Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is to be understood as broadly as it sounds: for it is distinguished in the body. – In the body there is a single two-membered division, with individual conclusions placed alongside the members themselves.

II. Distinction. That something is or comes to be by will occurs in two ways: namely concomitantly, or causally, that is, principiatively. An example of the first is Socrates is a man by his own will; an example of the second is Socrates builds a house by his own will.

First conclusion, according to the first member: The Father begot the Son with will concomitant. – And it is made evident: because even the Father is God with will concomitant; therefore a fortiori, etc.

The second conclusion, according to the second member, is: The Father begot the Son by nature, not by will, as originating principle; but he produced the creature in this latter way. – This conclusion, in all its parts, is first proved by the authority of Hilary; second, by reason; third, against the opposing Arian heresy. – And indeed the authority of Hilary is clear on its face.

The reason is taken from a fourfold difference between nature and will in causing, as follows. Of one thing there is only one natural form by which it is; but of will there is not one form by which it acts, but many, according as there are many understood reasons. Therefore nature is determined to one thing, but will is not. Therefore a natural agent acts in such a way as it itself is, whereas a voluntary agent acts in such a way as it wills and understands, and not in such a way as it itself is. Therefore nature is the principle of those things that cannot be otherwise than they are, whereas will is the principle of those things that can be thus or otherwise. Therefore nature, not will, is the principle of the divine person, whereas will is the principle of the creature. – The first consequence is made clear in the text: because the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent by which it acts. – The last, however: because the divine person, as being of the divine nature, is far removed from being able to be thus or otherwise, since God is of Himself necessary being (esse); but as regards the creature, because it is from nothing. – The remaining points are left as known.

The testimony, however, that is brought forward from the error of Arius is sufficiently clear from the letter itself, together with its refutation, which has been published on the authority of Hilary.

III. Concerning these statements, note that the following are common to the production of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, as is evident from the title, which inquires universally about the notional acts, and from the third argument. The Author, however, expressed in his conclusions the generation of the Son as prior according to understanding, so that by treating the notional acts in act under that name he might make clear how they stand in relation to the will.

IV. On the first conclusion and the distinction¹ together, note that the concomitant will is called the will considered in relation to that thing precisely as to its object, whereas the originating will is called the will considered in relation to that thing as cause or principle to effect. And therefore the concomitant will can be found in two ways: namely, antecedently, as when I desire a future rain; and consequently, as when I take pleasure in a rain that is or was. Whether, however, the first conclusion is verified of the concomitant will both before and after the act of understanding, or not, is not expressed in the text. Scotus, nevertheless, in I, dist. VI², held the affirmative position, which I believe to be in accord with St. Thomas. First, because in the same work above, in question XXXIII, article 3, ad 1, he taught that the absolute attributes common to the whole Trinity are prior to the notional ones. Now it is clear that willing the generation of the Son, just as willing the divine essence, is absolute and common to the whole Trinity; therefore the Father wills the generation of the Son before he generates him. – Second, because the same reasoning seems to apply to the procession of the Holy Spirit, which is admittedly loved, according to the order of reason, before it arises; since the Father, by loving himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and by the same reason the spiration itself, spirates the Holy Spirit. – Nor do the statements in the Questions on the Power of God, question II, article 3³ stand in the way; for there, by the will preceding and the will prior in time, nature, or understanding, he means the will as principle, as is evident to one who considers the passage carefully.

V. Concerning the argument brought forward for the second conclusion⁴, note that three differences there are posited between will and nature in causing, and a fourth in being in essendo. We have, however, numbered them in a different order than they are set down in the text, so that the force of the inference might proceed from what is prior. The difference, then, in being was assumed in the antecedent; the remaining three, however, are set forth successively in the three consequents.

Now the sense of the first difference is that there is a single form for one natural thing in act. And as far as the matter at hand is concerned, it makes no difference whether one natural thing has several subordinate forms, as those hold who maintain a plurality of forms in the same thing, or whether there is only one substantial form. First, because all of them, with respect to the matter at hand, are taken as having the force of one. Second, because each of them is only one: but the will, one and the same, receives many forms as many, that is, not having the force of one, as is clear when it wills things wholly disparate; and none of its forms gives it one act of willing, but opposed ones, since, as is said in Book IX of the Metaphysics⁵, a rational power is a power of opposites. The will therefore differs from nature, because nature is constituted in being by a single form: but the will is constituted in its being, which is willing, by many forms, that is, by the objects willed, both willing many things by many, and willing opposites by one.

The final difference, however, which is considered on the side of the products, must be understood not absolutely, but as they stand under such causes. This can indeed be understood in two ways: namely, simply, and in this way it is false that the effects of nature cannot be otherwise, as is plainly evident; and as they stand under such a cause, and in this way it is true and intended. For a natural effect, once impediments are removed, must be such as its agent is, nor can it or could it be made otherwise by that agent; whereas a voluntary effect can, or could, be done thus or otherwise, precisely because it is voluntary.

VI. Concerning the proof of the first consequence, by which the second and third differences are deduced from the first, from this proposition, the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent by which it acts⁶, a doubt arises. Either that proposition is true concerning assimilation to the form and to the mode of being of that form, or concerning assimilation to the form alone. If to the form alone, then it is cited in vain in the text to prove that a nature is determined to one, and that as the natural agent is, so it acts, from the fact that one natural thing has one form by which the thing is constituted in its natural being, because the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent. – And the consequence is made clear from the difference between the second and the third difference. For the second, namely that a nature is determined to cause one, pertains to assimilation to the form: for if an agent has a single form, and produces a likeness, it must produce a likeness to one form, and consequently one only. The third, however, namely to act such as it is in itself, pertains to assimilation to the form and to its mode of being, as is evident. And this is what is principally intended here: since from this the fourth follows, which is the proximate middle of the conclusion. If, therefore, that proposition does not hold with respect to assimilation to the mode of being, the intended point is not proved. – But if it is said that it is true with respect to assimilation to both, namely the form and the mode, there follows an objection against the other member. For it follows that the effect of the will is assimilated to the form in the mind in its mode of being: which is clearly false, for the house in the mind is without matter.

VII. To this doubt, although they would distinguish between the natural and the voluntary agent with regard to only a few points; yet if we attend to the fact that the text commonly uses this proposition of both the natural and the voluntary, and infers from it that a thing acts as it is, whereas the voluntary acts as it wills, not as it is; one must say otherwise.

I say, therefore, that that proposition is true with respect to its form and the mode per se of that insofar as it is the reason for acting. For every agent, whether natural or voluntary, makes something like itself to the extent it can according to the form and per se conditions or mode thereof. Now the mode per se of a thing is called, and is, that which modifies it within its proper latitude: for the mode per se of teaching is within the latitude of doctrine, and so with the others. Between a natural agent and a voluntary agent, however, there is this difference: that the natural one acts because it is (est), while the voluntary one acts because it wills; hence a natural form is the reason for acting because it is, whereas a voluntary form is the reason for acting because it is willed. And on account of this, the mode per se of a natural form is being thus or so (sic vel sic esse): for being-thus pertains to the latitude of being (essendi). But the mode per se of a voluntary form is willed thus or so, and not being thus or so: for being willed thus pertains to the latitude of what is willed, whereas being thus or so is distinguished against it.

From these, moreover, two things follow. First, that the voluntary form has a twofold mode of being: one, insofar as it is one of the beings in the world, and this is to be immaterially in the mind; and another, insofar as it is a principle of acting, and this is to be willed in this or that way. But a natural form has the same mode of being insofar as it is a being, and insofar as it is a principle of acting. And the reason is what we said: because the latter acts because it is, the former because it is willed; for willing is other than being. – Second, that a natural agent assimilates its effect to itself in form and in the mode of the form, as far as it can, without any distinction: and therefore the son is assimilated to the father even in individual conditions, if the generative power is strong. And from this it also follows that only composite substances can immediately produce material substances, among the Peripatetics. But a voluntary agent assimilates the effect to the form by which it acts, and to its mode insofar as it is a principle of acting: but not to its mode insofar as it is a being.

VIII. And from this the solution to the objections is clear⁷. For it is wrongly subsumed that the mode of being of a voluntary form is the mode of form spoken of in that maxim: for in it there is question of the per se mode of the form inasmuch as it is the ratio of acting. And it is universally true: for a voluntary agent strives, as far as it can, to do what it wills, as, when, where and in the manner it wills, as is evident. – And thus you see how perspicuously the Author drew from that maxim the third difference, namely that the natural agent acts as it itself is, whereas the voluntary agent acts as it wills, not as it is. Mark this well, and apply it when necessary.

IX. Concerning these differences⁸ another doubt arises, on the side of the will: namely, whether they are verified of it as productive ad extra only, or also as productive ad intra. For if ad extra only, this labor is vain, where the question concerns productions ad intra. – But if also ad intra, it follows that nothing will be produced by the will within, except in reflected act. And the consequence holds, because, from what has been said above⁹, everything voluntarily produced is produced as willed: for nothing is willed in the will except reflexively, etc.

To this it is briefly said that something's being willed in the will occurs in two ways. In one way, as a certain thing: and thus it is willed reflexively. In another way, as a tending toward the beloved object: and thus it is willed directly by the same act of willing by which it is willed. – It can also be distinguished in another way, into the willed as the reason for willing, and the willed as the object willed. – And according to both distinctions, what is said here about the will is preserved, within and without. For it is produced within, because it is willed in an actual direct act either as the reason for willing or as a tending toward something else. And this suffices: for thus the very act of willing is voluntary, and love itself free.

X. In response to the third, note the distinction and the reply. The distinction concerns the will in general, which can be considered in two ways: namely, as a certain nature, and as it stands with respect to either of two things; and that which the will wills in the first way, it wills naturally, while in the second way, freely. The first mode is declared in God's will with respect to Himself, and in ours with respect to beatitude; the second, however, in God's will with respect to things other than Himself. – The reply consists in applying the first member, namely, that the Holy Spirit proceeds naturally, though in the manner of a will.

XI. Concerning the distinction of the will a doubt arises. For Scotus, in Book I, distinction II, in the question on the Number of the divine Productions, and in distinction X of the same, and in the Quodlibets, question XVI, holding that the Holy Spirit proceeds freely, tries to overthrow this distinction, and to show that the will has no act merely naturally.

He argues, therefore, first as follows. Will and nature have opposite modes of originating action, such that neither are both reduced to a third, nor is one to the other; and neither implies imperfection: therefore will cannot act naturally, nor nature freely. — The antecedent, as to its first part, is made evident: because nature is of itself determined to acting; but will is not inclined by itself naturally, rather it determines itself to the exercise of the act. — As to that part, however, that one is not reduced to the other, it is proved: because then the other would be imperfect according to its whole genus. — As to the rest, for the sake of brevity I pass over them.

And it is confirmed. Because the opposite modes of acting, which are the first distinguishing features of active power, do not belong to one and the same active power: but to act freely and to act naturally are of this kind: therefore. – The minor is proved from Aristotle, who in Physics and in Metaphysics posits the first differences of the natural active principle and the free one: though under different names, for in Book II of the Physics¹⁰ it is called by our author, and in Book IX of the Metaphysics¹¹ it is called rational power, etc.

And it is confirmed. Because the will tends toward those things that are ordered to the end, as a free power: therefore, under the aspect also of a free power, it wills the end itself. – And the inference holds: because it is one and the same power with respect to both.

XII. Furthermore, the intrinsic condition of an absolute power, or in relation to perfect act, is not repugnant to perfection in operating: but freedom is of this kind: therefore it can stand together with a condition perfect and possible in operating. Such a condition is necessity: therefore freedom stands together with necessity.

And it is confirmed. The firmness of an act perfects it; but necessity implies firmness; therefore it perfects a free act. – And it is confirmed lastly. For the division into necessary and contingent active principle is not the same as the division into natural and free: just as, then, some natural principle can act contingently, because it can be impeded, so some free principle can act necessarily. – He also brings forward in support of this the authority of Augustine¹²: Either there is no will, or the will must be called free by which we wish to be blessed in such a way that not only do we not wish to be miserable, but we cannot even wish it at all.

From all of which he intends two things: namely, that every act of the will is free; and that with freedom there stands, in the same act, necessity simply speaking. And he says that the Spirit proceeds freely and necessarily.

XIII. Concerning the same distinction as applied to the Holy Spirit¹³, a doubt arises for man. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the will as from a principle: therefore the Holy Spirit can be disposed in one way and in another. – The antecedent is proved: because the paternal will is the principle of the Holy Spirit, just as the paternal intellect is the principle of the Word. – The consequence, however, holds from what was said in the body of this article, where it was said: That which is from the will as from a principle can be disposed otherwise.

And if it is said that being from the will as a principle distinct against nature gives itself thus and otherwise; but being from the will as nature does not — on the contrary, the Holy Spirit is from the will, as the will is distinct against nature; therefore. – The antecedent is proved in three ways. Because otherwise the number of the divine processions would have been badly proved above in qu. XXVII, art. 5, from this: that in intellectual nature there is only understanding and willing. Second, because the will concurs in the production of the Holy Spirit as a power distinct, according to reason, from the essence or nature, and from the intellect. Third, because, as is said in this response, the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will.

XIV. To make evident this difficulty, distinction, and proper manner of speaking, note first that, just as the intellect is considered in three ways: first, absolutely, as it is the intellective power, and thus it is called intellect; second, as it knows without discourse, and thus it too is called intellect; third, as it is discursive, and thus it is called reason: so, proportionally, though not in the same order, the will can be taken in three ways; first, for the volitional power, and thus it is called will; second, for that same power insofar as it is naturally determined to some object or work, and thus it is called will as nature; third, for that same power as it is undetermined with respect to either of two alternatives, and thus it is sometimes called free choice, sometimes will.

And because the will can be determined of itself in two ways: in one way, with respect to the specification of the act, that is, such that if it operates concerning a certain object, it must go forth into such an act, and not its opposite, as our will is determined to beatitude; in another way, with respect to both the specification and the exercise of the act, as the will of one seeing God is determined to loving Him, such that it cannot only not have an act of hatred toward Him, but also cannot suspend the act of loving Him: so too, in two ways, does the will have the character of nature. First, as it is determined of itself, with respect to some object, to willing, such that it cannot nill that object; or conversely, to nillying something, such that it cannot will it. And thus, in agreement, we say that the will has the character of nature with respect to beatitude and misery. But along with this natural character there stands freedom with respect to the exercise of the act, that is, to will or not to will; and likewise, to nill or not to nill. – Second, as it is determined by its own nature, with respect to some object, to willing, not only as distinguished from nillying, but also as distinguished from not willing; namely, that when such an object is presented, it must will it of itself, without the freedom of suspending the act. And in this Scotus intends to dissent: so that the character of nature in the will with respect to the exercise of the act is the point on which we disagree, and which is being attacked.

XV. Note secondly that, because the powers are distinguished by their acts, and the acts by their objects, it follows that if several acts have distinctions and differences, one must consider, in distinguishing them, that those differences of acts which are attended to in virtue of the per se first differences of formal objects are what distinguish the powers. The other differences of acts, however diverse they may be among themselves, do not distinguish powers. And therefore, if natural and free are not differences of acts taken according to per se first objects that distinguish powers, they will not on this account entail a distinction of powers.

Now natural and free seem to be differences of mode of acting, just as discursive reasoning and simple intuition are modes of understanding. And just as understanding by discourse and simply are indeed opposed modes of knowing, which do not of themselves, in the first instance, diversify the power but the mode of operating; presuppositively, however, they can be said to diversify the power, insofar as they presuppose diverse powers—one so intellectual that it is not rational, the other so rational that it is also intellectual (for it cannot be rational without intellect, since what is posterior cannot be absolved from participation in what is prior)—so too natural and free of themselves, in the first instance, diversify not the power but the mode of operating; yet they presuppose a diversity between a natural power and a free power—not such that, just as there is given a merely natural power, so there is given a merely free power (for this is impossible, since in what is posterior the ratio of what is prior must be preserved, and the inferior must participate in the superior as something weaker: for it is evident that nature is prior to will); rather there is given a truly free power, which according to its highest part has the character of nature, while according to the rest it is merely free.

XVI. These things having been briefly set forth, the argument of Scotus¹⁴ is denied, namely that neither of these two modes of acting is reducible to the other. For the free is reduced to the natural: the free stands to the natural as many to one, as motion to what is unmoved, as variable to uniform. And therefore it must arise from it and be grounded in it, and be its effect; as is made clear below in qu. LX, art. 2, and LXXXII, art. 1. – And when the opposite is proved, on the ground that it would follow that the free would be imperfect according to its whole genus: taking "imperfect" privatively and properly, the consequence is denied, when we speak of the natural and the free on the side of the producer. If, however, the discussion concerns also that which is produced, I say that free production signifies an imperfection in that which is freely produced in reality: for it signifies that this being has within itself the capacity to be so and otherwise disposed, as was shown in the body of the article. But I said "produced in reality" on account of the free volition by which God wills good to creatures: for this volition itself is not produced in reality, and therefore cannot be or have been so and otherwise disposed in itself; although it could have had a different relation of reason to creatures, on account of the imperfection of its term. – And thus Scotus's foundation collapses from this article, from this proposition: Free production, as distinguished against natural production, signifies an imperfection in that which is produced in reality, and therefore cannot be posited in God ad intra. And this is another defect of his foundation.

Hence, for the first confirmation, it is said that because posterior differences do not vary their prior; and the natural and the free are differences of mode of acting; therefore they do not vary the differences of actions by which the powers are distinguished. I concede, then, that the natural and the free are distinct modes of acting: but not that they are opposed modes distinguishing the powers. Rather, properly speaking, they distinguish modes of being able to act. – And this is what Aristotle intends in the passages cited. For he does not intend to exclude nature from the rational, identically and causally, but formally as such. Just as also the Author in this article distinguished the will against nature: and yet it does not follow, therefore it is another power; but rather, therefore it is another power or another aspect of the same power. – Yet this whole matter could be settled in a single word, by saying that the will is distinguished against nature precisely: and not against a nature intrinsic to the will, which is at once nature and will.

As a further confirmation, it is said that the same power indeed attains the end and refers to the end, but not in the same way. Just as the intellect that grasps first principles and the intellect that grasps conclusions are the same, yet not in the same way. Thus free choice and natural inclination stand in the will as discursive reasoning and natural knowledge stand in the intellect.

XVII. To the other argument, however,¹⁵ a distinction must be made concerning necessity, whether it is taken simply or as immutability. And it must be said that simple necessity—of which we are speaking here, by which the Holy Spirit proceeds necessarily—is repugnant to free act as such, such that its opposite involves a contradiction in itself. But necessity of immutability is firmness, which is compatible with freedom and perfects the free operation.

And by this the answer to the confirmations is clear. For they presuppose that liberty is compossible with the simple necessity of some act, in such a way that—as is clear from Book IX of the Metaphysics, at the place cited in note V ¹⁶—this is false; for liberty must be with respect to some opposition.

XVIII. To the second doubt¹⁷, which is directed against man, it is said that the labor is equivocal. For the Holy Spirit proceeds from the will as principle, and from the will as will, taking the name "will" for the volitive power. – And all the objections conclude to this. For, taking will in this way, it is true that the production of the Holy Spirit is from the will as principle, and as distinct against nature, that is, against the substance of the one willing: but not against nature, that is, against the reason of nature in itself as participated, that is, against the mode of operating of nature. And that the number of the divine processions is taken according to intellect and will. And that the Holy Spirit proceeds by the mode of will: for from the fact that he proceeds through the operation of the volitive power, he has those three conditions in which the mode of will differs from the mode of nature, which see in the Quodlibetal Disputed Questions on the Power of God, q. X, art. 2 ad 11. Yet with all this it remains true that they agree in this single mode, namely naturally, as you have in the text.

But if the name "will" is taken for the reason of the will insofar as it is free, then it is denied that the procession of the Holy Spirit is from the will; and it is said that the Spirit proceeds from the will, not insofar as it is will, but insofar as it is nature, and the like. — Hence here one must take note of how anyone uses words.

XIX. One doubt remains: whether "will" is taken equivocally in the first and second conclusions¹⁸ (which are, however, common to all theologians, and determined in Book I of the Sentences, distinction VI¹⁹). For if it is taken univocally, it follows that the Father, by the will concomitant with the indifferent, wills the generation of the Son: for it is of this that the second conclusion speaks. But if it is taken equivocally, the disputation and the distinction seem rather slight.

To this it is briefly said that what is taken univocally in both places, namely for the volitive power or the act of willing, is taken absolutely and indistinctly. And in the first place it is shown that the act of willing, without regard to its quality, refers to the generation of the Son or the procession of the Holy Spirit as its object; in the second place, however, it is determined that willing, even without regard to its quality, does not have the character of a principle with respect to either, in relation to the notional acts. Yet having the character of a principle with respect to either is signified by the act of proceeding and by the ablative of will, as in, generated by will. And thus there is no equivocation.