Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

In the title, the invisible mission is spoken of. For, as is treated by Augustine in Book IV de Trin.¹, and in the fifteenth distinction of the First Book of the Sentences, mission is distinguished into a visible and an invisible mission. That is called visible which occurs with some sensible sign: just as the Holy Spirit was sent in the form of fire and of a dove, and the Son in human flesh. The invisible, however, occurs when it takes place inwardly in the soul without external signs; as when grace is commonly infused. The question, then, is now concerning this invisible mission of a divine Person to the soul: whether it is attended only according to sanctifying grace, which constitutes the children of God, or also according to other gifts, common to the good and the wicked, for instance according to knowledge, faith, prophecy, etc. And grace is called sanctifying, by distinction from grace freely given, such as those of which the Apostle speaks to the Corinthians².

II. In this body he intends to prove three things. The first is that a divine Person is sent invisibly according to sanctifying grace alone. And this is the conclusion that directly answers the question raised. – The second is that a divine Person is also given according to sanctifying grace alone. – The third is that a divine Person, in the very gift of grace itself, is at once given and sent, there: But yet in the gift itself³.

He proves this, however, by joining the first two points, as follows. The mission of a divine Person indeed requires existence in a new manner in someone, while giving requires that something be had from another: therefore each requires sanctifying grace. – And the inference is proved: because neither of these occurs except according to perfect grace. This is proved point by point in the text⁴.

III. And first, concerning the new mode of existing, thus. The modes of God's existing in creatures are two: namely, the common and the special. The first is attended to according to the participation of the cause by its effects; and it is distinguished through essence, presence, and power, of which there was a lengthy treatment in question VIII⁵ The second, however, the special, is attended to according to objective esse with respect to the rational creature alone. And because according to this mode God himself is attained as loved and known, therefore he exists in a new way in the rational creature as in his temple. And consequently, by grace alone he exists in a new way.

IV. Concerning this deduction, a doubt arises about the intent and the force of the argument. As to the intent: does it intend a new mode of existing as disparate from those four enumerated (namely by essence, presence, power, and as known and loved), such that there is given a fifth mode proper to grace, according to which a divine Person exists when He is sent; or does it intend a new mode of existing as a new species of one of those four modes. If it intends the first, then it speaks falsely that God dwells in a rational creature as in a temple according to that mode in which He is loved in the lover. – But if it intends the second, this new mode can be posited with equal, and perhaps better, reason as a new species of one of those three prior modes, say, of being by essence: since grace is in the essence of the soul from God immediately as to virtue and supposit.

V. As to the force of the argument, there is first a doubt, since the cause given in the text is not a cause. For the text says: because, by knowing and loving, the rational creature reaches God by its own operation, therefore in this way God dwells in it as in a temple. That this is not a cause is clearly proved: for, when the cause is posited, the effect is posited, and so it would follow that in every rational creature knowing and loving God, He would dwell as in His temple; which is evidently false in the pagan philosophers, etc.

The second doubt is this: even granting that the assigned cause is efficacious, it remains unclear whence the exclusive claim follows, namely, that it is by grace alone that there is a new mode. For although God, as known and loved, is in a new way through grace, He is not so through grace alone: for through faith and prophecy also He is, as known and loved, in a new way; as is evident in Christians who are in mortal sin, yet perform many good works out of love for God. – And whatever may be the case with the matter itself, given that it is true that it is by grace alone that there is a new mode, where is this proved in the text? And yet after the mark of inference there is added: Therefore no other effect can be the reason why a divine Person exists, except sanctifying grace etc. For no other cause of this inference appears in the text than the one mentioned above; which either asserts only an affirmative exponent, or infers nothing. The exclusive claim was therefore introduced arbitrarily, etc.

VI. To the first doubt⁶ it is said that he intends not the disparate mode, but a new species of the fourth mode. And that the fourth mode is more suited to this, a twofold reason is intimated in the text, according to the two differences posited between it and the others. The first is that this one is special, that is, proper to rational creature: but the rest are common to all. The second is that by this mode God himself is attained by the creature: by those, only his effects. For her excellent mission, namely of a divine Person to rationals, must be attended according to what is proper and supreme in the rational creature. Now this is manifestly not any first act, since it is as one sleeping: nor any second act whatever, but that by which God himself, the best, is known and loved. Hence God, existing in the soul through the habit of grace, exists in a less noble way than he does in the same through the acts of grace, namely cognition and love, insofar as act excels habit, and touching in itself excels being touched through another. Therefore the fourth mode alone is that according to which a new mode of the existing (esse) of God in the rational creature is to be sought.

VII. To the second and third doubts⁷ it is said at once that the text can be expounded in two ways. First, as giving the cause of the proper genus, so to speak; second, as giving the cause of the proper form, so to speak⁸. For it can be understood of the love and knowledge of God absolutely; and it can be understood of the love and knowledge of God in himself, insofar as he is to be loved out of charity. If we understand it of the love of God absolutely, then the reason is given for the proper and per se genus of that new mode which is being sought. For from the fact that this fourth mode is special to a rational creature, and according to it God himself is attained by the operation of the creature, it follows that that excellent mode sought is contained within the breadth of this one. And this sense is clearly put forward in the text.

And so it is clear that nothing stands in the way of the objection to the second doubt. For it holds that there is a true cause assigning the proper genus, and yet it does not follow, therefore, that where that cause is, there is that species, but, therefore, that there is that genus: for although animal is the proper genus of the lion, it is nevertheless found outside the lion. – And since every species is constituted by a difference per se of its own genus, and not by a difference per accidens, as is clear in VII Metaphysics⁹; therefore from this, because that fourth mode is the proper genus of this new one, it must be that this new mode consists in the difference of God as loved and known. And since God, as loved and known, apart from the common mode is not present except in one way, speaking simply, namely through charity or grace sanctifying His temple; it follows that from that cause an exclusive one is also had, which is the subject of the third doubt.

But if you say that the text does not state that God is not loved beyond the common manner except by those in whom He dwells, etc., I concede it. But remember that the Author here presupposes the properties of grace and charity: and therefore, with these left unmentioned, he proceeded to the conclusion. The very practice of the Church also suggests this to us. For we grant that God is loved by no one (except in the common manner) who exists in mortal sin, or outside of grace: wherefore this, as being readily at hand, was understood from practice.

VIII. But if we interpret it of the love of God by which He is loved out of charity¹⁰, the way is shorter. For from the fact that, by loving and knowing, the rational creature ascends to such a height that it attains God Himself—that is, as He is in Himself, to be loved out of charity—it follows at once that according to this fourth mode it is only in this height of its being that the divine Person not only exists, but inhabits the creature as in a temple, where He is honored by acts of knowledge and love; since outside this height He Himself is not attained as He is in Himself, namely as He is loved out of charity. And since this height and this temple are brought about by grace alone, it is most fittingly inferred: Therefore sanctifying grace alone is the reason why God is present in a new way in the rational creature. – And thus the solution of both difficulties is clear.

IX. Next the assumption in the text is proved, namely, that a divine Person is had by someone¹¹. One has only that which one can freely use or enjoy; therefore a divine Person is had only by grace. – The inference is proved: because by grace alone can one enjoy a divine Person.

X. Third, namely, that the divine Person himself is both given and sent¹², is proved: because by the very gift of grace the Holy Spirit inhabits the creature.