Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear enough. It is to be interpreted just as it sounds, in an indeterminate way: for we must examine whether it is, and how it is, etc.

In the body there is a single conclusion, directly responsive to the question: It is necessary to posit equality among the divine persons. — And it is proved thus. Among the divine persons we cannot posit greater and lesser: therefore it is necessary to posit equality.

The consequent is proved from Book X of the Metaphysics: because "equal" is said as it were by the negation of greater and lesser. — The antecedent, however, is proved in two ways. First, by the authority of Boethius. Second, by reason, thus. If there were inequality among the divine persons, there would not be in them one quantity in number; therefore neither would there be one essence; therefore the three persons would not be one God, which is impossible. The first consequent is proved: because things unequal cannot have one quantity in number. The second, however: because quantity in God is nothing other than essence.

II. Concerning this argument, note that, although from the negation of inequality there does not follow simply the affirmation of equality, as is clear in the case of a point with respect to a line; and for this reason the Author said in the text that the equal is called as it were by negation: nevertheless, quantity being presupposed in distinct extremes, from the negation of inequality there follows the affirmation of equality. Whether, however, there follows an equality that is a real relation or not, will be made clear below.¹

III. In response to the first, note, Thomist, that in St. Thomas here the intension and remission of form belongs to the essence of the form itself, and not only to its act of being (esse). You have this in the first mode of virtual quantity.

IV. In response to the second, you have the solution to all of Aureol's arguments in Capreolus, at distinction 19 of the First Part² For equality grounded in substance is distinguished from likeness and identity according to mode, just as the grounds themselves are so distinguished, as the text makes manifest concerning the equality and likeness of white things, thus: for a white thing, insofar as it has the character of white not exceeding nor being exceeded in perfection by another white thing, is said to be like and equal by one and the same relation. And the same judgment holds for substance taken after the manner of quantity. For equality always includes the prior relation and adds a mode of ground.

V. In response to the third, note that Aureolus, as cited by Capreolus in the same place³, attacks the last words, holding that the Father is equal and is made equal to the Son. And his arguments rest on this. To be made equal does not signify receiving equality, but having equality by way of flowing forth, like the other verbs; therefore it can befit the Father. – The antecedent is evident from itself, and inductively: for we say that two lines are made equal to each other, and yet neither takes equality from the other, etc.

To this it is said that to be equalized, according to the property of the word, signifies a motion or a certain approach toward that to which one is equalized: hence we do not properly say that a line is equalized to a line, unless it becomes, in reality or by designation, equal to another. Therefore the antecedent must be denied: and the induction is to the opposite. Yet, for the sake of the matter at hand, in divine things every receiving, approaching, etc., pertains to origin: and therefore there follows there the difference placed in the text between noun and verb with respect to the Father and the Son. Although also in creatures, when a line is equalized per se to a line, it is equalized from that line; just as the image of Caesar is made from Caesar.

VI. In response to the fourth, note the opinion of the Doctor and its foundations. The opinion is that the equality of the divine persons is not a real relation; and that when it is said, the Father and the Son are equal, the term equal includes three things: namely, the unity of essence, the real distinction of the subsistent relations, that is, of the persons, and the relative appellation by which they are formally denominated equal; and that according to those two things, equality posits something real in God, while according to the third it posits only a relation of reason; which is also confirmed by the authority of the Master in distinction XXXI of Book I.

The foundations of the position, however, are two, corresponding to the two conditions required for real mutual relations that are lacking here. The one is the real distinction of the foundations; the other is that the foundation is not upon another relation.

VII. But against these things it is argued by those who hold the opposite position, among whose number is Scotus, in the thirty-first distinction of the First Book, and in the Quodlibets, question VI, where he objects against these.

It is argued, therefore, first against that condition concerning the real distinction of foundations. Equality is founded upon one quantity of distinct extremes; therefore, upon a quantity of distinct extremes that is simply one, equality is truer than upon a quantity one in a certain respect; therefore, equality is most truly founded upon a quantity one in number.

Second, because three conditions suffice for real relations: namely, real distinction of the real extremes, a real foundation, and that they inhere in the extremes without any operation of the intellect. Therefore.

Third, because in this way the relations of origin could not be really distinguished. For if essence were the foundation, it is itself indistinct; if relation, the second condition stands in the way.

And it is confirmed. For if one whiteness were in two surfaces, those surfaces would be similar.

VIII. Next it is argued against the conclusion⁴, thus. Equality is in the Son by the force of production; and it is the first equality, according to Augustine, VI On the Trinity, last chapter; and it is a perfection simply speaking, according to the same author, On the Quantity of the Soul, chapter IX. Therefore it is a real relation. – And this is confirmed: because, with every act of understanding set aside, the Son is really equal to the Father; therefore he is equal by some equality; therefore not by an equality that is a relation of reason.

Furthermore, says Scotus, if there were inequality between the Father and the Son, it would be a real relation: therefore equality is real. – And this is confirmed. Perfect inequality is found in reality: therefore also equality. But it can exist in nothing other than the divine persons, since every other quantity is imperfect. Therefore.

IX. For the clarification of these points, note that the failure of the first condition stated in the text, that is, if there is no real distinction of the foundations⁵, entails that it is impossible for founded relations to be real. For they are the very things that are referred first, just as whiteness disperses first: and they are understood first, when it is said that a distinction of the extremes is required; for being equal belongs first to quantity, and does not belong to any substrate or conjoined thing except by reason of quantity.

The second condition, however, does not make the relations unreal: rather it makes them not to be other than their foundations. Hence any two correlatives of real relations of opposition are opposed to one another, but they are those very correlatives: for paternity itself is relatively opposed to filiation. And therefore, if the first condition did not fail, the equality of the Son to the Father would be the very filiation itself, and that of the Father to the Son would be paternity.

X. Whence, in answer to the first argument⁶ it is said that the antecedent must certainly be understood in a certain way. For it can be understood in two ways: first, as the words sound, namely that the unity of quantity makes equal; in another way, that unity, i.e., the indistinction of quantity from another with respect to greater and less, makes equal. Further, equal can be taken in two ways: in one way, as signifying a real relation of equality; in another way, as signifying equality indistinctly, whether according to being or not. – If the antecedent is taken in the first way, it is true of what is equal in the second way, i.e., taken confusedly; and not of equality, i.e., of the real relation; and therefore the argument is worth nothing. – If in the second way, the antecedent is true of real equality: and this is the root of our position.

And from this it is clear that the second argument misinterprets the conditions of real relations: for the extremes must be really distinguished according to their foundations, if relations are exigent of their foundations.

To the third, however, it is said in two ways. First, that the relations of origin are founded on the notional acts. And when it is said, those are respective things: the answer is given that from this there indeed follows, therefore the relations of origin are not other relations than those; and it does not follow, therefore they are not real relations. – Second it is said, and better, that that condition is understood of relations that do not require a foundation. For there are relations of two orders. Some carry with themselves not only foundations but also supposits: and these are the relations of origin, which we said⁷ constitute hypostases, etc. But some do not carry them, rather they suppose foundations and hypostases: and such are equality and likeness. And therefore those are real, these are not. – And by this the solution to Scotus's arguments in the Quodlibets is clear. For they proceed from this, that essence is the foundation of the relations of origin: which is not true, properly speaking.

For the confirmation concerning whiteness, it is denied that there would be a likeness there by reason of a real relation, unless perhaps on account of the diverse parts of the extended whiteness itself—which lies outside the present question.

XI. To the objections first raised against the conclusion⁸, there is a single reply: that the Son is, setting aside every act of understanding, truly and really equal to the Father with respect to the unity of essence and the distinction of persons, and with respect to relative appellation fundamentally: for he has this from the force of generation. And thus it is a primary equality; and not by reason of an added real relation. Just as the Son is also most really identical with himself, setting aside every act of understanding, and this he has from the Father, etc.; and yet it does not follow that therefore the relation of identity to himself is real in him; for he is identical with himself by identity taken fundamentally. And so the Son is equal by equality taken fundamentally. For this instance makes clear the flaw of the objections. – Nor is it true that equality, taken formally, is a perfection simply speaking. Nor does Augustine say this, although he says that you rightly prefer equality to inequality. For you rightly prefer white to black, and yet neither is a perfection simply speaking. Know, however, the truth: that the equal, not as regards the relation but as regards its foundation, is preferred to the unequal, because one is preferred to many, and just as one is preferred to many. But "one" does not signify a perfection simply speaking unless the being denominated as one is itself a perfection simply speaking. And therefore equality is very remote from the genus of perfections simply speaking.

Nor does the reality of inequality, were it in God, entail the reality of equality. For the latter involves two quantities distinct in number, namely a greater and a lesser, whereas the former has in fact only one. – Now concerning the perfection of equality, we can speak in two ways: absolutely, and as a real relation. And in both ways I grant that equality is found in a perfect being: but taken in the first way, in God; in the second way, however, in other things. For it is false—indeed impossible—that it be found in God in the second way: since it is a form requiring imperfection, namely the numerical distinction of absolutes.

XII. And in this matter you should rightly notice, and concede, that in the divine there is a true equality, and perfect, and first, and supreme, etc., as was proven in the body of the article: but not insofar as it is a real relation, as is said in the response to the fourth objection. Nor should you be deceived by departing from equality in one way and returning to it in another.

The title is clear. – In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: The Son must be coeternal with the Father. – It is proved thus. Everything existing from a principle is later than that principle, and either proceeds from it voluntarily, or from a nature gradually perfected, or by successive action: but the Father does not beget the Son voluntarily, but from a nature perfect from eternity, and without successive action: therefore He has a Son coeternal with Himself. – And the same holds for the Holy Spirit.

The major premise is explained by distinguishing the cause of posteriority on the side of the agent, or of the action, etc., as is clear in the text.

The minor premise, however, as regards its final part, is proved by leading to an impossibility: namely, that the Son would be begotten successively, and with matter and motion. — Nor is this inference concerning matter founded on this, that wherever there is succession, there is matter: but that wherever there is a successive generation of substance, there is matter.

In the title, the word nature is not an oblique term determined by the word order; rather, on the contrary, it determines that order itself. Thus the sense is not: Whether there is an order of nature, as of an ordered thing; but: Whether there is an order of nature, that is, a natural order, inasmuch as "natural" is distinguished from "voluntary."

II. In the body there is one conclusion: In the divine persons there is an order of nature. – It is proved. Order is always by comparison to some principle: therefore it is multiple, according to the multiplicity of the principle: therefore it exists in the divine persons according to origin, without priority: therefore there is an order of nature.

The first consequence is explained in its setting, in the understanding, and in each of its causes. – The second, however, is proved: because principle in God is according to origin, without priority, from question XXXIII, article 1. – The third is made manifest by the authority of Augustine, who also introduced this very term.

III. Concerning this part, insofar as order is posited there without priority, a doubt arises among many, who think that priority and posteriority belong to the very notion of order; and just as an order of origin is posited there, it must be held that there is also priority and posteriority of origin.

But since it is not the task of theologians to serve contentions, and in this matter there is no disagreement except in words, therefore know briefly that, since the order of origin is nothing other than this esse from that esse; and in that, according to the thing itself, there is found that from which another is and that which is from another; and again, that from which another is is sometimes producing from itself, as is clear of the first producer; and in these there should be no discord: it follows that between us and Scotus, who consents to all of these, in the First Book, distinction XXVIII, last question¹, and in the Quodlibets, question IV, there is no controversy according to the thing itself, but only a difference in terms. For they call prior in origin that from which another is, and also producing from itself; but posterior in origin that which is from another; so that priority of origin is the ly from which or from itself, while posteriority is the ly from another; as is clear from Scotus himself in the First Book, dist. XII, qu. II, and elsewhere. Hence in matters of this kind, out of reverence for the holy Doctors, who did not use these terms, and in order to remove occasions of error, let them hold the opinion, but restrain their language².

Such expressions also beget obscurity in matters that are manifest, as is evident when the question arises concerning the identity or diversity of the sign of origin, by which or by which ones the Father and the Son spirate: even though the matter is clear, namely that the Father from himself and the Son from the Father spirate with one single act together, as a single principle, as was said³.

IV. In response to the second, a difficulty arises, one not overlooked by Scotus, in distinction XXVIII of the First Book, last question, namely that this statement conflicts with what is said in question XL, last article. For there it is said: paternity, or the Father, is in no way prior to the Son, so that he is prior neither according to nature nor according to intellect. But there it was expressly stated that the hypostasis of the Father is prior according to intellect by the actual notional act which is active generation; and consequently prior to the Son, who follows upon passive generation, as is said there. These two, therefore, cannot stand together.

V. To make this difficulty evident, both simply and ad hominem, know that one can speak of the Father and the Son in the divine in two ways. In one way, according to the pure reality of things: and thus our Author speaks here, denying all priority and posteriority. And he proves this with a most efficacious argument: namely, that in them there is nothing but relation and essence; in the essence there is no priority, since it is one; the relations are simultaneous by nature and by intellect; therefore. — In another way, one can speak of them under some partial concept, or mode of conceiving: and thus he spoke above. And deservedly so: because the title of the article concerned the pre-understanding of the properties with respect to the acts, and conversely; and thus the Father (and likewise paternity), conceived as hypostasis, precedes, according to the intellect, the generation and the Son. Hence there is no contradiction in what has been said.

Indeed, from this passage it is manifestly clear that Scotus, both in the place cited and in the Quodlibets, question IV⁴, attributed to St. Thomas the motive for making that distinction of paternity as constitutive and as relation, namely so as to preserve the Father being prior to the Son. For the Author never even dreamed of this; rather, he taught the opposite here, saying that the subsistent relations themselves, which are the Father and the Son, must be altogether simultaneous, even in thought; and this on the merits of the things themselves. For the reason that moved the Author to make that distinction was that a single relation has two acts, namely to constitute the hypostasis and to refer, as was evident there⁵.

VI. And know that, with this single distinction set forth beforehand—namely, concerning things in themselves, or concerning them according to some special concept or mode of conceiving—you will resolve the objections of those who wish to prove priority altogether in the divine; whether from what Augustine says⁶ that nothing generates itself, because it would be before it was, and thus it belongs to the notion of the generator that its esse be prior to that of the generated; or from similar arguments. For all these do not conclude that the thing or person generating, etc., is prior even according to the intellect: but that that thing so conceived is prior according to reason. It is clear, moreover, that an argument from a thing thus conceived to the same thing simply does not hold: for it is a sophism from a secundum quid to a simpliciter.

The title is clear. — In the body there is a single conclusion: It is necessary that the Son be equal to the Father in magnitude from eternity.

And this is proved first with respect to the first part, thus. It belongs to the notion of paternity and filiation that the son receive the perfection of nature just as the father does: therefore the Son in the divine has the perfection of the paternal nature: therefore He is equal to the Father in magnitude.

The antecedent is made clear in creatures. – The first consequence, however, is proved: because in the divine there is truly and properly paternity and filiation. – The second, moreover: because magnitude signifies nothing other than the perfection of a nature.

As to the second part, namely from eternity, it is proved. The power of God the Father is not defective, nor is the Son of God perfected successively: therefore from eternity.

And the consequence is declared: because from the opposites of these things it happens in human affairs that a son is not immediately made equal to the father. – And the whole is confirmed by the authority of Hilary.

The title is clear. – In the body there is a single conclusion, having three parts: the Father is in the Son, and conversely, according to essence and relation and origin.

As to the first part, it is proved thus. The essence of the Father is in the Son: therefore the Father is in the Son. – The antecedent is made manifest: because the Father communicates his essence to the Son without any transmutation. – But the consequence is proved: because the Father is his essence. – And likewise, conversely, the essence of the Son is in the Father: therefore the Son is in the Father, because the Son is his essence. – And this is confirmed by the authority of Hilary.

II. Concerning this part, note two things. The first is that the Father's being in the Son by reason of the essence can be understood in two ways. In one way, that the essence itself considered in itself is the reason of being (esse) in the Son; just as we say that the Father understands by reason of the essence. And this sense is foreign to the mind of the Author: for then it would follow most fittingly that therefore the Son is in the Son; just as it follows that therefore the Son understands. In another way, that the essence, as one in many, is the reason why one being is in another; just as we also say that the essence, as in the principle, is the reason of generating. And thus it is verified in the case at hand. For to be in another, since it requires two things, conjunction and distinction of extremes, occurs in two ways: either according to reason, with respect to distinction, as deity in God, and universally form in the supposit from which it is not really distinguished; or according to reality. In the case at hand it is understood according to reality, so that there concur toward the mutual being (esse) of the divine persons both real otherness and real conjunction: for the Father is in the Son as consubstantial in another consubstantial, by reason of the one essence in both.

Know secondly from this that esse in a person, as we are now speaking, is among the mixed notional notions, just like the power of generating: for it contains within itself the distinction of persons and the unity of essence. And therefore, just as in other things of this kind, which stand between the essential and the notional, an argument does not hold when applied to what is purely essential, so neither does it here. Hence, just as the essence does not generate, and yet in the Father is the reason for generating; so too it is not in any person in the way one person is in another, and yet in several persons it is the reason for their being (esse) in one another.

And from these it is clear, first, the efficacy of the argument from the letter, which proceeds not from the identity of the Father or of the Son with the essence, as some seem to have understood; but from the unity of the essence of both. And this is most fittingly intimated in the very names of the Father and of the Son and of the essence. – The solution to the arguments brought forward is clear, secondly, in distinction XIX of the First Part¹, at Capreolus. For both conditions joined together render the procession valid.

III. One doubt, however, remains: whether this argument holds from the unity of the essence of both, such that it would be equivalent to have said, the essence of the Father is in the Son, therefore etc., and, the essence of the Father is the Son, therefore etc.; that is, whether that mode of "in," as it lies in the text, is required for the force of the inference, namely, the essence of the Father is in the Son, therefore etc. – And the reason for the doubt is that the word "in" signifies only a relation of reason; but the Father is in the Son according to the thing itself. – And again, the essence is in the Son in a different way than the Father is in the Son: because the former is there as form in a supposit, whereas the latter is there as a substantial supposit in another supposit.

IV. To this it is said that, since the mode of signifying alone pertains to the truth of propositions, which sometimes varies their truth, therefore, although this process, as regards the thing, is grounded upon the unity of essence in the many (for this makes the persons consubstantial, and posits one substantially in another as regards the thing); nevertheless, as regards showing what is properly verified by this utterance, the Father is in the Son, and conversely, it is also grounded upon the ly in. For from the fact that the one essence of the many fittingly admits the ly in with respect to each of the singular persons, it follows most excellently: Therefore each person, by reason of that essence, can also be said to be in another.

Nor does the diversity of mode stand in the way: on the contrary, of necessity the mode of reason must be different from that of being, as is clear by induction. – Nor does it hinder that it signifies a relation of reason: since a relation of reason is also meant when it is said, the Father is in the Son, just as when it is said, equal to the Son; for there is no real relation in God besides those four relations of origin. Hence, just as equality and likeness of the persons are distinguished with respect to foundation and extremes, etc.²; so must mutual indwelling be spoken of proportionally: for it includes the unity of essence and the distinction of persons, just as those do, as is clear from what has been said³.

V. As to the second part, however,⁴ it is proved. One correlative is in the other according to the intellect: therefore one divine person is in the other according to relation.

VI. Against this argument Aureol and Durandus object, as reported by Capreolus in the place cited above⁵. First, because one relative is not in another, but toward another, and is distinguished from and opposed to it. – Second, because in that case the Holy Spirit would not be in the Father and the Son, since He is not referred to them: but in the spirator, to whom He is referred.

VII. But that these and similar things offer no obstacle is easily apparent, and the difference lies only in words. For the Author does not will that the Father be in the Son according to the thing, with respect to relation (since it is clear that the Father, as such, is toward the Son, not in the Son): but according to understanding, or the definitive account: for by most frequent usage we say that one correlative is in the account of the other, as Porphyry says in Praedicabilibus⁶ And since in the text it is expressly placed ly according to understanding, it is a wonder how these men argue against this.

Again, since it is sufficient for each mode to have what is proper to it beneath its formal account, there is no incongruity in granting that the Holy Spirit, with respect to relation, is not in the Father and the Son except as they are spirating him. For whatever is had from all the modes together need not be required from any single mode; this is what the objector dreams was the Author's intention. Hence, if from this one were to infer, therefore the Holy Spirit is not in the Father and the Son, or, therefore he is not in the Father and the Son except as in those spirating, that would be a sophism from a respect to something absolute. For he is in them thus; and he is in them by reason of essence, as consubstantial, as was said in the first mode⁷; and also according to origin, as will be said⁸. The argument therefore does not hold: the Holy Spirit, with respect to relation, is not in the Father and the Son except thus; therefore the Holy Spirit is not in them except thus: for the term with respect to relation functions as a respect.

VIII. As to the third part,⁹ it is proved. The Word does not proceed outside the one speaking, and what is said by the Word is contained in the Word: therefore one divine person is in another according to origin.

IX. Against this argument Aureol objects, above¹⁰, in two ways. First, because the mode of being in another as in a principle is more imperfect, as the Commentator holds, IV Physics, comment. 23; and it is not reciprocal. But the mode in which one divine person is in another is most perfect, and reciprocal. Therefore. — Second, because according to this argument the Father would be in the Word just as the whole world is in the Word. The consequence is proved: because he would be there as a thing spoken, and it is established that the whole world is spoken by the Word of God.

X. To these objections it is replied that being in an active principle occurs in two ways, namely extrinsically and intrinsically, that is, according to an operation that passes forth into something outside, and one that remains within. And that although being in an active principle extrinsically is a mark of imperfection, as in the case of being caused, nevertheless being in a principle intrinsically involves no imperfection whatsoever. Hence in the text the proof was taken from the fact that the word does not proceed outside the one speaking. – Reciprocity, moreover, is admitted even in extrinsic cases, so long as we grant that a cause exists in its effects by way of imitation or representation.

To the second, it must be said that the thing said is not one in manner only: for some thing is said essentially, while some is said representatively. The Father, therefore, is in the Son as a thing said essentially in the Word; but all creatures are said representatively, inasmuch as they are represented in God, whose Word essentially is, both as the thing said and as the speaker.

A clear title. – In the body, a single conclusion, answered affirmatively: The Son is equal to the Father in power.

It is proved. The notion of paternity and filiation requires equality in magnitude and perfection of nature; therefore equality in power. – The antecedent is clear from the fourth article. – But the consequence is proved: because active power follows upon the perfection of nature. This is proved: because in creatures, the more perfect a thing's nature is, the greater its power in acting, as is evident inductively both within the same species and within the genus of bodies, and universally among substances.