In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria

Whether universals in act exist outside the mind.

Concerning what has been said, there is no small question: whether universals in act exist outside the mind, or are made through the operation of the intellect, as was said. In this question, first the title will be explained. Second, Scotus's opinion will be set forth. Third, St. Thomas's opinion will be set forth. Fourth, the arguments on the contrary side will be answered.

As to the first: because this question, understood in different ways, has been determined by philosophers in different ways, assuming for the present the Peripatetic position, namely that universals do not subsist outside singulars, it must be explained how it is to be understood.

By the name “universal” we understand three things. First, universality, which is a relation of reason. Second, the thing which is denominated universal by that universality. Third, aptitude for being in many, which is something intermediate between those two and is the proximate foundation why the thing receives that relative denomination; for the intellect attributes the relation of universality to the thing precisely because that thing is naturally apt to be in many. It is not in doubt whether that relation, which is called the universal formally, is outside the mind; for all say that it is made by the intellect. Nor is it asked whether the thing which is denominated universal, which is called the universal objectively in potency, is outside the mind. For the common opinion is that sometimes that thing is outside the mind and sometimes it is not. If that thing is a real thing, such as a man, an ox, and the like, it is posited outside the mind. But if that thing is a being of reason, it is not posited outside, as subject, predicate, proposition, syllogism, and the like. But the doubt is whether aptitude for being in many is outside the mind: so that, without any operation of the intellect, a thing is found naturally apt to be in many, which is called the universal objectively in act; or whether only the thing is outside the mind, while aptitude for being in many belongs to the thing through the operation of the intellect. And because that aptitude completes the account of the universal in act, taking “universal” objectively, though not formally, to ask whether all this is found outside the mind—namely, a thing naturally apt to be in many—is to ask whether the universal objectively in act exists outside the mind.

And you must know, for clarity concerning the terms, that just as “white” is taken in two ways, namely formally and subjectively, so “universal” is taken in two ways, namely formally and objectively. It cannot be taken subjectively, since universality is not subjectively in anything, being a being of reason. The universal formally is universality itself, which is a relation of reason. The universal objectively is subdivided into the universal objectively in act and the universal objectively in potency. The universal objectively in act is all this, namely one thing naturally apt to be in many. The universal objectively in potency is the one thing itself formally, without adding to it aptitude for being in many. From these points it is clear where the difficulty lies, and it is clear what the terms placed in the title of the question mean. For we intend neither the universal formally nor the universal objectively in potency, because we agree about these, but the universal objectively in act. Therefore, when we speak of the universal in act without qualification, we wish it to be understood objectively, lest we labor over an equivocation. So much for the first.

As to the second: Scotus, above, Metaphysics VII, question XVI, following his foundations—namely, that formal unity and community follow nature outside the mind—opines that one thing naturally apt to be in many is given outside the mind; for this he says that the universal in act is in the nature of things without any operation of the intellect. He also adduces many arguments for this, to bring which forward would exceed the limits of our intention; therefore I shall bring forward those from whose solution the weakness of the rest becomes known.

First he argues from the definition to the thing defined as follows: with every act of the intellect excluded, a thing is naturally apt to be in many; therefore the universal in act is given outside the mind. The consequence holds because the universal objectively in act, as distinguished against the singular, is defined at the beginning of On Interpretation: “The universal is that which is naturally apt to be in many.” The antecedent is proved because, if not, then aptitude for being in many is repugnant to it, nor could it be conferred on it even by the intellect; for then, by the same reasoning, it could give such aptitude to Socrates.

Furthermore, the universal in act is the proper object of the intellect; therefore it precedes the act of the intellect. The consequence holds from On the Soul II, where it is said that the object is prior to the act.

Furthermore, the object of real science is a being outside the mind; the universal in act is the object of real science; therefore the universal in act is a being outside the mind.

Furthermore, the relation of measure is real, Metaphysics V; but it is founded on some universal. This is proved because there must be some one thing measuring other species; but not one numerically, according to Aristotle; therefore a universal.

Furthermore, a real operation or passion is first and adequately in the universal, as understanding is in man, from the first book of the Posterior Analytics; therefore a universal exists outside the mind. Furthermore, contrariety is a real opposition, and its extremes are universals, not singulars; therefore universals exist outside the mind. Furthermore, if the universal is made by the intellect, how is one thing predicated of another? And how is the universal everywhere and always, incorruptible and eternal? And how do matter and form belong to the quiddity of the physical universal? And how is there definition only of universals? And how are genera and species, and universally the categories, beings outside the mind?

Furthermore, if there were nothing in the thing except the singular, there would be no real unity except numerical unity, which is proper to the singular; the consequent is false; therefore, and so on. So much for the second.

As to the third, know that we, following St. Thomas and therefore the common Peripatetic doctrine, put forward the opposite position in this matter. For we say that of the three things understood in the name “universal,” only one is sometimes outside the mind, namely the thing itself formally one, while the other two follow through the operation of the intellect. This is also proved by arguing in a similar way to the argument above: whatever follows a nature on account of itself is simply predicated of an individual of that nature; but aptitude for being in many, according to you, follows nature—say, humanity—on account of itself; therefore aptitude for being in many is simply predicated of an individual of human nature; therefore this will be true: “Socrates is naturally apt to be in many,” which is impossible. The major was clear above, from the fact that all things which accompany a nature on account of itself are not separated from it when it is posited in an individual, and consequently are predicated of it: for being in grounds being said of.

Furthermore, every aptitude flowing from some nature is found in every singular nature inferior to it; but this aptitude, namely for being in many, flows from some nature, say from humanity; therefore aptitude for being in many is found in every human nature. The reasoning is sound, and the conclusion is false; therefore one of the premises is false—not the major, which is clear from the terms; therefore the minor, which is the conclusion of the adversaries. The falsity of the conclusion is proved thus: that aptitude must not be attributed to every humanity which in every humanity is impossible to reduce to act. This is clear, because otherwise such aptitude would have been given uselessly; for aptitude is for the sake of act. But aptitude for being in many is of this kind, namely, that when posited in any humanity it is impossible to reduce it to act, because it is impossible for Socrates's humanity actually to be in Socrates and Plato, or to migrate from Socrates into Plato; therefore aptitude for being in many must not be attributed to each humanity individually. Let us therefore say that the one thing is outside the mind, but that aptitude for being in many belongs to the thing according to the being which it has in the intellect, because it belongs to it when posited under the condition of solitude. For a nature taken in isolation is naturally apt to be in many, at least according to reason. But solitude, since it implies separation of the nature from individual properties, belongs to the thing only when it is presented to the agent or possible intellect.

And notice, for greater clarity of our position, that here a defect similar to the one attributed above to Scotus occurs. Since aptitude for being in many is the same as non-repugnance to being in many, he argues as follows: nature—for example, humanity, insofar as it is humanity—is not repugnant to being in many; therefore humanity, insofar as it is humanity, has aptitude, or non-repugnance, for being in many, and consequently humanity is universal without the operation of the intellect. But the error in this reasoning is plainly apparent, since an affirmative proposition about an infinite predicate with reduplication added is inferred from a negative one. The first proposition, which is negative, is true. The second, however, which is affirmative, is impossible: this is clear from the fact that humanity insofar as it is humanity abstracts from repugnance to being in many and from non-repugnance to being in many, just as it abstracts from white and not-white. For if humanity, insofar as it is humanity, claimed for itself non-repugnance to being in many, in no way could repugnance to being in many belong to humanity; and thus it could neither per se nor accidentally be repugnant to humanity to be in many, which is plainly false.

For it is repugnant to Socrates's humanity, on account of the haecceity added to it, to be in many. The consequence holds because the opposite of what belongs to something according to itself can in no way be found in that thing, as you have from Posterior Analytics I. Therefore, although nature on account of itself is not repugnant to being in many, it does not claim for itself, on account of itself, non-repugnance to being in many; and since it does not claim this for itself according to the being which it has in singulars, it remains that it will claim it for itself according to the being which it assumes in the intellect. And because, for something to be a universal in act, it is required that it claim for itself non-repugnance to being in many, since this is placed in its definition—for what is placed in a definition belongs per se to the thing defined—therefore a thing cannot be a universal in act on account of itself; but as soon as it is presented to the agent or possible intellect, it becomes a universal in act, having been a universal in potency. But how this reduction from potency to act occurs has already been said: it is done by the agent intellect through the production of the intelligible species, and by the possible intellect through the formation of the concept.

But if someone were to imagine that the universal in act is constituted by negation of repugnance to being in many, and does not require an affirmation of non-repugnance, let him notice that he errs for three reasons.

Second, because if negation of repugnance to being in many suffices for the universal, negation of repugnance to being in one alone will likewise suffice for the singular. For just as the universal is related to many, so the singular is related to one alone; and if this is so, then humanity, insofar as it is humanity, will be both universal and singular, since both repugnances are denied of it as such.

Third, because since the universal in act is distinguished against the singular, just as it is repugnant to the singular to be in many, so it is repugnant to the universal to be in one alone. But it is not repugnant to humanity, of which repugnance to being in many is denied, to be in one alone; therefore such negation of repugnance does not suffice to constitute the universal in act. And this argument can be formed against the principal argument as follows: it is repugnant to the universal in act to be in one alone; but it is not repugnant to humanity insofar as it is humanity to be in one alone, otherwise it could not be preserved in a single individual; therefore humanity as such is not a universal in act. Say the same similarly of any other nature. So much for the third.

As to the fourth, the arguments on the contrary side must be answered. In the first, the antecedent is denied, and in proof of it the consequence is denied. For this does not follow: “With the act of the intellect excluded, a thing is not a genus; therefore it is repugnant to it to be a genus.” It can stand that it abstracts from both; and so it is in the matter at hand. For nature itself, with the act of the intellect excluded, abstracts from aptitude for being in many and from repugnance to being in many, as is clear from what was said.

The second is answered in two ways, and both are sound. First, the consequence is denied if the agent intellect is under discussion, because an active power does not presuppose its object but makes it. If the possible intellect is under discussion, then, once the first consequence is granted, it will not follow that the universal in act is outside the mind, because it is made through the act of the agent intellect. Second, it is said that since the universal in act names two things, namely the thing and aptitude, and so on, the thing itself is the object, while aptitude is the mode or condition of the object, without which the thing is not an object. It is enough that the thing itself, which is the object, precede the act of the intellect; its mode need not precede it. For Aristotle says that the object is prior to the act, not the mode of the object. Hence, as to the form of the argument, the consequence must be denied: although the posteriority of the aptitude does not prevent it from being a mode of the object, it does prevent the conclusion from being inferred from that fact; for the priority of the mode cannot be inferred from the posteriority of the object.

The same answer is given to the third: the thing which is the object of real science is outside the mind, not the mode of the thing that is the object. But the universal in act names both, namely the thing and the mode; and therefore it does not follow that the universal in act is outside the mind from the fact that the thing of which there is science is outside it.

As to the form of the argument, it is said that, while the major is true, the fallacy of figure of speech is committed: the thing which is the object is changed into the mode of the thing, or into the thing together with its mode.

Against these answers Scotus argues there. First against the first as follows: whatever is through the agent intellect is a first intention; therefore no universal is in the category of substance; consequently there is no predication in quid of superiors concerning inferiors.

Furthermore, the universal precedes sense, as was proved elsewhere; therefore it precedes the agent intellect.

Furthermore, the agent and possible intellects are one power; otherwise every man would have two intellects. But one power has one object; therefore, if it precedes the act of one, it precedes the act of the other.

Furthermore, on this account there would be no univocal generation without the action of the agent intellect. It may perhaps be said that generator and generated do not have some real unity, but a likeness. Against this: the proximate foundation of likeness is one, Metaphysics V; but neither the generator nor the generated is one; therefore there is something common to both.

Against the second answer, however, he argues: when no intellect is considering it, there will be no universal in act, and thus habitual science would not be of an object that is a universal in act.

Furthermore, the object, insofar as it is prior to the act, is not understood under this mode; therefore either under no mode or under the opposite mode. But not under no mode; therefore, and so on.

Furthermore, either that mode is made by the intellect or it is not. If not, the intended conclusion is obtained; if so, then it is not necessary in the object, because the object is first understood without that mode caused by the intellection of the object.

To these objections it is answered by presupposing what has often already been said: the universal signifies two things, the thing and aptitude, or universality. The universal as a thing placed in a category is predicable, knowable, and an object of the intellect, definable, and the like. But the universal as aptitude is the mode or condition of the categorical thing, which is predicable, knowable, definable, and so on. Neither the agent nor the possible intellect makes the thing, but only the mode.

To the first, therefore, it is conceded that the universal insofar as it is made by the agent intellect is not in the category of substance; but the further consequence has no appearance of validity.

To the second, the antecedent is denied. For although sight is universally of color, as you have from St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I–II, question XXIX, article 6, it is not of a universal color.

Likewise, to the third, the antecedent is denied. For it is necessary, as is said in On the Soul III, text XVII, that there be two intellects in our soul, namely the agent and the possible, which cannot be the same power, since active power and passive power are not the same according to Aristotle.

To the fourth, the consequence is denied, and it is said that the response given there is indeed the best, when properly understood. To its refutation it is said that likeness is founded upon the things themselves, namely two whitenesses or two humanities, as upon its foundation; and that unity is not the foundation of likeness, but a condition of the foundation. For likeness properly so called is founded upon two things possessing that condition, namely mutual negation of formal distinction, such as two whitenesses; and Aristotle, Metaphysics V, is to be understood in this way. And granted that unity were the foundation, it still would not follow that there is something common and one to both: for I shall say that likeness is founded neither upon the one which is generating nor upon the one which is generated, but upon the one which the generating and the generated are. Now it has already been declared above that the fallacy of consequent is committed if one proceeds thus: the generating and the generated are formally one; therefore they have something common and one to both.

To the first of the points brought against the second response, it is said that, speaking precisely of the possible intellect, the universal is divided just as science is: thus science in act is universal in act; science in potency is universal in potency; and science in habit is universal in habit, which occurs when, whenever we wish, we make it actual. Proceeding, however, to the agent intellect, it is said that, provided an intelligible species has been produced, a universal in act is given without any intellect considering it: for, while the philosopher is asleep, the rose, whose intelligible species is preserved in his intellect, is called represented, without being actually intelligible here and now, and so on.

To the second it is said that the object, as previously actual, claims no mode for itself; for quiddity abstracts from every being and mode.

To the third it is said that this mode is made by the agent intellect, and when it is inferred, “therefore it is not necessary,” the consequence is denied, because an active potency does not presuppose the condition of its object, but makes it. It is said secondly that, granted it were not made by the agent intellect, it is made by the possible intellect, and that consequence is likewise denied. To the proof it is said that it assumes something false, namely that the intellect first understands the thing and then makes its mode: both are made simultaneously. For, by forming the conceived thing without the here and now in itself, the intellect makes it; nor can one imagine that it first makes the thing and then makes it without the here and now, just as Socrates simultaneously generates this human being, and does not first generate a human being and then this one.

To the fourth it is denied that the relation of measure is founded upon some universal: for it is founded neither upon the universal nor upon the singular as such, but upon one nature formally, which is found in the singular; and thus, as such, it is not one numerically as the measure of other things, but one formally.

To the fifth it is said that it concludes nothing else than that the universal as a thing is outside the soul: for, when the universal is taken in this way, a passion or real operation inheres in it first; for it is man who is the first to whom laughing belongs, not universal man. Otherwise the laughable would not be found in non-universal man, such as Socrates.

To the sixth it is likewise said that the extremes of contrariety are the things themselves, not particular things as such, nor universals; otherwise non-universal things, namely this whiteness and this blackness, would not be contrary.

To the seventh it is said that these two stand together: the universal is predicated of things, and the universal is made by the intellect. For the universal as a thing is that which is predicated, and in this respect it is not made by the intellect; but the universal as aptitude is a condition of the thing which is predicated, and such a condition is made by the intellect. For predication is not owed to things unless they possess some intentional condition. Hence Aristotle too, Metaphysics VII, text XLVI, says that substance is not said of a subject, because he was speaking of it according to its nature. But in the Categories, where he was speaking of substance clothed with intentional accidents, he said that substance is said of a subject.

To what is added there it is said that all those things are verified of the universal as a thing; but the affirmative proposition must be explained negatively, so that its sense is: universals are everywhere, and so forth—that is, the very natures denominated universal do not delimit a place or time for themselves. Likewise, to what follows, it is said that form and matter belong to the quiddity of the universal, that is, of the physical thing which is denominated universal. Likewise, only universals have definition, that is, things which are denominated universal. Likewise, things denominated genera, species, and differences are outside the soul; but their conditions are through the work of the intellect.

To the eighth it is said that by “singular” we can understand two things: sometimes singularity itself, sometimes the whole, namely the singular thing. Taking singular in the first way, the consequence is conceded, but the antecedent is not true. In the second way, the antecedent is Peripatetic, but the consequence has no force: for we have already said above that many unities exist in the singular, and not only numerical unity.

And although this understood nature has the character of a universal insofar as it is compared with things outside the soul, because it is one likeness of all, nevertheless, insofar as it has being in this intellect or in that, it is a certain particular understood species. Thus the defect of the Commentator in On the Soul III is clear: he wished to conclude the unity of the intellect from the universality of the understood form, because the universality of that form is not according to the being which it has in the intellect, but according as it is referred to things, as a likeness of things. Likewise, if there were one corporeal statue representing many human beings, it is clear that that image or species of the statue would have singular and proper being insofar as it was in this matter; but it would have the character of community insofar as it was a common representation of many.

In this second part of this chapter he intends to remove Averroes’ error, by which in On the Soul III, commentary V, he wished to declare the unity of the intellect from the universality of the understood form in this way: that which is universal, retaining its universality, is numerically undistinguished; the understood form, that is, nature according to its subjective being in the intellect, is universal, retaining its universality; therefore it is numerically undistinguished; therefore its subject, which is the possible intellect, is not numerically distinct, and thus one intellect in all human beings is concluded. The major seems self-evident, because numerical distinction is opposed to universality. The minor is clear from the fact that the intelligible species represents the universal. Although this argument requires a further principle for its dissolution and its proof, nevertheless, insofar as concerns the present intention, it is destroyed from what has been said as follows: the universal is twofold, namely in being and in representing. A universal in being would exist if there were a separated nature of man, like Plato’s idea; and of such a universal the major is true but the minor false. The major is true because, since such a universal receives universality according to being, numerical distinction will likewise be repugnant to it according to being; hence it is impossible to imagine several universal human beings. The minor is false because the intelligible species is not universal in being, since it is in a singular subject, namely the possible intellect, which is a certain individual, although immaterial. But a universal in representing, as was said, is that which represents a universal thing; and of such a universal the major is false, although the minor is true. The falsity of the major can indeed be known from this: such a universal does not have universality according to its being, by which it regards the subject, and hence numerical unity or plurality arises in accidents; but it has universality according to representation, which regards the object. Hence it does not represent numerically distinct objects, but one and the same object: all the species of the same thing represent one and the same object, such as the species of humanity in you and in me, just as the same face of Socrates is seen by many through many species representing exactly the same thing. The truth of the minor understood in this way is clear from the foregoing: for the intelligible species represents the nature without representing its particular conditions, as was said. This is the meaning of the text in this part.

And because it belongs to human nature according to its absolute consideration that it be predicated of Socrates, whereas the character of species does not belong to it according to its absolute consideration, namely the consideration of human nature, but is among the accidents which follow it according to a certain being which it has in the intellect, therefore the name “species” is not predicated of Socrates, so that one says, “Socrates is a species.” This would necessarily occur if the character of species belonged to man according to the being which it has in Socrates, or according to its absolute consideration, namely insofar as it is man; for whatever belongs to man insofar as he is man is predicated of Socrates.

In this third part of this chapter he intends to exclude the following objection from what has been said: what is predicated of a predicate is predicated also of the subject; but species is predicated of man, which is a predicate with respect to Socrates; therefore species is predicated of Socrates, and thus Socrates will be a species. The conclusion is false; the major is true, as is found in the antepredicaments. He shows from the distinction stated above of the things which belong to nature where the error of this objection arises, while also indicating how suitably the doctrine was given, since accidental difficulties are dissolved by it. For since it has been said that there are three kinds of things predicated of nature—some absolutely, some according to being in the intellect, and some according to being in the singular—those which belong to nature according to being in the intellect do not belong to it absolutely or according to being in the singular, since these are opposed; and therefore an error occurs in the stated process, because specific denomination belongs to man according to being in the intellect, while it is concluded of man according to being in the singular, when one infers: therefore Socrates is a species.

To make the form of the argument clear, he indicates the following distinction: being predicated of a predicate occurs in two ways. In one way, as a predicate, that is, according as it is predicated of another, as animal is predicated of the predicate of Socrates, namely man, according to that according to which man is predicated of Socrates. For according to the same thing man receives the predication of animal and is predicated of Socrates according to his nature; and in this way the major is true, but the minor false. In another way, something is predicated of a predicate not as a predicate, that is, not according to that character by which the predicate is predicated of its subject. Thus in the present case species is not predicated of man insofar as man is the predicate of Socrates, that is, species is not predicated of man according to the being by which man is predicated of Socrates, since man is predicated of Socrates according to his quiddative being absolutely. But species is predicated of man not according to quiddative being, but according to the being which it has in the intellect. In this way the major is false and the minor true; therefore one of the premises is false. This is what is said in the text: the character of species does not belong to man according to his absolute consideration, according to which it belongs to him to be predicated of Socrates, because in that case it would also have to belong to Socrates, as was said above; but it belongs to him according to being in the intellect, according to which being it is predicated of Socrates.

And yet being predicated belongs to genus per se, since it is placed in its definition. For predication is something completed through the action of the intellect composing and dividing, yet having a foundation in the thing, namely the very unity of those things one of which is said of the other. Hence the character of predicability can be enclosed in the character of this intention, which is genus, and which likewise is completed through the action of the intellect. Nevertheless, that to which the intellect attributes the intention of predicability, composing it with another, is not the intention of genus itself, but rather that to which the intellect attributes the intention of genus, such as what is signified by the name “animal.” Thus it is clear how essence or nature is related to the character of species: the character of species is not among those things which belong to it according to its absolute consideration, nor among the accidents which follow it according to the being which it has outside the soul, such as whiteness or blackness; but it is among the accidents which follow it according to the being which it has in the intellect. In this way the character of genus or difference belongs to it.

In this fourth part of this chapter he intends to respond to a tacit objection, which is this: what is predicated per se of species belongs to the species themselves; but “genus” is predicated per se of species, namely of man and ox; therefore “genus” belongs to the species themselves, and thus man will be a genus, and likewise ox. The major is evident from the terms; for it implies that something be predicated per se of something in any mode of per se predication and not belong to it. The minor is proved thus: that in whose definition it is placed that it is predicated of species is predicated per se of them; but “genus” is that in whose definition it is placed that it is predicated of species; therefore genus is predicated per se of species. The major of this syllogism is clear from the fact that every part of a definition in the nominative, in the first mode of per se predication, belongs to the defined thing. The minor is clear from Porphyry, who says: genus is predicable of many things differing in species.

The same argument can wholly be made concerning species with respect to the individual, since in the definition of species too it is placed that it is predicated of individuals; and thus it seems that it was wrongly said that Socrates is not a species. The motive of this objection is merely touched upon in the text, when it says: nevertheless, being predicated per se belongs to genus, since it is placed in its definition.

The response is set down in what remains, where, for a full discussion of this matter, he indicates two distinctions. The first is that being predicated is taken in two ways, namely formally and fundamentally or materially. The second is that genus is taken in two ways, namely formally and fundamentally or materially. And you must know, in order to understand the terms, that in this proposition, “man is an animal,” there are three things: “man,” “is,” and “animal.” Outside the soul these are nothing other than the human nature imported by “man,” the sentient nature imported by “animal,” and the unity or conjunction of these with one another imported by “is.” For apprehending these three in its second operation, the intellect forms the proposition “man is an animal”; and, once it has been formed, reflecting upon those three insofar as they terminate the act of its composition, it discovers and attributes certain relations to them. To “man” it attributes the relation of subject; to “animal,” the relation of predicate; and to “is,” the relation of predication. Hence predication formally is that relation discovered by the intellect; fundamentally or materially, it is the conjunction of the predicated thing with the subject thing. Likewise, when the intellect apprehends the sentient nature and reflects upon it as it stands under its act, and sees it as indifferently related to the species in which it had first inspected that nature as being preserved, it attributes to the sentient nature or animal as object the relation of genus. Thus genus formally is that relation, while genus fundamentally or materially is the nature itself, namely the sentient nature. Thus the terms of the distinctions are clear.

From these three things are deduced. First, since genus fundamentally, namely animal, includes in its definition neither fundamental predication—for the conjunction of animal with man or ox is not placed in the definition of animal—nor formal predication—for a second-intention thing is not placed in the definition of a thing—it follows that genus is taken formally when defined by Porphyry.

Second, since in the formal definition of genus fundamental predication of a species, namely of man, does not fall, because the generic relation is not really joined to the thing denominated species, it follows that “predicated of many” placed in the definition of genus must be taken formally, namely for the relation of predication. For one relation can fall within the definition of another, so that the concept of the relation which is predication of many falls within the concept of the relation which is genus, and so forth. From this you see how consistently with St. Thomas those speak who assert that genus and species are defined as second intentions in the concrete.

Third, it is to be deduced that something is said to be predicated of a species in two ways. In one way, as the thing denominated predicable of species; thus animal is predicated of man and ox. In another way, as that by which the thing is denominated predicable of species; thus genus, in whose definition it is placed that it is predicated of species, is predicated of its species. Likewise, something is called dispersive of sight in two ways. In one way, as the thing denominated dispersive of sight; in this way snow is called dispersive of sight. In another way, as that by which the thing is denominated dispersive of sight; thus whiteness is called dispersive of sight, since in its definition it is placed that it disperse sight. And just as these two stand together—namely, that the thing defined by “to disperse sight” is whiteness and not snow, while the thing denominated dispersive of sight is snow and not whiteness—so precisely in the present case these two stand together: the thing defined by “to be predicated of species” is the generic relation, while the thing denominated predicable of species is the nature underlying that relation, namely animal. Thus the thing defined by “to be predicated,” and so forth, is genus formally but not materially, while the thing denominated predicable is genus materially but not formally. Hence the text says that the character of predicability is enclosed in this intention which is genus; nevertheless, that to which the intellect attributes the intention of predicability is not the intention of genus itself, but the thing to which the intellect also attributes the intention of genus.

From these the response to the objection is clear. Speaking of that which is predicated per se of species as the thing denominated predicated, the major is true but the minor false; speaking of that which is predicated per se as the character of denominating, the major is false although the minor is true. Hence, since one of the premises is always false, nothing is concluded. Using the distinction now assigned in simple terms, you can say this: the predicable of species is twofold, formally and denominatively. What is predicated denominatively of man and ox is animal; what is predicated formally of man and ox is genus. Of the predicable denominatively the minor is false; of the predicable formally the major is false. When you apply these statements to species with respect to individuals, to difference, property, accident, and the rest of this kind, you will solve many objections, and the truth of many propositions which appear obscure will shine upon you. The remainder of the chapter is an epilogue: they are self-evident, and so forth.