In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria

Whether each species of separate substances has only one individual.

Concerning this part there arises the question whether each species of separate substances has only one individual. Three things must be done in this question. First, Scotus's opinion with its foundations will be set forth; second, the Peripatetic truth; third, the arguments on the contrary will be answered.

As to the first, Scotus, II Sentences, distinction II, question VII, holds that there are several intelligences of the same species, for the following reasons.

First: Every quiddity, in itself, is communicable; an intelligence is some quiddity; therefore the quiddity of an intelligence is communicable in itself; therefore it can be found in several. The major is proved thus: if no quiddity were communicable, communicability would either be repugnant to it by reason of quiddity's perfection or imperfection. Not by reason of perfection, because, according to the Catholic faith, communicability belongs to the divine quiddity, which is supremely perfect. Nor by reason of imperfection, because communicability belongs to the quiddities of composite substances, which are imperfect. Since it is repugnant to it by reason of neither, the major remains true.

Furthermore, every intelligible quiddity under the aspect of the universal, without contradiction, is numerically plurifiable; a separate quiddity is intelligible under the aspect of the universal without contradiction; therefore it is numerically plurifiable. The major is proved by the fact that it involves being understood under the aspect of the universal and being this in itself: for universality is opposed to haecceity, just as it involves understanding the divine essence under the aspect of the universal, since it is this in itself.

Furthermore, God can annihilate this angel in this species. Once it has been annihilated, God can restore this species in another individual, not in the same one, according to this opinion: for according to these men a human being could not rise again numerically the same unless the intellectual soul remained numerically the same. Therefore in the same species there will be several individuals, at least successively.

Furthermore, intellectual souls are numerically distinct in the same species, and yet they are immaterial; therefore, and so on.

Furthermore, Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter XXIX, says that because the whole of human nature, or species, had fallen, God in pity came to save it; but he did not come to save angelic nature, because the whole of it had not fallen. Behold: Augustine says that the whole angelic nature had not fallen through sin, which cannot be true if there are as many species as individuals; for thus many angelic natures would have fallen wholly, whereas there would be only one human nature, since the human nature is only one.

Furthermore, Damascene, in the Elementarium, chapter XII, says that God made angels according to each species.

Furthermore, he argues to the same conclusion in Quodlibet II, that the aforesaid opinion was condemned at Paris in several articles. The first is: “If anyone says that God cannot multiply forms without matter, let him be in error.” The second: “If anyone says that a form does not receive division without matter, let him be in error.” The third: “Because intelligences do not have matter, God cannot make several of the same species,” let him be in error.

But if it is said, with Anthony Trombetta, that this sentence was not condemned everywhere, even granting that it was so at Paris, the contrary is that a sentence condemned in any famous university is condemned everywhere, or suspected of heresy, not only by the authority of the diocesan but also by the authority of the Lord Pope, as is clear in Extra, On Heretics, chapter Ad abolendam. This concludes the first part.

CONCLUSION

Each intelligence constitutes one species.

As to the second, the Peripatetic truth accepted from Aristotle, his Commentator, and Saint Thomas is that each intelligence constitutes one species, so that several individuals of the same species cannot be found there. Saint Thomas proves this in many ways in Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures, article 8, Against the Gentiles II, chapter 113, and the First Part, question 50, article 4, and elsewhere; two of those arguments must now be used. The first is drawn from their immateriality, by which they lack every principle that distinguishes numerically. The argument is formed thus: every species having several individuals has in itself a numerical distinguishing principle; an intelligence has no such distinguishing principle; therefore it does not have several individuals. The proof of the minor was given immediately above, before the question. Note that this argument is taken from Metaphysics XII, text 49, where the consequence is made: heaven—that is, the first principle—is one in species and many in number; therefore it is material. Thus it is expressly given to understand that immateriality is a sufficient cause of non-multiplication numerically. But since Scotus expressly says in the place cited above that his opinion is against Aristotle, I shall omit the authorities.

Saint Thomas's second argument is taken from the order of the universe, founded upon three propositions. The first is that the universe, having three parts—the sphere of generable and corruptible things, heavenly bodies, and immaterial substances—has order as an intrinsic good. This is found in Metaphysics XII, text 52.

The second proposition is that order is twofold: essential and accidental. Essential order is among things essentially ordered, such as species, which are like numbers, Metaphysics VIII, text 10. Accidental order is among individuals of the same species, as is said in Metaphysics III, text 11.

The third proposition is that the part of the universe in which there is pure essential order is superior to that in which essential order is mixed with accidental order. This follows from Metaphysics XII, text 52, where the first part of the universe is compared with sons of families, in whom nothing accidentally ordered is found. On these propositions the following argument is founded: what lacks accidental order does not have several individuals of the same species; the highest part of the universe lacks accidental order; therefore it does not have several individuals of the same species.

The major is evident from the terms. Although the minor is found in Aristotle at the cited place, since these men deny Aristotle here as elsewhere, it is proved as follows. The highest part of the universe excludes accidental order no less than the middle part, since the highest is more perfect, the goodness of the universe consists in order, and accidental order is something imperfect and deficient from essential order; indeed, what is ordered accidentally is disordered, because the accidental condition diminishes the reason of order. But the middle part excludes accidental order, as is clear: heavenly bodies do not have several individuals of the same species, for there is only one sun, one moon, and so on. Therefore the highest part excludes accidental order a fortiori. This concludes the second part.

As to the third, Scotus's arguments are answered. To the first, since it is a theological argument, let us introduce theological terms: communicability is threefold. One is with division of essence, as the universal is communicable to particulars. Another is without any division of essence and being, by identity, as the divine essence is common to three supposits. The third is by assumptibility into hypostatic union, as human nature is communicable to all the divine supposits. If Scotus takes “communicable” in the premises in the first way, the major is false, as is clear in the divine essence. If in the second way, it is also false, for no created essence is communicable in that way. If in the third way, it is likewise false, as is clear of the divine essence. If “communicable” is taken in none of those ways but for communicable in general, without descending determinately to this or that communicable thing, the whole argument may be conceded, but it does not conclude that an angelic quiddity is communicable as a universal is to particulars. For the fallacy of consequent is committed, from superior to inferior affirmatively. The proposed proof therefore does nothing against us. Communicability in the first way is repugnant to intelligences because of their perfection; in the second way because of their imperfection; in the third way it belongs to them because of their imperfection, since being is really distinct from their essence.

To the second, the major must be distinguished. That something is intelligible under the aspect of the universal belongs to it in two ways. In one way, on the part of the thing and the intellect, to use Saint Thomas's words; in another way, on the part of the intellect alone. In the first way the major is true and the minor false. In the second way the major is false, although the minor is true. For since the foundation of universality on the part of the thing is the finding of that quiddity in several individuals, simultaneously or successively, while the foundation on the part of the intellect is the presentation of that quiddity without represented individuating conditions, that is universal in both ways—on the part of the thing and of the intellect—which is supported by both foundations. Thus human essence is intelligible under the aspect of the universal on the part of the thing, because it is really divided and found in many, and on the part of the intellect, because it is represented without here and now. That is universal on the part of the intellect alone which is supported by only one foundation, namely representation. Its universality is had solely from this: it is placed objectively in the intellect, to which the thing is presented according to quidditative rather than individuating conditions. In this way the quiddity of an intelligence is universal. Although individual and specific being there have the same principle, since the thing is represented as such and not as this, because it is represented not according to what it is in itself but according to the mode of composite things, in which nature is one thing and the individual of that nature another, it is therefore universal only as an object. In this same way the quiddity of an intelligence is predicable of several—not actually or aptitudinally, but as it is an object of the intellect—as Avicenna teaches in Metaphysics V. Indeed, the divine quiddity itself is common and universal in this way according to reason, and therefore grammarians give it a plural number. As for the proof of the major, the answer is clear from the negation: when it is said that it involves a quiddity being this in itself and universal and predicable of several, this is true if “universal” and “predicable” are taken on the part of the thing. A universal according to reason alone is in many and of many only as an object. A universal only on the part of the thing is in many in reality, although it is also an object. If you wish to understand these matters clearly, remember what was said in the question on universals.

To the third, in that case the numerically same angel would necessarily be restored: Gabriel here and Gabriel there are from the same Gabriel. Nor is it true among us that God cannot restore the numerically same thing. Although we say that if, in the resurrection, the numerically same soul—which must not have been annihilated if the reason of resurrection is to be preserved—did not rise again, it would not be the numerically same human being, it follows that the numerically same thing can be restored by God.

To the fourth, the case of intelligences and intellectual souls is not similar in this respect. Souls are parts of a species capable of union with bodies, whereas intelligences are not. A fuller discussion of this will follow below.

To the fifth, Saint Thomas replies that human and angelic nature can be taken in two ways. In one way, according to the being of nature: thus human nature is one, while angelic nature is several. In another way, according to the being of the way, namely as travellers toward supernatural beatitude: thus, just as human nature is one, so the whole breadth of angelic species is one nature. For just as all human beings tend in one way toward their homeland, through free choice capable of being flexibly remedied, so all angels tend in one way toward beatitude, through free choice incapable of being flexibly remedied: once bent, it cannot turn back, for they apprehend immovably. Therefore Augustine, speaking as a theologian concerned with human beings and angels in the being of the way and of the homeland, called all angels one nature.

To the sixth, it is said that Damascene perhaps stated the opinion of those whom he does not follow in this matter; or by “species” he understood a subordinate species, not the most specific species. Since it is not certain that he held the contrary opinion, I prefer this reading. Therefore the name “species” must be taken broadly if the statement is to be true.

To the seventh, first, the argument proceeds from articles of Paris wrongly understood. They are directed against the Averroists, who say that the intellectual soul, being an immaterial form, cannot be multiplied numerically. Thus the sense of the first article is: if anyone says that God cannot multiply forms without matter, that is, without dependence upon matter, let him be in error. Likewise the second means: if anyone says that forms do not receive division without matter, that is, without dependence upon matter, let him be in error. Likewise the third means: because intelligences do not have matter, God could not make several of the same species, let him be in error; “do not have matter” means dependence upon matter, and “could not” means that this would proceed from God's impotence.

Or, secondly, it may be said that the Paris articles, insofar as they touch or seem to touch Saint Thomas's doctrine, were revoked by Stephen, bishop of Paris, at Bertillac, in the year of Our Lord 1325, on the Thursday before Holy Ashes, as is clear in the letter beginning Magistra rerum experientia certis indiciis evidenter demonstrat.

Thirdly, it is said that since the most holy Pope Urban V approved Saint Thomas's doctrine in the extravagans beginning Laudabilis Deus in Sanctis suis et in sui maiestate mirabilis, it is astonishing that these men dare, against the approval of the Roman Church, to revive the Paris articles. The Pope's words at the end of the extravagans to the University of Toulouse are: “Moreover, we wish and by the tenor of these presents enjoin upon you that you follow the doctrine of the blessed Thomas as truthful and Catholic, and strive with all your strength to enlarge it.” Given at Montefiascone, and so forth. Let the opponents attend to these words and see with what temerity they strive against the command of the Supreme Pontiff to attack the Catholic doctrine of Saint Thomas.

Therefore, although such substances are forms without matter, they do not have complete simplicity, nor are they pure acts; rather, they contain a mixture of potency. This is clear as follows. Whatever is not included in the notion of an essence or quiddity comes to it from outside and makes a composition with the essence, since no essence can be understood without the things that are its parts. Yet every essence or quiddity can be understood without anything being understood about its actual being. I can understand what a human being or a phoenix is and nevertheless be ignorant whether it exists in nature. Therefore it is clear that being is other than essence or quiddity.

In this third part of this chapter it is proved that separate substances are composed of being and essence. Before approaching the proof, it must be noted that in material substances four things really distinct are found: matter, form, the essence composed of them, and existence. In a human being we consider the matter in which its form is received, the form itself, which is the act of that matter, the human essence, which is neither matter nor form, and the actual being of existence, by which the human being formally exists in the nature of things. Hence in these substances two compositions belonging to the genus of substance are found. The first is from matter and form; the second from essence and existence, which is called composition from being and essence.

These compositions agree and differ among themselves. They agree in two respects. First, each consists of act and potency. It is clear that matter and form have the relation of potency and act; essence and being likewise, because every quiddity is placed in the nature of things by acquiring existence.

Second, they agree in this: the extremes of both are in the same genus. Matter and form of a human being, and its essence and being, are placed in the genus of substance and in the human species.

They differ in ten respects. First, the extremes of the first composition are parts of a substance and, properly speaking, are not substance. Matter and form are in the genus of substance only reductively; hence they receive the predication of substance, which is the most general genus, only obliquely. Neither extreme of the second composition is a part of substance: one, essence, is substance in the direct line of the categories; the other, existence, is outside substance.

Second, the extreme that is potency in the first composition is a being purely potential, namely matter. The extreme that is potency in the second composition is not pure potency, but a being quidditatively complete in some species, namely essence.

Third, the extreme that is potency in the first composition is not, properly speaking, what is or what comes to be. Matter does not come to be, as is said in Metaphysics VII, text 27; yet being and coming-to-be belong to the same thing, since coming-to-be terminates in being. The extreme that is potency in the second composition is what is and what comes to be, since every making terminates in the composite, as is said in the same place.

Fourth, the extreme that is act in the first composition is not the thing's ultimate actuality, but causes a further act. The form of a human being, which informs its matter, by causing the whole composite completes its own proper receptacle of existence, and thus causes existence, which is a further act. The extreme that is act in the second composition is the ultimate actuality of that genus; for after Socrates' existence nothing substantial further accrues to him.

Fifth, the extreme that is act in the first composition is act in such a way that it is nevertheless related to another as potency. The extreme that is act in the second composition is act in such a way that it is related as potency to nothing belonging to the thing itself. This can be seen by noting the proportion between form and existence. The proportion of form to actual being is like that of transparency to light: form receives existence and causes it, as transparency does light. Air is not capable of light precisely as air; it must be informed by transparency to become light's proper receptacle. Thus neither air nor transparency, but transparent air, is first luminous, although secondarily both air and transparency shine with light. So here matter alone is not capable of existence, since act must be received in its proper potency; form must be received in matter so that the composite of them, neither matter nor form, becomes the proper receptacle of existence. What first exists is the composite, whose coming-to-be is also first. Yet matter and form are secondarily actualized by that same existence. Just as transparency is the formal cause and formal completion of transparent air so that it may be light's proper receptacle, while it is related to incoming light as receiving potency, though secondarily to received act, so form is the formal cause and completion of the composite so that it may be existence's proper receptacle, and thereby is related to the subsequent existence as receiving potency, though secondarily to received act. Hence actual existence is related as potency to act to nothing else, but is the ultimate actuality of every thing, including its form.

Sixth, the extreme that is act in the first composition belongs intrinsically to the intellect or definition of the thing, since form, according to everyone, is conceived intrinsically in the definition. The extreme that is act in the second composition is outside the quiddity of the thing, for a definition signifies neither being nor non-being, as is said in Posterior Analytics I.

Seventh, from the extremes of the first composition there results one third thing, one per se. From the extremes of the second composition there results neither one third thing one per se nor, properly speaking, one per accidens. The reason follows from what was said above: one per se arises only from two things, each of which is a part of substance, one of which is pure potency. For a third thing one per se does not arise from two acts, nor from two things unless one is act in such a way that it can be related to another as potency; the parts are matter of the whole, Metaphysics V, text 3. Since all these conditions are preserved in the first composition and none in the second, it follows that the second composition produces no third one per se; nor does it produce one per accidens, since one per accidens aggregates things of different genera. Nevertheless essence is joined per se with being. Eighth, the first composition is a composition “from these,” and therefore a third one arises there. The second is a composition “with these.” Properly speaking, no thing is given that consists of essence and existence as a thing is given that consists of matter and form; rather, essence composes with existence and conversely. Therefore it was said that they are joined per se, but do not compose a third thing. Ninth, the first composition extends to fewer things than the second. The extremes of the first composition are found only in sensible things, since it was concluded above that only these consist of matter and form. The extremes of the second composition are found both in sensible and immaterial things, for intelligences have quiddity and existence. Hence the first composition entails the second, but not conversely. Every composite of matter and form is a composite of essence and being, but not conversely. Tenth, they differ in their properties. The first composition is followed by quantity, sensible accidents, and at least local change. The second is followed neither by generation, corruption, nor any physical change, but only by receiving and being received, perfecting and being perfected, because these follow act and potency, whereas the former follow matter and form.

In the text, therefore, this second composition is proved to be found in every being short of the first, by proposing the following conclusion: every being other than the first is composed of being and essence. The reasoning is: everything having something really joined to its quiddity, outside its essence, is composed of quiddity and that addition, that is, essence and being; every being other than God has something real really joined to its quiddity outside its essence, namely being; therefore every being other than God is composed of being and essence. Saint Thomas leaves the major as manifest. It must be modified so that the addition is outside the essence of the thing taken particularly (which is said because it is outside the essence of a superior, yet does not compose with it). So modified, the proposition also serves, because existence is outside Socrates' essence: it would not be placed in his definition if he were defined. The major is therefore manifest, since two things joined, neither of which contracts the other, one being act and the other potency, are really joined only through composition. The minor is clear from the sixth difference and from Aristotle's saying in Posterior Analytics I that no definition signifies being. The minor is therefore clear from the sixth difference and from Aristotle's saying in Posterior Analytics I that no definition signifies being. Unless perhaps there is some thing whose quiddity is its being; this thing can be only one and first, because multiplication can occur only by adding a difference, as the nature of a genus is multiplied in species, or because one is abstract and the other received in something, as a separated color would differ from a non-separated color by its separation. If something is posited which is being alone, so that being itself is subsistent, it will not receive the addition of a difference, since it would no longer be being alone but being plus some form; still less will it receive matter, since it would no longer be subsistent but material being. Therefore such a thing, which is its own being, can be only one. In every other thing, then, its being must be other than its quiddity, nature, or form. Hence in intelligences there must be being besides form, and it was therefore said that an intelligence is form and being. Here a second argument for the same conclusion is given, by excluding an implicit reply. Someone could say that there is a thing whose quiddity is its being and whose definition does not abstract from existence. The second argument replies by proving that in one being alone, namely the first, essence is identical with existence, and consequently that in every other being being and essence are really distinct. The reasoning is: everything plurifiable, or plurified, is multiplied in one of three ways—by adding a formal difference, by receiving both in matter, or by receiving one in matter and separating the other. But a quiddity that is its own existence is multiplicable in none of these ways; therefore a quiddity that is its own being is neither multiplicable nor multiplied; therefore it is one alone; and thus everything other than it is not its own existence. The process is clear. The major is explained because plurality follows division. Division occurs through formal differences, as the generic nature of animal is multiplied in human being and lion; or through individual differences, as the specific nature is multiplied in Socrates and Plato because Socrates' humanity is in matter signate distinct from Plato's; or, thirdly, division can be imagined between two things of the same nature because one is wholly separated from material conditions while the other is concreted with them, as a separated human being, in Plato's account, is distinguished from a particular human being because the separated human is immaterial while Socrates' nature is received in this matter. No other real mode of multiplication in the universe appears when one runs through all the categories. Nor should anyone object that quantity and substance are really distinct and yet not through formal differences, and so forth. Whether division is made through modes or differences does not matter, provided that the contracting thing draws what is contracted to some limited nature. The minor is explained in all its parts. First, that it is not multiplicable as a genus is clear because a genus receives the addition of a difference, by which the nature of the genus is drawn to a determinate specific nature and loses its own purity: animal contracted to the human species is not pure animal but human animal. A quiddity that is its own existence, however, is pure being itself and not restricted. As soon as it were contracted, it would lose its purity and there would be two things there, being namely and the quiddity to which it had been contracted. The second part of the minor is clearer: what is received in another is not pure and subsistent being, but is sustained in another; whereas a quiddity that is its own being is pure and consequently subsistent through itself, not mixed into another in which it would be sustained. The third part is clear in the same way. If one quiddity that is its own being is separated and another is received, the latter, by being received, cannot be identical with its own existence; for, as was said, received being cannot be identical with the quiddity. Thus it is concluded that the quiddity which is its own being is one alone, namely the first cause of all things, and consequently that the others have being distinct from their essences.

Whatever belongs to something is either caused by the principles of its nature, as the capacity for laughter in a human being, or comes from some extrinsic principle, as light in air comes from the influence of the sun. Being itself cannot be caused by the form or quiddity of the thing as by an efficient cause, for then something would be the cause of itself and would produce itself in being, which is impossible. Therefore every such thing whose being is other than its nature must have being from another. In this fourth part of the chapter it is explained that intelligences have being from God efficiently, in whom being is entirely identical with essence. The first point is proved in this universal conclusion: everything other than the first cause is produced by it. Everything whose being is distinct from its quiddity is efficiently produced by the first cause; every being other than the first cause has being distinct from its quiddity; therefore every being other than the first is efficiently produced by the first cause. The minor is assumed from what has been and will be said. The major is proved thus: everything to which something distinct from its quiddity belongs is related to it so that either it is itself the efficient cause of that thing or it has it efficiently from another; no third possibility can be imagined. Risibility, whiteness, and whatever else belongs to a human being is either efficiently caused by the human being itself or by something else that is not the human being's quiddity. But no being can efficiently produce its own existence, as is said in On the Soul II, text 47. Therefore it must have existence efficiently from another. That a being cannot produce its own existence is clear because it would follow that it existed before it existed: by causing it would exist, since every efficient cause exists, Physics III, text 17; and by causing its own being, its existence would follow its causality. Thus it would exist before it existed.

Since everything that is through another is reduced to what is through itself as its first cause, there must be some thing that is the cause of being for all things, because it is being alone; otherwise there would be an infinite regress among causes, since every thing that is not being alone has a cause of its being, as was said. It is therefore clear that an intelligence is form and being, and that it has being from the first being, which is being alone; and this is the first cause, which is God. Here the second proposed point is declared, namely that the essence of the first cause is its existence. The reasoning is: everything that is through another such thing is preceded by what is through itself such a thing; every being other than the first cause is through another such thing, that is, a being; therefore it is preceded by what is being through itself. What is being through itself is the cause for all things that they may be beings, as is said in Metaphysics II, text 4. Therefore the first cause is being from itself, or being through itself, and consequently its quiddity is being itself; otherwise it would be a being through another and dependent upon another, as was deduced above. Although the major is found in Physics II, text 66, and VIII, text 39, it is proved in the text because otherwise there would be an infinite process in the cause. If one did not arrive at one thing that is such through itself, but all things were such through another, then for the same reason that one thing precedes another, another would precede that one, and so to infinity. The minor is the conclusion of the preceding argument.