truth and goodness in us have diverse concepts, they are not synonymous. Although they signify the same thing formally in itself, they also distinctly signify mental concepts as modes of signifying, and this destroys synonymy.

To the sixth, it is said that, on the side of the thing, a virtual or fundamental distinction of reason together with an actual distinction of reason on our side suffices. We speak as we conceive. We form distinct concepts, one arising from another, one not predicated of the other, and one having a relation the other lacks. Thus we make demonstrations and formal and identical predications, denying of God under one concept what we affirm under another. The doctors therefore fill books, stammering as they can, sounding forth the heights of God in human fashion: they can contemplate and teach that simplest formal notion, embracing formally whatever is in God, only through particular concepts—not because there is a distinction there from the nature of the thing. Equality among the divine perfections before every act of the intellect is only a fundamental non-excess among them, preserved among perfections distinguished only virtually.

It is said regarding the seventh that, since before every act of the intellect there is no contradiction formally but only fundamentally—for one contradictory member is formally a negation, which exists only through the work of the intellect—it is enough at that time that there be a distinction of reason fundamentally, which we concede; nothing else is required.

Regarding the last, it is said that emanations are distinguished both really and formally; and although the foundation of their formal distinction is the distinction of intellect and will, this is not so of their real distinction. The divine processions are not really distinct because one is from the intellect and the other from the will, but because they have a real relative opposition, as Boethius teaches. Therefore it is false that the distinction of the divine perfections grounds the real distinction of the divine emanations. To ground their formal distinction, a fundamental formal distinction between intellect and will suffices. Likewise the divine processions themselves, setting aside their real distinction, are not formally distinguished from the nature of the thing, but only by a virtual distinction of reason before every work of the intellect; without real relative opposition they are no more distinguished from the nature of the thing than are intellect and will.

More briefly, one may say regarding this and similar arguments that in divine things, before every act of the intellect, there is a formal distinction not formally but virtually—that is, contained eminently—in this way: each divine proper power performs its own act as though it were formally distinct from another. Intellect understands and does not will, and will wills and does not understand, as though there were a formal distinction formally between intellect and will, and similarly in other cases. This manner of possessing formal distinction is founded on the formally eminent formal unity of the deity; and it suffices for preserving all that is introduced by formal distinction, because it eminently equals it.

In intellectual created substances essence is found in a second way: their being is other than their essence, although their essence is without matter. Hence their being is not absolute but received, and therefore limited and finite to the capacity of the receiving nature. Their nature or quiddity, however, is absolute, not received in any matter. Thus it is said in the Book of Causes that intelligences are finite above and infinite below. They are finite as regards their being, which they receive from above, but are not bounded below, since their forms are not limited to the capacity of any matter receiving them. In such substances there is no multitude of individuals in one species, as was said, except in the human soul because of the body to which it is united.

In this second part of the chapter on the essences of created intellectual substances, which are placed in the second order, he gathers four propositions. First, in created intellectual substances being is other than essence. Second, matter is not found in them. Third, their being is finite, but their essence infinite. Fourth, none of them is numerically multiplied except the last, namely the human soul. He passes over the first and second as already explained, and explains the third by reason and authority.

For the evidence of the reasoning, note that act is limited by the potency in which it is received, and potency by the act which it receives, though in different ways. What is in potency is not determined but determinable by the act toward which it is in potency; once it has received that act, it is formally limited by it. Likewise an act, according to its essence, is receivable in this or that, and consequently determinable to this or that subject. Once received in this subject, its amplitude and indefiniteness toward this or that no longer remain, for it is determined to this. There are therefore two kinds of finitude and two of infinity: one on the part of act, the other on the part of potency. Infinity on the part of potency signifies imperfection, since it is through the absence of an act limiting potency. Infinity of act signifies supreme perfection, since it is through the absence of a potency limiting act. As a sign of this, forms not received in anything are far more perfect in reality than received forms. Since, then, the being of intellectual substances is received in their essence, it follows that it is finite in the way act is limited by potency; hence it is contracted and limited to the genus of its receiver, namely the nature of which it is. Since their essence is not received in anything, being a form not received in matter, it follows also that it is infinite with an infinity belonging to act: it is not determined to the capacity of any matter receiving it, as material forms are.

With these preliminaries, the argument is formed thus: that whose being is received but whose form is unreceived has finite being and infinite essence; intelligences are such; therefore. Note that here both finitude and infinity are always taken as belonging to act. By such finitude the being of intelligences is finite, and by such infinity their essence is infinite. If we speak of finitude belonging to potency, their essence is found finite, because the potency in them is terminated by the act of being.

This is confirmed by the authority of the Book of Causes, where it is said that intelligences are finite above and infinite below, because their being, which is supreme in them, is received, while their essence, which is lowest, is not received. Their essence, as it regards what is formally above it—namely the act of being—is finite, by receiving it; but as it regards what is below it, namely matter, it is infinite, since it is not received in matter, and so on. Thus avoid the error of those who, not understanding this foundation, say that if being is absolutely infinite because it is received in nothing, then the essence both of immaterial and of composite substances, since it is wholly received in nothing, will be absolutely infinite—which is absurd. Hence it seems very superficial to argue to infinity from non-reception.

Know, then, that this position is founded on the proposition: every thing which, according to its order, is receivable in another but is really unreceived is infinite with an infinity opposed to the finitude which a received thing of its order contracts. I said “according to its order receivable in another” because composites and matter, in their whole latitude, are unreceivable. I said “infinite with an opposed infinity,” etc., because just as not everything receivable is received in everything, but each act has its proper receiver, as is held in II On the Soul, texts XIV and XXVI, so every reception does not entail every finitude; a determinate reception entails a determinate finitude, and conversely such non-reception entails the corresponding infinity opposed to the finitude which the thing would contract if received. For example, whiteness, since it is receivable in a subject, if posited unreceived will be infinite—not with just any infinity, but with the infinity opposed to the finitude it has in a subject. In the present case, both being and form are, according to their order, receivable (for neither is opposed to being received), but in different receivers: the proper receiver of being is quiddity or supposit, while that of form is matter.

Therefore, just as the reception of form in matter is of another account than the reception of being in essence, so the finitude of form through matter is of another account than the finitude of being through essence, although both agree in being the way act is limited by potency. Likewise the infinity which form receives from being unreceived in matter is of another account than the infinity which being receives from there being no reception of it in quiddity. Form, because received in matter and enclosed within it, loses its amplitude, by which it is indefinite toward this or that particular; hence, when separated from matter, it is infinite only in lacking the limits of any matter’s capacity. Being, because received in a quiddity, is contracted to its genus and species; if posited unreceived, it will be defined to no genus and, lacking the limits of every genus, will consequently be absolutely infinite.

You therefore have the solution of the difficulty in this: we do not say that everything unreceived is infinite, but that a thing unreceived according to its order of receivability is infinite; and we do not say that every such unreceived thing is infinite in the same way, but in different ways. From the first it is clear that a composite substance has no infinity from its non-reception; from the second, that the essence of an intelligence, enclosed in the order of form, as a pure form separated from matter and not being being itself, is infinite from its non-reception in matter, but not absolutely, and so on; while divine being, contained under the order of being itself, is absolutely infinite from its non-reception in quiddity or essence.

Here too you can detect the error of the Scotists and of Scotus in I Sentences, dist. II, q. II, where they attribute to St. Thomas the argument last introduced there to conclude God’s infinity: form is limited by matter; therefore a form which is not apt to be in matter is infinite. For you know what sort of infinity this argument concludes, and that, according to St. Thomas, God’s infinity denies higher limits.

Notice three errors there. First, the stated argument is said by us to conclude absolute infinity, whereas for us it concludes only infinity in a certain respect. Second, the argument is asserted as the sophism of the fallacy of consequence, because form is finite in itself by nature before it is limited by matter: as in III Physics, body is limited by another body; therefore, if it is not limited by another body, it is infinite. The error is manifest. When it is said that form is limited by matter, “by” denotes the precise cause of the aforesaid finitude in a certain respect; form is not finite in itself in that way, since in itself it is indeterminate to this or that matter. Therefore it rightly follows: a form not apt to be received in matter is infinite in a certain respect. Just as affirmation is the precise cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation. The process in III Physics is not of this kind, because body is not causally and precisely limited by another body.

The third error is the attempt to deny what was said above, namely that the essence of an intelligence is finite above through its being. “Being,” he says, “is posterior to essence and its accident, according to you; therefore the essence of an intelligence in the first natural order seems intensively infinite, and consequently not limitable by being in a second order.” To this it is said that although being is posterior to essence in the order of generation, and is its accident—that is, outside its formal concept—nevertheless essence in that prior order is absolutely finite, because it is receptive of being and is not being itself. Just as essence, by being being itself, is absolutely infinite, as is clear in God from what was said, so by not being its own being it is not absolutely infinite, according to that maxim: if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, and so on. Since, therefore, in every prior order the essence of an intelligence is fundamentally receptive of being, and cannot be abstracted from this, although it does not possess it in every prior order, it follows that it is absolutely finite through its being—that is, through not being its own being, but being actualized or actuable by it, and so on. Thus it is understood when it is said that the essence of an intelligence is limited by its being. Let the first part of the fourth proposition, discussed above, be omitted. Its second part, namely that the intellectual soul, which is last among intellectual substances, is numerically multiplied, requires careful consideration. The text assigns its union with the body as the cause: every form so united to a body that it gives it being formally is necessarily multiplied according to the multiplication of that body; otherwise several bodies would have numerically the same being. From one form there comes only one numerically substantial being. The soul is rightly said to be numerically multiplied through union with the body, because numerical distinction, since it is not formal, must be according to quantity, as was explained above; but such distinction could not exist in the soul according to quantity if the form were not the form of a quantified thing, as intelligences show. The effective argument for concluding the numerical plurality of souls is therefore the union of the soul with a numerically multiplied body.

Although its individuation depends occasionally on the body as regards its beginning, since it does not acquire individuated being except in the body of which it is the act, it does not follow that, when the body is destroyed, individuation perishes. Since it has absolute being, from which it acquired individuated being by becoming the form of this body, that being always remains individuated. Hence Avicenna says that the individuation and multiplication of souls depends on the body as regards its beginning, but not as regards its end.

Here an objection against the fourth proposition is excluded. It is this: a form multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies does not remain in its multitude when the bodies are destroyed; the human soul is multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies; therefore many human souls cannot remain when the bodies are destroyed. The reasoning is good, but the conclusion is false; therefore one of the premises is false—not the major, as is proved, and hence the minor, which was the fourth proposition. The major is proved from the principle that when the cause is removed, the effect is removed. If the cause of the multitude of souls is the multitude of bodies, then when the multitude of bodies is removed the multitude of souls is also removed. The objection is excluded in the text by explaining that forms are multiplied with the multiplication of bodies in two ways: with dependence on matter, and without dependence on it. The former are destroyed when bodies are destroyed; the latter remain, since their individuation depends on bodies only occasionally. The intellectual soul belongs to the latter.

For clarity, note first that the same judgment applies to the being, unity, and multitude of a thing with respect to dependence and independence: what does not depend on matter for its being does not depend on matter for its unity or multitude; but what depends on matter for its being also depends on matter for its unity and plurality, since one and many are properties of being.

Note second that forms are of three kinds. Some come to be in matter and are educed from the potency of matter, such as material forms. Some come to be in matter but are not educed from the potency of matter, such as the intellectual soul, which comes from outside. Some neither come to be in matter nor are educed from the potency of matter, such as forms separated from matter, namely intelligences. There cannot be a fourth kind that is educed from the potency of matter but does not come to be in matter, since this is self-contradictory, as is clear in itself.

Those which are neither educed from the potency of matter nor come to be in it are wholly independent and separated from matter, and are not numerically multiplied, as was proved above. The first and second kinds, because they agree in coming to be in matter, also agree in needing to be adapted and proportioned to their receiving matters, in which they come to be; proper acts must occur in proper matters, as is said in II On the Soul, texts XXIV and XXVI. The form of a lion must be commensurate with a leonine body and not an equine one; and the form of this lion must be commensurate with this leonine body and not that one, and so on. Consequently they also agree in this, that both must be multiplied together in their proper bodies. Whatever must be mutually adapted and proportioned together receives multitude and unity together, as appears by considering each case: the multiplication of forms in one species is always accompanied by multiplication of bodies in that species, and conversely; otherwise one form would be in diverse matters, or diverse matters under one form, both of which are impossible.

Because the first forms are educed from the potency of matter and the second are not, they differ in this: the first have being dependent on matter as on the material cause causing and sustaining their being; the second have being exceeding the whole capacity of matter and independent of it, since they are not caused from matter. Consequently they differ secondly in this: both the unity and multitude of the first depend on matter, as does their being, and therefore, just as they are destroyed when bodies are destroyed, so are their unity and plurality. But the unity and multitude of the second are independent of matter, as is their being; therefore, just as their being remains when their bodies are destroyed, so do their unity and plurality. This is what St. Thomas intends here when he says the individuation of the soul, that is, its unity. The same is to be understood of plurality depending occasionally on the body. It depends in this way because the soul comes to be in a body, but not because it is educed from the potency of bodily matter. This is what he adds: it does not acquire it in the body; and he gives the reason, namely that, since it has absolute being, that is, independent of the body, it can remain without it when the body is corrupted. Hence Avicenna says that the individuation of the soul depends on the body at its beginning but not at its end, because it comes to be only in a body. It can, and in fact does, exist after death without a body. Thus the objection is solved, because the major is false of the second order of forms, such as the human soul.

It is now clear what must be said for its proof: the multiplication of bodies is not properly the cause but the occasion, and only in the coming-to-be, of the multitude of souls; when the cause in coming-to-be ceases, the effect does not cease as regards being.