Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear enough. It is to be interpreted just as it sounds, in an indeterminate way: for we must examine whether it is, and how it is, etc.

In the body there is a single conclusion, directly responsive to the question: It is necessary to posit equality among the divine persons. — And it is proved thus. Among the divine persons we cannot posit greater and lesser: therefore it is necessary to posit equality.

The consequent is proved from Book X of the Metaphysics: because "equal" is said as it were by the negation of greater and lesser. — The antecedent, however, is proved in two ways. First, by the authority of Boethius. Second, by reason, thus. If there were inequality among the divine persons, there would not be in them one quantity in number; therefore neither would there be one essence; therefore the three persons would not be one God, which is impossible. The first consequent is proved: because things unequal cannot have one quantity in number. The second, however: because quantity in God is nothing other than essence.

II. Concerning this argument, note that, although from the negation of inequality there does not follow simply the affirmation of equality, as is clear in the case of a point with respect to a line; and for this reason the Author said in the text that the equal is called as it were by negation: nevertheless, quantity being presupposed in distinct extremes, from the negation of inequality there follows the affirmation of equality. Whether, however, there follows an equality that is a real relation or not, will be made clear below.¹

III. In response to the first, note, Thomist, that in St. Thomas here the intension and remission of form belongs to the essence of the form itself, and not only to its act of being (esse). You have this in the first mode of virtual quantity.

IV. In response to the second, you have the solution to all of Aureol's arguments in Capreolus, at distinction 19 of the First Part² For equality grounded in substance is distinguished from likeness and identity according to mode, just as the grounds themselves are so distinguished, as the text makes manifest concerning the equality and likeness of white things, thus: for a white thing, insofar as it has the character of white not exceeding nor being exceeded in perfection by another white thing, is said to be like and equal by one and the same relation. And the same judgment holds for substance taken after the manner of quantity. For equality always includes the prior relation and adds a mode of ground.

V. In response to the third, note that Aureolus, as cited by Capreolus in the same place³, attacks the last words, holding that the Father is equal and is made equal to the Son. And his arguments rest on this. To be made equal does not signify receiving equality, but having equality by way of flowing forth, like the other verbs; therefore it can befit the Father. – The antecedent is evident from itself, and inductively: for we say that two lines are made equal to each other, and yet neither takes equality from the other, etc.

To this it is said that to be equalized, according to the property of the word, signifies a motion or a certain approach toward that to which one is equalized: hence we do not properly say that a line is equalized to a line, unless it becomes, in reality or by designation, equal to another. Therefore the antecedent must be denied: and the induction is to the opposite. Yet, for the sake of the matter at hand, in divine things every receiving, approaching, etc., pertains to origin: and therefore there follows there the difference placed in the text between noun and verb with respect to the Father and the Son. Although also in creatures, when a line is equalized per se to a line, it is equalized from that line; just as the image of Caesar is made from Caesar.

VI. In response to the fourth, note the opinion of the Doctor and its foundations. The opinion is that the equality of the divine persons is not a real relation; and that when it is said, the Father and the Son are equal, the term equal includes three things: namely, the unity of essence, the real distinction of the subsistent relations, that is, of the persons, and the relative appellation by which they are formally denominated equal; and that according to those two things, equality posits something real in God, while according to the third it posits only a relation of reason; which is also confirmed by the authority of the Master in distinction XXXI of Book I.

The foundations of the position, however, are two, corresponding to the two conditions required for real mutual relations that are lacking here. The one is the real distinction of the foundations; the other is that the foundation is not upon another relation.

VII. But against these things it is argued by those who hold the opposite position, among whose number is Scotus, in the thirty-first distinction of the First Book, and in the Quodlibets, question VI, where he objects against these.

It is argued, therefore, first against that condition concerning the real distinction of foundations. Equality is founded upon one quantity of distinct extremes; therefore, upon a quantity of distinct extremes that is simply one, equality is truer than upon a quantity one in a certain respect; therefore, equality is most truly founded upon a quantity one in number.

Second, because three conditions suffice for real relations: namely, real distinction of the real extremes, a real foundation, and that they inhere in the extremes without any operation of the intellect. Therefore.

Third, because in this way the relations of origin could not be really distinguished. For if essence were the foundation, it is itself indistinct; if relation, the second condition stands in the way.

And it is confirmed. For if one whiteness were in two surfaces, those surfaces would be similar.

VIII. Next it is argued against the conclusion⁴, thus. Equality is in the Son by the force of production; and it is the first equality, according to Augustine, VI On the Trinity, last chapter; and it is a perfection simply speaking, according to the same author, On the Quantity of the Soul, chapter IX. Therefore it is a real relation. – And this is confirmed: because, with every act of understanding set aside, the Son is really equal to the Father; therefore he is equal by some equality; therefore not by an equality that is a relation of reason.

Furthermore, says Scotus, if there were inequality between the Father and the Son, it would be a real relation: therefore equality is real. – And this is confirmed. Perfect inequality is found in reality: therefore also equality. But it can exist in nothing other than the divine persons, since every other quantity is imperfect. Therefore.

IX. For the clarification of these points, note that the failure of the first condition stated in the text, that is, if there is no real distinction of the foundations⁵, entails that it is impossible for founded relations to be real. For they are the very things that are referred first, just as whiteness disperses first: and they are understood first, when it is said that a distinction of the extremes is required; for being equal belongs first to quantity, and does not belong to any substrate or conjoined thing except by reason of quantity.

The second condition, however, does not make the relations unreal: rather it makes them not to be other than their foundations. Hence any two correlatives of real relations of opposition are opposed to one another, but they are those very correlatives: for paternity itself is relatively opposed to filiation. And therefore, if the first condition did not fail, the equality of the Son to the Father would be the very filiation itself, and that of the Father to the Son would be paternity.

X. Whence, in answer to the first argument⁶ it is said that the antecedent must certainly be understood in a certain way. For it can be understood in two ways: first, as the words sound, namely that the unity of quantity makes equal; in another way, that unity, i.e., the indistinction of quantity from another with respect to greater and less, makes equal. Further, equal can be taken in two ways: in one way, as signifying a real relation of equality; in another way, as signifying equality indistinctly, whether according to being or not. – If the antecedent is taken in the first way, it is true of what is equal in the second way, i.e., taken confusedly; and not of equality, i.e., of the real relation; and therefore the argument is worth nothing. – If in the second way, the antecedent is true of real equality: and this is the root of our position.

And from this it is clear that the second argument misinterprets the conditions of real relations: for the extremes must be really distinguished according to their foundations, if relations are exigent of their foundations.

To the third, however, it is said in two ways. First, that the relations of origin are founded on the notional acts. And when it is said, those are respective things: the answer is given that from this there indeed follows, therefore the relations of origin are not other relations than those; and it does not follow, therefore they are not real relations. – Second it is said, and better, that that condition is understood of relations that do not require a foundation. For there are relations of two orders. Some carry with themselves not only foundations but also supposits: and these are the relations of origin, which we said⁷ constitute hypostases, etc. But some do not carry them, rather they suppose foundations and hypostases: and such are equality and likeness. And therefore those are real, these are not. – And by this the solution to Scotus's arguments in the Quodlibets is clear. For they proceed from this, that essence is the foundation of the relations of origin: which is not true, properly speaking.

For the confirmation concerning whiteness, it is denied that there would be a likeness there by reason of a real relation, unless perhaps on account of the diverse parts of the extended whiteness itself—which lies outside the present question.

XI. To the objections first raised against the conclusion⁸, there is a single reply: that the Son is, setting aside every act of understanding, truly and really equal to the Father with respect to the unity of essence and the distinction of persons, and with respect to relative appellation fundamentally: for he has this from the force of generation. And thus it is a primary equality; and not by reason of an added real relation. Just as the Son is also most really identical with himself, setting aside every act of understanding, and this he has from the Father, etc.; and yet it does not follow that therefore the relation of identity to himself is real in him; for he is identical with himself by identity taken fundamentally. And so the Son is equal by equality taken fundamentally. For this instance makes clear the flaw of the objections. – Nor is it true that equality, taken formally, is a perfection simply speaking. Nor does Augustine say this, although he says that you rightly prefer equality to inequality. For you rightly prefer white to black, and yet neither is a perfection simply speaking. Know, however, the truth: that the equal, not as regards the relation but as regards its foundation, is preferred to the unequal, because one is preferred to many, and just as one is preferred to many. But "one" does not signify a perfection simply speaking unless the being denominated as one is itself a perfection simply speaking. And therefore equality is very remote from the genus of perfections simply speaking.

Nor does the reality of inequality, were it in God, entail the reality of equality. For the latter involves two quantities distinct in number, namely a greater and a lesser, whereas the former has in fact only one. – Now concerning the perfection of equality, we can speak in two ways: absolutely, and as a real relation. And in both ways I grant that equality is found in a perfect being: but taken in the first way, in God; in the second way, however, in other things. For it is false—indeed impossible—that it be found in God in the second way: since it is a form requiring imperfection, namely the numerical distinction of absolutes.

XII. And in this matter you should rightly notice, and concede, that in the divine there is a true equality, and perfect, and first, and supreme, etc., as was proven in the body of the article: but not insofar as it is a real relation, as is said in the response to the fourth objection. Nor should you be deceived by departing from equality in one way and returning to it in another.