Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

A clear title. — In the body he does three things: first, he sets out the mode of knowing that was asked about; second, carrying it out, he answers the question; third, he gives the reason for a certain saying of Dionysius.

II. As to the first point, the method consists in this, that one must take from the notion of the good what evil is. — It is proved: because one of two opposites is known through the other, as darkness through light.

III. As to the second point. Evil is a certain absence of good. — It is proved. Every appetible thing is good; therefore the being (esse) and perfection of every nature is goodness; therefore evil does not signify being (esse), or any form or nature; therefore it is a certain absence of good. — The first consequence is proved: because every nature desires its own being (esse) and its own perfection.

Note that in the conclusion it is called a certain absence because not every negation of a good is an evil, but only the negation of a good that is due, as is clear in Book III of the Contra Gentiles, chapter VI. The absence, therefore, of the due presence of a good is an evil. Now a presence is due when it is due in the manner, in the place, in the subject, and so on. The proof of the conclusion, however, did not concern itself with this, because for the present intention it suffices to find the genus of evil: for by this it is known whether the nature is something. Rightly, therefore, once what is an absence was found—which is admittedly a negation—the process stood still.

IV. As to the third¹, because evil is established by the negation of good; and Dionysius, as the text says in the argument to the contrary, defined evil not only by the negation of good, but of being: therefore the Author says this statement is secondary. Since being, as such, is good, the negation of one is therefore the negation of the other, and conversely; and so Dionysius posits evil as the negation of both. But since it is first of all a negation of good, it is therefore defined by us through good.

In the title, evil is found in things does not signify real being, since this has already been excluded ¹; rather, it signifies being commonly in things. Now it is said to be in things on account of those things that are found only in the soul, such as second intentions. And this is a question about formal discovery: so that we do not intend to ask whether evil has a foundation in things, but whether it is found formally in things.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: Evil is found in things, just as corruption is. – And it is proved. The perfection of the universe requires inequality among things, so that every degree of goodness may be filled: therefore, just as it requires that there be incorruptible and corruptible beings, so it requires that there be those unfailing in goodness and those failing from goodness: therefore certain things in the universe fail at some time: therefore evil is found in things, as corruption is.

The antecedent is had from what has been said. – The first consequence is proved: because these are two degrees of goodness found in the universe, in accordance with those two degrees of being, as is evident of itself. – The second consequence, however, is left as self-evident. And truly it is so: since, miracles set aside, it is impossible that possibles fail to never fail. – The third, however, is proved: because the ratio of evil consists in a defect from good; understand sub silentio due. – And that modification and expression, as, is confirmed: because corruption itself is a certain evil, since it is the evil of the thing corrupted.

III. And the word just as is well noted: because it resolves the doubt of beginners, who ask how, if evil is formally a negation, and negations have no being except in the soul (as he also says in the letter in his reply to the second argument, applying this to the being of evil); how, I say, it is true that evil is formally in things.

You have the solution: because it is not verified in things as being (ens); rather, it is in things as corruption in act exercised, that is, as the formal removal of a thing. For the very absence of the good is formally evil; and, as was said in the response to the fourth objection of the preceding article, evil formally corrupts the good opposed to it, because it is the very privation of the good in a fitting subject, etc.

Evils, therefore, are said to be in things not positively but privatively; that is, not by positing something in things, but by removing something formal from them. And thus evils are found formally in things as evils: for they are the evils of things. In the soul, however, through composition and any other operation of the intellect, they are found as beings and goods.

IV. And therefore nothing stands in the way—indeed it serves our purpose—that evil posits nothing in the thing. For we are speaking of evil as evil in act exercised: and it is evident that, as evil in act exercised, it is not found where something is posited, but only where a due good is removed; for this is its formal act, as is clear from what has been said². Therefore the following inference is worthless: evil or privation posits nothing in the thing, but is only an ens in the soul; therefore it is not found formally in things. For it can stand that it be found formally, as the removal of a thing in act exercised. Indeed the opposite follows: it removes esse from the subject; therefore it is found in the thing, as exercising an act of negation, not of position. Now to be thus found in things is simply to be found: for they are found formally, and according to the proper mode of their own genus, namely of non-being or of privation.

The title is clear. – In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: Evil is in good as in a subject. – It is proved. Evil is the removal of good, not negatively, but privatively: therefore evil and privated good are in the same subject, namely being (ens) in potency simply or in a certain respect: therefore evil is in good as in a subject.

The antecedent, as to its second part, is proved by a twofold reduction to impossibility. The first is that things which in no way exist would be evil. The second is that all things would be evil. – As to the third, this follows from the sufficiency of the two-membered distinction belonging to that very removal of good.

The first consequence is proved: because privation and form have the same subject, namely a being (ens) in potency simply or in a certain respect. – The second, however: because each is good. And concerning the being in potency in a certain respect, it is proved: because it is a being in act; but act is a certain goodness. Concerning the being in potency simply, however: because good is said just as being (ens) is said; and by this very fact, just as the being in potency is a certain being, so the good in potency is a certain good.

In the title, "to corrupt" is taken formally. But "the whole good" is taken for the whole integral, or quasi-integral, good, about which evil is posited. So that the sense is: Whether evil posited in something formally takes away whatever goodness is found in it.

II. In the body there is a single principal conclusion, directly responsive to the question in the negative: Evil cannot totally consume the good. – This conclusion, however, is made manifest by one threefold distinction, with special conclusions annexed to each member.

III. The distinction is: Good is threefold, namely form, subject, and the subject's aptitude for the form. - The first conclusion is: Good as form is entirely removed by evil. It is proved: because it is opposed to it. And it is made clear: just as light is removed by darkness, and sight by blindness. - The second conclusion is: Good as subject is neither removed nor diminished by evil. And it is made clear in the case of air and darkness. - The third is: Good as the subject's aptitude for act is diminished by evil, and not entirely removed. And this conclusion is explained, first as regards the diminution¹; second, there: If therefore contrary dispositions, as regards the non-total removal².

IV. Intending, therefore, to declare of what sort and how great such a diminution is, he indicates that a twofold mode of diminution is found to exist, namely by subtraction and by remission: the first is quantitative, the second is qualitative. And again, diminution by remission, or qualitative diminution, occurs in two ways: first, through the remission of the quality itself; and second, through contrary dispositions of the subject toward such an act. — In the case at hand, the diminution is to be understood as taking place by remission, not in any manner whatsoever, but by the addition of contrary dispositions.

And this is proved as follows. Habituality is intensified by the dispositions that prepare matter for act; therefore it is diminished by the dispositions that impede the potency with respect to act. — The antecedent is made evident: because the more the dispositions of matter are multiplied, the more apt it is for act. The consequence, however, is proved: because diminution is taken from the contrary of intensification.

V. Then, intending to show how the good of aptitude is never entirely removed³, he distinguishes two ways in which remission through contrary dispositions can be found: first, finitely; second, infinitely. And by neither way does he show that the subject's aptitude for act is entirely taken away.

For that the remission of aptitude is at some point finite is proved from the fact that the multiplication of contrary dispositions is finite; as is evident in the multiplication of the qualities of the elements, by which the aptitude of matter for form—fire, for example—is diminished. – That, however, in such remission the aptitude is not wholly taken away is evident from this: since the apposition of contraries and their remission are finite in existence, there is no need for the aptitude of the remaining subject to be eradicated.

That the remission is sometimes infinite is made manifest from the infinite multiplication of opaque bodies between the sun and the air; and proportionally, from the infinite multiplication of sins between the Sun of justice and the soul. – That, however, by such infinite remission the aptitude is not entirely taken away is proved by reason: because there always remains in its root what is the substance of the subject. And it is made manifest in the examples adduced, in natural things and in moral matters: namely, in the diaphanous with respect to light, and in the soul with respect to grace.

And so the principal conclusion is clear⁴, namely that evil never wholly takes away good: for it leaves behind the subject, and something of aptitude for act.

VI. In response to the third, note that so great is the difference between being diminished per se and per accidens—that is, by reason of itself or of another—that although it is impossible for a finite thing not to be consumed by an infinite and equal subtraction per se, it is nevertheless possible, as the text says, that from a finite thing there be subtracted equally even to infinity, and yet that thing not be consumed, when the diminution is per accidens, that is, through another, as in the case at hand; for the aptitude is diminished on account of the impediment applied to it, and not in itself.

Let the title be taken as it lies, understanding by sin the evil we do; by punishment, however, the evil we suffer.

In the body, one conclusion, responsive to the question in a limited way, namely: Every evil in voluntary things is either punishment or fault. – In which conclusion three things are contained, namely every evil, and in voluntary things, and punishment or fault. And therefore these three, proceeding in an orderly manner, he declares.

II. First, therefore, he distinguishes evil in general into the evil of a thing and the evil of an act. He proves this distinction from the distinction of good into goodness by way of first act, and second act.

Second, he shows that evil has fittingly acquired special reasons, distinctions, and names in voluntary things, thus. Good simply is the object of the will: therefore evil, according to a special reason, is found in voluntary creatures. – The consequence is proved: because evil is a privation of good; and for this reason, just as good is found specially in the voluntary, so also is evil.

Finally, the third point, which is principally intended, he makes clear as follows. The evil of a thing has the character of punishment in voluntary things, especially given that all things are subject to divine providence and justice; but the evil of operation in the same things has the character of fault. Therefore every evil in voluntary things is either punishment or fault. – The antecedent, as regards its first part, is made clear: because it belongs to the nature of punishment that it be contrary to the will. As regards the second part, however: because something is imputed to someone as a fault when it falls short of perfect action existing within his power. – The consequence, moreover, is evident from the distinction of evil set forth above.

A clear title from the preceding. – In the body there is one conclusion answering the question: Guilt has more of the nature of evil than any punishment whatsoever, whether of sense or of loss. – And it is proved in two ways.

First. From the evil of fault someone becomes evil, from the evil of punishment, not: therefore. – The antecedent is proved in two ways. First by the authority of Dionysius. Second by reason, thus. Good simply consists in act: therefore man's good simply consists in the good use of things possessed: therefore by a good will, whereby man uses well the things he possesses, man is said to be good, and by an evil will, evil: therefore fault has the character of evil more perfectly than punishment. – The first consequence is proved: because the ultimate act is operation, or the use of things. – But the second: because we use all things through the will. And the second part of the consequent is explained, namely from an evil will evil: because one can also use a good badly, as is clear in the case of the grammarian. – But the third: because fault consists in a disordered act of the will, while punishment consists in the privation of something of which the will makes use.

II. The second reason is this. God is the author of the evil of punishment, and not of the evil of fault; therefore the evil of fault is incomparably worse. The antecedent is proved thus. The evil of punishment deprives a creature of good, whereas the evil of fault is properly opposed to uncreated good; therefore God can be the cause of the former, but not of the latter.

Before this, as regards the first part, it is made manifest in the twofold good of a creature, namely possession and participation. As regards the second, however, it is proved thus: the evil of fault is contrary to the fulfillment of the divine will, and to the divine love by which the divine good is loved in itself; therefore it is opposed to the uncreated good.

III. Here it might be doubted how anything can be opposed to the divine good, and the divine will not be fulfilled. But since this has been discussed in the treatise on the divine will ¹, and is treated in the following question, article three ², let us pass over it now.