Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear from what has been said. – In the body he does four things: first, he answers the question, namely that creation is by his own power; second, he reports a certain opinion that creation is instrumental, there: Contingit autem¹; third, he refutes the aforementioned opinion in general, there: Sed hoc esse non potest²; fourth, he refutes the same opinion in particular, namely that a bodily agent could create, there: Et hoc praecipue³.

II. As to the first point, the responsive conclusion to the question is: Creation is the proper action of God alone. – And it is proved thus. To be (esse) is the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, which is God; and to produce being (esse) absolutely belongs to the nature of creation; therefore creation is the proper action of God alone.

The first proposition is proved in two ways. First, by reason: because more universal effects must be reduced to more universal and prior causes; but esse, among all effects, is the most universal. – Second, on authority from the book On Causes: that neither an intelligence nor a noble soul gives esse except insofar as it operates with the divine operation.

III. Concerning this part several doubts arise. And first, concerning the first proposition assumed. For Scotus argues against it, in Book IV, distinction 1⁴, saying that it is false. He proves this as follows. The esse of the composite is from the generator of the composite: therefore it is not the proper effect of God. – And he holds the inference: because the composite, say an ox, is from a univocal generator, etc.

IV. The second doubt concerns the proofs of that argument. For he argues there against them. And first, against the first proof. Either the discourse there concerns the universality of cause and effect according to predication, or according to perfection, or the universality of the effect according to predication, but of the cause according to perfection. If the discourse is always about universality according to predication, then the minor premise is false, because God is not the most universal cause in predicating; and, as is evident, the intended conclusion does not follow. – If, however, it is always about universality according to perfection, the minor premise is also false: because esse is not the most perfect effect. This is proved: because whatever is included in many things cannot be more perfect than any of those things in which it is included. – But if it is taken in a non-uniform way, so that on the side of the cause it is taken as more universal according to perfection, and on the side of the effect according to predication, then the argument errs in two ways. Because first, the major premise is false. For the most universal effect in predication can come from an imperfect cause: because it is found in many imperfect effects. Second, because it errs according to the fallacy of the Consequent. For from the fact that the most universal effect in predication is from a most universal cause according to perfection, and that esse is of this kind, there follows this conclusion, therefore esse, insofar as it is of this kind, can be only from a most universal cause according to perfection: but from this it does not follow that therefore the esse of this creatable thing can be only from such a cause. It is therefore evident that there is a fallacy of the Consequent in the inference. But if he distinguishes, saying that in this produced thing one must consider the esse of this thing and esse simply, this does not resolve the problem: because these are not so distinguished that they are not from the same cause, since they are the same.

Next he attacks the other proof, because it concludes to the opposite of what was intended. For that proposition does not deny absolutely that intelligence gives being (esse): rather, it affirms it all the more, when it says that giving being does not belong to it except insofar as it operates by a divine operation.

V. Concerning the force of the inference made by reason, the doubt is as follows. Either the Author intends that esse is the proper effect of the first cause in such a way that it is from the first cause alone: and then Scotus's objections carry weight⁵. Or that it is proper in such a way that it is per se first from God alone. And then the inference seems to have no force, except by virtue of that categorical proposition, to produce esse per se first is to create. But this is false: since to produce per se first the esse in an ox is not to create; otherwise, since the ox is generated, either its esse is produced per se first by no one, or creation is always mixed into every operation of nature, which is against St. Thomas in the last article of this question.

VI. For the clarification of these points, know that there is a great difference between some effect, and itself with the condition per se primo. For they are very far apart, A is made by B and A is made by B per se primo: for in the first it is signified only that A is made; in the second, that it is made per se primo. Hence these two, being (esse) is made and being (esse) is made per se primo, differ more than heaven and earth. For in the first it is signified only that being (esse) terminates the making; in the second, that it terminates, and the manner in which it terminates. In the first also it does not imply, therefore immediately before this there was no being (ens): in the second, however, it does so imply, as is clear from what was said above⁶ from Book I of the Physics. In the first again it does not imply a proper agent: in the second, however, it implies a proper agent and one that is per se primo. Finally, in the first it does not imply that in whatever it is made, that thing is its cause: in the second, however, it implies that in whatever it is made, it is made by that agent; since universally it must be made by that by which it is made per se primo. – Therefore, since in the present argument the discussion is not about effects as they are made in any way whatever, but as they are made per se primo; as is clear from the words of the text, which says that the more universal effects must be reduced to prior and more universal causes (for reduction proceeds from what is made per se primo): it plainly appears that this argument was badly understood by Scotus, interpreting it as concerning the coming-to-be of effects without the term per se primo.

VII. Hence, in answer to the first doubt⁷ it is said that that proposition is most true, but badly understood by the arguer. For the conclusion must be taken as it follows from the premises: from which we have that esse is the proper effect of the most universal cause, which is God; that is, esse is the effect of God per se and first. This is what "proper"proprius signifies: and it does not signify the same as only or solely, as the arguer understood, imputing to the Author the claim that esse is the effect of God alone. Of this we have never dreamed. On the contrary, we hold that every cause gives esse, though by the power of the first cause, as the proposition of the book On the Causes cited above⁸ intimates. Hence Scotus strove against this article in vain, in this respect.

VIII. To the second doubt, against the proofs⁹, it is said that, speaking directly, the major premise understands the universal dissimilarly on the side of cause and effect. For the sense is that the effect more universal in predication is reduced to a cause more universal in causality, or in perfection. – And to the first objection to the contrary it is said that this major premise is most true, as he himself is later compelled to admit there. And that the proof to the contrary is worth nothing: for with the fact that the most universal effect is from many causes, indeed from all causes, it stands that it is from the first cause alone per se and first. For we did not say that the more universal effects are only from more universal causes, as the objector understood: but that they are reduced to them, that is, that they are per se and first from them. And it is marvelous how he went blind here, when it was ready at hand to know this major premise from II Physics¹⁰ and V Metaphysics¹¹

To the second proof, however, it is said that the consequence is excellent: Being (esse) per se first is from the most universal cause; therefore, the being of this thing and of that, and of whatever, is per se first from the same cause. And the consequence is founded upon that categorical proposition, being, in whatever it comes to be, must come to be from that from which it comes to be per se first; which is known to be self-evident. – Nor does this truth stand opposed by the fact that, when an ox comes to be, its being comes to be from the ox generating: for it does not come to be from it except per accidens, in that mode of accidentality by which what is colored comes to be per accidens, when from black it becomes white.

But to the objection against the alleged authority, the answer is already clear¹² For it was not adduced to prove that esse belongs to God alone, but that esse is from God per se and first.

IX. To the third doubt, however,¹³ it must be said that the argument of the text can be understood in two ways. First, so that from the identity of the production of being (esse) by way of that which is per se first and of creation, it is inferred that creation is the proper action of God alone, that is, that it belongs to God alone by what is proper to him, or by his own power. And in this way the procedure would be clear from what was said in the preceding question¹⁴. And although true things would be said, it nevertheless does not seem very ingenious; nor would the propositions assumed concerning the reduction of effects to causes seem very much to the point.

Hence, secondly, it is understood that from the identity per se primo of the terms of the action of the first cause and of creation, it is inferred that creation is the proper action of God alone. And thus the argument proceeds very ingeniously and effectively from the propositions assumed: for from the fact that esse is per se primo the reason why something is made by the first cause, and also why something is created, it follows most fittingly that creation is proper to the first cause. And the text clearly intimates this sense, while it proves the first proposition, namely that esse is per se primo the reason why something is attained by the most universal cause, from the rule of the reduction of more universal effects to more universal causes. But it states the second, namely that esse is the reason why something is created, by saying that to produce esse, not insofar as it is this or such, but insofar as it is esse, belongs to the notion of creation. For in these words it is shown that esse is the reason of creation. And thus, subtly, from the identity per se primo of the terms, the intended conclusion has been drawn. And because this was sufficiently evident from what has been said, therefore the text says that it is sufficiently apparent at first glance that creation is the proper action of God alone.

X. Hence, in answer to the objection to the contrary, it is said that the categorical proposition grounding this argument is not that proposition (although it is true), namely to produce being esse by itself first is to create; but rather that to be ordered toward being esse by itself first is the proper operation of the first cause, or, to create is to be ordered toward being esse by itself first.

But when it is said that this is false, to give being per se in the first instance is to create, because in the making of a cow, etc.: the answer is that there is no absurdity here; rather, it is necessary, in the making of natural things, that what is made per se in the first instance then be made from nothing. For everything is always made from some other being, even if only per accidens; and, as has been said a thousand times already, that whose reason or account was immediately before it, whether per se or per accidens, is not made per se in the first instance—and consequently is not made from nothing per se in the first instance—as is clear from Book I of the Physics¹⁵

I said then advisedly, so that you would not err on this point, or attribute to me some positive effect per se one in the universe produced by no agent that is per se first. For every being that comes to be by nature, in the production of the whole universe, in which all things were produced according to one part of itself, namely matter, began to depend inchoatively from the first cause; and afterwards, through the cooperation of the first cause in secondary causes, each becomes a being completely. And thus each thing, insofar as it is a being, is from the first cause per se first: but not by an action wholly new. And likewise it is preserved by that same cause. And thus all esse is reduced to the action of God as to a cause that is per se first, but not to an action wholly new.

XI. As to the second point¹⁶, the opinions of Avicenna and the Master are set forth quite clearly concerning the communication of the act of creating, namely, that it can be communicated to a creature. And although their arguments are adduced only in order to be refuted, it is nevertheless shown here that this position does not conflict with the determined conclusion¹⁷. For together with the fact that creation is God's proper action, it stands that it can belong to another, not of itself, but insofar as that other participates in God, whose proper action it is. And this is as much as follows from the notion of what is proper. And this is shown in the text by the example of the action of fire with respect to air.

Note here that the Author, citing the Master, also refers to himself, in distinction 1 of Book II, question 1, article 3, and in distinction 5 of Book IV, question 1, article 3, question 3, ad 4, as not having disdained the Master's opinion, which he rejects here along with its followers, even though he himself was one of them.

XII. As to the third point¹⁸, the aforementioned position is criticized with the following argument. A secondary instrumental cause does not share in the action of a superior cause except insofar as it works dispositively toward the effect of the principal agent by something proper to itself: but no secondary agent can work dispositively toward the effect of God the Creator: therefore none can be an instrumental cause with respect to the act of creation.

The major is proven in two ways, by leading to an absurdity. First, because if the instrumental cause did not act according to what is proper to itself, it would be employed in vain for acting. Second, because there would be no need for determinate instruments for determinate actions. Next it is made evident by induction to sense: for thus we see in the axe, etc. – The minor is also proven in two ways. First, from the term: because absolute esse, which is the proper effect of the Creator, is presupposed by all other things. Second, from the mode: because creation is not from anything, and thus excludes everything available.

XIII. Against this argument objections arise. First, Scotus's: because, where above¹⁹ he attacks the major premise in two ways, wishing it to be false with that particle dispositive; but without it, to be capable of being well or badly understood. And since the Author expressly includes that particle, and in it places the force of the middle term, as is evident, therefore each point must be brought forward distinctly.

He wishes, therefore, first, that the instrumental cause need not have an action of its own. The opposite of this is said in the text.

Conceding also that the instrumental cause has something proper by which it acts, he denies that through that proper thing it has action except in the power of the principal agent. – And he proves this: because in any action which an instrument has not in the power of the principal agent, it is not an instrument in that action, but a principal agent.

Third, he argues against the dispositive. An instrument can attain the effect of the principal agent: therefore it is not universally necessary that it act dispositively. – The antecedent is conceded, he says, even by him himself, that is, by St. Thomas, elsewhere, namely in Book IV of the Sentences, distinction 1, question 1, article 4, question 1. And it is made evident in the minting of coin and in sealing with a seal.

Fourth, he attacks the example of the axe and similar things, wishing that from these the intended point cannot be drawn. For they are instruments for an action prior to another action: the axe, indeed, is an instrument for cutting, which is prior to the formation of a bench. But it is not so in all instrumental causes: since some are instruments, as was said, for that very action alone by which the principal effect is brought about.

XIV. Durandus then argues²⁰, wishing first to show that the argument presupposes something false, namely that every secondary cause is an instrumental cause with respect to God. This, he says, is false: for an angel is in no way moved by God when it acts. – And moreover, it would follow that a divine effect would follow upon every natural action.

Second, that the argument, especially in the second proof of the minor premise, presupposes another falsehood, namely, that every action of a second cause is from the subject. This, he says, is not necessary. For God can no less separate an accident from its subject while it is being produced by a natural agent than has in fact been done. Then thus: God separates the accident from its subject while it is being produced by a natural agent; therefore that production will not be from the subject; therefore a second cause need not act from its subject, since the opposite can be brought about by divine power.

XV. To make this difficulty evident, know that, speaking universally, the instrumental cause can be understood to require an action—that is, its own proper action and that of the principal agent—in two ways. In one way, so that there are two actions having different things as their terms, just as the heat of the soul both warms and generates flesh. And this, in my judgment, is not necessary. And Scotus argues against this. – In another way, so that one operation, insofar as it proceeds from the instrument's own power, produces something prior by the order of nature to what it produces insofar as it proceeds from the power of the principal agent: as the positional composition of a triangle, by its motive power, at once places three rods together, while by its formal character it makes the form of a triangle, with no other action added. And it is similar in sculptures. And this is indubitable, and is what is intended.

It is certain, indeed, that every instrumental cause has some proper active power of its own; otherwise, as the text says, it would be taken up for acting in vain, etc. Now to every active power there corresponds something capable of being made by it; otherwise it would be an active power of nothing. And since it is established that what is first in intention is last in generation, and that when the principal cause and the instrumental cause act together, what is first in intention is the effect according to that which it has from the principal cause, it follows that what the effect has from the instrumental cause precedes that which it has from the principal cause—whether those two are many things, or one, and are distinguished as a thing and its mode, or in any other way whatever, it makes no difference.

The intent, however, is clear both from the terms employed and from the force of the argument. For by the term disposition is understood everything that precedes; and by the term proper action is understood the operation insofar as it flows from the power of the instrument. – The force of the argument, moreover, is evident. Since if every instrumental cause produces something prior to the formal term of the principal agent by its own power; and in creation nothing can be produced as prior in any way whatsoever: it follows that no instrumental cause can concur in creating.

XVI. Hence, although it would perhaps not be necessary to respond to the arguments of Scotus²¹, which are directed against the first sense, I nevertheless say that the instrumental cause has its own proper action, which coincides materially, however, with the action that it has as the instrument of an agent.

And when, secondly, it is said that whatever operates through that proper power of its own causes in the power of the principal agent, this can be understood in two ways. First, thus: in the power of the principal agent, that is, through a power existing principally in the principal agent. And thus it is most false, since it causes that proper effect through a power in itself, and not in the principal agent; otherwise, as was shown ²², it would accomplish nothing proper through that proper power of its own. – In another way, thus: in the power of the principal agent, that is, insofar as it stands under the principal agent. And thus it seems true. For the principal agent is related to the instrumental cause in two ways: namely, as using the instrument's own power; and as elevating that power to cause something higher, intended, namely, by the principal cause itself. And thus the instrument, in order to be an instrument, requires its own power and action, and a participation in the principal action. And although it is properly said to cause instrumentally only in the second way, nevertheless in the first it is not called the principal agent, but a cause acting from its own power. Hence Scotus's inference, in this action it does not cause in the power of the principal agent, therefore it is the principal agent, does not hold: for it is not necessary that, with respect to every action, a cause be either principal or instrumental, properly speaking; but there is a middle case, namely, that it is an instrumental cause causing that action from its own power. Yet if the terms are extended, it can be called an instrumental cause even of that proper action of its own, insofar as it acts as applied by another (just as, because the soul uses heating for the generation of flesh, the heat of the soul can be called an instrument of the soul even in heating); and it can be called a principal cause, because it causes by its own power. Nor is this unfitting—indeed, it is necessary that every instrumental cause be thus principal, that is, possessing its own power, in various ways. Nor does this happen accidentally, but belongs to the instrument per se, just as proper matter belongs to each form: for the character of an instrument can be preserved only in its own active power, just as the character of a human being in such flesh and bones.

To the third, however, the consequence is denied: it reaches the ultimate form at some time, therefore not dispositively. For by disposing from its own resources, it reaches the ultimate by the power of the principal agent, even if disposition is taken as a really distinct disposition; there the Author gives an example concerning the active qualities and forms of natural things, and conversely with respect to the intellective soul.

Finally, it is said that doctrine must be handed down from what is more known, and for this reason the Author introduced the example of the axe. In it, however, he made his point clear by saying that it produces the form of the bench; thereby signifying that he intended nothing other than this: that the instruments, even in attaining the form intended by the principal agent, dispose—that is, they bring about something prior.

XVII. To Durandus²³ it is said first that the argument of the text does not need that proposition, namely, every second cause is an instrument of God: but rather this one, whatever second cause were assumed into the act of creation would be an instrumental cause. That this cannot be denied is evident: because according to all, creation is the proper action of God alone; and whatever cause is assumed to carry out the proper action of a superior is clearly employed as an instrumental cause. – It is said secondly that even that proposition is true; as is clear from the Quaestiones de Potentia, qu. III, art. VII, where the angel, and every second cause, does not act unless acted upon by God in multiple ways, as is shown at length there. – Nor is it unfitting—indeed it is necessary—that every action of a creature reach to the effect of God: because it always reaches to being (esse), which no cause gives except in virtue of the first cause; as is shown here and in III Contra Gentiles, chapter LXVI.

To the other objection of the same author, it is said that, although an accident can always be separated from its subject in the divided sense, it is nevertheless not compossible that an accident be separated from a subject and be brought about by a natural agent—unless perhaps in its coming-to-be something is assigned to it so as to take the place of a subject, just as in the Sacrament of the Altar we say that quantity takes the place of substance even in corruption. – The reason for the disparity between the possibility of an accident's separation once it has come to be and in its coming-to-be is that the being (esse) of an accident is not actually but aptitudinally inherent in its subject; and for this reason it stands that it be separated and yet be. Its coming-to-be, however, by a natural agent is to be actually drawn out of potency: for a natural agent does not act otherwise than by drawing things out of the potency of a subject. And therefore, just as it does not stand together that it come to be by a natural agent and not be drawn out of the potency of a subject, because this involves a contradiction, so neither does it stand together that it come to be by a natural agent and be separated from a subject. For the contradiction is manifest: had Durandus noticed it, he would perhaps have kept silent.

XVIII. As to the fourth point²⁴, the aforementioned opinion²⁵ is refuted specifically with respect to the body. For every body acts by touching; therefore it presupposes something for its action. But no creator presupposes anything. Therefore etc.

XIX. In response to the first, note that Scotus attributes it, as above²⁶, by way of an argument against Avicenna²⁷, thus: That which participates in some nature makes something like itself to itself, not by producing the nature absolutely, but by applying it, etc. And he argues against it in several ways.

First, because two things are assumed here that are rejected elsewhere²⁸: namely, that a man is here only through matter; and that an angel is here through its form.

Second, because that major premise is either founded on this, that the product must participate in the nature: and thus it would follow that an angel could not even be created by God. – Or on this, that the producing angel participates in the nature. And thus it is of no force. For the producing angel has nothing presupposed to its esse: therefore neither in producing is anything presupposed to esse required: for the thing produced must be like the producer.

Third, against the minor proposition of that argument, every created being participates in the nature of esse. Either esse is participated as an act posterior to essence, or as identical with the essence: but in neither way is what is intended concluded: therefore.

XX. To these, briefly, it is said. And to the first, that those things rejected elsewhere are also elsewhere upheld and verified²⁹.

To the second it is said that, as the text clearly shows, the major itself is verified, because the agent participates in that nature. – To the objection, therefore, it is said that from this something impossible follows: namely, that if a participant in some nature were to cause that nature absolutely, and not in this respect, it would follow that it causes that nature in itself. And the inference holds: because one who is the cause of some nature absolutely is its cause universally; and consequently in whatever that nature is participated; and consequently in itself, since it too belongs to the number of those participating in that nature. – To the objection, therefore, it is said that from this antecedent—that an angel produces another angel—two contradictories follow: namely, both that the angel to be produced has something presupposed, and that it does not. For from the fact that it must be like its producer, it follows that it does not have anything presupposed. But from the fact that the producer is an ens by participation, it follows that something preexists in what is produced: for its action can be nothing other than the making of esse in this respect. Nor is this surprising: because the antecedent is self-contradictory. Hence Scotus's argument is worthless, inferring from the consequence of one contradictory the non-consequence of the other: for we say that both follow. And this shows that the antecedent is altogether impossible. And, as the text says, from this it is evident that no creature can create.

To the third objection it is replied that the identity or diversity of essence from esse is irrelevant to the matter at hand: it is enough that they are beings by participation, or altogether simple, or inseparably composed, in such a way that nothing of them can be presupposed prior to something else among these same things. For it has already been shown that the major premise, together with its whole process of argument, is sound, whichever of these may be the case. – The objector adds that with us a subject is not supposed on account of an agent's nature being participated, but because the form, which is part of the participated nature, is material; the actions of things themselves, and the reasoning brought forward in the text to prove the major premise, show this to be crude.

XXI. In response to the third, you have the answer for those asking why the power of creating cannot be communicated to a creature, why it is repugnant, etc. The reason is that creative power is infinite—not indeed by reason of the thing made, but by reason of its mode of making. – And by this you will resolve many of the arguments recited by Capreolus in II, dist. 1, qu. 3³⁰ against this conclusion: see them there, if you wish.

Yet Scotus, in the place cited above³¹, brings forward this argument: and although he seems to infer badly, by inserting the distance of potency from act, nevertheless, because it clearly appears that he strives to censure this passage of the text, his solution must be recited and refuted. He says, therefore, that although there is no proportion between no power and some power, the consequence is nonetheless denied—namely, that therefore a virtue which can act upon this has no proportion to a virtue which can act upon that. And the reason for the denial is that the first extremes, namely no power and some power, are extremes between which there is not naturally any proportion, because one of them is not a quantity; but the other extremes, namely the virtues, are extremes between which proportion naturally exists, because both are quantities. – And he gives the example of a point and a line: between which there is no proportion, and yet the powers capable of acting upon them are not disproportionate.

XXII. To refute this solution and the firmness of the argument made in the text, know that the argument of the text is not founded precisely upon the disproportion of the first extremes, as the objector seems to pretend to conceal: but it is founded upon that Peripatetic rule, that when there are two extremes so related that as much as one is diminished, the other increases proportionally, and conversely; if each is multiplied numerically, and combined in such a way that every combination consists of one from one extreme and one from the other: if one is posited to be diminished down to no degree, its counterpart grows beyond every degree, that is, infinitely; and hence, just as between what is diminished down to no degree and what retains a degree there is no proportion, so between the other two increasing things there is no proportion. For example (and it is an example for the matter at hand from IV Physics, text 71³²), the velocity of motion and the bulkiness of space are two extremes which, other things being equal, are so related that, the more the bulkiness is diminished, the swifter is the motion, as is evident to sense. If each is multiplied, and we posit two motions and two spaces, one motion in one space and the other in the other; and the bulkiness of one space be diminished down to no degree, that is, such that there is no body: it must be that the velocity of the motion in that space increase to infinity; and such as is the proportion of a space without body to a space full of body, such must be the proportion of the velocity of this to the velocity of that. – Upon this rule is founded the procedure of the Philosopher there, to prove that motion in a vacuum and in a plenum are disproportionate. Upon this rule is founded the procedure of the text: as is evident from the text itself, expressly assuming in the first proposition two things, namely the extremes, and their proportional increase and decrease, saying that, if so much greater a power is required in the agent, by how much further the potency is removed from act (for this implies diminution): and afterwards he adds the other extreme down to no degree: it must be, he says, that the power of the agent, with no presupposed potency, be disproportionate etc.

XXIII. And although these things could not be denied even if the license to invent were granted, they can nevertheless be proved, and for our purpose in our own terms. For otherwise it would follow that a power able³³ to act from some potency, and a power able to act from no potency, would be equal: which is unintelligible; for it is repugnant to that self-evident major premise assumed in the text, which Scotus, as though he had not seen it, passed over in silence. — And the consequence is evident, arguing in the manner of Aristotle. Take some power acting from no potency, finite according to them, say A; and another definite power, say B, acting from some potency, say C; and suppose between them a certain proportion, say tenfold. Argue thus. If a potency were taken ten times more remote from act than C, the power acting from that potency would exceed B tenfold: therefore it would be equal to A itself, which exceeds B only tenfold: therefore a power acting from some potency would be equal to a power acting from none. — And note that it makes no difference whether there can exist in nature a potency ten or a hundred times more remote: just as it makes no difference whether there can be given a body a hundred times etc. more subtle, and motion ever swifter. For the truth of conditionals suffices: whatever is repugnant to the truth of such conditionals is impossible. And if you deny this, you destroy Aristotle's natural philosophy, as is clear in Book IV, VI, VII and VIII of the Physics³⁴

XXIV. To Scotus³⁵ therefore it is said that the argument does not proceed from the proportional extremes absolutely, but from them as terms of the progression of proportional increase and decrease, as is clear. And so it holds.

The example, however, of the point and the line, which are absolutely proportional extremes, presents no obstacle: because it is proposed for nothing.

There is therefore a solid demonstration from the text that the creative power is infinite, and therefore incommunicable: for every finite power is proportional to another finite power, as he himself admits³⁶, since each of them is quantified and finite.