Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear from what precedes. Let the novice only note this: that power is taken here not for the respect of a principle, but for the thing to which that respect belongs. For both are contained in the notion of power; but it is this thing that is in question here—whether it be essence or paternity, etc.

II. In the body he does four things: first, he reports a certain opinion; second, he refutes it; third, he refutes another opinion, at: Nor even essence, etc.¹; fourth, he answers the question².

III. As to the first point, the opinion just recited holds that the power of generating signifies relation only.

With respect to the second point, this opinion is criticized by showing that it signifies the divine essence principally, thus: The power in any agent whatsoever is that by which the agent acts; therefore it is a form to which assimilation is made; therefore generative power is that in which what is generated is assimilated to its generator; therefore the divine nature in the Father is the power of generating; therefore the power of generating signifies the divine essence principally, and not relation only. – The first consequence is proved: because everything producing produces something like itself with respect to the form by which it acts, which is made manifest in human generation. The third is proved: because the Son of God is assimilated to the Father in the divine nature. And it is confirmed by the authority of Hilary. The fourth consequence, as regards its first part, is confirmed by the authority of the Master, in the seventh distinction of Book I.

IV. As to the third point, the opinion must be rejected that the power of generating signifies the essence insofar as it is identical with the relation, in such a way that it signifies both equally. – It is rejected, however, as follows. In created things, the individual form constitutes the generating person, and is not that by which the generator generates; therefore, in the divine, paternity is what constitutes the person of the generating Father, and is not that by which the Father generates.

The antecedent is proved, as to its second part: because otherwise Socrates would generate Socrates. – The consequence, however, is proved: because paternity, although it is a form, is nevertheless an individual form. And the proof of the second part of the antecedent is applied to the second part of the consequent, leading to the impossible: namely, that the Father would generate the Father, just as there Socrates would beget Socrates.

V. As to the fourth point, the responsive conclusion to the question is: The power of generating signifies the divine nature in the direct case, and paternity in the oblique. And it is inferred from what was said above, ³ as follows. That by which the Father generates is the divine nature, because in it the Son is made like to Him; and generation, according to Damascene, is the work of nature, not as that which, but as that by which. Therefore.

And note that, as a rule, the Author assumes along with the other theologians that the power of generating includes within itself the relation: and therefore he was not concerned to prove that it is included in it; but it sufficed to prove that it is not included alone, and that it is not included in this way, namely on an equal footing. – And know that the second opinion censured in the text is the one which the Author had followed in distinction 7 of the First Book, question 1, article 2. And accordingly, it is here retracted.

VI. Concerning the first assumption, namely, the power in each agent is that by which the agent acts⁴, a doubt arises: whether this is true of everything by which an agent acts, or only of that by which it acts first, or only of that by which it acts proximately. It cannot be said that everything by which an agent acts is a power. For it would then follow that in Socrates there are several generative powers: since he generates by humanity, and he generates by the generative power, which is the faculty of the vegetative part. – Nor can it be said that it is verified only of that by which the agent acts first. For it would follow that heat in fire is not a heating power, but its substance, which is the first principle of heating. – Nor can it be said that it is verified only of that by which the agent acts proximately. For in that case what is said in the text would be false, namely, that human nature is the generative power of man. And likewise the principal conclusion would be badly inferred: since the divine nature is the principle of generation and spiration only through the mediation of intellect and will, as is evident from what was said above⁵.

VII. To this it is said that what has been assumed is true of everything by which an agent acts, provided two conditions are observed: namely, that it be some form of the agent (and this to distinguish it from instruments); and that it be the per se principle of that action, whether eliciting or principal (and this to distinguish it from concomitants). – Nor does it follow from this that there are several powers of the same kind in the same subject. For considered in themselves, powers in the same subject are of different orders, one being first and the other proximate, as is clear in the case of human nature and the generative power; but in relation to the act, they possess unity. For they are the principle of one and the same generation: and therefore, as such, they are reckoned as it were one principle and one power, consisting of the proximate and the first concurring together.

VIII. Concerning the position, insofar as it affirms the generative power to be the divine nature⁶, a doubt arises from a twofold source. First, from the divine nature as distinguished against the attributive perfections, namely intellect and will: and against this are brought the arguments of Scotus⁷. – Second, from the same as distinguished against relation: and against this are brought the arguments of Bonaventure, Garron, Henry, and Durandus⁸.

True, because the Author does not here take the divine nature as distinguished against intellect and will, except perhaps in a certain respect: — since in Him, although the divine nature is the first principle by which of generation, it is not however the only one; but the divine nature itself is as the first by which, while the intellect is as the proximate by which, as is manifestly clear from what has been treated concerning the procession of the Son and of the Holy Spirit⁹: whence the divine nature is taken here not only as itself, but as comprehending whatever absolute thing serves as a principle by which concurring to such notional acts: and therefore, with regard to the matter at hand, it makes no difference whether one speaks of the divine nature or of any other essential absolute: — for which reason, Scotist arguments are to be set aside.

IX. Others, however, who attack the essence as distinguished against the relations, draw their arguments from the intelligibility of the essence, from the personal property, from the notional act, and from authority.

By way of essence, first, thus. The action which has a form as its formal account is owed to that form, even if it be separate from its subject, as is clear in the case of whiteness considered separately with respect to dispersion: but to the deity, understood as separate from the Father, that action is not owed, namely to generate: therefore it itself is not the account of generating. – Further, the deity is of one most simple account: therefore it is not the account of only two actions, namely generation and spiration, but either of one or of infinitely many. – Further, the deity is common to the three persons: therefore it is not the proper account of an act proper to one person.

But from the constitutive form of the Father, namely paternity: because the principle of being and the principle of operating are the same; for it belongs to imperfection that the form should give the first act and not the second.

But from the act: because just as the essential act is from the essential form, so the personal act is from the personal one.

But the authority is Augustine's, V de Trin., chapter V: the Father is such as the Son is to him. Therefore the Son is his not by divinity, but by paternity. And the inference holds: because the Father is Father by paternity.

X. To make these things evident, know that the objectors seem to be deceived in this, because they do not discern how great a difference there is between the divine nature and the divine nature in this, namely, the Father. The Author does not intend that the divine nature is generative power; but that the divine nature in the principle is not generative power from the principle. And to intimate this, in the text, immediately before the authority of Hilary, it is said: Hence the divine nature in the Father is generative power in him: where he twice named the person, once on the side of the nature, and once on the side of the power of generating, so as to show that neither is taken purely absolutely. For the divine nature is common to the three, with all its properties: but the divine nature, not only as Father, but as in the Father, belongs to the Father alone: for it as such, that is, as in the Father, or as of the Father, is the power of generating. And therefore in the text it is said that the power of generating includes paternity not directly, but obliquely: for the Godhead, not as paternity, but as of the Father, is the power of generating, and proper to the Father. – And by this the objections are easily answered.

XI. Whence the first argument¹⁰, although the major could be denied, since whiteness separated from quantity would not disperse; nevertheless let a distinction be made, that an act is attributed to some form in two ways. In one way, absolutely and per se positively. And thus, even if the major were true, the minor is false: for generation is not attributed to the divine nature absolutely nor per se positively, since it would belong to it in whatever it is found; but quasi-permissively, in the way in which particulars belong to universals; for thus are the persons compared to the essence, as was said in q. XL¹¹. In another way, the act of the form is attributed as in this. And thus the major is false, and the minor true. – And by this the response to the third is clear. For the common as common is not the proper account of the proper; but the common as of the proper, that is, of the person, is well the proper account of the act proper to the person itself. – To the second, however, one may reply by the same, that although the deity, considered in itself, would no more regard two than a thousand; nevertheless as in this, that is, as in a principle not of a principle, and as in that which is and a principle of a principle at once, the act begins only two. — Yet this argument can be resolved in several other ways. Namely, because the deity together with the intellect of one, and with the will of the other, is the principle. And not of more: because beyond the act of intellect and will, there is no third in intellectual nature. On the side, too, of a certain order of the productions themselves among themselves, it can be said that it is not unfitting that they arise in an ordered way from one.

As for the argument from the side of the form, the assumption is false, according to the common way of the philosophers, which holds that not every form is active, and especially relation. — Yet it could be said that in a certain way paternity, by constituting the Father, gives him the power to generate; insofar as it gives him to concur actively in generation as that from which. Nor is anything more owed to it on that account.

But to that argument from act, proportional similarity must be denied. For the essential act, within the latitude of purely essential things, is found both as that which and as that by which; but the personal act, within the latitude of purely personal things, cannot be found as that by which; for personality cannot be the reason of making something like itself, unless it could generate itself, which is unintelligible.

Finally, as to the authority of Augustine, it must be said that "labor" is used equivocally. For he speaks of that by which formally: but the deity of the Father is that by which the Father generates causally, and by which the Son is his.

XII. In response to the first, note that between generator and generated two things are found, namely agreement and distinction. And indeed distinction is the condition, while assimilation is the reason: for the generator does not generate in order to distinguish, but in order to assimilate what is distinct. And therefore, the greater the agreement, the more perfect is the generation, while the hypostatic distinction remains intact. And the lesser this supposital distinction is, the more perfect is the generation. Hence in the divine the distinction is minimal, because it is relative: and the agreement is maximal, because they are the same thing in number, most simple and wholly undivided, etc.