In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria

Whether actual existence and essence are really distinct.

Regarding the foregoing, there are two questions. The first is whether actual existence and essence are really distinct. The second is whether intelligences are composed of act and potency. Regarding the first, three things are to be done: first, Scotus’s opinion will be set forth; second, St. Thomas’s opinion; third, the arguments to the contrary will be answered. As to the first, Scotus, in III Sentences, distinction VI, question 1, holds that actual existence and the essence of a thing are really the same, although they are distinguished by the nature of the thing, as an intrinsic mode and the quiddity of which it is the mode; just as whiteness is not distinguished from its intrinsic mode, namely its degree, whether three or four. To prove this, although Scotus’s arguments could be brought forward, since they concern the union of human nature with the divine supposit, I have judged it best first to recite the ten arguments introduced by Antonius Trombetta in his Quodlibet. First, he argues, as he himself says, against Thomas’s foundation: When the same reason remains, the same effect remains. But the whole reason why these men posit essence as differing from existence is the indifference of essence to existence and non-existence: for, they say, a stone is in potency to be and not to be; therefore, wherever such indifference is found, such a distinction must be posited. But there is a similar indifference of existence to existence and non-existence (for the existence of a rose is not in winter, but is in spring); and there is also a similar indifference of essence to essence and non-essence, since the essence of a creature is not from eternity. Therefore existence really differs from existence, and essence differs from essence, which is ridiculous. Moreover, II: Whenever two things are essentially ordered and really distinct, the prior can, without contradiction, come to be without the posterior. But essence cannot come to be without existence; therefore, and so on. The minor is clear, because the particular essence, which alone comes to be, is necessarily existent. Moreover, III: Whatever things are really distinct are related as thing and thing. But essence and existence are not related as thing and thing; therefore, and so on. This is clear, because “thing,” properly speaking, is convertible with being in act, with the actuality of existence. Moreover, IV: No thing composes with its reality; therefore no quiddity really differs from its existence. The consequence holds because existence is the very reality of a thing: to say that a thing is real is nothing other than to say that it exists, and conversely. The antecedent is self-evident; for it is ridiculous to say that something composes with its reality. Moreover, V: A true man does not compose with his truth, nor does an affirming man compose with his affirmation; therefore quiddity does not compose with its existence. The consequence is clear from the fact that the existence of a thing is nothing other than the positing of its truth and the affirmation of this. But the contrary antecedent does not seem intelligible. Moreover, VI: Existence and essence have the same contradictory; therefore they are not really distinct. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is shown by the fact that nothing deprives something of existence without depriving it of essence, nor is there one nothing depriving existence and another nothing depriving essence. Moreover, VII: Man in potency does not compose with man in act; therefore essence does not compose with existence, and consequently they are not really distinct. The consequence is self-evident, because essence is in potency and existence is its actuality. The antecedent is clear from the fact that act and potency divide being as a condition that diminishes and one that perfects, just as the true and the painted divide animal, as the Commentator says in IX Metaphysics, commentary 7. Thus man in potency, since he is not man simply, when he is man in act loses only the distracting condition placed beneath the perfecting condition; and so he has no composition with man in act. Moreover, VIII: If the existence of a thing is really distinct from its quiddity, it is neither substance nor accident; therefore, and so on. The antecedent is proved. It is granted that it is not an accident. That it is not substance is proved: it is either matter, form, or composite; according to Thomas it is none of these; therefore, and so on. Moreover, IX: Existence and essence are really distinct; therefore in every substantial generation there are two total terms and two formal terms. The consequence is impossible; therefore, and so on. The consequence is proved in both parts, supposing two things. First, a per se one composite comes from a per se act and a per se potency, from VIII Metaphysics, where Aristotle knows no reason why a substantial composite is per se one except that matter is per se potency and form per se act. Second, essence is per se potency and existence per se act. From these it follows that what results from existence and essence is per se one. Given this, there will be two composites possessing per se unity, one composed of matter and form, the other of existence and essence; and since each per se one is naturally able to terminate generation, there will be two total terms in generation. Thus the first part is clear. There will also be two formal terms, namely existence and substantial form, proved as follows: the formal term of generation is that by which something is generated. But both existence and form are that by which something is generated; therefore, and so on. The minor is proved thus: in the way in which something is the reason for being, it is the reason for generating; but existence is the reason for being; therefore it is the reason for generating. Or let the reasoning be formed thus: in the way in which something is generated, in that way it is; but a per se composite is not generated through existence, so that existence is the term of generation; therefore it does not have being through existence itself. The consequence is false; therefore one of the premises is false. It is not the major; therefore it is the minor. Moreover, X: From existence and essence a per se one results; therefore there is an infinite process in essences. The consequence is impossible; therefore, and so on. The antecedent is clear from the preceding argument and is proved thus: just as a third per se one results from matter and form because the former is per se potency and the latter per se act, so from existence and essence, since existence is also per se act and essence per se potency, a per se one results, for the reason is the same. The consequence is proved because, if a third per se one results from existence and essence, then, since it is again distinguished from its existence, it will compose with that existence, and from them something per se one will result; the same will then be argued of that, and so to infinity. This much for the first point.

As to the second, St. Thomas’s opinion, given by him in II Contra Gentiles, chapter 52, is that in every creature its quiddity and actual existence are really distinct. Although this conclusion is now proved in the text, for fuller declaration I shall draw three proofs from St. Thomas there. The first is: Every created essence has something really joined to it besides its existence; no unreceived existence has anything annexed to it besides itself; therefore no unreceived existence is the essence of a creature, and consequently existence and essence are not the same. If they were the same, it would be unreceived existence itself, just as the essence itself is unreceived, speaking of substances. The major is self-evident: Socrates, besides his existence, has quantity, whiteness, and the like; likewise separated substances, as we now suppose, have some accident, at least the act of understanding. The minor is explained by this: if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation will be the cause of negation. But the precise reason why existence has something annexed to it besides itself is that existence is received in another, in which something else can be received. This is clear because the substantial existence of Socrates and his existence as white are united for no other reason than that both are received in Socrates; they are one only in subject. Therefore, when existence is not received, no way remains by which it can have something annexed to it. This is confirmed because the substantial existence of Socrates is either identical with other things besides itself, which is plainly false—for Socrates’s substantial existence is not his existence as white—or it is related to them as potency and act, so that substantial existence is potency and accidental existence its act. But this cannot be, because no actual existence can be the subject of another, since it is ultimate actuality. It remains, then, that they are united because both are received in a third; and therefore, when this is removed from actual existence—namely, its being received—what it can have something annexed to it is removed as well. This is what Boethius says in the Hebdomads: “that which is” has something joined to it besides itself, but being itself has nothing. The second argument is: Every unreceived existence is infinite simply; no existence of a creature is infinite simply; therefore no existence of a creature is unreceived existence; therefore it is distinct from essence, and so on. The minor is self-evident. The major is proved thus: every pure being is infinite simply; every unreceived existence is pure being; therefore every unreceived existence is infinite simply. The major is clear from the terms, for being is limited because it is not pure but mixed with the categories; being is limited by categorical natures, and if it is purified of them, it remains wholly without finitude, altogether infinite. The minor is also clear from the preceding argument and from the argument made above in the text. It is further explained by an example: if whiteness were posited as unreceived in anything, it would be pure whiteness and have nothing but itself, and it would be infinite in the species of whiteness, as is clear in itself. A separated whiteness, defined to some degree of whiteness, cannot be imagined by a sound intellect; whatever is such through itself has every perfection possible to that nature, just as Plato’s separated man has every perfection possible to human nature. Nor is what Antonius Trombetta says against this, taken from Scotus, II Sentences, distinction II, last question, valid: if whiteness were separated and had every perfection possible to that species, whiteness would be infinite simply, because it would have the perfection of infinitely many individuals capable of existing under the species of whiteness. This, I say, is of no force. Just as infinitely many individuals of whiteness, even if posited together, are not simply infinite in perfection, since they are limited to the species of whiteness, so separated whiteness possessing their perfections will not be infinite simply, but infinite in that species. The third argument is this: Whatever belongs to a specific nature without any efficient cause is really distinct from what belongs to it only through some efficient cause. But quidditative predicates belong to a thing without any efficient cause, whereas existence belongs to a thing only through some efficient cause; therefore the quidditative predicates and the existence of a thing are really distinct. The major is self-evident. The minor is also perfectly clear as to the second part; as to the first it is explained thus: setting aside all efficient causality with respect to a rose, I ask whether this is true: “A rose is a corporeal substance.” If so, I have what I intend. If not, then a rose taken absolutely is not in the meadow, and predicates of the first mode could be understood not to be present in the thing, and the definition would be separated from the defined thing—none of which can be imagined, and so on. This opinion also seems to derive from the ancients, namely Plato, Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel, Boethius, Hilary, Albert, and their followers, although we have nothing manifest from Aristotle on this matter. This much for the second point.

As to the third, the arguments to the contrary are answered. To the first it is said, by way of preface, that the objector did not see St. Thomas at the source. For, as appears from II Contra Gentiles, where he deliberately grounds his opinion on seven arguments, the argument assumed by the objector is not named among them. He therefore erred in imposing on us that this was the whole foundation of our position, although that argument can be elicited from St. Thomas, I Sentences, distinction VIII, question 4, article 2 (where he does not, however, treat this matter), and it should be formed thus: A particular essence taken in itself is indifferent to being and non-being; therefore it is really distinct from its being. Nor is his reply valid, when he says that the antecedent must add that essence has a reality proper to it, other than the reality of existence, because this is voluntary. For real distinction is between matter and form, which philosophers do not doubt to have the same reality of existence, since from them they posit one per se thing. To the argument made against this reasoning, it is said that it is false that being is indifferent to being and non-being, and essence to essence and non-essence. Nothing is indifferent to two things one of which determines it in its definition; but it is clear that being belongs to the understanding of being, and essence to the understanding of essence. That the existence of a rose is not in winter but is in spring is because the essence of the rose, to which its quidditative predicates always belong, does not attain to the act of being—not because being itself is indifferent. When he adds that essence is indifferent to essence and non-essence because it is not from eternity, he does not seem to understand the proper expression. From the negation of the act of being from eternity it follows that the rose is indifferent to being and non-being, but not that it is indifferent to rose and non-rose. As Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel, and Albert say, whether a rose is or is not, it is always a rose and always a corporeal substance, if one may use a term of measurement in these matters. To the second, both premises are denied; the major, as assumed, has already been shown false. The minor is shown in Christ, in whom humanity exists without created actual existence. To the third, the major is denied in the objector’s understanding: for real distinction does not require that each have its own existence. To the fourth, it is said that, just as being is twofold—existence and essence—so reality is twofold, the reality of essence and the reality of existence. Although no thing composes with its reality, it nevertheless can compose with the reality of existence. Thus the essence of man is placed in a real category, namely substance; but when posited in the nature of things, it becomes real through the reality of existence.

To the fifth, the same is said, because the true is also convertible with being and thing. Thus man is simply true in two ways: by the truth of essence and by the truth of existence. A true man by the truth of essence does not compose with such truth, which is nothing other than fundamental conformity to his quidditative predicates; but he does compose with the truth of existence, that is, with being, which grounds this truth: “Man is.” The same is said of affirmation. To the sixth, the antecedent is denied, and both assumptions in its proof are false. For just as many ways as one of the opposites is said, so is the other said, as is held in I Topics. Therefore, just as being is said in two ways, namely quidditative being and existence, so non-being, or nothing, is said in two ways: quidditative nothing and nothing of existence. For man taken absolutely, since he is in the category of substance, is quidditatively being, though outside the category he is opposed to nothing in actual existence. Therefore one is the nothing opposed to categorical being or essence, and another the nothing opposed to actual existence; likewise, the negation of essence is one thing and the negation of existence another. To the seventh, the consequence is denied. It is not the same to say that man in potency composes with man in act and that essence composes with existence. The first is false, because the same thing does not compose with itself; the second is true, because the extremes are really distinct. Hence the proportion of existence to essence is not the same as that of man in act to man in potency. Between the first there is a proportion of receptive potency to act, and a real distinction with both extremes posited outside their causes; between the second there is no such proportion, but a relation of the same thing to itself according to diverse dispositions of itself that are simultaneously incompatible, namely being in potency and being in act.

To the eighth, the antecedent is denied. The existence of a substance is substance, and the existence of an accident is accident; and, as is clear above, the existence of a substance is neither matter nor form nor composite, but the actuality of all of them, and so it is reductively in the genus of substance. But the objector presses: whatever is reductively in a genus is placed there as its principle; being is not the principle of substance; therefore it is not reductively in the genus of substance. It is answered that, since being is the ultimate actuality of a thing, and what is last in generation is first in intention, being is placed in the genus of substance as the ultimate formal principle of substance itself. For a thing is placed in the genus of substance because it is capable of substantial being; indeed, differences in all genera, as will be explained below, are taken from their order to being itself. To the ninth, the consequence is denied. In its proof the first supposition is badly understood. Aristotle, VIII Metaphysics, text 15, which the objector cites, does not say that a third thing results from per se potency and per se act, but that a thing having parts is one because one part is act and the other potency. This is to be understood, as was explained above, with reference to real composition: one part is pure potency, since a third per se one does not result from two acts. But a thing’s quiddity and its existence are not related as pure potency and act, nor are they parts, as is clear; therefore the authority is irrelevant. It follows that it is false that essence becomes a third per se one, and consequently the proof of the consequence as to its first part has no force, since there are not two composites. As to the second part, it is said that generation can have two formal terms in different ways, one primary and the other secondary. The primary formal term of generation is form, and the secondary is being; conversely, the primary formal term of creation is being, and the secondary is form. In this way the arguments are conceded. If they intend to prove that being is the primary term of generation, the answer is that what they assume—namely, that in the way in which something is the reason for being, it is the reason for generating—is false. It is true that what is the reason why a thing is, is the reason why the thing is generated; but it is not true that in the same way in which it is the reason for being it is the reason for generating. The reason is that a thing through generation does not pass from non-being altogether to being, but from privation to form, as is said in I Physics. It is proper to creation that a thing be transferred from non-being altogether to being; hence being, which is primarily the reason for being, is deservedly also primarily the reason for the first production, which is creation. But form, which is secondarily the reason for being, is the first reason for the second production, namely generation; hence in I Physics the principles of generation are posited as form and privation. The same is clear regarding the other formulation of the argument: the major is false, for the mode in which a thing is generated differs from the mode in which it is. It is through form secondarily and through being primarily, but it is generated conversely. To the tenth, the answer is clear from what has been said: the antecedent is false.

Regarding the second question, it should be known that the common opinion of philosophers is that intelligences other than the first are not altogether pure acts, but have an admixture of potency in themselves. Yet there is great disagreement among them about the manner in which these two, act and potency, are in them. To omit the others, lest we exceed the limits of our intention, Scotus, in I Sentences, distinction VI, question 1, holds that every creature is composed of act and potency in this way: since every creature is not nothing, it must have some actuality; and since it is defined to such a genus or species or degree of perfection, it must have in itself a negation of another perfection capable of being found within the breadth of being. Thus it is possible; for whatever is being and lacks some perfection possible in being is simply possible. Therefore every thing is composed of act and objective potency: from the fact that it is, it has act in itself; from the fact that it is a possible being, it has potency in itself, for “possible” is named from potency. Since God alone is act that is not possible, that is, is not capable of terminating the action of any agent capable of producing it, intelligences according to Scotus are composed only of act and objective potency, because he posits no receptive form in their substance. St. Thomas, however, from the foundations set down in the preceding question, holds that intelligences and every creature are composed of act and potency as of two things really distinct, namely existence and essence. The proofs need not be repeated; we need only solve Scotus’s argument made there against this position. He argues: If in every creature there is composition from two things, I take one of those component things and ask whether it is simple or composite. If simple, then not every created thing is composite. If composite, the same question will be asked about its parts, and so to infinity.

The answer is very easy: the argument proceeds from a bad understanding of our position. When it is said that everything other than God is composite, “everything” is distributed only over those things which truly are and properly have being. According to Aristotle and the truth, these are only subsistents. Therefore every supposit, both substantial and accidental, if one may speak thus, is composed of act and potency really distinct, namely quiddity and being. For the quiddity of Socrates, as we have explained, is really distinct from his being, and the whiteness of this white thing is really distinct from its own existence, as can be clear from what has been said. We are not so senseless as to say that every entity, in whatever way, is composite. Who doubts that the ultimate components in resolution must be simple? We say, therefore, that intelligences, since they subsist, have quiddity and existence united in them as potency and act, and are thus composed of two really distinct things. Scotus can maintain his opinion without harming the other, but he must restrain his language.

And because potency and act are posited in intelligences, it will not be difficult to find a multitude of intelligences, which would be impossible if there were no potency in them. Hence the Commentator says, in III On the Soul, that if the nature of the possible intellect were unknown, we could not find multitude in separated substances. Their distinction from one another is therefore according to the degree of potency and act: the higher intelligence, being nearer to the first, has more act and less potency, and so with the others. This is completed in the human soul, which holds the lowest degree among intellectual substances. Hence its potential intellect is related to intelligible forms as prime matter, which holds the lowest degree in sensible being, is related to sensible forms, as the Commentator says in III On the Soul. For this reason the Philosopher compares it to a blank tablet on which nothing is painted. And because among the other intelligible substances it has more potency, it becomes so near to material things that a material thing is drawn to participate in its being, so that from soul and body there results one being in one composite, although that being, insofar as it belongs to the soul, is not dependent on the body. Therefore after this form, the soul, there are found other forms having more potency and being nearer to matter, to such an extent that their being does not exist without matter. In these too there is an order and degree down to the first forms of the elements, which are nearest to matter; hence they have no operation except according to the requirements of the active and passive qualities and of the other things by which matter is disposed to form.

In this sixth and final part of this chapter, treating the multitude of intelligences, he first proposes two conclusions. The first is that, according to the foundations stated above, it is not difficult to find a plurality of intelligences. The second is that without such foundations it is impossible to find plurality in them, and this indeed only by the authority of the Commentator, III On the Soul, commentary 14. The proof of the first conclusion is this: whenever there is some intermediate, through participation in both extremes it is multiplied according to a greater participation in one and a lesser participation in the other. For example, let a name be imposed on the intermediate colours, and let them be called A. Then A, because it is intermediate between whiteness and blackness, is multiplied through participation into several species—for example, pale, saffron-coloured, and yellow—because of its greater approach to whiteness and withdrawal from blackness, and conversely. But an intelligence is something intermediate, according to what was previously established, between two extremes, namely pure act and pure potency, participating in the nature of both, because it has act joined to potency. Therefore it can easily be discerned from this foundation that there are many intelligences, namely from the fact that they are composed of act and potency.

For the evidence of this it must be known that in the breadth of being there are two extremes, namely glorious God, wholly pure act, and prime matter, wholly pure potency. Everything else is intermediate, as having act and potency. Their essential or specific multitude is measured according to approach to and distance from the extremes. For because one thing savours the nature of act more than another, and that one more than another, therefore there are more of them, and their dignity is measured by a greater approach to the noble extreme, namely pure act. For the more actual and the less potential a thing is, the nobler it is. Therefore all intermediate forms participate in act and potency. But among them some have received so much actuality that they are so close to pure act that they subsist through themselves without matter, being greatly distant from it; yet not without an admixture of potency, whose purity is the reason why matter is an extreme. And among these there is such breadth according to greater and lesser participation in act and potency that the last of them has so much potentiality that it informs matter, namely the intellectual soul. For this, among all subsistent forms, is most distant from pure act; consequently it happens that it approaches the other extreme so closely that it receives matter itself and is drawn to its being. Other forms, however, have so much potentiality that they depend on matter for being and becoming; among them too there is a great breadth, since some are more actual than others. You can know this from their operations, for operation makes the form known. Hence the forms of the elements, which have the greatest amount of potency, being nearest to matter, are principles of no operation except through material qualities, namely heat and cold. The forms of mixed things, however, being more elevated above matter, operate in a higher mode, as a diamond draws iron not by reason of heat or cold but from a property of its nature. The forms of animals are recognized as much more actual when we observe them moving themselves and discerning other things.

From these things one perceives not only how easy the approach is to knowing the plurality of intelligences, but also that it is impossible to imagine it without this foundation. For how can breadth be found in that which lacks act and potency? It is common to all extremes, if they are extremes, that they do not admit breadth in themselves. For they would be both ultimate and not ultimate, as is clear in itself. Therefore those things in which breadth is sought must be intermediates, which savour the nature of both extremes. And because we know that intellectual nature has actuality from the fact that it is intellectual, we would not know that it had potency mixed with it unless we saw that our soul had it, since potency is said equivocally of the potency of intellectual things and of the potency of sensible things, and without potency the multitude of intellectual substances cannot be understood. Therefore the Commentator says that if the nature of the possible intellect were not known, we could not understand plurality in abstract substances.

Three things are to be noted in this passage. The first is that this is brought forward from the Commentator’s statements: if the nature of the possible intellect were not known, we could not know plurality in immaterial substances.

The second is that St. Thomas does not say that the intellectual soul participates in potency to such an extent that it is a material form, but so that matter is drawn to participate in the being of the soul itself.

The third is that he says the being of the soul and of the body is one and the same being, which is independent of the body.

The procedure of Aristotle in XII Metaphysics, text 42, seems to oppose the first statement: there he concludes a plurality of intelligences from a plurality of movements, and makes no mention at all of act and potency. But this does not trouble those who understand the matter correctly. For it is one thing to conclude the number of movers and another to conclude a plurality of intellectual substances. Although the movers of the spheres and immaterial substances are the same in subject, they nevertheless differ in account, so that they belong to different sciences, according to the Commentator, XII Metaphysics, commentary 6. Therefore, although from a plurality of movements a plurality of movers as such can be concluded, a plurality of intellectual substances as such cannot. Averroes and St. Thomas therefore intend that the multitude of intelligences, insofar as they are intelligences, is discerned by us only through knowledge of the nature of the possible intellect, although their plurality, insofar as they are movers of the spheres, is inferred from the number of their effects.

Or say that that investigation, presupposing the knowledge obtained in the book On the Soul, where the plurality of possible intellectual substances was radically made known, asks from the number of movements how many there are. That the proper movers of the spheres are supposed there to have potency mixed with them can be argued from the fact that it is supposed there that the proper movers of the spheres are proportioned to their spheres, so that one moves only one sphere; and if a star were added, it either would not move or would move more slowly, as is said in II On the Heavens, text 71. For when one extreme of such proportion or commensuration is a material thing, namely a sphere, the other extreme should not be thought wholly stripped of potency; indeed, it is not intelligible to sound understanding.

For understanding the second point, one must note that there are two orders of things in the universe, namely of intelligible and sensible things. The order of sensible things is material and necessarily claims matter for itself, for all sensible substances have matter, although in different ways, as is said in VIII Metaphysics, texts 41 and 42. The order of intelligible things is immaterial and does not depend on matter. For each thing is intelligible through separation from matter, as is said in III On the Soul, text 11. Therefore, when matter is under some form of the sensible order, such as every form having all its powers attached to sensible organs, it does not exceed its proper limits, for it belongs to that genus. But when it is under a form of the intelligible order, it rises beyond its limits and is said to be drawn to that which transcends its capacity, namely the being of a thing not dependent on it. And because the highest touches the lowest, and the lowest the highest, according to the teaching of Dionysius in On the Celestial Hierarchy, therefore the highest among sensible things, namely man or his matter, is joined to the lowest form of the intelligible order, namely the intellectual soul, and participates in its being. For this reason it is said that matter is drawn to its being: matter is elevated to what is higher.

For the evidence of the third point, Scotus’s reasons against this statement of St. Thomas must be brought forward, so that the truth may shine forth more clearly. Scotus, in Quodlibet IX and in II Sentences, distinction 42, question 1, brings six arguments against it, some of which are recounted by Antonius Trombetta in the question whether what has been corrupted by divine power can return numerically the same.

In that question both he and Scotus, in the passage cited above, attribute to St. Thomas an opinion that is not his concerning what he asks there. This is because they did not survey the whole law of the matter, and, looking to few things according to Aristotle, they readily make assertions. He argues first in the present matter as follows: the being of the soul and of man is the same; therefore the soul joined to the body is not more perfect than itself outside the body. The consequence is contrary to St. Thomas, I, question 79, where he says that the soul has a more perfect state in the body than outside it. The consequence is proved as follows: nothing having the same being is more perfect merely because it communicates something to another, even if the other is perfected by this. For communicating may presuppose perfection in the one communicating, but it does not give that perfection to it. Now the soul, while in the body, always retains the same being; it has nothing more in the body except that it communicates its being to the body. Therefore it is not more perfect for this reason than it is when separate. This is confirmed because a cause acquires no imperfection merely from not communicating something. Therefore the soul is not less perfect when separate if it retains the same being, for it has lost nothing except its communication to the body.

Furthermore, the soul has the same being with man; therefore man is not more perfect in being than the soul itself is in being. The antecedent is false, but the consequence is proved because whatever things have altogether the same being are equally perfect in being, or at least that to which the being is communicated is not more perfect in being than the one communicating it.

Furthermore, man as man is a third being, really distinct from either of his parts, namely soul and body. Therefore he has a proper being other than the being of his parts, and consequently the being of the soul and of man is not the same. The consequence holds because a distinct being must have a distinct being.

Furthermore, the being of man is corrupted in death, whereas the being of the soul is not corrupted. Therefore the being of the soul and of man is not the same. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is proved because, just as generation terminates in the being of the composite, namely man, so corruption terminates in his non-being.

Furthermore, man does not remain after death; therefore neither does his being. Then further: the being of man does not remain after death; therefore the being of the soul and of man is not the same, since the being of the soul remains. The whole procedure is clear except for the first consequence, which is proved from the fact that no thing’s actual being is found when that whose being it is is not found.

Furthermore, there is another form in man besides the soul; therefore there is in him another being besides the being of the soul. The consequence is evident, because each form has its own being; the antecedent, however, was proved elsewhere.

Before answering these arguments, observe first that the foundation of St. Thomas is universally that in every composite there is only one substantial being of actual existence, which is what is now under discussion, because he holds only one substantial form in the composite: for from one form there is only one substantial being. But there is a difference between the being of man and the being of other things. Although both the being of man and the being of other things is first the act of a supposit, as of a thing, in man the whole composite begs that being from the form of which it is first the act, as of its proper and complete principle; in other composites, however, the form begs that being from the composite. The reason for the difference is that in man alone, who holds the highest place among sensible things, the lower order, namely the sensible, is drawn to the higher intelligible and immaterial order. Hence the being of man, since it flows from the intellectual soul, is immaterial and of a higher order than man, just as the soul itself is. Therefore man begs it from the soul, to which it belongs properly, as pertaining to its own genus. Hence after the death of man the soul remains: for its proper being was independent of the corrupted composite, and thus, drawing it back to itself, it subsists. But the being of other things, since it is of the same order as the composites to which it is attributed, just as are the forms from which it flows, is begged by the forms themselves from the composites, as is their becoming. Thus they enjoy it as long as they are in the composites; when the composites are corrupted, they themselves, since they cannot remain without existence, immediately cease.

Observe secondly, for resolving the arguments, three propositions. The first is that, since there are two kinds of perfection of a thing, first and second, a created thing capable of causing, even if it is not made more perfect according to first perfection by actually causing, is nevertheless made more perfect according to second perfection. This is clear for three reasons. First, because a thing actually causing is more in act than a thing capable of causing. For operation is the second act of a cause, while perfection follows actuality and imperfection potentiality. Second, because everything is more perfect when joined to its end than when separated from it. Now a thing actually operating is joined to its intrinsic end, which is operation, according to the statement in II On the Heavens, text 16: everything exists for the sake of its operation. Third, the same is clear because everything is more perfect the more like God it is. Now a thing actually causing is more like God than one not actually causing, because it is assimilated to God not only according to the fact that it is, but also according to the fact that it communicates itself to others.

The second proposition is this: a thing is simply perfect not because of first perfection but because of ultimate perfection. Boethius teaches this in The Hebdomads, saying: “I discern in things one being by which they are, and another being by which they are good”; and St. Thomas explains it in I, question 5, article 1, reply to objection 1.

For understanding this, note that, as the same author says in I, question 6, article 3, there are three perfections of a thing. The first is that by which a thing is constituted in its being, as the first perfection of man is his substantial being. The second is that by which it is immediately capable of its perfect operations, as the powers of the soul and the habits informing them, by which man can proceed to perfect operation. The third perfection is that by which it is joined to its end, as contemplation, which unites man to separate substances. It is clear, however, that a man who enjoys only the goodness of nature, or who is far from his proper end, is not simply perfect. Hence the order of being simply is opposed to the order of being in a certain respect, just as the order of what is simply perfect is opposed to that of what is perfect in a certain respect. According to substantial being man is called a being simply, but perfect in a certain respect; for one who has no other perfection except that he is a man is not asserted to be simply perfect, but is said with an addition to be perfect according to substantial being. According to accidental being, such as that of habits and operations, man is called a being in a certain respect, but simply perfect, for then nothing required for perfecting man is lacking to him. Therefore the proposition intended is clear: a thing is simply perfect from its ultimate perfection.

The third proposition is this: a real part of an essence is more perfect when existing in the whole than when separate. It is explained as follows: everything is more perfect when it possesses the completion of its specific being than when it falls short of it. But an essential part, when it is in the whole, is in the completion of its specific being, to whose integrity it is essentially ordered. When it is separated from it, however, it is not with the complete being of the species, since the species is composed by the aggregation of matter and form. Therefore an essential part is more perfect in the whole than when separate.

Descending from these points to the matter at hand, we say that the intellectual soul has a more perfect state in the composite than outside it, because when joined to the body it has not only first perfection, which is being, but also second perfection, by flowing into the body with its powers and communicating itself. Thus it is more like God than when separate, although God is wholly immaterial and incapable of composition. A moving heart is likewise more like God than a non-moving heart, although God is wholly immobile; for their perfection consists in this.

Moreover, there is perfection in the body, because in it the soul has complete specific being, which when separate it possesses only partially. For although the separated soul retains the whole being of existence that it had in the composite, it does not then have the whole complete being of essence in the species in the manner in which it is naturally disposed to have it, namely as a part in the whole. Yet it is ordered essentially, not accidentally, to having this. Therefore it is false that a separated soul retaining the same being of actual existence has lost nothing by separation except its communication of itself. For it has lost the integrity of specific quidditative being whenever it does not remain in its complete species. Hence blessed Thomas says in On the Soul, disputed questions, article 1, reply to objection 16, that the essential principles of a species are ordered not merely to being, but to being of this species. Therefore, although the soul can be through itself, it cannot be without the body in the completion of its species.

To the first argument, therefore, the consequence is denied. Its proof plainly assumes something false from the first proposition. For although communicating presupposes first perfection in the one communicating, it perfects it with second perfection, by which a thing is called simply perfect. Indeed, according to Dionysius, the highest thing creatures participate in from God is that they are communicative.

It is said secondly that the minor of the proof is also false, namely that the separated soul lacks only this, its communication of itself, as is clear from the third proposition. For it lacks the integrity of its specific being, and this is the first and principal thing that makes the separated soul less perfect. It lacks second perfections for this reason, because it lacks specific integrity, and not conversely. The confirmation is clear from the first proposition: a created cause, from the fact that it exists, has second perfection, and deprivation of this is a great imperfection. In the present case there is something more, because the separated soul not only ceases to communicate itself and its powers, but is in a state in which the communications of itself and its powers are impeded. This is a sign of no small imperfection, namely the separation from the complete quidditative being of the species. St. Thomas expressly has this in On Spiritual Creatures, disputed question, article 1, reply to objection 5.

To the second, the consequence is denied. To the proof it is said that, since being is twofold, quidditative and actual existence, the first remains in the soul only partially, whereas man has it integrally, and according to this being man is more perfect in being. As regards the being of existence, man can be said to be more perfect according to the mode of possessing it, namely because he has it as a supposit; the soul, however, can be called perfect according to another mode, namely insofar as such being belongs properly to it and not to man, in the manner explained above. Thus man and soul stand in this respect as exceeding and exceeded.

To the third, the consequence is denied, speaking of the being of actual existence. For a thing is not really distinguished from another and thereby has an existence different from it; it has already been said that parts and whole have the same being. The consequence is conceded concerning the being of essence, but this does not support the argument.

To the fourth it is said as before that, if the antecedent speaks of the being of essence, it is truly assumed in its first part but not in its second. For it is clear from what was said above that the complete specific being of the soul is corrupted.

But if the discussion concerns the being of existence, it can be understood in two ways. First, that the being of man’s actual existence simply ceases; and this is false, for the soul draws it back to itself. In another way it can be understood that the being of man in death ceases to be the being of man, that is, ceases to inform man; and in this way it is conceded. For just as we speak specially of the generation of man, and not in the same way of the propagation of other animals, Aristotle saying in II On the Generation of Animals, chapter 11, that only the intellect comes from within and that it alone is divine, because its operation has no communication at all with bodily operation, so a special discussion ought to be made of its corruption, the same author saying in XII Metaphysics, text 16, that in some cases nothing prevents a form from remaining afterward, as, if it is such a soul, perhaps not every part of it, but the intellect.

To the fifth, the first consequence is denied. And to the proof, using the distinction made, it is said that, since man’s actual being is taken in two ways—first, in itself or simply; second, insofar as it is the being of this man—in the first way it is not impossible for it to remain after man has been corrupted; in the second way, it is unintelligible that it remain. Therefore the actual being of no thing remains as its being when that whose being it is is not found. Yet it can be found simply, and the reason in the present case is the one often already given: that being is not proper to man but to the soul. Therefore it must always be found when that whose proper being it is exists, even if that to which it belonged as communicated ceases.

To the sixth, the antecedent is denied. To the other proofs previously made, the responses previously given apply. Therefore it remains true, speaking of the being of actual existence, that the being of the intellectual soul and of man is altogether one being, which in itself is independent of the body, since it is not caused by it. For it is not drawn out of the potency of matter, although, insofar as it is the being of this man, it can be found only in the body.