Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, every being does not stand for every thing other than God, otherwise the following article would be superfluous; rather it stands for every thing that is properly called a being, such as composites are among us, and those subsisting things in the heavens. – The term created is not taken properly, since throughout the whole course of this article no difficulty arises concerning the mode of causality signified by creation; rather, here, the term created signifies an effect caused efficiently, for this is what he intends to examine. Hence the same title is set out in the text at the first division of the articles of this question as follows: Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings, where what we have said is plainly evident. And the text shows the same thing also in its responsive conclusion. Now the Author used the terms efficient cause and created not by chance, but for this reason: to show that, for the sake of the matter at hand, these two coincide—every being is created, and every being is made by God, etc.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: Everything that exists in any way whatsoever must be from God. – And it is proved thus. Whatever is found in something by participation is caused by that in which it is present by essence: but esse is found in all things other than God by participation, and in God by essence: therefore all other beings are caused by God Himself.

The major is made manifest in red-hot iron and fire. – The minor, however, as regards God, is proved from the third question, in which it was proved that God is subsistent being itself. – As regards things other than God, thus. Subsistent being is one only: therefore all things other than God are not their own being: therefore they participate in being. The antecedent is said to be proved in question VII, article 1, ad 3, and more clearly in article 2 of the same question: and it is made manifest by an example, just as if whiteness were subsistent, etc. And the reason is added: because multiplication occurs according to the recipients. – And the whole argument is confirmed by the authorities of Plato and Aristotle.

III. Concerning this argument many things must be noted, both concerning the letter and concerning the thing itself. Concerning the letter, note first that, when it is said in the conclusion, everything that is in any way whatsoever, every constitutive mode of being of whatever genus is signified: and not the common or transcendent mode by which being is distinguished through act and potency. So that the sense is: everything that is a what, a quality, or a quantity, etc.; and not the sense: everything that is in act or in potency. I say this on account of prime matter, which is reserved for the following article; and on account of the very act of being (esse), of which it cannot be verified that it is not its own esse, which nevertheless is subsumed in the minor premise of everything else besides God.

Note secondly, that the text reckons as one and the same that all things other than God are not their own being (esse), and that they participate in being.

IV. As to the matter itself, know that this argument, in its common terms, is common to nearly all the wise: the disagreement, however, lies in the exposition of the terms and in the proofs. For greater evidence, then¹, know that it is common to the Platonists and the Peripatetics, if that which is found per essentiam is meant. And it is a proposition immediate in itself. As to us, however, it is made manifest: because the imperfect is derived naturally from the perfect, and what is through another from what is through itself. – Now a thing is called per essentiam when it has three conditions. First, that it be the very nature itself, say goodness or whiteness. Second, that it be not contracted in any way: I say this on account of the intellectual soul, and of imaginary positions, if whiteness were separated as a fourth thing and thus preserved even without quantity. Third, that it subsist naturally in itself: I say this on account of the mode of signifying of the abstract noun; for the thing signified by the name of whiteness is not whiteness per essentiam except according to the mode of signifying. – But a thing by participation is constituted from the contraction of some latitude of a formal ratio, in whatever way it may occur; whether subjectively, or gradually, or in any other way whatsoever.

V. Concerning the minor premise, note that all concede that God alone is being by essence: yet they explain this in different ways. Scotus, indeed, in I, dist. II, qu. III, ad tertium principale, and dist. VIII, ad secundum, according to the first question, explains that God is said to be being by essence because His esse is most perfect and infinite: and therefore a creature is said to be a being by participation, because its esse is a part, that is, less, with respect to that esse which is naturally meant to be infinite; and therefore it is reduced to the infinite as the imperfect to the perfect. But according to St. Thomas, Avicenna, Boethius, Alfarabi, and Algazel² it is explained thus, because esse is the very quiddity of God: whereas in creatures esse is the actuality of the quiddity, contracted by it. And for this reason, from the subsistence of esse itself, it is made manifest that He is by essence.

VI. Concerning the proof of both minor premises, note carefully that subsisting alone does not make a thing that subsists to be such by essence; as is clear in the case of separate substances, and also of material composites. But subsisting makes a receptive act, according to its own order, to be such an act by essence: and the negation of subsistence constitutes that same act by participation. Hence, because esse, according to its own order, is receptive in another; and likewise wisdom, goodness, etc.; and with Plato³, the quiddities of sensible things were receptive in matter: therefore whichever of these, if it subsists, is such by essence, and if it does not subsist, by participation. And for this reason an example is given in the text concerning whiteness, which is known to be a form receptive in another. And since to subsist naturally includes irreceptibility, and not to subsist reception in another, therefore in the text the argument passes from subsistence to being received, when it is said that whiteness is not multiplied except according to its recipients.

VII. Two doubts nevertheless remain here. The first, touched upon above⁴ and to be discussed below⁵: namely, whether the multiplication of individuals of the same nature occurs only on the side of the recipients. The second, whether it is true that all things other than God are not their own act of being (esse): on this, consult the Commentary on Being and Essence, chapter V. There too you will find many points relevant to the unity of being (esse) through essence arising from its unreceptivity; hence I pass over them briefly here.

VIII. Concerning the force of this argument, note two things. First, that although it concludes explicitly only, therefore every being is from God, omitting the word effectively; nevertheless, for this reason the word effectively is left to be understood. For since it is most natural for each thing to act so as to produce its like, and it is impossible for anything other than what is such by essence to effect its own likeness more perfectly, it follows necessarily that it itself is the first maker of things that are such by participation, unless perhaps something were found that prepossesses that quality more eminently; which has no place in the matter at hand, since nothing can even be thought more eminent than being (ens) itself as esse by essence. Second, that the Author, treating of creation here, employed an art most subtle. For he proceeded from what is truly proper. Since creating is nothing other than making things be, and does not include their being of such or such a kind, it is the same thing to seek the creator of all beings and the effective cause of all things inasmuch as they are beings, as will also be made clearer below⁶. But no cause can be assigned more proper to beings, inasmuch as they are beings, than esse by essence, in this way; just as for living things, inasmuch as they are living, life by essence, and for true things, inasmuch as they are true, truth by essence; according to the authority of Book II Metaphysics⁷, and Proposition XVIII of the book On Causes; with the property of the effective cause understood, which is to make what is like itself.

IX. In response to the first, there would be a doubt as to whether the relation of passive creation is really distinct from the created thing; but this will be treated in the third article of question XLV⁸

X. In response to the second, note that the formal reply consists in the denial of that major premise, What cannot not-be does not need an efficient cause, or does not need a cause giving it that it be. And the reason is assigned in the text: because it is a fallacy of the Consequent, from several causes of truth, etc. For needing an efficient cause arises from two things: either from the fact that it can be and not-be; or from the fact that it would not be if the cause, insofar as cause, were not, that is, if it did not have its esse from another; for this is the sense that the name of cause conveys.

And note this interpretation carefully. For by it the doubt of those less penetrating readers of this text is resolved—those who insist that this does not hold: this would not be if that were not, therefore that is the cause of this, as is evident in correlatives, and also in man and the risible: for man would not be if the risible were not, and yet the risible is not the cause of man. All these objections cease, however, if it is seen that the text speaks of cause insofar as it is cause, and not of the thing which is a cause absolutely. For this holds: A would not be if its cause were not, that is, if it were not caused, therefore A needs a cause. But they were interpreting it of the thing which is a cause materially.

XI. Concerning the same response, note carefully that the Author explicitly grants several necessary beings: which he also proves in II Contra Gentiles, chapter XXX. And know that, in reality, there is perhaps no disagreement of Scotus from the Author; but only in words. For Scotus, and others who follow him, understand by the name of necessary simply that which no power can render non-existent⁹: and thus they say that God alone is simply necessary. Saint Thomas, however, accustomed to Peripatetic modes of speech, following the intentions of Book V of the Metaphysics¹⁰, calls simply necessary that which cannot be non-existent by a power within itself. And therefore he grants and proves many beings simply necessary. And indeed, since judgment about things must be given and stated according to what is proper to those very things, and not according to what is extraneous, the naming of the Author is more reasonable: for there are many beings which in themselves have no power toward non-existence. And thus it is simply true that they cannot be non-existent, and consequently that they are necessary beings: although according to logical power, and power in another, namely God, all things other than God can be non-existent.

And from this you may see how puerilely, not to say ignorantly, certain men have presumed to say that the words of St. Thomas in this matter sound badly. Let them attend to the natures of things, to formal and proper speech, and to metaphysical intentions; and they will discover their own blindness.

XII. Concerning the same reply, note that some authorities say that the texts cited in the letter from Book V of the Metaphysics, text 6, and Book VIII of the Physics, text 15, are not to the point: because Aristotle is speaking of complex things, and not of incomposites.

But this interpretation is very crude. First, because in Book VIII of the Physics he says this while treating of the principle of eternal motion, against Democritus, wishing that a cause be sought for an eternal thing; and to make this manifest, he introduces the example of the triangle having three angles. Second, because in Book V of the Metaphysics, after treating of complex things, he adds that there is a twofold necessity, namely from itself and from another; and he wills that what is necessary from itself be altogether simple; and he speaks of God. Third, because the cause of complex things with respect to being (in essendo) is the cause in the nature of things of that esse which lies under affirmation or negation: which is clearly incomposite, for all composition exists only in the soul.