Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae

The title is clear from what has been said: for the notional acts are generating, spirating, speaking, etc.

In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question affirmatively: Notional acts are to be attributed to the persons. – And it is proved thus. In the divine persons there is a distinction according to the order of origin: therefore it was necessary to attribute notional acts to the persons. – And the inference is proved: because an order of this kind cannot fittingly be designated except by means of these acts.

II. In response to the second, note that he says two things: namely, that these actions are really the same as the relations; and that they differ from them in reason. And the first is proved: because action, with motion subtracted, is nothing but a relation, etc. But the second: because concerning the divine we understand and speak after the manner of sensible things, etc.

And this is the place they use when saying that the action is subjectively in the patient¹. – But it is easily answered to this, that here we are speaking of action as action is, and not as accident is or substance: and therefore it helps nothing.

The title is to be understood as broadly as it sounds: for it is distinguished in the body. – In the body there is a single two-membered division, with individual conclusions placed alongside the members themselves.

II. Distinction. That something is or comes to be by will occurs in two ways: namely concomitantly, or causally, that is, principiatively. An example of the first is Socrates is a man by his own will; an example of the second is Socrates builds a house by his own will.

First conclusion, according to the first member: The Father begot the Son with will concomitant. – And it is made evident: because even the Father is God with will concomitant; therefore a fortiori, etc.

The second conclusion, according to the second member, is: The Father begot the Son by nature, not by will, as originating principle; but he produced the creature in this latter way. – This conclusion, in all its parts, is first proved by the authority of Hilary; second, by reason; third, against the opposing Arian heresy. – And indeed the authority of Hilary is clear on its face.

The reason is taken from a fourfold difference between nature and will in causing, as follows. Of one thing there is only one natural form by which it is; but of will there is not one form by which it acts, but many, according as there are many understood reasons. Therefore nature is determined to one thing, but will is not. Therefore a natural agent acts in such a way as it itself is, whereas a voluntary agent acts in such a way as it wills and understands, and not in such a way as it itself is. Therefore nature is the principle of those things that cannot be otherwise than they are, whereas will is the principle of those things that can be thus or otherwise. Therefore nature, not will, is the principle of the divine person, whereas will is the principle of the creature. – The first consequence is made clear in the text: because the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent by which it acts. – The last, however: because the divine person, as being of the divine nature, is far removed from being able to be thus or otherwise, since God is of Himself necessary being (esse); but as regards the creature, because it is from nothing. – The remaining points are left as known.

The testimony, however, that is brought forward from the error of Arius is sufficiently clear from the letter itself, together with its refutation, which has been published on the authority of Hilary.

III. Concerning these statements, note that the following are common to the production of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, as is evident from the title, which inquires universally about the notional acts, and from the third argument. The Author, however, expressed in his conclusions the generation of the Son as prior according to understanding, so that by treating the notional acts in act under that name he might make clear how they stand in relation to the will.

IV. On the first conclusion and the distinction¹ together, note that the concomitant will is called the will considered in relation to that thing precisely as to its object, whereas the originating will is called the will considered in relation to that thing as cause or principle to effect. And therefore the concomitant will can be found in two ways: namely, antecedently, as when I desire a future rain; and consequently, as when I take pleasure in a rain that is or was. Whether, however, the first conclusion is verified of the concomitant will both before and after the act of understanding, or not, is not expressed in the text. Scotus, nevertheless, in I, dist. VI², held the affirmative position, which I believe to be in accord with St. Thomas. First, because in the same work above, in question XXXIII, article 3, ad 1, he taught that the absolute attributes common to the whole Trinity are prior to the notional ones. Now it is clear that willing the generation of the Son, just as willing the divine essence, is absolute and common to the whole Trinity; therefore the Father wills the generation of the Son before he generates him. – Second, because the same reasoning seems to apply to the procession of the Holy Spirit, which is admittedly loved, according to the order of reason, before it arises; since the Father, by loving himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and by the same reason the spiration itself, spirates the Holy Spirit. – Nor do the statements in the Questions on the Power of God, question II, article 3³ stand in the way; for there, by the will preceding and the will prior in time, nature, or understanding, he means the will as principle, as is evident to one who considers the passage carefully.

V. Concerning the argument brought forward for the second conclusion⁴, note that three differences there are posited between will and nature in causing, and a fourth in being in essendo. We have, however, numbered them in a different order than they are set down in the text, so that the force of the inference might proceed from what is prior. The difference, then, in being was assumed in the antecedent; the remaining three, however, are set forth successively in the three consequents.

Now the sense of the first difference is that there is a single form for one natural thing in act. And as far as the matter at hand is concerned, it makes no difference whether one natural thing has several subordinate forms, as those hold who maintain a plurality of forms in the same thing, or whether there is only one substantial form. First, because all of them, with respect to the matter at hand, are taken as having the force of one. Second, because each of them is only one: but the will, one and the same, receives many forms as many, that is, not having the force of one, as is clear when it wills things wholly disparate; and none of its forms gives it one act of willing, but opposed ones, since, as is said in Book IX of the Metaphysics⁵, a rational power is a power of opposites. The will therefore differs from nature, because nature is constituted in being by a single form: but the will is constituted in its being, which is willing, by many forms, that is, by the objects willed, both willing many things by many, and willing opposites by one.

The final difference, however, which is considered on the side of the products, must be understood not absolutely, but as they stand under such causes. This can indeed be understood in two ways: namely, simply, and in this way it is false that the effects of nature cannot be otherwise, as is plainly evident; and as they stand under such a cause, and in this way it is true and intended. For a natural effect, once impediments are removed, must be such as its agent is, nor can it or could it be made otherwise by that agent; whereas a voluntary effect can, or could, be done thus or otherwise, precisely because it is voluntary.

VI. Concerning the proof of the first consequence, by which the second and third differences are deduced from the first, from this proposition, the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent by which it acts⁶, a doubt arises. Either that proposition is true concerning assimilation to the form and to the mode of being of that form, or concerning assimilation to the form alone. If to the form alone, then it is cited in vain in the text to prove that a nature is determined to one, and that as the natural agent is, so it acts, from the fact that one natural thing has one form by which the thing is constituted in its natural being, because the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent. – And the consequence is made clear from the difference between the second and the third difference. For the second, namely that a nature is determined to cause one, pertains to assimilation to the form: for if an agent has a single form, and produces a likeness, it must produce a likeness to one form, and consequently one only. The third, however, namely to act such as it is in itself, pertains to assimilation to the form and to its mode of being, as is evident. And this is what is principally intended here: since from this the fourth follows, which is the proximate middle of the conclusion. If, therefore, that proposition does not hold with respect to assimilation to the mode of being, the intended point is not proved. – But if it is said that it is true with respect to assimilation to both, namely the form and the mode, there follows an objection against the other member. For it follows that the effect of the will is assimilated to the form in the mind in its mode of being: which is clearly false, for the house in the mind is without matter.

VII. To this doubt, although they would distinguish between the natural and the voluntary agent with regard to only a few points; yet if we attend to the fact that the text commonly uses this proposition of both the natural and the voluntary, and infers from it that a thing acts as it is, whereas the voluntary acts as it wills, not as it is; one must say otherwise.

I say, therefore, that that proposition is true with respect to its form and the mode per se of that insofar as it is the reason for acting. For every agent, whether natural or voluntary, makes something like itself to the extent it can according to the form and per se conditions or mode thereof. Now the mode per se of a thing is called, and is, that which modifies it within its proper latitude: for the mode per se of teaching is within the latitude of doctrine, and so with the others. Between a natural agent and a voluntary agent, however, there is this difference: that the natural one acts because it is (est), while the voluntary one acts because it wills; hence a natural form is the reason for acting because it is, whereas a voluntary form is the reason for acting because it is willed. And on account of this, the mode per se of a natural form is being thus or so (sic vel sic esse): for being-thus pertains to the latitude of being (essendi). But the mode per se of a voluntary form is willed thus or so, and not being thus or so: for being willed thus pertains to the latitude of what is willed, whereas being thus or so is distinguished against it.

From these, moreover, two things follow. First, that the voluntary form has a twofold mode of being: one, insofar as it is one of the beings in the world, and this is to be immaterially in the mind; and another, insofar as it is a principle of acting, and this is to be willed in this or that way. But a natural form has the same mode of being insofar as it is a being, and insofar as it is a principle of acting. And the reason is what we said: because the latter acts because it is, the former because it is willed; for willing is other than being. – Second, that a natural agent assimilates its effect to itself in form and in the mode of the form, as far as it can, without any distinction: and therefore the son is assimilated to the father even in individual conditions, if the generative power is strong. And from this it also follows that only composite substances can immediately produce material substances, among the Peripatetics. But a voluntary agent assimilates the effect to the form by which it acts, and to its mode insofar as it is a principle of acting: but not to its mode insofar as it is a being.

VIII. And from this the solution to the objections is clear⁷. For it is wrongly subsumed that the mode of being of a voluntary form is the mode of form spoken of in that maxim: for in it there is question of the per se mode of the form inasmuch as it is the ratio of acting. And it is universally true: for a voluntary agent strives, as far as it can, to do what it wills, as, when, where and in the manner it wills, as is evident. – And thus you see how perspicuously the Author drew from that maxim the third difference, namely that the natural agent acts as it itself is, whereas the voluntary agent acts as it wills, not as it is. Mark this well, and apply it when necessary.

IX. Concerning these differences⁸ another doubt arises, on the side of the will: namely, whether they are verified of it as productive ad extra only, or also as productive ad intra. For if ad extra only, this labor is vain, where the question concerns productions ad intra. – But if also ad intra, it follows that nothing will be produced by the will within, except in reflected act. And the consequence holds, because, from what has been said above⁹, everything voluntarily produced is produced as willed: for nothing is willed in the will except reflexively, etc.

To this it is briefly said that something's being willed in the will occurs in two ways. In one way, as a certain thing: and thus it is willed reflexively. In another way, as a tending toward the beloved object: and thus it is willed directly by the same act of willing by which it is willed. – It can also be distinguished in another way, into the willed as the reason for willing, and the willed as the object willed. – And according to both distinctions, what is said here about the will is preserved, within and without. For it is produced within, because it is willed in an actual direct act either as the reason for willing or as a tending toward something else. And this suffices: for thus the very act of willing is voluntary, and love itself free.

X. In response to the third, note the distinction and the reply. The distinction concerns the will in general, which can be considered in two ways: namely, as a certain nature, and as it stands with respect to either of two things; and that which the will wills in the first way, it wills naturally, while in the second way, freely. The first mode is declared in God's will with respect to Himself, and in ours with respect to beatitude; the second, however, in God's will with respect to things other than Himself. – The reply consists in applying the first member, namely, that the Holy Spirit proceeds naturally, though in the manner of a will.

XI. Concerning the distinction of the will a doubt arises. For Scotus, in Book I, distinction II, in the question on the Number of the divine Productions, and in distinction X of the same, and in the Quodlibets, question XVI, holding that the Holy Spirit proceeds freely, tries to overthrow this distinction, and to show that the will has no act merely naturally.

He argues, therefore, first as follows. Will and nature have opposite modes of originating action, such that neither are both reduced to a third, nor is one to the other; and neither implies imperfection: therefore will cannot act naturally, nor nature freely. — The antecedent, as to its first part, is made evident: because nature is of itself determined to acting; but will is not inclined by itself naturally, rather it determines itself to the exercise of the act. — As to that part, however, that one is not reduced to the other, it is proved: because then the other would be imperfect according to its whole genus. — As to the rest, for the sake of brevity I pass over them.

And it is confirmed. Because the opposite modes of acting, which are the first distinguishing features of active power, do not belong to one and the same active power: but to act freely and to act naturally are of this kind: therefore. – The minor is proved from Aristotle, who in Physics and in Metaphysics posits the first differences of the natural active principle and the free one: though under different names, for in Book II of the Physics¹⁰ it is called by our author, and in Book IX of the Metaphysics¹¹ it is called rational power, etc.

And it is confirmed. Because the will tends toward those things that are ordered to the end, as a free power: therefore, under the aspect also of a free power, it wills the end itself. – And the inference holds: because it is one and the same power with respect to both.

XII. Furthermore, the intrinsic condition of an absolute power, or in relation to perfect act, is not repugnant to perfection in operating: but freedom is of this kind: therefore it can stand together with a condition perfect and possible in operating. Such a condition is necessity: therefore freedom stands together with necessity.

And it is confirmed. The firmness of an act perfects it; but necessity implies firmness; therefore it perfects a free act. – And it is confirmed lastly. For the division into necessary and contingent active principle is not the same as the division into natural and free: just as, then, some natural principle can act contingently, because it can be impeded, so some free principle can act necessarily. – He also brings forward in support of this the authority of Augustine¹²: Either there is no will, or the will must be called free by which we wish to be blessed in such a way that not only do we not wish to be miserable, but we cannot even wish it at all.

From all of which he intends two things: namely, that every act of the will is free; and that with freedom there stands, in the same act, necessity simply speaking. And he says that the Spirit proceeds freely and necessarily.

XIII. Concerning the same distinction as applied to the Holy Spirit¹³, a doubt arises for man. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the will as from a principle: therefore the Holy Spirit can be disposed in one way and in another. – The antecedent is proved: because the paternal will is the principle of the Holy Spirit, just as the paternal intellect is the principle of the Word. – The consequence, however, holds from what was said in the body of this article, where it was said: That which is from the will as from a principle can be disposed otherwise.

And if it is said that being from the will as a principle distinct against nature gives itself thus and otherwise; but being from the will as nature does not — on the contrary, the Holy Spirit is from the will, as the will is distinct against nature; therefore. – The antecedent is proved in three ways. Because otherwise the number of the divine processions would have been badly proved above in qu. XXVII, art. 5, from this: that in intellectual nature there is only understanding and willing. Second, because the will concurs in the production of the Holy Spirit as a power distinct, according to reason, from the essence or nature, and from the intellect. Third, because, as is said in this response, the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will.

XIV. To make evident this difficulty, distinction, and proper manner of speaking, note first that, just as the intellect is considered in three ways: first, absolutely, as it is the intellective power, and thus it is called intellect; second, as it knows without discourse, and thus it too is called intellect; third, as it is discursive, and thus it is called reason: so, proportionally, though not in the same order, the will can be taken in three ways; first, for the volitional power, and thus it is called will; second, for that same power insofar as it is naturally determined to some object or work, and thus it is called will as nature; third, for that same power as it is undetermined with respect to either of two alternatives, and thus it is sometimes called free choice, sometimes will.

And because the will can be determined of itself in two ways: in one way, with respect to the specification of the act, that is, such that if it operates concerning a certain object, it must go forth into such an act, and not its opposite, as our will is determined to beatitude; in another way, with respect to both the specification and the exercise of the act, as the will of one seeing God is determined to loving Him, such that it cannot only not have an act of hatred toward Him, but also cannot suspend the act of loving Him: so too, in two ways, does the will have the character of nature. First, as it is determined of itself, with respect to some object, to willing, such that it cannot nill that object; or conversely, to nillying something, such that it cannot will it. And thus, in agreement, we say that the will has the character of nature with respect to beatitude and misery. But along with this natural character there stands freedom with respect to the exercise of the act, that is, to will or not to will; and likewise, to nill or not to nill. – Second, as it is determined by its own nature, with respect to some object, to willing, not only as distinguished from nillying, but also as distinguished from not willing; namely, that when such an object is presented, it must will it of itself, without the freedom of suspending the act. And in this Scotus intends to dissent: so that the character of nature in the will with respect to the exercise of the act is the point on which we disagree, and which is being attacked.

XV. Note secondly that, because the powers are distinguished by their acts, and the acts by their objects, it follows that if several acts have distinctions and differences, one must consider, in distinguishing them, that those differences of acts which are attended to in virtue of the per se first differences of formal objects are what distinguish the powers. The other differences of acts, however diverse they may be among themselves, do not distinguish powers. And therefore, if natural and free are not differences of acts taken according to per se first objects that distinguish powers, they will not on this account entail a distinction of powers.

Now natural and free seem to be differences of mode of acting, just as discursive reasoning and simple intuition are modes of understanding. And just as understanding by discourse and simply are indeed opposed modes of knowing, which do not of themselves, in the first instance, diversify the power but the mode of operating; presuppositively, however, they can be said to diversify the power, insofar as they presuppose diverse powers—one so intellectual that it is not rational, the other so rational that it is also intellectual (for it cannot be rational without intellect, since what is posterior cannot be absolved from participation in what is prior)—so too natural and free of themselves, in the first instance, diversify not the power but the mode of operating; yet they presuppose a diversity between a natural power and a free power—not such that, just as there is given a merely natural power, so there is given a merely free power (for this is impossible, since in what is posterior the ratio of what is prior must be preserved, and the inferior must participate in the superior as something weaker: for it is evident that nature is prior to will); rather there is given a truly free power, which according to its highest part has the character of nature, while according to the rest it is merely free.

XVI. These things having been briefly set forth, the argument of Scotus¹⁴ is denied, namely that neither of these two modes of acting is reducible to the other. For the free is reduced to the natural: the free stands to the natural as many to one, as motion to what is unmoved, as variable to uniform. And therefore it must arise from it and be grounded in it, and be its effect; as is made clear below in qu. LX, art. 2, and LXXXII, art. 1. – And when the opposite is proved, on the ground that it would follow that the free would be imperfect according to its whole genus: taking "imperfect" privatively and properly, the consequence is denied, when we speak of the natural and the free on the side of the producer. If, however, the discussion concerns also that which is produced, I say that free production signifies an imperfection in that which is freely produced in reality: for it signifies that this being has within itself the capacity to be so and otherwise disposed, as was shown in the body of the article. But I said "produced in reality" on account of the free volition by which God wills good to creatures: for this volition itself is not produced in reality, and therefore cannot be or have been so and otherwise disposed in itself; although it could have had a different relation of reason to creatures, on account of the imperfection of its term. – And thus Scotus's foundation collapses from this article, from this proposition: Free production, as distinguished against natural production, signifies an imperfection in that which is produced in reality, and therefore cannot be posited in God ad intra. And this is another defect of his foundation.

Hence, for the first confirmation, it is said that because posterior differences do not vary their prior; and the natural and the free are differences of mode of acting; therefore they do not vary the differences of actions by which the powers are distinguished. I concede, then, that the natural and the free are distinct modes of acting: but not that they are opposed modes distinguishing the powers. Rather, properly speaking, they distinguish modes of being able to act. – And this is what Aristotle intends in the passages cited. For he does not intend to exclude nature from the rational, identically and causally, but formally as such. Just as also the Author in this article distinguished the will against nature: and yet it does not follow, therefore it is another power; but rather, therefore it is another power or another aspect of the same power. – Yet this whole matter could be settled in a single word, by saying that the will is distinguished against nature precisely: and not against a nature intrinsic to the will, which is at once nature and will.

As a further confirmation, it is said that the same power indeed attains the end and refers to the end, but not in the same way. Just as the intellect that grasps first principles and the intellect that grasps conclusions are the same, yet not in the same way. Thus free choice and natural inclination stand in the will as discursive reasoning and natural knowledge stand in the intellect.

XVII. To the other argument, however,¹⁵ a distinction must be made concerning necessity, whether it is taken simply or as immutability. And it must be said that simple necessity—of which we are speaking here, by which the Holy Spirit proceeds necessarily—is repugnant to free act as such, such that its opposite involves a contradiction in itself. But necessity of immutability is firmness, which is compatible with freedom and perfects the free operation.

And by this the answer to the confirmations is clear. For they presuppose that liberty is compossible with the simple necessity of some act, in such a way that—as is clear from Book IX of the Metaphysics, at the place cited in note V ¹⁶—this is false; for liberty must be with respect to some opposition.

XVIII. To the second doubt¹⁷, which is directed against man, it is said that the labor is equivocal. For the Holy Spirit proceeds from the will as principle, and from the will as will, taking the name "will" for the volitive power. – And all the objections conclude to this. For, taking will in this way, it is true that the production of the Holy Spirit is from the will as principle, and as distinct against nature, that is, against the substance of the one willing: but not against nature, that is, against the reason of nature in itself as participated, that is, against the mode of operating of nature. And that the number of the divine processions is taken according to intellect and will. And that the Holy Spirit proceeds by the mode of will: for from the fact that he proceeds through the operation of the volitive power, he has those three conditions in which the mode of will differs from the mode of nature, which see in the Quodlibetal Disputed Questions on the Power of God, q. X, art. 2 ad 11. Yet with all this it remains true that they agree in this single mode, namely naturally, as you have in the text.

But if the name "will" is taken for the reason of the will insofar as it is free, then it is denied that the procession of the Holy Spirit is from the will; and it is said that the Spirit proceeds from the will, not insofar as it is will, but insofar as it is nature, and the like. — Hence here one must take note of how anyone uses words.

XIX. One doubt remains: whether "will" is taken equivocally in the first and second conclusions¹⁸ (which are, however, common to all theologians, and determined in Book I of the Sentences, distinction VI¹⁹). For if it is taken univocally, it follows that the Father, by the will concomitant with the indifferent, wills the generation of the Son: for it is of this that the second conclusion speaks. But if it is taken equivocally, the disputation and the distinction seem rather slight.

To this it is briefly said that what is taken univocally in both places, namely for the volitive power or the act of willing, is taken absolutely and indistinctly. And in the first place it is shown that the act of willing, without regard to its quality, refers to the generation of the Son or the procession of the Holy Spirit as its object; in the second place, however, it is determined that willing, even without regard to its quality, does not have the character of a principle with respect to either, in relation to the notional acts. Yet having the character of a principle with respect to either is signified by the act of proceeding and by the ablative of will, as in, generated by will. And thus there is no equivocation.

The title inquires about the notional acts, etc., exercised in act: namely, whether the Father generates the Son from his substance, or from nothing.

II. In the body there is a single responsive conclusion to the question: The Son is begotten, not from nothing, but from the substance of the Father. – It is proved first as regards the negative part, by leading to an impossibility. If the Son were produced from nothing, then he would be made: therefore he would not be truly and properly a Son. – The first consequence is proved from the proportion of matter to the craftsman, and of nothing to God. The second, however, from the difference between being made and being born. But the destruction of the consequent is shown by the authority of John the Apostle.

Then he responds to the tacit objection, namely that in Scripture son of God is predicated truly of someone who is from nothing: saying that this is not verified of the true Son, but of a son by assimilation, authorities being brought forward for these points.

There is then inferred the second part of the conclusion by way of division. And it is added how differently this second part is understood concerning the substance of a human father, and concerning the substance of the divine Father: for there it concerns a part, here the whole.

III. In response to the first, in which it is denied that the divine essence has the character of matter; and to the second, in which it is said that it has the character of a subsistent form; the arguments of Henry and Durandus occur in Capreolus, on distinction V of Book I¹, for proving that the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father as from matter, with respect to those conditions of matter that do not import imperfection.

There are brought forward, however, four conditions, as follows. That the being of what is begotten is intrinsic, not receiving its esse from another; that it pre-exists and inexists; that it remains the same throughout the whole generation; and that it is that from which the begotten is begotten—so that the term from which is distinguished against from nothing—these belong to the divine essence with respect to the generation of the Son: and they are properly the conditions of matter; therefore the Son is generated from the essence as matter, or as it were matter. – The assumption, in all respects, is made manifest inductively. And as to the last point, it is proved from the difference between creation and generation, namely that the former is from no subject, while the latter is from a pre-existing subject.

The confirmations are adduced. If the Father were to beget the Son from a part or from an alien substance, that substance would without doubt have the character of matter; therefore, if He begets from the whole and proper substance, it has the same character. For whole and part, proper and alien, do not vary the argument.

And this is confirmed once more. Because the essence receives the constitutive property of the begotten, and is as it were a passive potency in generation: otherwise not every natural active potency would have a corresponding passive one. Therefore it has the character of matter.

IV. To these things it is briefly answered that, although it can be tolerated in a qualified sense to attribute to the divine essence some condition of matter in generation, as the Author maintained in dist. V of the First Part, question II, article 1; yet absolutely speaking, together with the letter of this article, it must be denied that the Son is begotten from the substance of the Father as from matter, and affirmed that He is begotten as form. – Nor is any proper condition of matter preserved in the divine essence. For being made from something, as distinguished against being made from nothing, is not proper to matter, but to a preexisting intrinsic principle, which is common to form and matter; as is clear if we suppose Socrates to be made by God from the preexisting soul of Socrates and matter now newly created; for then he would not be created, because he would be made from something preexisting, and yet he would not be made from any subject. But error occurs in this and in other conditions because, for the most part, we are accustomed to explain these through a subject, or matter; as also happens in this very article, where from nothing is explained by proportion to from a subject in the case of artificial things; whereas it is opposed to being made from something, whether as subject or as form preexisting. – And similarly the remaining three conditions are common to a preexisting intrinsic principle.

For the confirmation, however, from the part and from the alien, the assumption must be denied. And as to the alien indeed, this is clear in the angelic nature; as to the part truly, in the fiction of the proposed example concerning Socrates.

To the things brought forward in the final confirmation, it must be denied that the essence receives the property: for they are compared as the same, not as receiver and received. – Nor is passive potency far removed from the production of wholly simple things, among whose number it is established that a divine person is. Nor is there any incongruity in active potencies of this kind having no passive potencies corresponding to them: for it suffices that terms correspond, as the creative potency, which is nevertheless inferior, testifies.

In the title: potentia, as is clear from V¹ and IX² Metaphys., is taken in two ways. First, for logical potency, which consists in the non-repugnance of terms: and of this there is no question here. Second, for the principle of operation: and it is so taken here. Hence, in the divine, to be potency signifies to be the formal reason of potency with respect to the notionals; just as also, when it is asked whether in God there is knowledge, nothing else is asked except whether knowledge is predicated of God formally.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, answering the question in the affirmative: It is necessary to posit in God a potency with respect to the notional acts. – This conclusion is first proved in the text as follows. Notional acts are posited in God: therefore it is necessary to posit there a potency of these acts. And the inference is proved: because potency signifies nothing other than a principle of act.

Second, the force of this argument is explained in particular, as follows. Every generator generates by something; therefore in every generator there must be posited a power of generating; therefore it is necessary to attribute to the Father a power of generating. – The first inference is proved: because the power of generating signifies that by which the generator generates. The second, however, is proved: because the Father is the principle of generation. – And in like manner you can form the argument concerning the spirator and the spirative power: for the judgment is the same.

III. Concerning these matters, note that although Aureol, as reported by Capreolus, in the seventh distinction of the First Book³, argues against both the argument and the conclusion, I have nevertheless judged that two objections should be brought forward: one against the argument and the conclusion together; the other against the conclusion alone.

It is argued, therefore, first as follows. Either potency is posited in God with respect to the notional acts according to the thing itself: and this is not so, because it is not a principle eliciting the notional act according to the thing itself, as is evident, since the act is identical with the potency itself. Or only according to reason: and this is not so either, because then even intellect would have the character of a potency, since it is a principle of understanding according to reason. Therefore in no way does the argument of the text hold, founded on this, that potency is a principle of act.

It is argued secondly, from the opposite side. The negation of the power of generating is not a negation of power: therefore the affirmation of the power of generating is not an affirmation of power. – The antecedent is from Augustine⁴. The consequence is clear from I Peri Hermen.⁵: affirmation and negation are about the same thing.

IV. To the first of these it is said that power is posited in the divine persons with respect to the notional acts, in reality (secundum rem). But it must be noted that an act can imply as its principle a power on account of two conditions: the first is that the act be elicited; the second is that its term be really produced by it. So that each of these, by itself and separately, implies a power secundum rem. Indeed, when an act is elicited, it implies the power that is its principle with respect to itself; but when an act is not elicited, but is only an effect or term really produced, it implies the power that is its principle, not with respect to itself, but with respect to its effect or term. And since generation is not an act elicited by the Father, but is the Father himself; yet it has, as it were, the Son as its effect, really distinct: therefore in the Father there is a power of generating, which is the principle of the generation secundum rem, not with respect to itself, but with respect to the fact that it posits the begotten. Hence the argument of the text, taken from the act, is valid, provided it be understood with the aforesaid distinction: namely, concerning the act either with respect to itself, or with respect to its term really emanating. And to intimate this, the text expressly says that, just as acts are posited there, so are powers; signifying by ly "just as" and ly "so," that according to the mode of the act is the mode of the power. And this because in many ways an act can claim a power for itself; as we have said, and as is expressed in the text, in reply to the third objection.

To the second, the whole is conceded: since the power of generating does not affirm power, but power thus; that is, power with respect to such an act, namely a notional one; for nothing else is concluded in this article. Hence Augustine said excellently that the Son did not beget, not because he could not: for this would be a negation of absolute power, which is acknowledged to be common to the whole Trinity. With which it is nonetheless consistent that the power of generating is in the Father alone, as will be said below⁶.

The title is clear from what precedes. Let the novice only note this: that power is taken here not for the respect of a principle, but for the thing to which that respect belongs. For both are contained in the notion of power; but it is this thing that is in question here—whether it be essence or paternity, etc.

II. In the body he does four things: first, he reports a certain opinion; second, he refutes it; third, he refutes another opinion, at: Nor even essence, etc.¹; fourth, he answers the question².

III. As to the first point, the opinion just recited holds that the power of generating signifies relation only.

With respect to the second point, this opinion is criticized by showing that it signifies the divine essence principally, thus: The power in any agent whatsoever is that by which the agent acts; therefore it is a form to which assimilation is made; therefore generative power is that in which what is generated is assimilated to its generator; therefore the divine nature in the Father is the power of generating; therefore the power of generating signifies the divine essence principally, and not relation only. – The first consequence is proved: because everything producing produces something like itself with respect to the form by which it acts, which is made manifest in human generation. The third is proved: because the Son of God is assimilated to the Father in the divine nature. And it is confirmed by the authority of Hilary. The fourth consequence, as regards its first part, is confirmed by the authority of the Master, in the seventh distinction of Book I.

IV. As to the third point, the opinion must be rejected that the power of generating signifies the essence insofar as it is identical with the relation, in such a way that it signifies both equally. – It is rejected, however, as follows. In created things, the individual form constitutes the generating person, and is not that by which the generator generates; therefore, in the divine, paternity is what constitutes the person of the generating Father, and is not that by which the Father generates.

The antecedent is proved, as to its second part: because otherwise Socrates would generate Socrates. – The consequence, however, is proved: because paternity, although it is a form, is nevertheless an individual form. And the proof of the second part of the antecedent is applied to the second part of the consequent, leading to the impossible: namely, that the Father would generate the Father, just as there Socrates would beget Socrates.

V. As to the fourth point, the responsive conclusion to the question is: The power of generating signifies the divine nature in the direct case, and paternity in the oblique. And it is inferred from what was said above, ³ as follows. That by which the Father generates is the divine nature, because in it the Son is made like to Him; and generation, according to Damascene, is the work of nature, not as that which, but as that by which. Therefore.

And note that, as a rule, the Author assumes along with the other theologians that the power of generating includes within itself the relation: and therefore he was not concerned to prove that it is included in it; but it sufficed to prove that it is not included alone, and that it is not included in this way, namely on an equal footing. – And know that the second opinion censured in the text is the one which the Author had followed in distinction 7 of the First Book, question 1, article 2. And accordingly, it is here retracted.

VI. Concerning the first assumption, namely, the power in each agent is that by which the agent acts⁴, a doubt arises: whether this is true of everything by which an agent acts, or only of that by which it acts first, or only of that by which it acts proximately. It cannot be said that everything by which an agent acts is a power. For it would then follow that in Socrates there are several generative powers: since he generates by humanity, and he generates by the generative power, which is the faculty of the vegetative part. – Nor can it be said that it is verified only of that by which the agent acts first. For it would follow that heat in fire is not a heating power, but its substance, which is the first principle of heating. – Nor can it be said that it is verified only of that by which the agent acts proximately. For in that case what is said in the text would be false, namely, that human nature is the generative power of man. And likewise the principal conclusion would be badly inferred: since the divine nature is the principle of generation and spiration only through the mediation of intellect and will, as is evident from what was said above⁵.

VII. To this it is said that what has been assumed is true of everything by which an agent acts, provided two conditions are observed: namely, that it be some form of the agent (and this to distinguish it from instruments); and that it be the per se principle of that action, whether eliciting or principal (and this to distinguish it from concomitants). – Nor does it follow from this that there are several powers of the same kind in the same subject. For considered in themselves, powers in the same subject are of different orders, one being first and the other proximate, as is clear in the case of human nature and the generative power; but in relation to the act, they possess unity. For they are the principle of one and the same generation: and therefore, as such, they are reckoned as it were one principle and one power, consisting of the proximate and the first concurring together.

VIII. Concerning the position, insofar as it affirms the generative power to be the divine nature⁶, a doubt arises from a twofold source. First, from the divine nature as distinguished against the attributive perfections, namely intellect and will: and against this are brought the arguments of Scotus⁷. – Second, from the same as distinguished against relation: and against this are brought the arguments of Bonaventure, Garron, Henry, and Durandus⁸.

True, because the Author does not here take the divine nature as distinguished against intellect and will, except perhaps in a certain respect: — since in Him, although the divine nature is the first principle by which of generation, it is not however the only one; but the divine nature itself is as the first by which, while the intellect is as the proximate by which, as is manifestly clear from what has been treated concerning the procession of the Son and of the Holy Spirit⁹: whence the divine nature is taken here not only as itself, but as comprehending whatever absolute thing serves as a principle by which concurring to such notional acts: and therefore, with regard to the matter at hand, it makes no difference whether one speaks of the divine nature or of any other essential absolute: — for which reason, Scotist arguments are to be set aside.

IX. Others, however, who attack the essence as distinguished against the relations, draw their arguments from the intelligibility of the essence, from the personal property, from the notional act, and from authority.

By way of essence, first, thus. The action which has a form as its formal account is owed to that form, even if it be separate from its subject, as is clear in the case of whiteness considered separately with respect to dispersion: but to the deity, understood as separate from the Father, that action is not owed, namely to generate: therefore it itself is not the account of generating. – Further, the deity is of one most simple account: therefore it is not the account of only two actions, namely generation and spiration, but either of one or of infinitely many. – Further, the deity is common to the three persons: therefore it is not the proper account of an act proper to one person.

But from the constitutive form of the Father, namely paternity: because the principle of being and the principle of operating are the same; for it belongs to imperfection that the form should give the first act and not the second.

But from the act: because just as the essential act is from the essential form, so the personal act is from the personal one.

But the authority is Augustine's, V de Trin., chapter V: the Father is such as the Son is to him. Therefore the Son is his not by divinity, but by paternity. And the inference holds: because the Father is Father by paternity.

X. To make these things evident, know that the objectors seem to be deceived in this, because they do not discern how great a difference there is between the divine nature and the divine nature in this, namely, the Father. The Author does not intend that the divine nature is generative power; but that the divine nature in the principle is not generative power from the principle. And to intimate this, in the text, immediately before the authority of Hilary, it is said: Hence the divine nature in the Father is generative power in him: where he twice named the person, once on the side of the nature, and once on the side of the power of generating, so as to show that neither is taken purely absolutely. For the divine nature is common to the three, with all its properties: but the divine nature, not only as Father, but as in the Father, belongs to the Father alone: for it as such, that is, as in the Father, or as of the Father, is the power of generating. And therefore in the text it is said that the power of generating includes paternity not directly, but obliquely: for the Godhead, not as paternity, but as of the Father, is the power of generating, and proper to the Father. – And by this the objections are easily answered.

XI. Whence the first argument¹⁰, although the major could be denied, since whiteness separated from quantity would not disperse; nevertheless let a distinction be made, that an act is attributed to some form in two ways. In one way, absolutely and per se positively. And thus, even if the major were true, the minor is false: for generation is not attributed to the divine nature absolutely nor per se positively, since it would belong to it in whatever it is found; but quasi-permissively, in the way in which particulars belong to universals; for thus are the persons compared to the essence, as was said in q. XL¹¹. In another way, the act of the form is attributed as in this. And thus the major is false, and the minor true. – And by this the response to the third is clear. For the common as common is not the proper account of the proper; but the common as of the proper, that is, of the person, is well the proper account of the act proper to the person itself. – To the second, however, one may reply by the same, that although the deity, considered in itself, would no more regard two than a thousand; nevertheless as in this, that is, as in a principle not of a principle, and as in that which is and a principle of a principle at once, the act begins only two. — Yet this argument can be resolved in several other ways. Namely, because the deity together with the intellect of one, and with the will of the other, is the principle. And not of more: because beyond the act of intellect and will, there is no third in intellectual nature. On the side, too, of a certain order of the productions themselves among themselves, it can be said that it is not unfitting that they arise in an ordered way from one.

As for the argument from the side of the form, the assumption is false, according to the common way of the philosophers, which holds that not every form is active, and especially relation. — Yet it could be said that in a certain way paternity, by constituting the Father, gives him the power to generate; insofar as it gives him to concur actively in generation as that from which. Nor is anything more owed to it on that account.

But to that argument from act, proportional similarity must be denied. For the essential act, within the latitude of purely essential things, is found both as that which and as that by which; but the personal act, within the latitude of purely personal things, cannot be found as that by which; for personality cannot be the reason of making something like itself, unless it could generate itself, which is unintelligible.

Finally, as to the authority of Augustine, it must be said that "labor" is used equivocally. For he speaks of that by which formally: but the deity of the Father is that by which the Father generates causally, and by which the Son is his.

XII. In response to the first, note that between generator and generated two things are found, namely agreement and distinction. And indeed distinction is the condition, while assimilation is the reason: for the generator does not generate in order to distinguish, but in order to assimilate what is distinct. And therefore, the greater the agreement, the more perfect is the generation, while the hypostatic distinction remains intact. And the lesser this supposital distinction is, the more perfect is the generation. Hence in the divine the distinction is minimal, because it is relative: and the agreement is maximal, because they are the same thing in number, most simple and wholly undivided, etc.

In the title, note that the question here is not whether there could be more than three divine persons: for this was discussed in qu. XXX¹ Rather, the only question here is whether the formal principle of some person can be multiplied, so that, namely, there would not be only one Son or one Holy Spirit; and thus this question differs from that one in that there the question concerns the plurality of persons simply, whereas here it concerns the plurality of persons of the same formal principle.

Now we can imagine such a plurality in two ways. First, that there be several Sons, none of whom is the Father or the Spirit. Second, that there be several Sons, such that the Holy Spirit too would be a Son by another filiation. And similarly a distinction can be made concerning two Holy Spirits: namely, either that neither be the Son, or that the Son too would be the Holy Spirit by a passive spiration other in number. For in both ways there would be several Sons and several Holy Spirits. And in one way, there would be more persons than three; in the other way, however, not. Wherefore, if this question is considered carefully, it stands together with the Trinity of persons; and therefore it was placed after the determination of the number of persons. Nor does it pertain to it to examine anything except a plurality purely numerical, or individual.

II. In the body there is a single conclusion, from the Creed of Athanasius: In the divine there is only one Father, one Son, and one Holy Spirit. - And it is proved in four ways. And although the arguments in the text are sufficiently well formed, since they are nevertheless attacked, they will be examined one by one.

III. The first argument, therefore, founded on the principle that the form of one species is not multiplied except according to matter, has many opponents, namely Scotus, Aureolus, Adam, etc.² Their objections consist in this: that a multiplication of accidental forms is found in the same matter. And they bring forward light, the species in the medium or in the eye, and relation. For in one and the same part of the diaphanous we see many lights, according to the multitude of illuminating bodies, as the opposing multitude of shadows and illuminations testifies. – In the same medium there is also the species of both walls of the same quantity, color, figure, etc., so that there is no ground of specific diversity. – Every white thing has many likenesses to the other white things; and likewise one father is referred by several paternities to several sons; otherwise the relation would remain after the corruption of its term.

They also bring forward other arguments against this reasoning, which you may see, if you wish, in Capreolus, on the seventh distinction of the First Book³: every ambiguity will indeed be resolved from what is to be said.

IV. Scotus also argues, in the Quodlibet, question II⁴, directly and in several ways that the immateriality of a form is not the reason why it is of itself this, or unmultipliable in number. First thus: By that which something is first in act outside cause and intellect, by that is it first this: but every absolute entity is first of itself outside cause and intellect: therefore. – The major is proved: because being outside cause and intellect does not belong except to this.

And it is confirmed. A thing is not this by that which is not of itself the cause of it: but matter is not the cause of form, according to Avicenna⁵: therefore form is not this by matter.

Furthermore, it would follow that Gabriel would be a being from himself here: and consequently, without contradiction, there could not be posited a universal, predicable of many things, etc.

Furthermore, against this proposition there are the articles condemned at Paris: If forms admit of division only according to matter. Error, etc.⁶

And finally he infers that it is not, according to⁷ sound doctrine, to hold so certain and necessary a conclusion by way of propositions that are too general, and with so many instances.

V. To make this evident, note first that by the name matter is understood in this passage every receptive principle. For it is clear that charity is a form of one species multiplied among the multitude of blessed angels and men: and yet there is no matter, which is a part of the composite, in the will, but only a receptive power. Hence the sense of the proposition is that a specific form is not multiplied except according to what is receptive. And he means that if a form is receptive of being received, it is multiplied according to the multiplication of its receivers actually or potentially (which I say on account of intellectual souls); but if it is unreceptive, it is thereby incapable of multiplication.

Note secondly that, as is clear from Book V of the Metaphysics⁸ (where the foundations of every science are set forth, since we possess the seminal principles of all things), things are one in number when their matter is one. Numerical identity, therefore, is grounded in the unity of matter: nor can numerical plurality of forms of the same species stand together with the unity of matter.

VI. And therefore, following Aristotle, we deny all that was assumed in the instances⁹. For it stands that the form is one in its being (esse), and multiple in depending, or representing, or regarding, or other things of this kind. And thus the likeness of white to all white things is one relation in being (esse), and multiple in regarding. But concerning the defect with respect to the defect of the term, distinguish: what is lacking is the defect of the term adequate to it, not however of the inadequate, such as are the singular respects had from one thing. For the singular falls short extensively: and therefore, when one remains, it does not suffice for the relation which was to it to be absent; but only for it to cease regarding it. – Likewise the species in the medium, even with respect to objects more and less intense, is unique according to its being (esse): but multiple in representing and depending. And therefore, as the intention is of this object, it leads to this; and as of that, to that. – And the same holds for light: for there is one light according to its being (esse), and multiple in its dependencies. And therefore many illuminations are granted: and it is granted that it is multiple according to its ways or tendencies, and obstacles. And therefore many shadows appear.

The proposition, therefore, stands firm in its strength, as established in the treatise on the Angels¹⁰

VII. To Scotus's first argument, however,¹¹ it is said first that he did not understand the proposition he attacked with such zeal. For it is not immateriality, that is, the absence of matter which is one part of the composite; but immateriality, that is, the absence of matter, that is, of receptive potency, of which the Author speaks, as we have shown¹², and as even the text itself suggests here in the example of whiteness if it subsisted. – And therefore he vainly adduces the Parisian articles, which speak of matter as matter: since, according to the truth of the matter, matter as receptive potency is what is meant, formally speaking, in this proposition. Yet, lest the same arguments be brought against irreceptibility, a reply is made to each one.

To the first: the major premise is false. For each thing is first outside cause and intellect by the esse signified by the second adjunct, and yet it is not this. – The proof, moreover, is worthless, even on the face of it, from the fact that only in a singular do two things coincide, namely esse outside intellect and cause and esse this, inferring the formal identity of each whereby.

To the second objection, that we never even dreamed that a form existing in matter is this through matter intrinsically or formally, but rather causally. – And although matter, according to Avicenna, is not the material cause of the form, but of the composite, because "material cause" names an intrinsic cause; nevertheless matter is the cause of the form in the genus of material cause, for it is educed from it as from matter; and this suffices.

As for what is touched upon concerning the angels, this will be treated in its proper place; and it was said in the Commentaries on Being and Essence De Ente et Essentia¹³, where we also glossed the Parisian articles.

And note that this doctrine, as it has been handed down, is not new, but perhaps ascends to the depth of the intention of St. Thomas. He called irreceptibility immateriality, partly because in the separate substances irreceptibility signifies nothing other than immateriality subsisting in species, and partly because receptive potency is grounded on the side of matter, and it was therefore easy to understand the latter from the former. – And thus is clear the first reason, taken from what is common to all subsisting forms whatsoever that are immaterial.

Nor is it unfitting that she has been led to the personal properties. Indeed it was necessary: since these themselves are of the number of such things, and we do not know them in themselves, but from creatures, as far as we are able, we ascend to them; so that we may hold a conclusion certain and necessary, from a most certain proposition common to all philosophers—indeed common to the conception of the wise.

VIII. The second argument¹⁴ is drawn from the mode that specifies the processions, namely, by way of word and love. And it rests upon the unity of the act of understanding, and the unity of the act of loving, in the divine.

Against this argument some object as follows. If the unity of the act of understanding entails the unity of the Son, you are speaking either of real unity or of unity according to reason. If of real unity, then the real unity of the act of intellect and will in God would entail the unity of the person produced. If of unity according to reason, then a distinction according to reason would entail a distinction of persons: for as unity is related to unity, so distinction is related to distinction.

IX. Scotus, however, in the Quodlibet cited above¹⁵, says against this argument that it is not valid, because it rests upon this proposition: Where there can be only a single act of understanding, there cannot be more than one act of speaking and one Word. This proposition is indeed true in us, on account of matter, because in us every act of understanding is expressed through an act of speaking; but it is not so in God, etc. — And briefly, he says, from the unity of the absolute form of the same nature one cannot infer universally, and in every case, a unity of production and of term: therefore, from the unity of intellection there does not follow, on account of form, a unity of speaking and of Word.

X. To this it is briefly answered that the discussion here concerns numerical unity, which presupposes formal unity, as is clear from Book V of the Metaphysics, chapter on the One¹⁶: for the question is only about the numerical multiplication of persons. Thus the argument stands thus: God's intellection is one in number, therefore the Word is one in number. And if there were several of God's intellections according to number, there would be several words according to number.

To the argument, therefore, it is said¹⁷ that he is concerned with formal numerical unity, that is, the unity which entails formal unity; but not with identical numerical unity, such as exists between the act of the divine intellect and of the divine will. And for this reason the inference is denied. – How, however, from the formal distinction according to reason between intellect and will there is inferred a distinction of persons was explained in q. XXVII¹⁸; and it was said that this does not follow immediately, but mediately through the order of origin.

XI. To Scotus's objection,¹⁹ it is said that the argument of the text is not founded upon that proposition, but upon this: that where there is only one act of understanding, and a saying adequate to it, there there is only one saying and one Word. That this is true is evident: for another saying would be superfluous. – And likewise, from the unity of the absolute form, the unity of the respective form, or of the action adequate to it, is most fittingly inferred. And to intimate this adequation, it is said in the text that God understands all things by one simple act, and therefore speaks them.

XII. The third argument²⁰ is taken from the common mode of proceeding, which is truly a mode, namely that they proceed naturally, as distinguished from freely. And it is founded on this, that nature is determined to one thing.

Some also object against this argument. Either you mean that a nature is determined to one in number: and this is false, even in limited natures. Or to one mode of producing: and this is false in an infinite nature. Therefore in neither way does the argument have any force.

XIII. To this it is briefly replied that he intends the third mode, namely, that nature is determined to one formally. For under this is subsumed, and rightly, that a nature communicable in several ways, being one and the same nature, is determined to one formally of each mode according to each mode: and consequently that this nature, according to this mode, is determined to this one. And thus is concluded the numerical unity of what is produced in one way. – This argument was introduced to show the difference between a natural agent and a voluntary agent in bestowing numerical unity upon an effect while acting with a single action. For from a voluntary agent several things can be produced at once, as Averroes says, comment. XLIV on XII Metaphysics: but from a natural agent, only one thing from one. – And from these things the answer to Scotus's objection, where above ²¹, which also seeks to undermine this argument on the ground that nature is not determined to one in number, is clear.

XIV. The fourth reason²² is drawn from the divine perfection. It rests on this, that every divine reality possesses whatever can be found within the breadth of that formal notion. From this it plainly follows that it does not admit of division of itself, and consequently not of plurality either.

But against this argument it is also objected that it is worthless: because from it there would follow that only one thing is produced in the divine. – And the consequence is proved: because what is produced is a divine reality, and thereby possesses whatever can be found within the breadth of the thing produced; and so it excludes its own multiplication. But if this does not hold here, then neither does it hold in your argument.

XV. To this it is briefly answered that that foundation is to be understood of the divine reality which is one by the mode of a most special species, and not of the divine reality which is one by the mode of a genus: for under a species only material difference remains, whereas under a genus many things lie hidden. And thus it directly serves the purpose at hand: since what is in question is numerical plurality, as has already been said ²³. – And the objections cease: for productum signifies not a specific but a generic notion, while Filius signifies a specific one; and therefore the argument holds concerning filiation, but not concerning production.

XVI. And note this argument: since it concludes universally that no specific predicate, whether absolute or relative, is multiplied in God. Hence it is clear that Scotus's instance is of no force, where above²⁴, against this argument, because the Son is perfect God, and yet does not have deity in every mode of having it; therefore filiation can be perfect, and yet had by one from another. For there is no similarity, as is evident: because the Son is perfect God, it follows: Therefore he has whatever is within the breadth of the divine being (esse), and consequently he is incapable of being multiplied according to the divine being (ens).