Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, every being does not stand for every thing other than God, otherwise the following article would be superfluous; rather it stands for every thing that is properly called a being, such as composites are among us, and those subsisting things in the heavens. – The term created is not taken properly, since throughout the whole course of this article no difficulty arises concerning the mode of causality signified by creation; rather, here, the term created signifies an effect caused efficiently, for this is what he intends to examine. Hence the same title is set out in the text at the first division of the articles of this question as follows: Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings, where what we have said is plainly evident. And the text shows the same thing also in its responsive conclusion. Now the Author used the terms efficient cause and created not by chance, but for this reason: to show that, for the sake of the matter at hand, these two coincide—every being is created, and every being is made by God, etc.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: Everything that exists in any way whatsoever must be from God. – And it is proved thus. Whatever is found in something by participation is caused by that in which it is present by essence: but esse is found in all things other than God by participation, and in God by essence: therefore all other beings are caused by God Himself.

The major is made manifest in red-hot iron and fire. – The minor, however, as regards God, is proved from the third question, in which it was proved that God is subsistent being itself. – As regards things other than God, thus. Subsistent being is one only: therefore all things other than God are not their own being: therefore they participate in being. The antecedent is said to be proved in question VII, article 1, ad 3, and more clearly in article 2 of the same question: and it is made manifest by an example, just as if whiteness were subsistent, etc. And the reason is added: because multiplication occurs according to the recipients. – And the whole argument is confirmed by the authorities of Plato and Aristotle.

III. Concerning this argument many things must be noted, both concerning the letter and concerning the thing itself. Concerning the letter, note first that, when it is said in the conclusion, everything that is in any way whatsoever, every constitutive mode of being of whatever genus is signified: and not the common or transcendent mode by which being is distinguished through act and potency. So that the sense is: everything that is a what, a quality, or a quantity, etc.; and not the sense: everything that is in act or in potency. I say this on account of prime matter, which is reserved for the following article; and on account of the very act of being (esse), of which it cannot be verified that it is not its own esse, which nevertheless is subsumed in the minor premise of everything else besides God.

Note secondly, that the text reckons as one and the same that all things other than God are not their own being (esse), and that they participate in being.

IV. As to the matter itself, know that this argument, in its common terms, is common to nearly all the wise: the disagreement, however, lies in the exposition of the terms and in the proofs. For greater evidence, then¹, know that it is common to the Platonists and the Peripatetics, if that which is found per essentiam is meant. And it is a proposition immediate in itself. As to us, however, it is made manifest: because the imperfect is derived naturally from the perfect, and what is through another from what is through itself. – Now a thing is called per essentiam when it has three conditions. First, that it be the very nature itself, say goodness or whiteness. Second, that it be not contracted in any way: I say this on account of the intellectual soul, and of imaginary positions, if whiteness were separated as a fourth thing and thus preserved even without quantity. Third, that it subsist naturally in itself: I say this on account of the mode of signifying of the abstract noun; for the thing signified by the name of whiteness is not whiteness per essentiam except according to the mode of signifying. – But a thing by participation is constituted from the contraction of some latitude of a formal ratio, in whatever way it may occur; whether subjectively, or gradually, or in any other way whatsoever.

V. Concerning the minor premise, note that all concede that God alone is being by essence: yet they explain this in different ways. Scotus, indeed, in I, dist. II, qu. III, ad tertium principale, and dist. VIII, ad secundum, according to the first question, explains that God is said to be being by essence because His esse is most perfect and infinite: and therefore a creature is said to be a being by participation, because its esse is a part, that is, less, with respect to that esse which is naturally meant to be infinite; and therefore it is reduced to the infinite as the imperfect to the perfect. But according to St. Thomas, Avicenna, Boethius, Alfarabi, and Algazel² it is explained thus, because esse is the very quiddity of God: whereas in creatures esse is the actuality of the quiddity, contracted by it. And for this reason, from the subsistence of esse itself, it is made manifest that He is by essence.

VI. Concerning the proof of both minor premises, note carefully that subsisting alone does not make a thing that subsists to be such by essence; as is clear in the case of separate substances, and also of material composites. But subsisting makes a receptive act, according to its own order, to be such an act by essence: and the negation of subsistence constitutes that same act by participation. Hence, because esse, according to its own order, is receptive in another; and likewise wisdom, goodness, etc.; and with Plato³, the quiddities of sensible things were receptive in matter: therefore whichever of these, if it subsists, is such by essence, and if it does not subsist, by participation. And for this reason an example is given in the text concerning whiteness, which is known to be a form receptive in another. And since to subsist naturally includes irreceptibility, and not to subsist reception in another, therefore in the text the argument passes from subsistence to being received, when it is said that whiteness is not multiplied except according to its recipients.

VII. Two doubts nevertheless remain here. The first, touched upon above⁴ and to be discussed below⁵: namely, whether the multiplication of individuals of the same nature occurs only on the side of the recipients. The second, whether it is true that all things other than God are not their own act of being (esse): on this, consult the Commentary on Being and Essence, chapter V. There too you will find many points relevant to the unity of being (esse) through essence arising from its unreceptivity; hence I pass over them briefly here.

VIII. Concerning the force of this argument, note two things. First, that although it concludes explicitly only, therefore every being is from God, omitting the word effectively; nevertheless, for this reason the word effectively is left to be understood. For since it is most natural for each thing to act so as to produce its like, and it is impossible for anything other than what is such by essence to effect its own likeness more perfectly, it follows necessarily that it itself is the first maker of things that are such by participation, unless perhaps something were found that prepossesses that quality more eminently; which has no place in the matter at hand, since nothing can even be thought more eminent than being (ens) itself as esse by essence. Second, that the Author, treating of creation here, employed an art most subtle. For he proceeded from what is truly proper. Since creating is nothing other than making things be, and does not include their being of such or such a kind, it is the same thing to seek the creator of all beings and the effective cause of all things inasmuch as they are beings, as will also be made clearer below⁶. But no cause can be assigned more proper to beings, inasmuch as they are beings, than esse by essence, in this way; just as for living things, inasmuch as they are living, life by essence, and for true things, inasmuch as they are true, truth by essence; according to the authority of Book II Metaphysics⁷, and Proposition XVIII of the book On Causes; with the property of the effective cause understood, which is to make what is like itself.

IX. In response to the first, there would be a doubt as to whether the relation of passive creation is really distinct from the created thing; but this will be treated in the third article of question XLV⁸

X. In response to the second, note that the formal reply consists in the denial of that major premise, What cannot not-be does not need an efficient cause, or does not need a cause giving it that it be. And the reason is assigned in the text: because it is a fallacy of the Consequent, from several causes of truth, etc. For needing an efficient cause arises from two things: either from the fact that it can be and not-be; or from the fact that it would not be if the cause, insofar as cause, were not, that is, if it did not have its esse from another; for this is the sense that the name of cause conveys.

And note this interpretation carefully. For by it the doubt of those less penetrating readers of this text is resolved—those who insist that this does not hold: this would not be if that were not, therefore that is the cause of this, as is evident in correlatives, and also in man and the risible: for man would not be if the risible were not, and yet the risible is not the cause of man. All these objections cease, however, if it is seen that the text speaks of cause insofar as it is cause, and not of the thing which is a cause absolutely. For this holds: A would not be if its cause were not, that is, if it were not caused, therefore A needs a cause. But they were interpreting it of the thing which is a cause materially.

XI. Concerning the same response, note carefully that the Author explicitly grants several necessary beings: which he also proves in II Contra Gentiles, chapter XXX. And know that, in reality, there is perhaps no disagreement of Scotus from the Author; but only in words. For Scotus, and others who follow him, understand by the name of necessary simply that which no power can render non-existent⁹: and thus they say that God alone is simply necessary. Saint Thomas, however, accustomed to Peripatetic modes of speech, following the intentions of Book V of the Metaphysics¹⁰, calls simply necessary that which cannot be non-existent by a power within itself. And therefore he grants and proves many beings simply necessary. And indeed, since judgment about things must be given and stated according to what is proper to those very things, and not according to what is extraneous, the naming of the Author is more reasonable: for there are many beings which in themselves have no power toward non-existence. And thus it is simply true that they cannot be non-existent, and consequently that they are necessary beings: although according to logical power, and power in another, namely God, all things other than God can be non-existent.

And from this you may see how puerilely, not to say ignorantly, certain men have presumed to say that the words of St. Thomas in this matter sound badly. Let them attend to the natures of things, to formal and proper speech, and to metaphysical intentions; and they will discover their own blindness.

XII. Concerning the same reply, note that some authorities say that the texts cited in the letter from Book V of the Metaphysics, text 6, and Book VIII of the Physics, text 15, are not to the point: because Aristotle is speaking of complex things, and not of incomposites.

But this interpretation is very crude. First, because in Book VIII of the Physics he says this while treating of the principle of eternal motion, against Democritus, wishing that a cause be sought for an eternal thing; and to make this manifest, he introduces the example of the triangle having three angles. Second, because in Book V of the Metaphysics, after treating of complex things, he adds that there is a twofold necessity, namely from itself and from another; and he wills that what is necessary from itself be altogether simple; and he speaks of God. Third, because the cause of complex things with respect to being (in essendo) is the cause in the nature of things of that esse which lies under affirmation or negation: which is clearly incomposite, for all composition exists only in the soul.

In the title, created is not taken properly, as distinguished against co-created: but as distinguished against uncreated, namely, that which is not caused efficiently.

In the body he does two things: first, he sets out three orders of efficient causes, discovered gradually by the philosophers; second, there: Hoc igitur, he answers the question raised.¹

II. As to the first, he makes four points. First, the first order of causes, of accidental transmutations. – Second, according to the order of causes, of substantial transmutations. – Third, there: But it must be considered, the agreement between these orders among themselves. And it consists in this, that in both cases the philosophers assigned particular agent causes to things. This is proved: because in both ways they considered particular being particularly, namely insofar as it is such a being, or insofar as it is this being. This is proved: because just as the subject is contracted through an accidental form to a determinate mode of being (essendi), so prime matter through a substantial form to a determinate species. – Fourth, he posits the third order of causes: and in it is the cause of beings inasmuch as they are beings. And this cause is said to be investigated from the consideration of beings, not only according as they are this or that, as in the previous cases, but according as they are beings.

III. Concerning these orders of causes, note first how being or this esse is taken in this passage. For three conditions of things are posited here, namely accidental esse, substantial esse, and absolute esse: which are not distinguished among themselves in a uniform manner. For between substantial and accidental esse, the disparity is manifest. Absolute esse, however, is not a third thing, but stands to those as animal does to such and such an animal. And therefore, although whenever some esse comes to be, whether substantial or accidental, being comes to be (just as when a man comes to be, an animal comes to be, and when something white comes to be, something colored comes to be); nevertheless esse is not always brought about per se, but sometimes per accidens and sometimes per se. And when indeed esse comes to be per accidens, it comes to be from every cause: and this lies outside our present purpose. But when it comes to be per se, it comes to be from the cause of being alone insofar as it is being. And in this way the present text speaks of esse itself, that is, of being: and this is intimated by that mark of specification, insofar as they are beings.

And therefore in the text it is said that those considering the causes of transmutations, both substantial and accidental, considered things under a certain particular consideration, that is, according to some special account, and not according to the most universal account: that is, they considered them insofar as they are these, for instance man, ox, animal, etc., or such, for instance heavy, rare, white, sweet, etc.; and not insofar as they have being.

IV. Concerning the agreement between the first two orders, and their difference from the third, a doubt arises as to how far the reason given in the text is valid, when it says that, because matter is contracted by form, just as substance etc., therefore in both cases particular reasons and causes have been considered, and for this reason there remains to be considered being inasmuch as it is being, and the first and most universal cause. These points are sufficiently ambiguous, both on account of authority and on account of reason. On account of authority indeed: because, as is clear from Metaphysics XII Metaphysics, text 28², the causes of being inasmuch as it is being are the causes that make substance out of pure potency. – And Physics V Physics, text 7³, it is said that in substantial generation a being simply is made from a non-being simply; therefore a being inasmuch as it is being comes to be. And the same is found a thousand times over in the philosophy of Aristotle.

But as for the reason: because to become being inasmuch as being, and being inasmuch as being in act, is the same thing; since potency is a diminishing condition, as is said in IV Metaphysics, commentary XV. But being in act comes per se from being in pure potency: therefore it is by substantial transmutation that a thing becomes being inasmuch as being. And thus the difference assigned in the text is none at all. And its reason collapses: because matter, even if it is contracted, is nevertheless not contracted as though it were something in itself, but because through contraction it receives esse simply and absolutely; for of itself it is neither a what, nor a quality, nor anything of the other genera, as is said in VII Metaphysics, text 8⁴.

V. Concerning the third order itself a doubt arises, because it presupposes falsely that being, inasmuch as it is being, has an efficient cause. For if being, inasmuch as it is being, had an efficient cause, every being would have an efficient cause insofar as it is a being: and thus God, as a being, would be caused, etc. And the inference holds, even if ly inasmuch as is held specifically; as is clear when it is said: being, inasmuch as it is being, is the subject of metaphysics; therefore every being, insofar as it is a being, is the subject of metaphysics.

VI. Before these are answered, the second part of the body of the article must be treated⁵ so that all things may be made clear at once, since they are interconnected. The Author therefore answers the question affirmatively, namely: Prime matter must be created by the universal cause of beings, which is God.

It is proved. The cause of beings insofar as they are beings is the cause of beings with respect to everything that pertains to their esse in whatever way; therefore prime matter must be from the universal cause of beings. – The consequence is clear. – And the antecedent is inferred in the text from the previously stated difference between the cause of being insofar as it is being, and the causes of transmutations; namely, that the latter are causes of beings insofar as they are these or such, while the former is their cause insofar as they are beings.

VII. Concerning the antecedent of this argument, a doubt arises as to how much force it has: A is the cause of beings inasmuch as they are beings, therefore it is the cause of everything that pertains to their esse; since it does not have force, A is the cause of man inasmuch as he is man, therefore he is the cause of everything that pertains to the esse of man; and similarly for the cause of an ox and the rest. And that it does not have force is evident if we suppose the Platonic ideas to be per se causes of sensible things: for it is clear that the idea of man would be the cause of men, in this way; and yet it would not cause matter, which is nevertheless part of man. And the same judgment holds concerning any transmuting agent.

VIII. To make these difficulties evident, it must first be set forth when a being comes to be per se. According, then, to the doctrine of Book I Physics, text 76⁶, speaking in general terms, something comes to be in two ways: namely, per se and per accidens. And, as is said there, that comes to be per se whose form was not present immediately before this; but that comes to be per accidens whose form was present before it came to be. An example of the first: when the colored comes to be from the uncolored; an example of the second: when from black there comes to be colored, because it becomes white; for in the black, colored was already present. And the reason for this difference is assigned there most excellently: namely, that no agent per se intends to make that which already is, but that which is not, so that it may be. – The particle ly ex is taken here not as signifying the relation of a subject, but the order of duration with respect to the terminus a quo; so that it signifies the same as post, as is clear there.

Being, therefore, comes to be in two ways: namely, per accidens and per se. Per accidens indeed it comes to be when the agent finds being already there, or when being is made from being, as when colored comes to be from black; but per se when it comes to be from non-being, as when colored comes to be from what is not colored; and for the same reason. And since every agent of transmutation finds some being in act, from which it makes another being in act, therefore no agent makes being per se, but only per accidens. For since it finds being, though not that which it intends to generate, it does not act per se so as to make being; rather it happens that, intending to make such a being, it also makes being. Hence, if it did not intend to make anything except being itself, it would not act at all: for being already exists before its action.

If, therefore, this Peripatetic doctrine, most excellently grounded upon continuous experience and reason, is true; it must be said that, just as for something colored to come to be per se, there must not have previously been something colored, so for being (ens) to come to be per se, there must not have previously been being. This, however, is for nothing to preexist, and for the whole to come to be not from something. And thus it must be that, if being comes to be per se, it comes to be after the nothing of that very being. And from these points the reasoning of what is said in the text is clear. For since every agent found acting determines a subject, it plainly follows that it does not make being per se, but determines it to this or that. For prime matter, even if in itself it is neither a what nor a such, is nevertheless of such a kind a being (ens) that each thing producible from itself places itself outside nothing by means of her: for she is in potency something of all things. And therefore she deservedly impedes the causation of being insofar as it is being: and from an agent producing being per se, the whole effect must be produced syncategorematically, as is said in the text.

IX. To the first doubt, then⁷ it is said that, speaking of the intrinsic causes, the same causes—though not in the same way—are causes of beings insofar as they are beings, and of transmutable things as such: namely matter and form, as is clear in Book I Physics⁸, and Book VII Metaphysics⁹ For transmutable beings, inasmuch as they are beings, consist of matter and form; but those separate from matter consist of form alone. Speaking also of the extrinsic principles, the principles of transmutable things and of beings as such coincide materially: since God, glorious and first mover, is also the supreme end and the first principle of being (esse). And therefore one sometimes finds, without distinction, discussion of the causes of beings insofar as they are beings and of the causes of transmutation. The reader must nevertheless carefully discern when the discourse is verified formally and when materially. For here we speak formally, and therefore we distinguish the causes of being (ens) insofar as it is being from the causes of transmutation.

That which is added from V Physics, and similar passages, presents no obstacle. For it is one thing to come to be a being simply, and another to come to be a being insofar as it is a being: the former signifies coming to be a being from pure potency as subject, while the latter signifies coming to be a being after non-being simply. .

But as to the reason: even granting that becoming being per se and being in act are the same, it must be denied that being in act comes to be per se when it comes to be from pure potency. For a thing never comes to be per se except when it comes to be after not-being in act; but this can never happen through transmutation, as is clear from what has been said¹⁰. And beware lest you be deceived, not knowing how to distinguish between these propositions: being in act comes to be from being in potency per se, and being in act comes to be per se. For in the first is noted the relation of the term to the subject, and it is true: because if being in act has a subject, its subject per se is being in potency; and in this sense it is posited in book XII of the Metaphysics, text 8¹¹. In the second, however, is noted the relation of the term to its coming-to-be absolutely; and therefore it is never verified when the ratio of the term was already present.

X. To the second doubt¹² it is said that from the specificative to the universal the consequence does not hold simply, nor with the mark of specification, formally speaking. For this does not hold: Socrates is curly insofar as he has hair, therefore every one having hair, as such, is curly, etc. Hence, since in this proposition, being (ens), insofar as it is being, has causes, the word ly insofar as is taken specificatively; for the sense is that being has causes not only according to the special rationes of being (esse), such as human, equine, etc., but also according to the very ratio of being itself (although not in every case, because not in God); for Socrates does not depend only because he is a man or an animal, but also because he is, etc. – As for the instance brought forward, it does no harm: because it holds on account of the matter.

XI. But to the third doubt it is said¹³ that, speaking formally, in every matter the following holds: A is the per se efficient cause of B insofar as B, therefore it is the cause of everything that pertains to the being of B as such; otherwise it would not be a sufficient and properly per se cause of B. And thus the proper cause of man insofar as he is man is the cause of everything that pertains to the being of man as such. And similarly, the cause of being insofar as being is the cause of everything that pertains to being as such. And in this there is no difference. But the disparity lies in the further consequence, because of matter. For between being and the remaining more specific things, for example man, animal, etc., there is this much difference: that in the latter, one thing is matter absolutely considered, and another is matter insofar as it is the matter of that thing (since matter absolutely considered is ingenerable and incorruptible, but insofar as it is proper to man, it is from an agent producing man); whereas in being, matter and matter insofar as it is of being are the same (since matter absolutely considered can exist only as the being of something). Therefore, in the case of specific terms, the inference does not hold, A is per se the cause of man, therefore it is the cause of everything that pertains to man; rather one must add, as such. And afterwards the further inference does not hold either: therefore it is the cause of everything that pertains to the being of man; and therefore it is the cause of matter, which is a part of man. But in the most universal term, namely being, it does hold first: A is the cause of being as being, therefore it is the cause of everything that pertains to being as such; and it holds further: therefore it is the cause of everything that pertains to being; and therefore it is the cause of matter, which is a part of being; as is inferred in the text.

In the title, exemplary cause is not a fifth genus of cause, but is coordinated in Book V of the Metaphysics¹ among formal causes: for it is a formal cause of a thing, though nevertheless separate. Nor is an exemplar called the productive art of the thing, but that in imitation of which art produces its effect; whether that be a thing outside the soul or within it, or whether it be identical with the art itself or not; for we speak formally. — Besides God, however, is said directly against the position attributed to Plato concerning the exemplars of sensible things, etc.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion answering the question: God is the first exemplar of all things. — This conclusion is first proved; second, at: It can also be found in created things, that particle first is made clear.

It is proved. The determination of the form of an effect is from the exemplar cause, and natural things attain determinate forms: therefore the determination of natural forms is reduced, as to its first principle, to divine wisdom, which devised the order of the universe: therefore in divine wisdom there are the exemplary forms of all things: therefore God himself is the first exemplar of all things. — The antecedent, as regards its first part, is declared in the case of artifacts concerning the exemplar, both within and without. As for the second part, it is evident. — But the first consequence is proved: because the order of the universe consists in the distinction of things. — The third consequence, however, is proved by simultaneously excluding a certain objection. The proof is: because those exemplary rationes are not really other than the divine substance. The objection, however, is: because forms of this kind are many, whereas the substance of God is one. The exclusion of the objection is: that this multitude does not multiply the divine reality, but only the relation to created or creatable things, as was made clear in Question XV²

Next it is explained why he said in the conclusion ly the first: saying that secondary exemplars can be granted. For higher beings can indeed be called exemplars of lower ones, as the philosophers say.

III. Concerning the necessity of the exemplary cause, know that the determination of the form of the effect is the proper effect of the exemplary cause, as is said in the text, and inductive experience makes this manifest. For we see that artisans determine forms in artificial things according to what those requesting such artificial things propose: but to propose that something be thus, in this way, of such a quantity, etc., I will, is to give an exemplar from which a determinate form of the effect is given. It is true, however, that such an operation does not have its exemplar through itself, but through the agent. Yet in different ways: for it has it through the deliberating agent immediately; but through the natural agent mediately, namely through the giver of nature as intermediary. And so, insofar as the work of nature is the work of intelligence, the exemplary cause is necessary for determining forms in all effects. Nor does the exemplary cause take away the sufficiency of the agent, whether natural or deliberating, nor is it itself superfluous: rather, within its own order it does the same thing that the agent does by another mode of causing.

IV. Concerning the root of the conclusion³, note again that, because above, in his determination concerning natural forms, which we clearly see, the Author grounds his argument for positing God as an exemplary cause; and Aristotle refutes⁴ Plato, who believed that the exemplars exist apart from the particular agents, so that things may receive their definite forms: lest one fall into error here, it can be inferred in two ways from the determination of forms that they are exemplars. In one way thus: that from the determinate forms we conclude determinate exemplars as the proximate causes of things. And this is false: for the principal action of the agents that are among us would perish; for a bull would not generate a bull. In another way thus: that from the determinate forms, insofar as from them there arises the order of the universe, we conclude their exemplars in the first cause, which devised the order of the universe, as parts of its idea of that order. And this is reasonable: because the exemplar of any whole is not perfectly had unless the proper exemplars of its parts are had. And this is clearly how the argument proceeds here. Hence the causality of proximate causes is not taken away: but, since the work of nature is the work of intelligence, the first reasons of natural operations are assigned. And thus you have the force of the first consequence⁵.

V. In response to the second, you have the gloss of that proposition, Every such thing by participation is reduced to such a thing by essence: for it is glossed, or to something more eminent containing it.

In the title, the word omnium is distributed over all things other than God, since this treatise concerns God's causality with respect to what is outside him.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion: The divine goodness is the end of all things. – It is proved thus. The first agent intends only to communicate its goodness, and every creature intends to attain the likeness of that goodness: therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things.

The antecedent, as regards the first part, is declared from the difference between the first agent and the other imperfect agents: namely, that these, even while acting, intend to acquire something, because they act and are acted upon at once; but this one acts not on account of acquisition, but solely on account of the communication of its end. As regards the second part, it is proved: because the end of the agent and of the patient is the same, as such, though in different ways. – The consequence itself is proved, as regards the first agent, from two propositions. The first is that every agent acts for an end. This is proved: because otherwise no more would follow from the agent's action that this rather than that, except by chance. The second is: the end of the agent and of the patient is the same. As regards creatures, however, it is proved from the aforementioned proposition, namely: the end of the agent and of the patient is the same.

III. Concerning the foregoing, insofar as they hold that the divine goodness is the end of all things, including even the first agent, note that God can be taken in two ways. In the first way, absolutely: and thus he has no end. In another way, as first agent: and then in two ways. In one way, with respect to the thing that is the action by which he is said to act: and thus again he has no end, because the action of God is his substance. And so it has been customary to say that God acts on account of an end not for his own sake but for that of others, as was touched upon in qu. XIX, art. 1, ad 1. In another way formally, according to the intelligibility of the action: and thus his goodness is the end of his action, because every agent, as is said in the text, acts on account of an end. And this is confirmed: because the end is the cause of causes, that is, of the causality of the other causes; therefore it is the cause of the causality of the agent, which is to be the cause of its own action. If, therefore, the end on account of which God acts is his goodness, that goodness itself will be the cause why God acts.

And the text explicitly tries to teach this in the body and in the reply to the first objection, by distinguishing between an agent acting in order to attain an end, or to communicate it; and in the reply to the fourth objection, by teaching that it is not unfitting that, according to reason, God's goodness be distinguished as prior cause from Himself as agent. – And thus the response is in a certain way broader than the question. I said in a certain way: because the causality of the divine goodness, as end, is not extended to more things than all creatures are; but to some aspect of reason in the Creator Himself as such, as is clear from what has been said.

IV. Concerning the difference between other agents and the first¹, know that imperfect agents, which act and are acted upon, are of two kinds. Some act and are acted upon by those upon which they act, through reaction; and these are those that share in matter, as is said in I On Generation². Others, however, are those which act and are acted upon, that is, act as moved by another; and this is the condition of all secondary agents. And they are called imperfect in the same mode of imperfection in which all beings short of the first are also called imperfect, because they fall short of the nobility of the first. And the text speaks directly of these, distinguishing the first agent in contrast to them. For from the fact that they act as though acted upon, it follows that in³ acting they tend, as being in potency, to acquire or preserve (for it makes no difference which of these is said in the present matter, since to act for preserving apart from the order of acquiring does not occur) some perfection proper to themselves; and, as Averroes says, XII Metaph., comm. XXXVI⁴, at least an assimilation to the first cause in the causing of beings. And this is the highest perfection: since, as Dionysius says⁵, the most divine of all things is to become a cooperator with God.

V. In reply to the second, note three things. First is that a certain distinction is intimated, of which only one member is expressed, namely: The form of the begotten is taken in two ways; in one way, as like the form of the begetter; in the other way, it is left unspoken. For this distinction is intimated when it is said that only as like is it an end: there is therefore another way in which it may be understood. – Second is what is said there, namely that the form of the begotten, only as like the begetter, is an end. – Third is that this is proved, because the end is nobler than those things which are for the sake of the end. – About each of these there is doubt.

Regarding the distinction, it is ambiguous which is the one member of the distinction.

But concerning the response, first because it seems false: since the form of the thing generated, even absolutely speaking, is the end of the generation, as is evident in itself. – Second because by means of it the inferential argument is not adequately answered: from the fact that the form of the thing generated is the end of the generation, it does not follow that the agent itself is not the end of its own action, since the end of the generation does not coincide numerically with the agent. For since from this response we have only this, that the form of the thing generated is an end only as a likeness, the argument is rather confirmed: for whether it be an end as a likeness or not as a likeness, it suffices that it itself is an end, which admittedly does not coincide numerically with the agent. – And it is confirmed also because that form, as a likeness, is distinct from the form of the agent; for diversity belongs to the intelligible content of similitude, as is said in Book V Metaphysics⁶

Finally, there is doubt concerning the account, because, since in univocal agents the nobility of the generator and of the generated is equal, if the form of the generated cannot be the end, because it is not more noble than those things that are for the sake of an end, then by parity of reasoning neither can the form of the generator, nor the form of the generated as similar to the generator, be the end.

VI. To make the difficulty of this evident, it must be known that, although, when corruptible things are compared to eternal things, as in II De Anima, text. 34⁷, and in II Caeli, comm. XVII, it is said that corruptible agents act for the sake of another (for, as is shown here, all things act in order to participate in the divine perfection); nevertheless, speaking absolutely, and not of these or those agents, and comparing them to their effects, as is done in this argument, it must be said that it is common to all agents to act for themselves, though in diverse ways. This is made clear as follows. Every agent intends to make something like itself: therefore it intends to diffuse, extend, and enlarge itself: for this reason the generator generates, so that it may persevere forever in that way in which it can, as the Philosopher said in the same place⁸. Now in what I say, to diffuse itself or to communicate itself, two things are contained, namely to diffuse and the word itself: and since it is evident that no agent intends itself for the sake of diffusing or communicating as an end, it remains that it intends to diffuse for the sake of itself as an end: and thus it is itself the end of communication, and not conversely.

Other agents, however, differ from the first in this respect: that the rest order communication to themselves, that is, to their own utility. Although this too occurs variously in eternal and corruptible substances: for those act so as to preserve their assimilation to the first cause individually, while these act so as to preserve their assimilation, as far as they can, to the same. But the first cause orders communication to itself, that is, to its own goodness. And therefore the rest act in order that they may thus be or be preserved; but God acts because He is. And for this reason He is said even by the philosophers to be of the most liberal action, as is stated in the response to the first question.

VII. With these points pre-established, to the first doubt⁹ it is said that the distinction is this: The form of the begotten is twofold, namely, as it is of the begotten, and as it is like the begetter. For the Author intends to exclude the claim that, insofar as it is of the begotten, it is not the end of the agent, so that he may maintain that God does not act on account of created nature as an end, but on account of Himself.

To the second, it is denied that this is false. For generation can be taken in two ways: in one way, as from an agent; in another way absolutely, for instance as a way. And in the latter way the end of generation is the form even as of the generated; but not in the first way, as is said in the text. – Nor is it true that on this account the argument is not sufficiently answered. For "the form as like the generating form" signifies indeed the form of the generated, but from that aspect by which it is one with it, by which it is another than itself, by which it is as it were its vicar: and thereby it intimates that if that form, as it were clothing itself in it, is the end, then that other is truly the end. And thus formally the argument is satisfied: for although the end of generation does not coincide in numerical identity with the form of the agent, it nevertheless redounds to numerical identity, from the fact that the form of the generated is not an end except as like the form of the agent. – To the confirmation it is said that likeness, since it is the same quality of distinct things, holds more to the unity which it signifies than to the distinction which it requires as a condition of its subjects. And therefore the Author used it to intimate unity.

Finally, to the doubt against the argument, it is said that the argument of the text concludes excellently that the form of the generated thing, as such, cannot be the end of generation on the part of the agent, because it is not nobler than the agent. But it cannot be turned against the form of the generated thing as like the agent, that is, against the form of the agent: because no comparison has any place once distinction is set aside. For it is not necessary that a thing be nobler than itself when it acts for its own sake; but when the end is other than the agent, the end must be nobler than the agent.