Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear. – In the body there is a single conclusion, with two corollaries.

The conclusion is: Nothing besides God existed from eternity, in such a way that this is not impossible. – Here note that the conclusion states two things. For it asserts first, that nothing other than God has always existed. And since this is held by faith, and is not to be proved, it adds the second, namely, that this assertion is possible.

And he proves this as follows. The will of God is the cause of things: therefore things necessarily exist in the same way that it is necessary for God to will them: therefore it is not necessary for God to will that the world have always existed: therefore the world exists only insofar as God wills it to exist: therefore it is not necessary for the world always to exist. – The antecedent is clear from what was said above. The first consequence is proved: because the necessity of an effect depends on the necessity of its cause, from Book V of the Metaphysics. The second: because it is not necessary for God to will anything except himself. The third, however: because the existence of the world depends on the will of God as on its cause.

The first corollary is: It cannot be demonstratively proved that the world has always existed. – The second is: The arguments which Aristotle brings forward to prove this are not demonstrative simply, but only in a qualified sense. This is shown in three ways: namely, from the opinions he refutes, from the testimonies he adduces, and from his express admission. – All of this is plain in the text.

II. In response to the tenth objection, the question is whether God's action is in act from eternity formally, that is, insofar as it is action; or only materially, that is, insofar as it is a thing. For if it is understood in the first way, it follows that God is from eternity actually acting, creating, causing, etc. And if so, then something is created, actualized, caused, etc., from eternity. And this consequence holds from Book V of the Metaphysics¹: singular causes, in act insofar as they are causes, and their effects, are and are not simultaneously. – But if it is understood only in the second way, then God is from eternity an agent cause in potency, and afterwards becomes a cause in act as agent: which is unfitting.

III. This doubt must be answered with caution, lest we say either that God from eternity is a cause in potency only, which is rejected in II Contra Gentiles, chapter VI; or that God creates the world from eternity, which is known to be erroneous, since "creating" is said with respect to what is created, just as "creative" is said with respect to what is creatable, as is stated in V Metaphysics² Therefore let us take the middle way and say, by making a distinction, that God's action is in act from eternity not only materially but formally. But this can be understood in two ways: first, insofar as it is in act according to what the action posits, qua action, in the agent; second, according to that which it entails of itself, namely a being acted upon or an effect. In the first way, God's action is in act from eternity; in the second way, it is not. And on account of the first, God is not a cause in potency but in act from eternity; on account of the second, however, God did not create the world from eternity, nor does He now create the soul of Antichrist. – And if it is asked how the entailment of a being acted upon or of an effect is in God from eternity, in act or in potency: the answer is ready at hand, namely that it is in Him in active potency, and never is, was, or will be in Him formally. For with respect to things existing formally, it is unfitting to posit anything as in potency in God. And therefore the action, according to all that it posits formally in the agent, must be in act in God from eternity, etc.

In the title, article of faith signifies that it must be held by faith alone. – In the body there is a single conclusion answering the question, namely: That the world began is held by faith alone, in such a way that it cannot be demonstrated. – This conclusion he first proves with respect to the second part; secondly, he makes clear with respect to the first¹; and thirdly, he shows how great a benefit it is to know the proposed conclusion².

II. Therefore, as to the first point, he intends the following argument. The newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world, nor on the part of its cause: therefore it is indemonstrable.

The antecedent, as to its first part, is proved. The principle of demonstration is what a thing is, and each thing, according to the account of its species, abstracts from here and now: therefore it cannot be demonstrated that man, or the heavens, or a stone did not always exist. – The second part of the antecedent is made manifest by the common saying that universals are everywhere and always.

As to the second part, it is proved. The will of God cannot be investigated by reason except with respect to what He wills necessarily; therefore what He has willed concerning creatures cannot be known demonstratively. — And the inference holds: because He wills nothing concerning creatures necessarily.

III. Concerning the proof of the first part of the antecedent of the assumption, note that the force of the argument consists in this: that the quiddity of any created thing, taken specifically, abstracts from here and now; therefore it cannot be a sufficient middle term for inferring the newness of a thing, because that newness itself contains a difference of time; for it is clearly evident that to be now and not before is not a reason of being, since what is at issue is in itself indifferent to now and before. Hence the Author concluded, not only concerning the world, but concerning any thing of the world, that from its quiddity its newness simply cannot be demonstrated.

IV. Concerning the principal inference, note that, since "world" signifies the totality of things, and outside the universe there is nothing but its own beginning; it follows that no place is left for a demonstration proving the novelty of the world. And therefore the text, having set aside the cause and the quiddity of the world and of all its parts, took as settled that the novelty of the world is indemonstrable.

V. As to the first part of the conclusion³, namely, that it be held by faith, it is made manifest. The divine will can be made manifest to man through revelation: therefore, that the world began is credible. — And the inference holds: because faith rests upon revelation.

VI. Thirdly⁴, it is useful, he says, to consider this. And he shows this from two benefits: the first is the repression of presumption; the second is the avoidance of mockery by unbelievers; as is clearly evident in the text.

VII. In response to the seventh, note, novice, that it is one thing to say that Socrates is the per se cause of Plato his son, and Plato the per se cause of Cicero; and another to say that Socrates and Plato are together the per se causes of Cicero. The first is most true: for just as man begets man per se, so your father begot you, as is said in XII Metaphysics, text 27⁵. But the second is most false. For per se causes ordered with respect to some effect are, as is said in the text, of different orders, simultaneously causing that effect; and therefore they cannot be infinite. Now a father and grandfather are causes of the same order, not simultaneously causing a third: although, as was said, among themselves the grandfather was the per se cause of the father, and the father of the son. And therefore, for the production of Socrates, it matters not whether the progenitors are finite or infinite.

VIII. In response to the eighth, carefully note what is said there, and why it is said. For after the opinions have been recited, he adds that it must be considered that this argument is particular. And he spoke truly: because it is particular, not in itself, but with respect to what was asked, as he himself adds. For what was asked here is whether the world, that is, the totality of creatures, began to be is an article of faith: and not whether that individual species of creatures began to be is an article of faith. For even if it were granted that that man began to be is demonstrable, there would still remain the question whether that the universe began to be is demonstrable: since the eternity of the world or of the angels is compatible with the beginning of man, as is said in the text.

The reason, however, why he said this is that, according to the teaching of the Author, the argument he adduces compels assent. Yet the same Author says little of use in Book II Contra Gentiles, chapter XXXVIII, since it presupposes many things about which philosophers disagree.

IX. Concerning the same response, note that, according to the Author's doctrine, given the immortality of the numbered soul without a cycle, and the impossibility of an actual infinity even per accidens, it is not intelligible that human generation should be eternal. And therefore Thomists should be cautious in granting that the world could have existed from eternity. Let them grant the world as regards its substance, consisting of the five simple bodies; let them grant the world also as regards the motion of the heavens, and all generations except the human. For it is inevitable that either there be an actual infinity, or recourse be had to miracles, positing that one man lived for an infinite time and began to generate from a certain time. And thus even so eternal human generation would not be preserved, but only the human species. But it is ridiculous, in my judgment, to interpose this miracle, where the question concerns the possibility of the production of the world such as we see it.

The title is clear enough. – In the body, the responsive conclusion is that In the beginning God created heaven and earth is expounded in three ways, against three errors: namely, in the beginning of time, against the philosophers; in the Son, against the Pythagoreans and Manichaeans; before all things, against Plato, Avicenna, and their followers. – All things are plain in the letter. From these is obtained the responsive conclusion to the question, affirmatively; and, for the perfection of the doctrine, with many additions.

II. In response to the first, note that the Author denies that the first instant of time measured creation—not because that emanation lasted longer, since it is instantaneous, as was said in the response to the first in the preceding article—but because creation extends also to incorporeal substances, which are above time and the instants of time. Hence the first instant of time, even if it was not the measure of creation, was nevertheless coexistent with creation; and it was measured by a discrete instant of time, by which spiritual operations are measured, as will be shown below¹.