Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, created is not taken properly, as distinguished against co-created: but as distinguished against uncreated, namely, that which is not caused efficiently.

In the body he does two things: first, he sets out three orders of efficient causes, discovered gradually by the philosophers; second, there: Hoc igitur, he answers the question raised.¹

II. As to the first, he makes four points. First, the first order of causes, of accidental transmutations. – Second, according to the order of causes, of substantial transmutations. – Third, there: But it must be considered, the agreement between these orders among themselves. And it consists in this, that in both cases the philosophers assigned particular agent causes to things. This is proved: because in both ways they considered particular being particularly, namely insofar as it is such a being, or insofar as it is this being. This is proved: because just as the subject is contracted through an accidental form to a determinate mode of being (essendi), so prime matter through a substantial form to a determinate species. – Fourth, he posits the third order of causes: and in it is the cause of beings inasmuch as they are beings. And this cause is said to be investigated from the consideration of beings, not only according as they are this or that, as in the previous cases, but according as they are beings.

III. Concerning these orders of causes, note first how being or this esse is taken in this passage. For three conditions of things are posited here, namely accidental esse, substantial esse, and absolute esse: which are not distinguished among themselves in a uniform manner. For between substantial and accidental esse, the disparity is manifest. Absolute esse, however, is not a third thing, but stands to those as animal does to such and such an animal. And therefore, although whenever some esse comes to be, whether substantial or accidental, being comes to be (just as when a man comes to be, an animal comes to be, and when something white comes to be, something colored comes to be); nevertheless esse is not always brought about per se, but sometimes per accidens and sometimes per se. And when indeed esse comes to be per accidens, it comes to be from every cause: and this lies outside our present purpose. But when it comes to be per se, it comes to be from the cause of being alone insofar as it is being. And in this way the present text speaks of esse itself, that is, of being: and this is intimated by that mark of specification, insofar as they are beings.

And therefore in the text it is said that those considering the causes of transmutations, both substantial and accidental, considered things under a certain particular consideration, that is, according to some special account, and not according to the most universal account: that is, they considered them insofar as they are these, for instance man, ox, animal, etc., or such, for instance heavy, rare, white, sweet, etc.; and not insofar as they have being.

IV. Concerning the agreement between the first two orders, and their difference from the third, a doubt arises as to how far the reason given in the text is valid, when it says that, because matter is contracted by form, just as substance etc., therefore in both cases particular reasons and causes have been considered, and for this reason there remains to be considered being inasmuch as it is being, and the first and most universal cause. These points are sufficiently ambiguous, both on account of authority and on account of reason. On account of authority indeed: because, as is clear from Metaphysics XII Metaphysics, text 28², the causes of being inasmuch as it is being are the causes that make substance out of pure potency. – And Physics V Physics, text 7³, it is said that in substantial generation a being simply is made from a non-being simply; therefore a being inasmuch as it is being comes to be. And the same is found a thousand times over in the philosophy of Aristotle.

But as for the reason: because to become being inasmuch as being, and being inasmuch as being in act, is the same thing; since potency is a diminishing condition, as is said in IV Metaphysics, commentary XV. But being in act comes per se from being in pure potency: therefore it is by substantial transmutation that a thing becomes being inasmuch as being. And thus the difference assigned in the text is none at all. And its reason collapses: because matter, even if it is contracted, is nevertheless not contracted as though it were something in itself, but because through contraction it receives esse simply and absolutely; for of itself it is neither a what, nor a quality, nor anything of the other genera, as is said in VII Metaphysics, text 8⁴.

V. Concerning the third order itself a doubt arises, because it presupposes falsely that being, inasmuch as it is being, has an efficient cause. For if being, inasmuch as it is being, had an efficient cause, every being would have an efficient cause insofar as it is a being: and thus God, as a being, would be caused, etc. And the inference holds, even if ly inasmuch as is held specifically; as is clear when it is said: being, inasmuch as it is being, is the subject of metaphysics; therefore every being, insofar as it is a being, is the subject of metaphysics.

VI. Before these are answered, the second part of the body of the article must be treated⁵ so that all things may be made clear at once, since they are interconnected. The Author therefore answers the question affirmatively, namely: Prime matter must be created by the universal cause of beings, which is God.

It is proved. The cause of beings insofar as they are beings is the cause of beings with respect to everything that pertains to their esse in whatever way; therefore prime matter must be from the universal cause of beings. – The consequence is clear. – And the antecedent is inferred in the text from the previously stated difference between the cause of being insofar as it is being, and the causes of transmutations; namely, that the latter are causes of beings insofar as they are these or such, while the former is their cause insofar as they are beings.

VII. Concerning the antecedent of this argument, a doubt arises as to how much force it has: A is the cause of beings inasmuch as they are beings, therefore it is the cause of everything that pertains to their esse; since it does not have force, A is the cause of man inasmuch as he is man, therefore he is the cause of everything that pertains to the esse of man; and similarly for the cause of an ox and the rest. And that it does not have force is evident if we suppose the Platonic ideas to be per se causes of sensible things: for it is clear that the idea of man would be the cause of men, in this way; and yet it would not cause matter, which is nevertheless part of man. And the same judgment holds concerning any transmuting agent.

VIII. To make these difficulties evident, it must first be set forth when a being comes to be per se. According, then, to the doctrine of Book I Physics, text 76⁶, speaking in general terms, something comes to be in two ways: namely, per se and per accidens. And, as is said there, that comes to be per se whose form was not present immediately before this; but that comes to be per accidens whose form was present before it came to be. An example of the first: when the colored comes to be from the uncolored; an example of the second: when from black there comes to be colored, because it becomes white; for in the black, colored was already present. And the reason for this difference is assigned there most excellently: namely, that no agent per se intends to make that which already is, but that which is not, so that it may be. – The particle ly ex is taken here not as signifying the relation of a subject, but the order of duration with respect to the terminus a quo; so that it signifies the same as post, as is clear there.

Being, therefore, comes to be in two ways: namely, per accidens and per se. Per accidens indeed it comes to be when the agent finds being already there, or when being is made from being, as when colored comes to be from black; but per se when it comes to be from non-being, as when colored comes to be from what is not colored; and for the same reason. And since every agent of transmutation finds some being in act, from which it makes another being in act, therefore no agent makes being per se, but only per accidens. For since it finds being, though not that which it intends to generate, it does not act per se so as to make being; rather it happens that, intending to make such a being, it also makes being. Hence, if it did not intend to make anything except being itself, it would not act at all: for being already exists before its action.

If, therefore, this Peripatetic doctrine, most excellently grounded upon continuous experience and reason, is true; it must be said that, just as for something colored to come to be per se, there must not have previously been something colored, so for being (ens) to come to be per se, there must not have previously been being. This, however, is for nothing to preexist, and for the whole to come to be not from something. And thus it must be that, if being comes to be per se, it comes to be after the nothing of that very being. And from these points the reasoning of what is said in the text is clear. For since every agent found acting determines a subject, it plainly follows that it does not make being per se, but determines it to this or that. For prime matter, even if in itself it is neither a what nor a such, is nevertheless of such a kind a being (ens) that each thing producible from itself places itself outside nothing by means of her: for she is in potency something of all things. And therefore she deservedly impedes the causation of being insofar as it is being: and from an agent producing being per se, the whole effect must be produced syncategorematically, as is said in the text.

IX. To the first doubt, then⁷ it is said that, speaking of the intrinsic causes, the same causes—though not in the same way—are causes of beings insofar as they are beings, and of transmutable things as such: namely matter and form, as is clear in Book I Physics⁸, and Book VII Metaphysics⁹ For transmutable beings, inasmuch as they are beings, consist of matter and form; but those separate from matter consist of form alone. Speaking also of the extrinsic principles, the principles of transmutable things and of beings as such coincide materially: since God, glorious and first mover, is also the supreme end and the first principle of being (esse). And therefore one sometimes finds, without distinction, discussion of the causes of beings insofar as they are beings and of the causes of transmutation. The reader must nevertheless carefully discern when the discourse is verified formally and when materially. For here we speak formally, and therefore we distinguish the causes of being (ens) insofar as it is being from the causes of transmutation.

That which is added from V Physics, and similar passages, presents no obstacle. For it is one thing to come to be a being simply, and another to come to be a being insofar as it is a being: the former signifies coming to be a being from pure potency as subject, while the latter signifies coming to be a being after non-being simply. .

But as to the reason: even granting that becoming being per se and being in act are the same, it must be denied that being in act comes to be per se when it comes to be from pure potency. For a thing never comes to be per se except when it comes to be after not-being in act; but this can never happen through transmutation, as is clear from what has been said¹⁰. And beware lest you be deceived, not knowing how to distinguish between these propositions: being in act comes to be from being in potency per se, and being in act comes to be per se. For in the first is noted the relation of the term to the subject, and it is true: because if being in act has a subject, its subject per se is being in potency; and in this sense it is posited in book XII of the Metaphysics, text 8¹¹. In the second, however, is noted the relation of the term to its coming-to-be absolutely; and therefore it is never verified when the ratio of the term was already present.

X. To the second doubt¹² it is said that from the specificative to the universal the consequence does not hold simply, nor with the mark of specification, formally speaking. For this does not hold: Socrates is curly insofar as he has hair, therefore every one having hair, as such, is curly, etc. Hence, since in this proposition, being (ens), insofar as it is being, has causes, the word ly insofar as is taken specificatively; for the sense is that being has causes not only according to the special rationes of being (esse), such as human, equine, etc., but also according to the very ratio of being itself (although not in every case, because not in God); for Socrates does not depend only because he is a man or an animal, but also because he is, etc. – As for the instance brought forward, it does no harm: because it holds on account of the matter.

XI. But to the third doubt it is said¹³ that, speaking formally, in every matter the following holds: A is the per se efficient cause of B insofar as B, therefore it is the cause of everything that pertains to the being of B as such; otherwise it would not be a sufficient and properly per se cause of B. And thus the proper cause of man insofar as he is man is the cause of everything that pertains to the being of man as such. And similarly, the cause of being insofar as being is the cause of everything that pertains to being as such. And in this there is no difference. But the disparity lies in the further consequence, because of matter. For between being and the remaining more specific things, for example man, animal, etc., there is this much difference: that in the latter, one thing is matter absolutely considered, and another is matter insofar as it is the matter of that thing (since matter absolutely considered is ingenerable and incorruptible, but insofar as it is proper to man, it is from an agent producing man); whereas in being, matter and matter insofar as it is of being are the same (since matter absolutely considered can exist only as the being of something). Therefore, in the case of specific terms, the inference does not hold, A is per se the cause of man, therefore it is the cause of everything that pertains to man; rather one must add, as such. And afterwards the further inference does not hold either: therefore it is the cause of everything that pertains to the being of man; and therefore it is the cause of matter, which is a part of man. But in the most universal term, namely being, it does hold first: A is the cause of being as being, therefore it is the cause of everything that pertains to being as such; and it holds further: therefore it is the cause of everything that pertains to being; and therefore it is the cause of matter, which is a part of being; as is inferred in the text.