In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria

Whether nature taken absolutely is that which is predicated of individuals.

There is a third difficulty concerning the assignment of the fourth difference. For it does not seem true that nature taken absolutely is that which is predicated of individuals, since nature taken absolutely is neither universal nor common. Yet in propositions of this kind—Socrates is a man, Socrates is an animal, and the like—the universal and the superior are predicated of the particular and inferior. Likewise, when it is asked whether “Socrates is a man” is a predication of equal of equal, or of superior of inferior, it does not seem possible to answer this while holding that absolute nature is predicated, since it is neither equal nor superior.

It must be said that, just as in an external nature we consider its very account of acting and also its condition without which it does not act—for example, in color we consider its nature, from which it is visible, and its particularity, which is the condition without which it is not visible—so in a predicable nature we must consider two things: what is predicated and attributed to the subject, and the condition without which it is not attributed to it. In “Socrates is a man,” what is attributed to the subject is human nature itself and nothing else. The condition without which “man” is not predicated of Socrates is its being a universal, superior, common nature, or something of this sort. As will be clear below, and as Aristotle says in Metaphysics VII, text 46, nothing is predicated unless it has being in the intellect, since predication depends on the intellect. Hence I say that, according to its own account, nature is what is predicated of the individual itself. For it is a predication of thing of thing. Superiority, universality, and the like are its conditions. Therefore, to the question whether these predications are of equal or of superior, I say that it is a predication of superior.

Nor does it matter that superiority is not intrinsic to the absolute nature that is predicated, since St. Thomas does not say that this condition—predication of individuals—belongs to absolute nature insofar as it abstracts from every kind of being. Rather, he says that the thing to which that condition belongs is absolute nature, and not an aggregate of nature and being in the intellect or in the singular. When I say “Socrates is a man,” the sense is not “Socrates is a man according to being in the intellect, or in the singular, or superior, or equal”; the sense is “Socrates is one who has humanity.”

Therefore, the distinction between what is predicated and the condition of the predicate must be carefully observed. If it is not observed, some may perhaps have been deceived into saying that from this text it is absolutely established that “Man is an animal” is neither a predication of superior, nor of inferior, nor of equal. The sense of the text, then, is this: absolute nature is what is predicated—that is, nature according to the conditions due to it by reason of itself is what is attributed to singulars, and not according to the conditions due to it from being in the intellect or in the singular. This is compatible with being in the intellect, universality, and superiority being conditions without which nature itself is not predicated of singulars.

Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the account of universal belongs to nature taken in this way, since the account of universal includes unity and community. Neither belongs to human nature according to its absolute consideration. If community belonged to the intelligibility of man, then wherever humanity were found community would be found; and this is false, because no community is found in Socrates, but whatever is in him is individuated.

Here the fourth negative conclusion is set down: The essence of a composite substance taken absolutely is not universal as a species, etc. It is proved as follows: a universal is one common to many; the essence of a composite substance in itself is not one common to many; therefore the essence of a composite substance in itself is not universal, and so forth. The major is Aristotle’s, from Posterior Analytics II. The minor is proved because, if the essence of a composite substance in itself were one and common, then wherever that essence were found it would be one and common to many, which is impossible. The consequence is clear from the fact that whatever belongs to something in itself belongs to it wherever it is posited, as appears from Posterior Analytics I. The impossibility of the consequent is so evident that Avicenna says in Metaphysics II that no sane person can think its opposite. Who could be so foolish as to say that Socrates’ essence is common to himself and to Plato?

But a difficulty arises concerning the proposition on which the whole argument rests: “Whatever belongs to something in itself belongs to it wherever it is posited.” For this seems to have many counterexamples. Motion in itself is infinitely accelerable, according to Physics VI, text 15; but motion placed in the heavens is not so, but is the fastest, as is said in On the Heavens II, text 28. Likewise, the continuum in itself is infinitely divisible, according to Physics VI, text 3; but a continuum placed in a natural thing is not, since the magnitude of every natural body is determined, as is said in On the Soul II, text 41. Likewise, motion in itself has a contrary, according to Physics V, texts 8 and 14; but motion placed in the heavens lacks a contrary, On the Heavens I, text 20.

To these and similar objections it is said, by first noting that it is one thing to say “A belongs to something in itself,” and another to say “A is not incompatible with something in itself.” For the truth of the first requires that A claim that thing for itself in the first, second, or fourth mode of essential predication. For the truth of the second it is enough that, to A considered as such, the thing not be incompatible. The first entails that it belong to A wherever A is posited; the second does not. There are many things that are not incompatible with animal insofar as it is animal, yet are not found in every animal. Whatever belongs to animal in the first, second, or fourth mode of essential predication, however, is found in every animal. Hence I say that none of the proposed counterexamples is against the assumed proposition, because everything said in them is understood by non-repugnance and compatibility. When motion is said to be infinitely accelerable, we understand that infinite acceleration is not incompatible with motion as such. Likewise, when the continuum is said to be infinitely divisible, infinite divisibility is understood not to be incompatible with the continuum as such. Likewise, when motion is said to have a contrary, we understand that having a contrary is not incompatible with motion as such.

If this is not satisfactory, say that it is one thing to say “A, insofar as it is A, belongs to something,” and another to say “A, insofar as it is A, does not belong to something,” as is evident. Whatever belongs to A insofar as it is A belongs to every A; but whatever does not belong to A insofar as it is A need not be denied of every A. The risible does not belong to animal insofar as it is animal, yet it is not denied of every animal, since it belongs to animal in man. Add that all the propositions in the proposed examples are to be understood negatively: “motion is infinitely accelerable,” that is, motion as such is not of a determinate velocity; “the continuum is infinitely divisible,” that is, the continuum as such is not of a determinate division; “motion has a contrary,” that is, motion as such does not determine itself to be without a contrary. Thus, according to either manner of answering, the assumed proposition remains universally true.

One could also answer these counterexamples in another way; but because I attend more to the form of the proposition than to its matter, I pass over it for the present.

Likewise, it cannot be said that the account of genus accrues to human nature according to the being it has in individuals, because human nature is not found in individuals according to unity, as one thing belonging to each, which the account of universal requires.

Here the fifth negative conclusion is set down: The essence of a composite substance according to the being it has in singulars is not universal. It is proved thus. A universal is one in many; the essence of a composite substance according to the being it has in individuals is not one in many but diverse in many; therefore the essence of a composite substance according to the being it has in individuals is not universal, and consequently neither species, nor genus, nor difference, which presuppose universality.

It remains, then, that the account of species accrues to human nature according to the being it has in the intellect. For nature itself has being in the intellect abstracted from all individual things, and has a uniform account toward all individuals outside the soul, insofar as it is essentially the image of all and leads to knowledge of all insofar as they are men. From the fact that it has such a relation to all individuals, the intellect discovers the account of species and attributes it to nature. Hence the Commentator says in On the Soul I that it is the intellect that makes universality in things; Avicenna says the same in Metaphysics VII.

Here, by the method of division, the sixth affirmative conclusion determining the difficulty proposed is inferred: Essence according to being in the intellect is universal, genus, species, difference, etc. It is proved thus: what is one in and of many is universal; nature according to being in the intellect is one in and of many; therefore it is universal. The minor is proved: what is uniformly related to many, as their essential image, is one in and of many; nature according to being in the intellect is of this kind, because it has being abstracted from every dissimilarity of individuals and essentially produces knowledge of them; therefore, and so forth.

For clarity concerning this conclusion and argument, since terms are used in many ways according to Aristotle’s teaching and must be distinguished, note first the distinctions among the terms placed in the conclusion. Being in the intellect occurs in two ways: subjectively and objectively. Being subjectively in the intellect is inhering in it as an accident in its subject, like whiteness in a surface. Being objectively in the intellect is terminating an act of the intellect. The intellect in us is twofold, agent and possible, as is said in On the Soul III, text 17. The agent intellect abstracts the intelligible species from phantasms. The possible intellect receives intellection in itself. The universal is twofold, in representing and in predicating. The universal in representing here is what represents a thing without representing its individual conditions. The universal in predicating is what is predicated of many differing according to being.

With these distinctions seen, know that the conclusion “Nature according to being in the intellect is universal” is verified in three ways. First: nature according to objective being in the agent intellect is universal in predicating. Second: nature according to subjective being in the possible intellect is universal in representing. Third: nature according to subjective being in the possible intellect is universal in predicating.

Second, it must be known that an external thing, insofar as it is actually intelligible, is objectively in the agent intellect. For thus it terminates its action, since Aristotle posited the agent intellect to make what is potentially intelligible actually intelligible, as the Commentator says in On the Soul III, commentary 18. An external thing becomes actually intelligible through the agent intellect, not because it receives or loses anything in being through that action, but because its intelligible species is produced by the agent intellect. Through this the external thing is represented without its individual conditions, with which it was potentially, not actually, intelligible. Thus the production of the intelligible species is the making of the external thing actually intelligible. The action has two terms: one within the soul, namely the intelligible species, newly produced in the possible intellect; the other external, namely the thing of which it is the species. The thing acquires nothing real from this, but only an extrinsic denomination: that it is abstracted from here and now and is actually intelligible.

An external nature, insofar as it is actually understood, is objectively in the possible intellect. Thus it terminates its action, which is understanding. An external thing becomes and is actually understood, not because it receives or loses something through the action of the possible intellect, but because its concept is formed by the possible intellect; for a thing is understood when we form its concept. Thus the formation of the concept is the making of the external thing actually understood. This action too has two terms: one within the soul, namely the concept, which really comes to be and is nothing other than an expressed likeness of the thing, making the thing present objectively to the possible intellect; the other external, namely the thing extrinsically denominated actually understood by the produced concept.

From this it is clear what difference and agreement there are between a thing objectively in the agent intellect and in the possible intellect. The difference is that, from being objectively in the agent intellect, it is actually intelligible but not actually understood; from being objectively in the possible intellect, after it was already actually intelligible, it becomes actually understood. The agreement is that, both from being objectively in the agent intellect and from being objectively in the possible intellect, it is represented without individual conditions and consequently is abstracted from here and now, and so forth.

Third, from Avicenna, Metaphysics V, chapter 1, it must be known that the universal in predicating is what is not impossible in the intellect to predicate of many. And this can be related in three ways:

First, those many may actually exist in nature: thus man, as an object of the intellect, is universal with respect to Socrates and Plato.

Second, those many may not exist but may be able to exist: thus a heptagonal house, as an object of the intellect, is universal with respect to several heptagonal houses that do not exist but can exist.

Third, those many may neither exist nor be able to exist: thus the moon, as an object of the intellect, is universal with respect to several moons that cannot exist. Gabriel, as an object of the intellect, is universal with respect to several Gabriels, whose existence involves contradiction. The universal in the first way is called by St. Thomas in Summa I, q. 13, a. 9, universal according to thing and according to account, because that thing really exists in many and not merely as an object of the intellect. The universal in the third way is there called universal or common according to account alone, because the thing is not really found in many, but only as an object of the intellect. The universal in the second way is distinguished there from the universal in the first way. It could nevertheless properly be called universal according to account and thing, but only potentially. St. Thomas assigns not merely these names, but also their subtle rationale, founded on four propositions.

The first is that universality and predicability do not belong to a thing in itself, nor according to the being it has outside the soul; this is clear from what has been said.

The second is that a material thing, which alone is known by us through its proper species, insofar as it is objectively in our intellect is represented without individual conditions; this too is clear from what has been said.

The third is that an immaterial thing, even God himself, insofar as it is objectively in our intellect is represented in the manner of material things, namely without its individual properties. This is clear because such things are not known by us as they are in themselves, but in the manner of material things, and not through their proper species but through the species of material things.

The fourth is that every thing represented without individual conditions regards one individual no more than many. This is clear because, insofar as it is abstracted, it is equally related to one and to many. Nothing can be imagined by which the abstract, as abstract, would regard one more than many, or the reverse. Hence Avicenna deliberately added to the definition of universal the phrase “insofar as it is in the intellect.” For many things are universal which, both according to being outside the soul and according to their proper account, are incompatible with being predicated of many, as will be said of the intelligences. But no universal, insofar as it is represented in the intellect without its own particular existence, property, and hypostasis, is incompatible with being predicated of many. From these propositions the following argument is formed: every thing, and only a thing, equally related to one and to many individuals is actually universal in predicating; every thing, and only a thing, as represented to our intellect is equally related to one and to many inferiors; therefore every thing, and only a thing, as represented to our intellect is actually universal in predicating. The major is clear from Aristotle’s definition of universal in On Interpretation I. The minor, as to its second part, is clear from the first proposition; as to its first part, from the other three.

As a corollary I infer that, for something to be actually universal in predicating, an actual relation of the nature as an object to particulars is not required. It is enough that the thing itself be in a disposition such that the intellect can freely attribute that relation to it as true, adding nothing beyond the actual relation itself.

With these preliminaries, the intended conclusion can now be seen according to all three assigned senses.

For the first sense one can argue thus: what is not impossible in the intellect to predicate of many, or, in Aristotle’s words, is naturally apt to be predicated of many, is universal in predicating; but a thing according to objective being in the agent intellect is of this kind; therefore a thing according to objective being in the agent intellect is universal in predicating. The major is clear from Avicenna and Aristotle. The minor is proved thus: a thing abstracted from individual conditions as such is naturally apt to be predicated of many; a thing according to objective being in the agent intellect is abstracted from individual conditions; therefore, and so forth. All the premises are manifest from what has been said.

From this you see how badly Scotus spoke in Sentences II, dist. 3, q. 1, in answer to the first objection, saying that nature before the act of the possible intellect has nothing except what belongs to it outside the soul. For it is now clear that, according to Aristotle’s view, it is actually intelligible, abstracted from here and now, and consequently actually universal before the act of the possible intellect.

For the third sense no other argument is needed, since the procedure would be the same.

The second sense is clear to those who understand the terms from the accounts of the terms. For nature according to subjective being in the possible intellect is nothing other than an immaterial likeness representing itself, existing in that intellect. An immaterial likeness abstracted from singulars necessarily represents the thing universally, precisely because it is abstracted. For if it did not represent the thing universally, but were mingled with particular conditions and not abstracted from material conditions, it would not be universal. Therefore, in representing it, the thing is universal insofar as it is subjectively in the possible intellect—that is, the species or likeness of the nature itself insofar as it represents that nature without representing individual conditions.

And note that, since nature itself has two likenesses in the soul, namely the intelligible species and the concept, or the impressed species and the expressed species, it is universal in representing according to both species. Why it is necessary to posit two species, and how this is so, will be said elsewhere, if God grants us life. Although the second conclusion can be verified in all the ways mentioned, the first and third are relevant to the text. For here we intend the universal in predicating, which expresses a logical second intention, and not the universal in representing, which is not called universal by any logical second intention, but from the proper being it receives according to the thing.

You can gloss the text as follows. Nature itself has being in the agent or possible intellect, both objectively and subjectively, abstracted from all individual conditions. It has a uniform account—objectively in predicating and subjectively in representing—toward all individuals outside the soul, insofar as it is essentially the likeness of all objectively in being and subjectively in representing, leading to knowledge of all insofar as they are men, because as such they are assimilated. From the fact that nature has toward all individuals this relation, namely uniformity and essential or representative likeness, the intellect discovers the account of species, that is, the second intention which is species, and attributes it to nature uniformly related to individuals because it is represented without every dissimilarity that individuates.